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Notes on transliteration and orthography 
 
The people central to this thesis are nomadic pastoralists by origin and their ethnic 
group has different names in different languages. They are widely spread over Sub-
Saharan Africa, from Senegal in the west to Sudan in the east (see Map 1). In French, 
Fulɓe are better known as ‘peul’ and in English, they are known as ‘Fulani’. In this 
thesis, I chose to stick to the name they use for themselves: Fulɓe. 
The written form of the language of the Fulɓe is not standardised. There is no 
standard Fulfulde dialect, accordingly there is no standard Fulfulde orthography. Many 
differences in dialects and writing exist between Fulɓe in Senegal, Mali, Cameroon and 
beyond. But also within Mali, the Fulfulde of Fulɓe living in Kayes or Nioro du Sahel 
differs significantly from that of Fulɓe living in Maacina or the Douentza region. Since 
there is still no recognized single Roman orthography, I use linguist Anneke 
Breedveld's orthography (1995), thus Jawaamɓe instead of Diawaamɓe and Riimayɓe 
instead of Riimaayɓe. Often used words, such as Riimayɓe, Maccuɓe and Weheeɓe are 
only in italics in the beginning where the reader gets to know these words first. After ten 
or more times being used, they are supposed to be ‘common sensical knowledge’.  
Both French and Arabic have influenced the Fulfulde language: bitiki is the word for 
shop and is derived from the French word boutique; assalaam aleikum is an Arabic-
based formula mainly used by men in greetings. Arabic words are spelled out in the 
Roman language (Hajj, fiqh etc.). For each foreign word, I have indicated whether it is 
French (FR), Fulfulde (FF) or Arabic (AR). The reader will find an overview and 
translation of FF and Arab words in the glossary in the appendix of this thesis. 
For personal names in Fulfulde I used the most basic spelling: Amadu instead of 
Ahmadou and Musa instead of Mousa. However, for names of official persons, which 
have become more or less iconic in their French spelling, I have stuck to the French OU 
instead of U: President Amadou Toumani Toure, dictator Moussa Traore and Ministers 
Oumar and Hamadoun Dicko. This principle extends to the spelling of place names: I 
used Segou / Douentza / Timbouctou / Maasina instead of Segu / Duwanza / Timbuktu / 
Maacina. The spelling of place names as used on my maps is as follows: 
Douentza, Timbouctou (not Timbuktu), Maasina (not Maacina), Hamdallaye, Bandi-
agara, Djibo (not Jibo), Koro, Kanyume (not Kanyoume, Kaniume), Joona (not Djona), 
Dalla (not Dallah), Booni, Mondoro (not Monndoro), Haayre, Hombori (not Hom-
mbori), Djenne (not Jenne), Segou, Mopti. For small hamlets around Dalla (Map 5, see 
Chapter 2), I adopted the Fulfulde spelling of U instead of the French OU, which makes 
Bussuma (not Boussouma), Bumbam (not Boumbam), Diankabu, Bumbani-Kani and so 
on. 
Names of ethnic groups are spelled according to Standard English (or French) 
orthography: Dogon, Songhay (not Sonrai), Tuareg (not Kel Tamasheq), Bambara, 
Bella (not Eklan). 
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I also added an * to names to conceal the identity of informants who I felt or who 
had said themselves had an interest in remaining anonymous (see section on method-
ology). In the description of exceptional marriage cases (Chapter 3) and manumission 
documents (chapter 5), I did not add an * for every name, but indicated with a footnote, 
that the informants described were anonymised. 
Pronunciation 
Consonants: 
C - is pronounced as in chapter 
G - is pronounced as in garden 
J - is pronounced as in jar 
K - is pronounced like the c in courageous 
Ñ - is pronounced like the gn in the French espagnol 
η - is pronounced like ng in song 




U - as in flute 






Setting the scene 
Central to this thesis are the various roads taken by slave descendants who used to 
belong to one specific noble family.1 By investigating the social careers of slave 
descendants I wish to make a contribution to an understanding of a slave past that over 
time has generated new cultural and social forms in ‘modernity’ as described by 
Geschiere et al. (2008: 4). The unique aspect of this study resides in its approach to 
social change in Sahelian hierarchies through the lens of mobility. The way in which the 
heritage of slavery through social hierarchy “directs” the various itineraries and roads 
travelled by slave descendants is in a nutshell what this thesis is all about. However, as 
in theatre play, the nutshell needs to be staged and to do so, I propose to tune in to an 
average encounter of an anthropologist in Mali.   
 
Tuning in 
November 2007. It is a typically dry and hot day in Bamako. When I get in the taxi I am 
welcomed by kora music and greetings from two female co-passengers smelling of 
incense. An animated conversation starts about why I am in Bamako. When I explain 
that I am doing research on slave descendants in Mali, the discussion stereotypically 
moves to the transatlantic slave trade. When insisting that this is not what my research 
is about, I can see questions in their eyes. Slave descendants in Mali? ‘Ah, so you are a 
historian researching a past long gone?’ remarks one of them. I try to explain that I am 
an anthropologist studying contemporary issues by talking with people about their 
present situation. Silence follows, so I add that the week before in Central Mali, I talked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  I will describe the choice for this network of mobile people later in the methodological considerations 
in this introduction and also in Chapter 2. 
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to someone who proudly showed me his ’manumission document’, a kind of contract 
written in Arabic to confirm his liberation from his master. The taxi driver reacts with 
disbelief and indignation: ‘People buying freedom in Mali? Never heard of it! That can 
only be the broussards.’2 I reply that I have talked to people in Bamako who also have 
such a contract or are eager to get one. The conversation stops abruptly and there is a 
certain unease in the air. Indigenous slavery is something that many Malians feel it is 
ridiculous to consider today as it belongs to the past. In other words, the country’s slave 
past is not allowed in the present for my fellow passengers.  
I have engaged in many similar conversations with passengers on buses, trucks and 
taxi buses and their reactions vary. One person insists on slavery being a thing of the 
past in Mali, the next denies the existence of indigenous slavery in the first place and 
the third may actually take pride in ’her slaves’ who are at disposition day and night. 
The history of indigenous slavery is thus clearly a paradoxical topic in Mali. This 
ambiguity is a recurring issue that is central to this thesis.  
Obviously, this ambiguity also travels with Malians who have moved abroad. Not 
only in Mali but also among Malians in Paris, the issue of slavery crops up now and 
then. Fanta for example is a woman from a royal family in Central Mali who had been 
living in Paris for almost twenty years when I first meet her for coffee at the Gare de 
l’Est. When describing a conflict she had with a French colleague, she reminded him of 
the fact that she was a royal princess, who had slaves at her disposition in Mali and she 
therefore expected him to display more respect towards her. When some days later he 
inquired whether what she had said was actually true, she proudly replied that it was. 
Thinking back on it, I know she is right, she can ask for almost everything to be done 
for her by people of slave descent belonging to her royal family back in Mali. 
From Bamako I take a bus to Douentza Province (Map 2), the area in Central Mali 
where I was conducting fieldwork among the former slaves of an elite royal family. On 
the road, I think both situations over. The random taxi conversation points out how the 
(indigenous) slave past is a ‘silenced’ (Trouillot 1995) reality in the Malian public 
sphere. The example of Fanta living in Paris points in an opposite direction, showing 
how pervasive the idiom of slavery is as a mindset that people apply in completely 
different cultural contexts. It is precisely this paradoxical contrast that makes the need 
for a profound analysis of legacies of slavery in the context of mobility even more 
salient. 
 See map 2 in appendix 
Map 2: Mali and Douentza as one of the administrative zones  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  French notion to point to those people living in ‘the bush’, i.e. in rural areas that are difficult to reach.  
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Questions and eyebrows raised 
The migrant and the slave share two common aspects: They both 
transcend locality. Both are at the same time insider and outsider to 
their host community. Paradoxically they are both in- and 
excluded, integrated but at the same time alienated.  
(Argenti & Röschenthaler 2006: 38-39) 
The majority of younger slave descendants had moved out of the village where I was 
living in 2001-2002. These youngsters left to spend shorter or longer periods of time in 
cities like Mopti, Bamako and Segou in Mali, Abidjan and Bouake in Ivory Coast, 
Kumasi in Ghana, Dakar in Senegal, Malabo in Equatorial Guinea and so on. Do they 
have more reasons to move out compared to non-slave-descending (freeborn) families? 
Freeborn families in the village under study clearly migrated less. Migrants were 
omnipresent in their absence: My neighbour in her fifties was taking care of her son’s 
young children while he was working in the capital city of Bamako, and the peanut 
seller at the market had just bought new flip-flops with the money her husband had sent 
her.  
One of my key informants was Maman Abidjan, a slave descendant from a village in 
Central Mali (Map 2). Her name was the result of having spent most of her life in 
Abidjan. When her husband died, her family moved her back to her home village where, 
paralyzed and with diabetes, she had to use a stick to keep the children away from her 
collection of letters, pictures and souvenirs from both Mecca & Abidjan. In Abidjan she 
had been treated with respect, while in her home village even little children ridiculed 
her.  
Maman’s story made me wonder about the extent to which migrants are able to 
change their identity in their new place of residence. Although she was of slave descent 
in Dalla, she was known as a casted praise singer in Abidjan. How would she have 
presented herself in Paris? Maman appeared to have moved out of her slave status 
outside her village but once she returned home, this status was reascribed to her. She 
tried to uphold her new respectability, but was forced to take her place among slave 
descendants on ritual occasions and had not been able to uphold her social promotion 
once she returned home. These kinds of moral and social obstacles to belonging and 
social promotion are central to this thesis.  
What is original in this study is that it addresses social change related to the slave 
past in Fulɓe society through the lens of mobility. As the quote that opens this section 
indicates, the migrant and the slave share the same predicament, that of being an out-
sider in the places they moved to. This book shows how, for many slave descendants, 
being a migrant and slave descendant is a double predicament: It is a double articulation 
of non-belonging and of strangerhood. The central question is therefore in what ways 
movement allows slave descendants to reconfigure (Rossi 2009a) their status and 
relations with their former masters? To what extent does movement in space give 
people room for manoeuvre to adapt to new ideas and social settings? Does mobility 




Before explaining the three notions central to this thesis, I point out what kind of 
slavery I will be discussing here. Rossi (2009a: 5) outlined four ways in which slavery 
in West Africa manifests itself: (i) the resilience of historical forms of enslavement 
(slavery); (ii) stigmatization on the grounds of inherited or putative slave status (cate-
gorical slavery); (iii) forms of exploitation akin to slavery (metaphorical slavery); and 
(iv) exogenous discourses opening up new fields of thought and action around the 
notion of slavery (extraverted slavery). In this model, only the first category can be 
considered as a type of ‘slavery’, as all the others are different phenomena variously 
related to slavery but they cannot be considered as slavery itself. The forms of slavery I 
refer to mostly in this thesis are categorical and metaphorical slavery.  
The Fulɓe communities I studied changed from being slave economies to a hierar-
chically organized society. Fulɓe are spread across vast areas of West and East Africa 
(Map 1) and since the seventeenth century have created several empires.3 Though each 
emerged under different conditions, they share a similar social hierarchical organization 
throughout the Sahel. The Sahel is a so-called frontier zone (Kopytoff 1987) in which 
kingdoms or empires existed alongside each other. The ‘uncontrolled’ zones between 
these areas served as slave reservoirs (Goody 1980: 25). Mobile Fulɓe warlords ruled 
over vast territories and were interested in accumulating wealth in people and labourers 
to cultivate the extensive areas of land they acquired (Klein 1993a: 4). Most of their 
slaves were either captives of war, traded slaves from other ethnic groups or pagans 
who did not want to embrace Islam (Clark 1999: 93).	  Slavery was thus an important 
institution that reinforced the war economy and the economic development of these pre-
colonial Sahelian kingdoms (Meillassoux 1975: 15-16).	  	  
Slaves were exploited in various ways and were specialized in forms of physical 
labour. The traders in slaves and cattle formed a separate social group (FF:4 Jaawamɓe) 
and the exploitation of slaves by the elites was the basic characteristic of this economy 
and society. The monopoly of violence rested with the political elites who raided vast 
areas as warlords. Islam was a justification for their enslavement of others.  
This social stratification of society was based on a legal system in which inter-
dependence and the exchange of protection, products, trade and religious services were 
regulated. Slaves and the freeborn had different rights: Freeborn Fulɓe controlled their 
slaves’ movement, activities and labour, while slaves were excluded from the rights 
reserved for the freeborn. Under Islamic legislation, freeborn were granted exclusive 
rights to kinship, which were denied to slaves. And on the basis of these legal differ-
ences in rights, freeborn set the terms for slave behaviour. Slaves were a necessary 
contrast that ‘proved’ the nobility of others.  
Slavery in Fulɓe society consisted of multiple relations on a broad spectrum, differ-
ing in terms of (social) distance to their masters and of juridical statutes. Slave groups 
were diverse both among themselves and individually. Depending on the position of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  The first empires were in Futa Djallon (present-day Guinea) and Futa Toro (present-day Senegal) in 
the western Sahel. Later the Sokoto Empire in northern parts of today’s Nigeria inspired the rise of 
neighbouring empires in Adamaoua, today’s Cameroon and Chad. See also Map 1 next to notes on 
language. 
4  The abbreviation FF will be used in the rest of this text to refer to words in the Fulfulde language. 
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their masters, slaves became weavers, peasants, beggars, butchers, traders, soldiers, 
musicians, squatters, day labourers, concubines or persons of trust, which explains why 
there was a lot of variety among slaves, some of which had little in common with each 
other. Upon enslavement, slaves had different cultural backgrounds: They came from 
different regions with different linguistic background and religion. Also their family 
relations and professions were varied.5  
Slavery gained shape in different kinds of relations. In practice, it consisted of very 
different relations within one single legal institutional framework, which made it almost 
impossible for French colonial officers to abolish slavery in all its forms. The first steps 
in the fight against the trade in slaves in the French colonies were taken in 1889 but it 
was only in 1905 that slavery as a legal system was declared illegal (Klein 1998; Klein 
& Miers 1999; Kopytoff & Miers 1977).6 It was difficult to abolish slavery as 30% to 
50% of the economy was based on it (Meillassoux 1975) and it was deeply engrained in 
socio-cultural practices. Its legal abolition did not result in the disappearance of slavery 
as an important idiom for expressing and reproducing inequalities. Although raids and 
the trade in slaves were abolished by the French colonial administration at the beginning 
of the twentieth century in Mali, inequality continues to be expressed in a vocabulary of 
slavery. This stigmatization on the grounds of inherited or putative slave status is what 
has been called ‘categorical slavery’ (Rossi 2009a: 5).  
In the first part of this introduction, I explain how the central line of argument in this 
thesis is guided by three emic concepts used by Fulɓe themselves: The Rope (FF: 
ɓoggol), the Head (FF: Hoore) and the Road (FF: Laawol). In the second part, I link 
these emic concepts to theories of mobility, legacies of slavery and styles. In so doing, I 
contextualize this study in a broader framework and describe the various (anthropo-
logical) debates on slavery, mobility and memory.  
Emic notions guiding the research problematic 
The Rope: Past slaveries connected to present cultural fields of hierarchy 
The changes in Fulɓe society moving from a slave economy to a hierarchically or-
ganized society will be explained in this section. I describe informants’ use of the 
(metaphor of the) Rope, which they use to discuss present relations to the slave past. 
The rope is what connects the past to the present and the present to the past. It is a 
connecting link, a tie that binds.  
The first time I remember an informant using the notion of the Rope is when he 
described how his slave ancestors were sold at the market ‘with a Rope tied around their 
neck’. This informant thus refers to master-slave relations in the past: A master tied his 
slaves to keep them with him. In fact, references to the Rope contrast strongly with the 
more generic association between slavery and chains. The transatlantic slave trade is 
often symbolized by chains binding slaves together, the internal (indigenous) African 
slave trade has sometimes been portrayed as being more benign, which corresponds to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  See Chapter 2 for more details on this network.  
6  The first official treaty dates from 1889 (the Treaty of Brussels) but its rigorous implementation in the 
colonies only dates from 1905 in West Sudan (contemporary Mali).  
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the image of the more benign Rope vis-à-vis the harsher chains of the transatlantic 
trade.  
A more symbolic use of the notion of the rope was voiced by the mayor of a village 
in Central Mali who indicates how between his royal family and the family of their 
former slave descendants: ‘The Rope is always there.’7 In his use of the metaphor, the 
Rope points to a connection, a line between the past and the present. The present in this 
view is directly ‘tied’ to the past and vice versa. This metaphorical use of the Rope in a 
historical sense points to a social relation that is at present no longer strictly definable as 
slavery. The mayor implies here that the legacy of slavery is present in various ways. 
The third relation is illustrated in the way in which people of slave descent are called 
‘children of the Rope’ and therefore lack certain assets. One frequently hears people 
saying: ‘I refuse to discuss with a child of the Rope’.8 Such a remark reinforces the 
moral boundaries whereby the speaker implies that s/he is of higher status then the slave 
descendant and considers it a waste of time to spend energy on people of slave descent, 
whom he considers unworthy persons. This arrogant use of the ‘Rope’ demarcates the 
social and moral boundaries between the freeborn and persons of slave descent.  
In conclusion, there are three main relationships that are implicitly embedded in the 
(metaphorical) use of the concept of ‘the Rope’ by informants. They are: Master-slave / 
past-present and status-stigma. Below I address the Rope in each of these relations in 
more detail and illustrate in greater detail how the Rope connects a past ideology of 
slavery to what I call a ‘cultural field’ (Comaroff & Comaroff 1991) of hierarchy. 
 
The Rope as a cultural field of hierarchy 
So far the notion of the Rope has explained how hierarchical relations from the past are 
reflected in the way honour is today distributed among various groups in Fulɓe society. 
To explain how hierarchies can be understood in the society under study here, I now 
turn to some theoretical concepts. To understand present inequalities between different 
social status groups among Fulɓe, I propose using the notion of the ‘cultural field of 
hierarchy’. Comaroff & Comaroff (1991: 27-28) introduced this term instead of ‘cul-
ture’ because it is less all encompassing. The notion of field makes it easier to open it 
up to interact with other cultural fields such as capitalism, colonialism and Islam. 
Several fields coexist in one semantic dimension, which is often referred to as ‘culture’.  
Existing hierarchies in Fulɓe society today are not unilinearly traceable as legacies, 
residues or remnants of slavery. Physical violence by an older person vis-à-vis a 
younger one can be due to a range of statuses that are in no way related to master-slave 
relations. Beatings can take place in the context of the legal authority of the father over 
his son or the authority of an Islamic teacher over his student. Legacies of slavery in 
contemporary Fulɓe society are thus part of a broader cultural field of hierarchy. Within 
this cultural field, not all practices of inequality necessarily echo accepted practices 
from when slavery was still a legal institution before its abolition.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  In French this informant literally says: “Il y a toujours la corde”. See also de Bruijn & Pelckmans 
(2005). 
8  In Fulfulde: ‘Mi haɓɓataa e ɓi ɓoggol’ (ɓi = child /ɓoggol = rope) 
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Since this study is about changes in relations of power, a framework to address the 
notion of power is needed. Comaroff & Comaroff (1991: 22) draw a triangular relation 
between cultural field and the two sides of power: Hegemony and ideology. Power has a 
Janus face: An active, agentive and questionable aspect (ideology) versus a naturalized, 
passive and uncontested aspect (hegemony). While ideology is the active, questionable 
part of culture, hegemony in contrast is the part of culture where power lies ‘in what it 
silences, what it prevents people from thinking and saying, what it puts beyond the 
limits of the rational and the credible’ (Ibid.: 23). In other words, while hegemony 
silences, ideology can be articulated in the public sphere (Ibid.: 24). There is an inter-
relationship and difference between the world as represented (ideology) and the world 
as experienced (hegemony). In other words, hegemony relates to ideology like ‘form to 
content’ (Ibid.: 29) or a recipe to taste. 
For now let us zoom in more closely on hegemony in relation to the concept of 
‘habitus’, which Bourdieu (1991: 56) defined as follows:  
Embodied history – internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history – is the active presence 
of the whole past of which it is the product. As such, it is what gives practices their relative autonomy 
with respect to external determinations of the immediate present ... It ensures the permanence in 
change that makes the individual agent a world within the world.  
Habitus is explicitly not about unchangeable practices but about how structure and 
agency mutually reinforce each other. Put differently, hegemony can be seen as the 
process of power in habitus formation. The question is how the incorporation of habitus 
and hegemony is organized. Comaroff & Comaroff (1991) and Foucault (1979) 
described how government attempts at disciplining the social transformation of people’s 
habits necessarily ask for ‘bodily reform’. Their theories start from the way macro-level 
processes impact on micro-level practices and actors. The advantage of the habitus 
approach is that it also allows for an inverse direction: From micro to macro. It allows 
for a bottom-up analysis of the ways in which slave status has been internalized. Habi-
tus explains both the mental (Baldus 1977) and bodily (Shaw 2002; Hardung 2002) 
internalization of the cultural field of hierarchy by slave descendants themselves. Miers 
(2003: 659) called such features the ‘immaterial weapons of submission’ of slave 
descendants by freeborn elites.9 To summarize, habitus is hegemony in that it consists 
of practices that are internalized but have not yet been consciously experienced as 
power. Habitus and hegemony can be experienced negatively (constraint), positively 
(values) or more neutrally as conventions (Comaroff & Comaroff 1991: 22).  
In Fulɓe society, habitus is for a large part defined by a mixture of customary and 
Islamic notions of honour (FF: Ndimu). There is unequal access to honour for different 
groups, which, in Islamic societies, is mainly defined by ancestry and lineage descent.10 
Those who identify with freeborn ancestry (FF: Riimɓe) in Central Malian Fulɓe society 
are the ruling Weeheeɓe, the religious Moodibaaɓe and the pastoralist Jalluɓe, with each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  It is impossible to isolate certain acts of exclusion from cross-cutting realms that define people’s 
positions in social relations such as gender, religious status, age, generation and economic status. 
10  Iliffe (2005: 1) in his comparative study on honour in Sub-Saharan Africa describes honour as the 
‘chief ideological motivation of African behaviour’. As I demonstrate in the second part of this 
introduction, similar notions of honour are shared by several groups in the Sahel. See Villesante-De 
Beauvais (2000) for a comparison of honour among different ethnic groups in Mauritania.  
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having their own realm of honour. Ideally, ruling Weeheeɓe derive honour from their 
political power (FF: laamu), pastoralist Jalluɓe achieve it through their cattle (FF: 
Jawdi) and the Moodibaaɓe gain it from knowledge in the Muslim community (FF: 
Alsilaamaaku). Currently the lineages of trading Jaawamɓe and arts- and crafts-pro-
ducing Ŋeeyɓe are also considered part of the community of freeborn (FF: Riimɓe). 
More generally, honour in Fulɓe society can be obtained by specializing in noble 
behaviour (FF: Ndimaaku) and/or piety (FF: Juulde). Slaves were and some of their 
descendants continute to be excluded from these realms.11  
Slaves have limited access to what is defined as ‘honourable’ in Fulɓe society.12 
Through their capture, they were disconnected from their ancestry in their society of 
origin. Their lineage starts from their arrival in the new host society and thus necessarily 
lacks seniority. Slave lineages continue to be stigmatized because the absence of a 
lengthy genealogy implies lesser moral qualities, and thus stigma for slave descendants. 
Non-freeborn members of society can be legally marginalized according to Islamic legal 
prescriptions. Mainstream interpretations of Malikite Islamic legislation, which is 
dominant in the study area, have it that slave status in this body of legislation is 
perpetual. One is either of freeborn status or of slave status (i.e. a slave or a descendant 
of a slave). In customary interpretations of the Islamic body of legislation, those with 
freeborn status have more rights than those of non-freeborn status (Brunschwig 1960: 
30). Belonging to a freeborn lineage ideally gives one access to honour, belonging to a 
slave lineage does not. This main difference is underlined by practices of stigmatization 
(Goffman 1963). The stigma attached to slave descent makes honour less accessible for 
descendants of slaves. Once acquired, the stigma of slave descent was often transferred 
over the generations (Klein 1993a: 26). In socio-cultural practice, slave descendants 
continue to be excluded because of their slave descent & status. 
Slaves and their descendants are stigmatized through insults, the use of discrimi-
natory phrases and stereotypes that constantly remind them that slave ancestry equals 
lesser moral worth. I mentioned earlier the example of a freeborn person saying that he 
refused to discuss with a child of the Rope, implying it is not worthwhile having serious 
consideration for someone of slave descent. Such derogatory expressions reinforce the 
differences in status between freeborn persons and slave descendants. 
The relative absence of contestation of their lesser status by slave descendants today 
is connected to the fact that slavery was a heterogeneous institution.13 Those slaves who 
developed social ties and acquired rights and sometimes even an honourable position in 
their host societies, such as royal court slaves were not interested in actively contesting 
their low status as, in practice, their status was fairly high.14 The elite have no reason to 
contest ascribed status and hierarchy in relations and actively seek to reproduce them. 
Habitus, socialization, embodiment and the internalization of hierarchical relations in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  For a discussion of the Fulfulde notions of ndimaaku and Ndimu, see Breedveld & de Bruijn (1996). 
12  The same goes for neighbouring societies in Central Mali (see Breedveld & de Bruijn 1996) and for 
the Sahel region more generally, see Klein (2009). 
13  Georg-Deutsch (2003: 176) puts forward a similar argument on East Africa: ‘The absence of evidence 
regarding slave revolts or slave resistance in colonial archives arguably reflects the social hetero-
geneity of servility in East Africa’. 
14  Their so-called condition is higher than their actual status (Meillassoux 1991). 
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the ideology and identity of the people involved explains why there is so much con-
formism and these distinctive patterns tend to be reproduced in Fulɓe history.  
However, conformism to an existing cultural field of hierarchy can be superfluous 
and is not always an outcome of hegemony. Instead, as Comaroff & Comaroff (1991: 
27) remark:  
Even when there is no well-formed opposing ideology, no clearly articulated collective consciousness 
among subordinate populations, (such) struggles may still occur. But they are liable to be heard in the 
genre of negation-refusal, reversals, the smashing of idols and icons - and not in the narrative voice of 
political argument. 
It is important to note the subtleties of contestation rather than declaring its lack of 
existence. Furthermore, the section on the Road will demonstrate that the existing 
cultural field of hierarchy tends to become an object of active contestation by those who 
have moved out of their home societies. So far this section has demonstrated a double 
meaning for the Rope: once used as a practical tool for preventing slaves from running 
away, it has become a metaphor for expressing bondage, stigma and dependency in the 
cultural field of hierarchy. Slaves were related to their new hosts through Ropes, while 
freeborn created relatedness through lineages.15 The mayor of a small Central Malian 
village, himself a descendant of slaves, became freeborn member of the royal family 
thanks to the marriage of his mother with the king.16 Being a royal family member 
today, he describes his relationship with his family members who were descended from 
slaves as follows: ‘the Rope is always there’. He thus considers his own kinmembers as 
slaves which are tied to him in dependency relations, symbolised by the Rope. The 
Rope became a stigmatizing symbol for slaves’ lack of relations and freedom of move-
ment in freeborn Fulɓe society. In this thesis, I analyze the extent to which such a lack 
of relating and of free movement defined the trajectories of slave descendants.  
Today, the cultural field of hierarchy offers a common ground of belonging and 
identification for both freeborn persons and slave descendants. Nobility consists of free-
born genealogy and descent, specific rules of behaviour, non-physical labour, wealth, 
religious ideology and historical claims (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 202-207). Slave 
status was generally marked by a lack of all these parameters. Some are restrained by an 
internalized feeling of inferiority (Baldus 1969) embedded in their habitus. One of my 
informants used the term ‘mental slavery’ (French: Esclavage mentale) to point to the 
reluctance of rich slave-descending politicians who, despite their position in national 
politics, do not dare to oppose a freeborn colleague because of the fear of sanctions and 
insults. 
Depending on the specific time, place and socio-political dynamics, stigmatized 
status was forced on newcomers, while others managed to opt out or only temporarily 
reengaged in it to benefit from relations of dependency. In the modernization view, 
master-slave relations moved to client-patron relations to end in monetized contract 
relations. I go against this perspective, starting from the premise that slavery never 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  See Chapter 3 for a description of how relatedness and kinship are organized differently among des-
cendants of slaves as opposed to freeborn. 
16  See Chapter 3 for this special form of concubine marriage, which frees the children of a slave con-
cubine from slave status.  
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consisted of a uniform relation. Since the starting point is already so diverse, the 
expected evolution from slavery through clientelism to contract relations that monetized 
over time is necessarily hybrid as well. It is senseless to analyze changing hierarchical 
relations according to such modern ideas that are often upheld by informants them-
selves. Instead, relevant questions regarding legacies of a hierarchical past in the present 
are questions that do justice to the wide variety of responses to the stigmatized status by 
both people of slave descent and their freeborn former masters.  
 
The head: Knowing one’s head and styling one’s social status  
A second metaphor that points to people who do not behave according to their social 
status is the Fulfulde proverb ‘to know your Head’ (FF: Anndude hoore ma). This is the 
reflexive form of the verb to ‘know’. To know your Head is a very literal translation of 
‘knowing oneself’. In this section I connect the idea of knowing oneself to the notion of 
style developed by Ferguson (1999: 93).  
Hierarchy is embodied in appearances, behaviour and in stereotypical discourses 
people have about one another. The expression of ‘knowing one’s Head’ is either used 
by slave descendants themselves or by others to remind them that everyone is supposed 
to stick to his inherited, ascribed style in the cultural field of hierarchy. Behavioural, 
performative expressions of nobility are subtle and at first sight invisible or difficult to 
grasp for an outsider. One’s nobility can, for example, be derived from the way some-
one talks: The level of one’s voice, the carefully chosen words and the kind of in-
formation that is (not) conveyed. It is in small details and gestures that hierarchical 
(status) differences are played out.17 Informants generally describe how they can easily 
read the status of others from subtle signs in their (embodied) behaviour. Some say they 
can tell what status group someone belongs to from that person’s language and external 
appearances (dress, hairstyle, behaviour).  
Such moral evaluations of appropriate behaviour and dressing according to one’s 
social standing are widely shared among different ethnic groups in Mali. Within ethnic 
groups, marked differences and social boundaries do not only exist between freeborn 
versus slave-descending status groups but are also often applied to intermediate status 
groups. Musicians, for example, are not supposed to be of aristocratic descent. The 
world famous Malian singer Salif Keita is a member of a royal family and was severely 
stigmatized by his peers and family when he started to sing (Ndour 2008: 29). Poli-
ticians of caste status have likewise been ridiculed, for example Mali’s President 
Amadou Toumani Toure (Le Sphinx 2006: 4), Senegalese ministers (Mbow 2000) and 
Cameroon’s President Ahidjo (Saibou 2005: 865).  
Besides ‘knowing one’s Head’, a similar expression which my Bamako based 
informants only used in French, is ‘staying in one’s skin’. Demba Dicko used it when 
referring to the fact that some people no longer respect their status group and display 
behaviour associated with styles of other social groups. He mentioned how people ‘have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  Zempleni (1996) demonstrates how it took him years to find out that his host family had a slave 
background because he had been unable to read the ‘secretions’ (signs that hint to a secret) that 
informed insiders of the family’s slave status. Kopytoff & Miers (1977: 51) describe how there are 
conscious ways of camouflaging explicit hierarchical differences in many societies in Africa.  
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to stay in their skin’ (French: les gens doivent se reserver dans leur peau). Moussa 
Tambura mentioned when discussing the case of a co-villager of slave descent that as 
soon as he is with his former masters, he takes on the skin of a captured person again 
(French: Il se met dans la peau d’ un captif). The reference to skin reflects a racial 
aspect of differentiation between freeborn persons and people of slave descent.18 If a 
person knows himself, then s/he will behave unmistakably in the style that corresponds 
to his/her status. People perform in expected styles for fear of social sanctions. 
To know your Head is thus to respect the cultural field of hierarchy and the stylistic 
behaviour that corresponds to one’s status within this field (as both ideology and 
hegemony). Informants indicate how it is important to know oneself, literally to know 
one’s position and the correct style of (embodied) behaviour that goes with it. The 
notion of style seems to be an apt analytical notion for grasping and integrating these 
internalized ways of talking, thinking and moving to explain differences in status. By 
emphasizing the dynamics of slave status, the notion of style helps to deconstruct the 
noble-slave opposition, which was so often recalled by both informants and researchers 
past and present.  
 
The head as ‘style’ in the cultural field of hierarchy  
Ferguson (1999: 93) uses the notion of style as an analytical tool to overcome mutually 
exclusive cultural dualisms.19 The advantage of the notion of style over habitus is that it 
draws more attention to performative aspects such as dress, speech, attitudes, taste and 
stereotypes. In short, alongside attention for discourse and practice, this notion imme-
diately highlights intimate aspects where the self communicates embodied through 
experiences with the world.  
Style stands for how ’the doer is constituted in the deed’ (Butler quoted in Ferguson 1999: 96). Like 
riding a bicycle, cultural style is a kind of skilled social action you do with your body, often with little 
conscious elaboration or awareness ... Style ... is not achieved simply by having certain ideas or 
adhering to certain norms, it is a matter of embodied practices, successfully performed. (Ibid.: 98). 
Style requires not only a situational motive but also internalized capacity and skill. 
Cultural style is a performative competence involving not only abstract know-how but 
also a certain ease which, as Bourdieu has shown, is related not only to knowledge but 
to ‘the mode of acquisition of that knowledge over time’ (Ibid.: 96).  
Although style is about the construction of meaning, it can only be understood as 
part of a hard structure, the so-called ‘situations of duress’ (Ferguson 1999: 101).20 If a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  Racialized as opposed to racist, which is the biological aspect of physical appearance. See also 
Schmitz (2006) and Hall (2005). 
19  He addresses cultural dualisms in sociological and anthropological studies on urban and rural orien-
tations of migrant workers in the Zambian Copperbelt. Ferguson labels the livelihoods of these 
migrants by analysing whether they adopted rather a cosmopolitan versus a localist style. 
20  An important advantage of the notion of style is that it overcomes the mechanical effects of structure 
implicit in feminist and symbolic interactionist ideas about roles. I refer to the discussion Ferguson 
makes on the notion of style. He criticizes feminist notions of role for making it into a secondary 
manifestation of a given identity or the prior orientation of a distinctive atemporal type of actor 
(Ferguson 1999: 94). He also criticizes symbolic interactionists’ interpretations of roles for their 
overemphasis on performance and process only, thereby losing sight of broader political economic 
and historical structures (Ibid.: 99). 
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Malian woman wants to wear a ‘real wax hollandais’,21 the situation of duress is that 
she will need the capital (money and/or social relations) to acquire such expensive 
material. So apart from being discursive and bodily enacted, style is practised within 
given structural constraints. Style highlights symbolic aspects of human interaction as 
being embedded both in micro-cultural ideology and macro socio-economic praxis.  
Secondly, cultivating a style requires investment in social, cultural, symbolic and 
economic capitals. The style notion keeps intersections with other vital elements con-
stituting selves, such as class, gender, age and profession, in the picture. Style is thus an 
incorporated way of acting and being acted upon. This process has also been called 
‘navigation’ (Vigh 2009), as interaction with a world that is in movement. Style is not 
something one can readily adapt as it demands time, investment and interaction with 
others who ‘master’ a certain style and set the example. I use the style notion for the 
interplay between ideology and hegemony in individual behaviour. It allows me to 
analyze subtleties in the changing ways in which slaves descendants position them-
selves in the cultural field of hierarchy. Like habitus, it draws attention to how different 
social groups within Fulɓe society patrol, reproduce and reconfigure the social boun-
daries of their status groups as contingent on time and place.  
The style notion accounts for ideological and hegemonic aspects in the cultural field 
of hierarchy. My analysis uses the notion of style to frame possible orientations of 
people from various backgrounds towards different forms of social honour. The concept 
of style allows the bringing of both hegemony and ideology into one framework. The 
hegemonic corresponds to the implicit, unsaid, silenced and often intimate aspects of 
style by which people give meaning to social honour in the set cultural field of hier-
archy. The ideological corresponds to explicit rules and expectations of honourable 
behaviour in the cultural field of hierarchy.  
The road: Trajectories in and out of the cultural field of hierarchy 
A last concept that is central to my analysis of the various itineraries of royal slave 
descendants is the concept of the Road. The expression ‘having a Road’ (FF: Heɓude 
laawol) links mobility to changing opportunities. It points to the liberty to move and the 
option for social promotion. When someone does not manage or is not permitted to do 
something, Fulɓe say ‘he has no Road’ (FF: omo hebbaai e laawol). To have a Road is 
about the importance of having access, being given or actively seizing opportunities and 
experiencing possibility and agency. Put simply, besides spatial movement over 
physical Roads, ‘having a Road’ underscores the symbolic Road of social mobility and 
advancement in life.  
The saying indicates how such advancement corresponds to mobility to other places. 
The Road is a literal and symbolic way out of existing constraint. But does the mobility 
of people of slave descent generate a certain social distance from existing hierarchies 
and inequalities? Does mobility transform people’s ideas of opportunities in life or does 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  Wax Hollandais is one of the most expensive wax cloths and is renowned for its strength and colour 




their identity travel with them? What connections and disconnections has mobility 
brought about and in what ways?  
In the Fulfulde expression ‘it is the master that binds the feet of his slave’, the Road 
and the Rope become linked. An informant used this expression to indicate that there is 
an irreversible power relation between the master and the slave. In this literal sense, the 
binding refers back to the Rope, while the feet stand for the Road. The expression 
points to the controlled and often forced (im)mobility of slaves. Reference to the Rope 
thus indicates how the mobility of slaves was curtailed by their masters who ‘tied’ 
them. Masters controlled or mastered the mobility of their clients and impeded them 
from ‘having roads.’ However this form of power (mastering mobility) has been 
reconfigured over the past century. There are three ways in which slave descendants 
tried to obtain social promotion: one was by specializing in noble behaviour (FF: 
Ndimaaku); the second by specializing in religious piety (FF: Juulde); and the third was 
by moving out of slave status, sometimes even actively contesting it. This thesis mainly 
focuses on the third, spatial strategy of social promotion. The originality of this study 
lies precisely in taking mobility as the central point of departure to analyze strategies of 
social promotion as related to (control over) mobility.22  
 
The road as a trajectory of social promotion 
There are two important remarks to be made about the use of teleological concepts like 
social mobility and social promotion. I decided not to use the notion of social mobility23 
as it can easily be confused with the notion of spatial mobility. I therefore use the 
concept of social promotion when pointing to those individuals who have managed to 
move up the social ladder. However having said this, I should emphasize the temporary 
nature of such a move, whether up or down. The roads travelled by slave descendants 
and freeborn are necessarily bifurcating and winding and are taken to go or to return. 
Thus social promotion is not a unilinear trajectory from A to B, which is often impli-
citly associated with notions such as emancipation and promotion. 
Secondly, in addition to temporal variety in the roads available, there are structural 
limits to social promotion in terms of professional specialization. The range of existing 
slave conditions do not correspond to the spectre of options available to each slave. 
Slave positions in the past could range from positions such as agricultural assistants to 
top-level state officials. 
This need not mean that the state official began at the bottom and worked his way up, or that persons 
acquired by farmers have the slightest chance of becoming state ministers, as has sometimes been 
interpreted. All it may mean is that the acquired strangers were from the beginning marginal to quite 
different institutions- the peasant household in one case and the palace in the other. (Kopytoff & 
Miers 1977: 20) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  Few other studies have taken mobility or migrants as their point of departure to analyze social change 
in what I called cultural fields of hierarchy in the Sahel. The exceptions are Leservoisier (2005) and 
and Ruf (2000) on Mauritania, Sy (2001) and Giuffrida (2005) on Mali, Boyer (2005) on Niger 
23  Kopytoff & Miers (1977) describe how the changes in ‘degrees of social mobility’ of slaves and their 
descendants occur in three main dimensions: Formal (slave) status, informal affect, worldly achieve-
ment and success. 
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In short, since slaves’ possibilities for social promotion used to be intrinsically tied to 
the position of their master, the trajectories of emancipation of their descendants are 
also specific to their masters’ position. This is why the methodological approach of 
studying one single group of slave descendants, namely those who used to work at the 
royal court, was selected. (See methodological section below.) 
To summarize, the notion of the Road refers to strategies by which slave descendants 
contest the hegemonic aspects and sometimes even the ideology of the cultural field of 
hierarchy as a result of their mobility. Some migrants have benefitted from encounters 
with alternative social realities, often while studying abroad in countries like Libya, 
Russia and Morocco. A small number of them started a social movement (see Ould 
Ahmed Salem 2009 for Mauritania) that contests the stigma of slave status. In so doing, 
these leaders have turned hegemony into ideology, in other words they have turned a 
passive and invisible form of power into an active and discernible one. However, not all 
migrants have done so: Most migrants who left and lived elsewhere have no interest in 
contesting existing relations. They simply make their living as much on distance as 
possible from possibly constraining hierarchies back home. In fact, they no longer hold 
onto the Rope and the ties of their past. Still others instrumentalize existing relations by 
actively referring to their slave past and engaging with the Rope to make claims to the 
ties that bind them to patronizing freeborn elites.  
Various strategies to obtain social promotion thanks to or despite spatial mobility 
exist. It is important to realize that the Road can be travelled in different ways and both 
as a move towards as well as a move away from. The Road can be travelled in two 
directions: Towards social promotion or rather towards social degradation: People can 
move in or out of their slave status while on the road. It is a two-way process. 
Methodological considerations 
As mobility is central to my analysis, I opted for multi-sited fieldwork (2001-2007) and 
ethnography (Marcus 1995; Hannerz 1998) in three main locations: Rural Central Mali 
(Douentza), urban Mali (mainly Bamako) and urban France (Paris). Although the 
Haayre region is often labelled ‘rural’, much of what I describe points to extremely 
mobile lives in these rural areas and from these rural areas to other places. In Bamako, 
doing urban fieldwork meant that I had to follow a dispersed minority in a wide, 
cosmopolitan area. I moved between various people’s compounds, shops, associational 
meetings and ritual events. My fieldwork was thus in itself itinerant, especially in Paris 
(2005) where the dispersed homes of African migrants (French: Foyers) in suburbs 
(French: Banlieues) necessarily meant that my immersion in the Fulɓe networks there 
was fragmented.  
Although I conducted 6 months of research in Paris, the data and interviews from 
this fieldwork are not included in this thesis for various reasons. First of all, it turned 
out that there was no Central Malian Fulɓe community in Paris. Migration from this 
area to France is ad hoc and small scale and the few migrants who are in Paris do not 
interact with each other to any great extent. This was therefore not a suitable field to 
analyze the transformations of social relations. I decided that an inter-ethnic comparison 
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with Soninke communities in France (Sy 2000; Timera 1996, 2001; Daum 1998; 
Quiminal 1991; Quiminal & Timera 2002) would weaken the close ties of trust and 
depth needed to unravel contemporary ideologies of hierarchy, also in terms of language 
competence and the time available for fieldwork. In the end, I decided to leave out the 
material I had assembled on Paris.24  
Dilemmas were constantly arising, not only for my informants but also for me in my 
position as a researcher. I became a kind of hybrid member in the network of people 
described: Sometimes engaging more with freeborn, sometimes more with slave des-
cendants. In many ways I was lucky to have the resources to secure my independence 
both logistically (by buying a motorcycle and living in a private rented room near my 
host in Bamako) and socially (dividing my time as much as possible between the two 
social status groups). In the village of Dalla I was more successful in engaging with 
slave descendants, while in Bamako I spent more time with the freeborn part of the 
network central to this thesis. The saying ‘whose bread one eats, whose word one 
speaks’ thus means that I speak in two tongues or languages in this thesis. The reason 
why I am emphasizing my own dilemma of loyalty is because I am convinced that these 
same dilemmas were faced by the people I describe, but in more existential ways.  
Time and the different periods when I was able to interact with people impacted on 
the data I was able to collect. My fieldwork lasted eighteen months in total but had been 
preceded by six months of research in the Douentza area (2001-2002) while working on 
my Masters thesis. Other fieldwork periods were spent in Paris (November 2005 - May 
2006). While based in Bamako, I conducted trips to several regions in Mali between 
November 2005 and April 2006 and from November 2006 to June 2007. What I was 
able to learn also depended on factors such as my personal characteristics, gender and 
race as a white person (FF: Tuubaaku).  
The choice to stick to one specific Fulɓe family also means that this study has an 
ethnic dimension. It has been demonstrated how ethnicity is a politically sensitive issue 
in the African context (Amselle & M’Bokolo 1985; Amselle 1990). Nevertheless, I did 
not choose ethnicity as an object of study nor did I assume that this group was a natural 
unit. The Haayre region is a patchwork of different ethic groups who, over time, have 
intermixed. Group identities are social constructs (Amselle 1990) that are maintained 
through social boundaries (Barth 1969). Fulɓe, for example, have a strong discourse 
over not marrying people from other ethnic groups. In national discourse Fulɓe are 
represented as one cohesive group and they themselves actively contribute to patrolling 
the social boundaries of their ethnic group. They do so, for example, through active 
participation in Tabital Pulaaku,25 an international organization that promotes Fulɓe 
culture.  
Fully aware of ethnicity as a social construct, I chose to focus on slave descendants 
in Fulɓe society because I wanted to give precedence to depth over breadth. As outlined 
in the introduction, the multiplicity of slave groups within one ethnic group is already 
very diverse. Therefore comparisons of the legacies of an institution, which is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  Although I have addressed the imagination and transnational practices of some. See Pelckmans 
(2007).  
25  See website: www.tabitalpulaaku-international.org, accessed August 2010. 
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singular, would do away with precisely those subtleties and differences from which we 
would be able to understand the process of change. To keep these subtleties in the 
picture and account for the interweaving of all the spatial areas described, I decided to 
make one family central in the analysis. Although I alos interviewed and interacted with 
both freeborn and descending Dogon, Soninke, Bambara, Tuareg, Bozo and Songhay 
groups in the Kayes, Segou, Mopti and Haayre regions,26 this thesis focuses on data and 
case material of only one single network of informants. In order to ensure my data of 
the quality resulting from established close-knit relations of trust, I chose a royal family 
with the patronym Dicko and their former slaves, who were the descendants of an 
ancestor called Kau.27 My host in Bamako was Madame Dicko,28 a freeborn Dicko, 
while my host in the village of Dalla was Suleymane Dauda, who is of slave descent. 
Focusing on only the Kau and Dicko families allowed me to be more accurate in 
specific transformations in the group of slave descendants of royal domestic slaves in 
relation to their former masters.  
A second reason for sticking to one single network of people relates to issues of trust 
and confidentiality.29 Establishing trust is important when motivating people to talk 
about a traumatic and/or shameful past, which many are not used to addressing in words 
(Argenti & Röschenthaler 2006; Hardung 2002). This is why language competence was 
important and in order to improve my competence I studied the Fulfulde language for 
six months at the INALCO language institute in Paris and followed some courses with 
linguist Breedveld (1995) in Leiden, the Netherlands.  
Most colonial studies on slavery are based on collaboration with and interpretations 
of noblemen’s perspectives. This bias has been denounced (Leservoisier 2005b; Bier-
schenk 1993) and countered by reflexive anthropology (Riesman 1977, 1992) and post-
modernist approaches to ethnography (Marcus 1995). Chapter 2 explains in more detail 
the impact that my research assistants and the interpreter’s status could have had on my 
data.30  
Another ethical issue to be addressed was the use of personal names and pictures. 
Although some would take pride in seeing their contribution to this thesis crystallized 
with a mention of their name and picture, others have far more interest in anonymity. 
Some of the public figures, such as politicians, were more difficult to ‘anonymize’ and 
their public position necessarily exposes them more than others. To ensure the privacy 
and anonymity of those who wanted it, names have been changed where I felt it was 
necessary to do so.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26  I conducted research in Kayes for three weeks in 2006 and visited Melga (both the Malian and 
Mauritanian parts on the border), a small town with many migrants in France. I also conducted 
research among Haayre migrants in Segou and Mopti-Sevare in 2007. 
27  The Kau and Dicko families are interrelated through the marriage of King Yerowal Dicko and a 
concubine from the Kau family (see Chapter 3).  
28  See Chapter 6. 
29  Chapter 2 has a description of how my alliance with the King’s former domestic slaves sometimes 
prevented me from establishing relations of trust with other groups of former slaves. 
30  Troughout the theis, methods are addressed there where I deemed it most relevant to mention in the 
particular analytical contexts. An overview of specific methodological choices I made are discussed in 
most detail in Chapter 2.  
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The catch-all practice of participant observation made me realize that attention for 
and experiences of the cultural field of hierarchy lie in non-verbal, everyday actions (the 
above-mentioned habitus and style). Understanding a social context requires long-term 
commitment and physical engagement with the cultural environment. This is why I 
participated as far as possible in ritual occasions and engaged in activities such as 
helping youngsters with their job applications and cooking with the maids and shopping 
for food at the market.  
Apart from observations, I also document change in the cultural field of hierarchy by 
referring to written historical sources I consulted in the Colonial Archives at Koulouba 
and the National Archives in the ward of ACI 2000 in Bamako (Map 7, see Chapter 8). 
For additional information and documents, I consulted journalists and members of 
associations31 and also used alternative sources such as notes on presents given during 
ritual occasions by women in town (Chapter 8), letters sent to migrants (Chapter 6) and 
articles in journals (referred to in this Introduction). 
II. The rope, the head and the road in existing anthropological 
debates  
The first part of the introduction outlined the red line throughout this thesis by 
connecting three emic concepts to existing theoretical notions. I described how Roads 
(trajectories of social promotion) reconfigured the Ropes (cultural field of hierarchy) 
and the Heads (style) of slave descendants in a well-defined social network in Central 
Mali. Before going into ethnographic detail in the following chapters of this thesis, this 
second part of the introduction first takes up some of the broader theoretical issues 
raised surrounding the three emic concepts described so far. I will first address the issue 
of slavery in anthropology and then focus on the particularities of slavery in Fulɓe 
society. Finally I will discuss contemporary legacies of slavery in the public sphere and 
explain more about the mobile approach in existing debates beyond slavery.  
 
Slavery: A single institution covering a wide range of relations 
Slavery covers a wide variety of institutions, practices and hierarchical social relations 
in different parts of the world. It is an umbrella concept that has been imbued with 
different meanings (Testart 1998: 31) ranging from those covering the builders of the 
Egyptian pyramids to the Atlantic Afro-American plantation slaves to those working in 
modern sweatshops in Italy. The kind of slavery that is referred to in this thesis is in-
digenous slavery in the Sahel, which existed in the West African Sahel as an economic 
(Meillassoux 1975: 15-16), legal (Botte 1999a) and social (Meillassoux 1986) system. 
Chapter 1 describes the history of slavery in Fulɓe society in Central Mali from the 
eighteenth to the twentieth centuries in more detail and will demonstrate the range of 
slavery practices and statuses throughout time.  
Universal definitions of slavery are impossible because it is a notion that covers 
many different practices of relating. Paterson (1982: 13) defined it as a ‘total social 
system’ and emphasized the fact that it was not only a social relation between slaves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  Associations such as TEMEDT and Taabital Pulaaku. 
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and masters but also an institutional process in which slaves’ relations with broader 
society are central. In an edited volume on African slavery, Kopytoff & Miers (1977: 
11) discuss how neither property nor saleability are criteria that distinguish slavery from 
kinship in non-western societies.32 A common dimension of slaves in various societies 
is that they are excluded from the fundamental social rights central to their society 
(Testart 1998: 77).33 While Greek slaves lacked citizenship and plantation slaves lacked 
control over their own activities, sexuality and labour, the central issue for domestic 
slaves in Africa is that they lack and are actively excluded from kinship. Testart (1998: 
65) observed that having rights and juridical status in most societies is linked to and 
guaranteed through kinship. To deny slaves legal rights, one had to exclude them from 
freeborn kinship systems. In the academic literature, (neo-Marxist) debates on African 
slavery increased significantly in the 1970s.34 Slavery in the Sahel has been defined as a 
system of control over rights in persons (Kopytoff & Miers 1977: 11) and as a way to 
accumulate wealth in people (Guyer 1995), with slaves lacking both (Meillassoux 
1986). Some argued that African slavery was more benign35 because of the (partial) 
inclusion of slaves in local kinship systems in Africa, while for plantation slaves in 
Asia, for example, kinship remained hermetically ‘closed’ (Watson 1980).36  
Another important aspect of the resurgence of slavery studies in the 1970s and 1980s 
is that they increasingly tried to gain access to ‘the slave voice’ and slaves’ experiences. 
There was a lack of sources describing their views from below. Most colonial reports 
were based on cooperation with interpreters and rulers that often, but not always, were 
of noble/freeborn descent. Tracking the changes in the ways of enslavement and 
incorporation through oral evidence is a difficult process. Informants tend to present 
‘the past’ as a static period of uniform practice (Miers & Willis 1997: 481). Doing 
research and talking to slave descendants about their past is not easy (Klein 2009) as it 
is ‘the history of those who would rather forget’ (Klein 1989). At the same time the 
hegemonic power of freeborn elites often silences slave histories (de Bruijn & 
Pelckmans 2005, see also Chapter 1). Nevertheless, several academics have successfully 
managed to distil the ‘slave voice’ from oral accounts (Olivier de Sardan 1976; Wright 
1993; Greene 2011 forthcoming). 
Over time, some slave groups have found ways of becoming assimilated in their new 
host societies. This process has been called ‘absorption’ by Kopytoff & Miers (1977) 
who emphasize that slavery was not a static, prolonged state of being but rather a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  See also Dottridge (2005). 
33  Testart (1998: 77) argues for ‘exclusion from social dimensions’ as a common denominator of slavery 
in various societies: ‘Whether it is about kinship ties in lineage societies, or citizenship in Antiquity, 
or the believing community in Islamic right, the slave is always, in every society, excluded from 
(social) dimensions considered to be fundamental to these societies.’ 
34  This literature focussed on the lack of slave access to kinship and social relations. It is by becoming 
‘unkinned’ (Bohannan 1963: 18) that slaves came to be at other people’s disposal: They died a ‘social 
death’ (Meillassoux 1986: 106). Slaves were initially strangers who ideologically remained outsiders 
by being deprived of kinship (Meillassoux 1986).  
35  Cooper (1977) was accused by Morton of presenting slavery as benign and static. See also Winter for 
an analysis of the debates on ‘benign’ slavery. 
36  In a comparison of African and Asian systems of slavery, Watson (1980) contrasted the ‘open’ 
systems described by Kopytoff & Miers with ‘closed’ systems where kin groups tend to be exclusive, 
and where slaves remain outsiders instead of being incorporated.  
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practice whereby people moved in or out of a society and had opportunities to adapt 
their condition in this process.  
Slavery in the old kingdoms of the Sahel has been distinguished from other societies 
where fewer slaves were kept by the term ‘slave societies’ (Finley 1981: 103). Oral 
traditions and written documents on nineteenth-century Central Mali clearly indicate 
that slave raiding was part of the economy. Slave societies had external relations with 
distant economies through the trade of slaves on the Atlantic Coast and towards the 
Middle East and Asia (Klein 1989), along with other products such as salt and ostrich 
feathers. The demand for slaves in Mediterranean, as well as American and African 
production systems stimulated the growth of military and commercial elites in the 
Sahel. Too date the hierarchical organization of social status groups among Fulɓe in the 
Sahel reflects the previous positions of these groups in the ‘slave economy’: Freeborn 
groups who occupy political positions today used to be the warriors who raided large 
numbers of slaves, who were in turn traded by trading groups. Religious elites ensured 
ideological support for slavery and had a monopoly on healing and jurisprudence, and 
the other subordinate but free groups were the artisans: Smiths, praise singers and 
woodcarvers. In these warrior economies nomadic pastoralists lived as vassals to 
warriors who centralized their power and slaves worked the land of any freeborn who 
could afford to pay for a human being to assist him. 
 
Tracking changes beyond abolition 
The academic literature in the 1980s was led by historians addressing the (French) 
colonial role in reducing slavery to an illegal institution but not prohibiting the related 
socio-cultural practices and ideologies (Klein 1998). The first practical steps in the fight 
against slavery in the French colonies only started in 1905 (Klein 1998; Klein & Miers 
1999; Kopytoff & Miers 1977). Slavery was formally abolished but no social or eco-
nomic freedom emerged for the people involved (Botte 1999a: 17). On the contrary, 
some have argued that the colonial regime homogenized relations by categorizing a 
wide variety of different relations as ‘slavery’. This homogenization hardened intra-
ethnic social boundaries including those between slave and freeborn groups.37  
Other scholars such as Soares (2005: 63) and Pollet & Winter (1971: 371) have, 
however, contested this view and indicate how colonial projects encouraged more 
fluidity in social relations and removed specific forms of authority. When analyzing this 
from a ‘relational’ approach to modernity (Geschiere et al. 2008: 2), both situations can 
exist at the same time. When applying the ‘genealogical principle’ (Ibid. 2008: 4) to the 
aftermath of slavery, one discerns multiple trajectories in several directions of modern 
life. Like a genealogy, slavery has branched out in diverse directions and not towards a 
final teleological ‘end’. This corresponds to my descriptions of the Road as a multi-
directional process.  
This multiplicity of trajectories was increasingly addressed in a wave of studies on 
so-called ‘post-slavery societies’ (Rossi 2009a) in the Sahel from the 1990s. These 
studies considered how, despite the legal abolition of slavery, practices related to 
master-slave relations remained in place, while others vanished. Botte (2003) describes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37  See Amselle (1990), Bazin (1985) and, for Fulɓe in particular, Guichard (1998) & Bierschenk (1993). 
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how the embedding of social relations in the legal framework of Islam, which 
recognizes the property of persons and is thus fundamentally unequal, is crucial to 
understanding the current legacies of slavery.38 Others (Hall 2005; Schmitz 2006) 
indicated how in Sahelian societies, slavery was not racist (as in the Americas) but 
racialized. Those formerly enslaved are discriminated against in racial terms and, in 
Fulɓe society, descendants of slaves are commonly referred to as ‘blacks’ (FF: 
Baleeɓe). The stigmatization of groups of descendants of slaves is apparent in several 
realms and will be addressed in more detail later.  
Gupta & Ferguson (1992) argued that cultural differences are often read between 
analytically distinct ‘societies’. The challenge in post-slavery studies has been to 
describe cultural differences within one society. Most of the academic literature from 
the 1990s indeed opts for relational approaches to status within a given society. In his 
study of the differences in the construction of self by both slave descending Riimaayɓe 
and freeborn Fulɓe in northern Burkina Faso, Riesman (1992) demonstrated how child-
ren are socialized according to the specific expectations of (of style) their own social 
status group (FF: Sy) and lineage (FF: lenyol). Other scholars working on Fulɓe in West 
Africa (Hardung 1997, 1998; Vereecke 1994) describe the marked differences between 
former masters and slaves, such as labour ideology and politics in relation to each other.  
Another group of studies questions linear, modern approaches to emancipation and 
abolition. Implicitly adopting the genealogical principle described above, they analyze 
the legal ways of emancipation that existed prior to colonial abolition within and 
outside formal slave status. Stillwell (2004) describes the possibilities for social 
climbing and alliances among royal slaves at the royal court of Kano in present-day 
Nigeria. Schmitz (2009) described how in the Senegalese-Mauritanian Fuuta Tooro 
region slaves were emancipated thanks to social promotion in a matrimonial or religious 
context. Hall (2009) describes eighteenth-century letters, demonstrating that 
commercial paths to emancipation existed at that time for Songhay slaves in northern 
Mali, while Berndt (2008) describes the religious paths to emancipation before and after 
Malian independence for Fulɓe slave (descendants) in the Guimbala region. Most of 
these scholars emphasize the existing variety in trajectories of emancipation prior to 
colonial abolition and underline how they where blocked rather than encouraged by 
French colonial abolition. But most importantly, their studies emphasize that there have 
always been ways for groups of slave descendants to improve their condition, despite 
their inferior social status.  
 
Modern expectations of mobility 
I indicated above that there are two dimensions of distance in which the legacies of 
slavery and the cultural field of hierarchy can be framed: Time and space. The distance 
in space generated by mobility has made some migrants more critical about the existing 
cultural field of hierarchy in their home societies. Being able to control one’s own 
mobility defines one’s liberty of movement. But is freedom the ability to choose where 
to go and what to do? In ‘modern’ thought, mobility is expected to bring betterment 
(Ferguson 1999). It is a way of moving up and enhancing social mobility. Throughout 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  I describe the Islamic legal framwork in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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the case studies in this thesis however, this ‘self-evidency’ will be bent in directions that 
go against ideas of mobility as a linear and modern process. Mobility is embedded in 
and controlled by socio-cultural institutions. The thesis is mainly concerned with the 
meso and micro level of the social organization of migration (Brettell 2003: 1-7). 
The mobility turn in social sciences has also been applied to studies on the legacy of 
slavery in the Sahel. Due to increased attention on mobility and transnationalism, 
studies on social change in Sahelian hierarchies have focused on the interrelationship 
between social distance and spatial movement. My study is part of this fairly recent 
group of studies (Boyer 2005; Rossi 2009b, 2011 forthcoming) that explicitly use 
mobility as a methodological lens to address the Roads available to slave descendants. 
Boyer’s (2005) study, for example, describes how mobility brings temporary relief and 
social distance in imagination from slave status for seasonal labourers of slave descent 
among Tuareg in Niger. Other studies have compared the trajectories of slaves and 
migrants as outsiders (Argenti & Röschenthaler 2006: 38-39; Gaibazzi 2010; Bella-
gamba 2009a; Miers & Willis 1997; Manchuelle 1997).  
Lately, there has been a tendency in academia to go against an overemphasis on 
mobility. The mobility turn is starting to wane because there is an increasing realization 
that celebrating ‘nomadist metaphysics’ (Cresswell 1997; 2002: 15) is equally problem-
atic. Considering nomadism as the norm risks reinforcing tropes of nomadism in colo-
nial and national discourses (Azarya 1996). Secondly there is a large group of people 
who are involuntarily immobile (Carling 2002; Gaibazzi 2010; Jonsson 2008) because 
they face cultural, social, economic or institutional obstacles that impede their (possible) 
migration. This study focuses on mobility as embedded in the power relations under-
lying the cultural field of hierarchy. It is the idea of being both spatially and socially 
mobile that is reflected in the expression of ‘having Roads’ in Fulɓe society.  
 
Mobility and immobility in Fulɓe society 
Being mobile and on the move is a way of life associated with groups of pastoralist 
Fulɓe nomads in the West African Sahel (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a; Botte et al. 
1999a: 25; Dupire 1970). The idea of a ‘travelling culture’ (Gillroy 1993; Clifford 
1992), a ‘culture of migration’ (Hahn & Klute 2007) and a ‘culture of mobility’ (Boesen 
& Marfaing 2007) have been applied to pastoralist Fulɓe in West Africa (Botte et al. 
1999a: 24, 28-30). This stereotype is based on the Fulɓe’s self-image as nomads.39  
The recent ‘mobility turn’ (Urry 2000) and ‘mobilities paradigm’ (Urry 2007) in the 
social sciences has denounced ‘sedentarist metaphysics’ (Malkki 1992) where people 
are naturally connected to a place and states. By taking a transnational focus (Bash et al. 
1992), these studies focus on how people organize their lives and identify themselves 
both within and outside national borders. Migrants thus have mobile livelihoods, long-
distance interactions and inhabit their country of destination and homeland simultane-
ously (Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004). The centrality of mobility as a way of life in 
African societies is addressed in de Bruijn et al. (2001). Increasingly, studies are fo-
cusing on the intensification of movements and connections between people that are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39  It is also based on ethnic stereotypes ascribed to Fulɓe by their neighbours (de Bruijn & van Dijk 
1997; Amselle 1996). 
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being facilitated by modern means of communication, such as the mobile phone (Brink-
man et al. 2010, Horst & Miller 2006). These have intensified possibilities for staying 
in touch while on the move for both researchers (Pelckmans 2010) and migrants 
themselves (Vertovec 2002).  
Nevertheless, the focus in the West African Sahel has, for a long time, been on 
the mobile lifestyle of nomads40 based on a pastoral economy. This exclusive 
focus on nomadic pastoralists as movers has tended to obfuscate the mobilities of 
other social groups in Fulɓe society. There is no study that addresses the mobility 
of former slave groups in the Haayre region. Some freeborn social groups of 
Fulɓe society have in fact become extremely immobile. Their immobility has 
facilitated control over conquered territories and people, as is the case of a group 
of Fulɓe warriors who sedentarized in the nineteenth-century Islamic Diina 
Empire of Maasina (Klein 1998: 47; Sanankoua 1990). Some of these warriors, 
called Weeheeɓe in Fulfulde language, settled on the outskirts of the empire in a 
region called the Haayre (Map 3). Today they continue to be distinguished from 
other noble families by their patronym Dicko.41 As I described in the 
methodology section, one such Dicko family is central to the social network in 
this thesis.  
@ see Map 3 in appendix.  
Map 3: Haayre region and Gourma region. Overview of former FulBe kingdoms 
Booni, Dalla & Joona ruled by Dicko families.  
 
A central aspect of power and nobility in the Haayre region was control over 
the mobility of others. From the outset, enslavement meant that a person was 
forced to go and live elsewhere, and this removal through capture was an explicit 
form of ‘forced migration’ (Lovejoy 2009). Slaves were either immobilized or 
forced to move but had no freedom of movement:42 they had no Road. Nevertheless, 
some tried to become mobile and fled their host societies if they were too oppressive. 
Georg-Deutsch (2003, 2006) explains the mobility of slaves as a form of resistance to 
their exploitation. The exodus of slaves from some areas was problematic for their 
owners (Klein & Roberts 1980; Georg-Deutsch 2003).  
Collective slave revolts by running away are not reported in the colonial archives for 
the Haayre region. The region under study in Central Mali was typically a ‘frontier 
region’ (Kopytoff 1987) and escape was difficult because of insecurity and instability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  The cattle-rearing Fulɓe have come to represent Fulɓe identity and have found their way into coffee-
table books produced by Western photographers, such as Beckwith & van Offelemn (1983) and Mols 
(2000), and magazines like National Geographic (de Bruijn et al. 2001a: 66). A consequence of this 
mobility is that Fulɓe are regarded everywhere as ‘the other’ or ‘the stranger’ (Ibid.: 72-73). 
41  The word Dicko literally means ‘vultures’ and refers to the hunting instinct of this former warrior 
group.  
42  On the relationship between freedom and liberty: ‘Liberty is the ability to move freely where one is, 
that is, choosing one’s activities and one’s associations; or moving to places where it is possible to act 
freely’ Rossi (2009b). 
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due to raiding warlords. Also, there was a marked difference in the liberty of movement 
when comparing ‘domestic’ versus ‘plantation’ slaves. The royal elites maintained their 
power over their domestic slaves well into the twenty-first century, effectively 
immobilizing them, even if the French colonial government had legally freed them.  
 
The modernity of slavery: Confusion, conflation, ambiguity and paradox  
Like witchcraft (Geschiere 1997), references to slavery are often a metaphor, sometimes 
with real consequences, for commenting on social inequalities in wealth and status. The 
idiom of slavery can likewise be considered as ‘a source and resource of personal and 
collective power or powerlessness in its call for ‘domesticated agency’ against various 
forms of exploitation, marginalization, inequality and individualism’ (Nyamnjoh 2005: 
246). As mentioned earlier, the use of a pervasive idiom like slavery to refer to ex-
ploitation akin to slavery has been called metaphorical slavery by Rossi (2009a: 6), 
Kopytoff & Miers (1977: 25) and Morice (2005). Metaphorical slavery manifests itself 
in the renowned West African ‘joking relations’ that are replete with references to 
slavery (Canut & Smith 2006: 699, 703).43 To summarize, metaphorical references to 
slavery tend to conflate inequality and slavery in one idiom. 
Another example of the metaphorical use of the language of slavery, is the use of 
statutary language. In Malian joking relations, patronyms are an important tool for 
negotiating claims to social status as a king, bard or slave (Jansen 1996; Jansen & Zobel 
2001; Pelckmans 2011b forthcoming). Van Hoven (1995) describes how kinship rela-
tions in The Gambia are expressed in so-called ‘statutary language’. A freeborn person 
can be compared to a slave to refer to his inclusion through the female side, which 
recalls the way slaves used to be incorporated through matrilineal descent in patriarchal 
societies.  
In the Sahelian context, similar cultural fields of hierarchy are shared by neigh-
bouring ethnic groups, such as Tuareg, Moors and Songhay (Amselle in de Bruijn & 
van Dijk 1997: 10). Fulɓe can be considered a kind of intermediate category between 
Tuareg and Bambara in the way they shape and practise the cultural field of hierarchy. 
Pulaaku has been commonly described by Fulɓe specialists as the emic notion 
describing Fulɓe behaviour (Botte et al. 1999a; de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 199). 
However as Breedveld & de Bruijn (1996) pointed out, the notion of pulaaku in the 
Haayre region simply refers to all those identified as Fulɓe people. There are more 
specific emic concepts (FF: Ndimu, yaage and juulde) that are central to honourable 
behaviour for the Fulɓe in the Haayre.  
People of slave descent try to obtain social honour in the ways available to them 
(Klein 2009). With the exception of Iliffe’s 2005 publication on honour in African 
societies in historical perspective, most of the literature on honour (and shame) focuses 
on Mediterranean and North African societies, such as Gillmore (1987) and Bourdieu 
(1977) who emphasize how honour is based on gender relations. According to 
(Bourdieu 1977: 133) the honour of men is the most ‘elementary form of domination’ as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43  See for a range of examples, Cahiers d’études africaines on ‘Parentés, plaisenteries et politique’, 
edited by Canut & Smith (2006). 
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it demands the shame of women.44 Parallels as well as differences in ideologies of 
social honour in West Africa (Klein 2009) can be drawn between nomadic groups in 
Egypt (Abu-Lughod 1986), Algeria (Bourdieu 1977) and Mauritania (Ruf 1999; Ville-
sante-de Beauvais 2000). A central aspect of honour in Islamic societies that is linked to 
rights as related to kin groups is descent. Abu-Lughod (1986: 45) describes how: ‘The 
ignominy of origin is a metaphor for present shortcomings. Nobility of origin is be-
lieved to confer moral qualities and character.’ Furthermore, the dualism between 
freeborn and non-freeborn was exacerbated by the memory of one group having pos-
sessed the other. Sharkey (1994: 189-190), working in Sudan, describes how:  
... elites had relied on some slaves to farm their lands, though they valued slaves as a whole for a 
loftier reason: The enhancement of status and proof of power that the possession of slaves could bring 
... Indeed, the greatest service that slaves may have provided to their owners in the 19th and early 20th 
century – through the eyes of the owners themselves – was not so much to ... boost their regional 
economy, but rather to enhance their social status and prestige. 
Today a person of slave descent can decide to opt for emancipation, renegotiation 
over or the maintenance of hierarchical relations. In some cases, slave status is con-
sidered advantageous (Valsecchi 2009; Bellagamba 2009a). In times of hardship, some 
realize that a complete rupture with their past is too costly or risky and they therefore 
opt back into dependency relations with their former masters (Bellagamba 2009a). This 
may present people with complex dilemmas (de Bruijn & Pelckmans 2005). Other 
descendants of slaves no longer identify with their slave status. They have managed to 
move out of the orbit of power and existing constraints in their home societies. Instead, 
they engage in alternative exit options outside the existing paths to social promotion 
within the social boundaries of their home societies. Examples of such exit options for 
slave descendants are access to colonial education (Hesseling & Van Dijk 2001); 
national decentralization politics (Hahonou 2009, 2011; Leservoisier 2005b; Vereecke 
1994; de Bruijn & Pelckmans 2005; Mauxion 2008); international development institu-
tions (Giuffrida 2005); globalizing interpretations of Islamic legislation (Berndt 2008; 
Schmitz 2009) and the global monetary economy (Hardung 1998: 219).45  
The changing exit options described above imply a certain social distance in spatial 
space (physical distance) as well as in time (emotional distance from the past). As I will 
demonstrate in the following sections, both distances have grown significantly. The 
emotional distance to people’s slave pasts has increased now that most of those who 
experienced slavery as a legal institution have died. 
 
Remembering the rope: Contemporary echoes of slavery 
The increased distance to the past and commemorations of the abolition of slavery (in 
British African colonies in 2007 and in French African colonies in 2005) help to explain 
the renewed attention for slavery in Africa. Academic studies on slavery in the first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  The cultural field of hierarchy is gendered within Fulɓe society too. Freeborn women are expected to 
respect the rules more than men (Breedveld & de Bruijn 1996: 808). 
45  ‘Money as such is situated outside the social traditional order and its symbols. It creates a margin of 
maneuvering which resets relatively freely from constraints attached to social roles and statuses’ 
(Hardung 1998: 219).  
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decade of the twenty-first century address the (invisibility of) memories of indigenous 
African slavery. Three main reasons can be identified.  
Firstly, West African national governments do not generally invest in research, 
documentation or commemorations of indigenous African slavery but have prioritized 
tributes and attention for victims of the transatlantic slave trade.46 The most telling case 
in this respect is probably the remarkable offer by Senegal’s President Wade to the 
people of Haiti after the devastating earthquake that hit their country in 2010. He 
offered them land in Africa (their continent of origin) and wanted to show how the 
Senegalese empathized with them for being double victims, firstly of the slave trade and 
later of a natural disaster. A similar proposal from president Wade  vis-à-vis descen-
dants of slaves who have been victims of indigenous slavery in Senegal’s recent past, 
would be unthinkable.47 A similar silence can be found in the Malian public sphere. It is 
rare to find references in Malian journals to an indigenous slave past, although there are 
some fairly recent exceptions.48 Only one newspaper has a column by a journalist 
involved in the new social movement of TEMEDT that defends and promotes the rights 
and culture of ‘black Tuareg’ (Tuareg of slave descent, also called Bella in Mali).49 
There is hardly any debate about the recent slave past of different ethnic groups and 
indigenous slavery remains for most national governments a shameful past mistake that 
is not or hardly worth commemorating (Hahonou & Pelckmans 2012 forthcoming). 
Secondly, the silence in public discourse on indigenous slavery practices can be 
explained by the active refusal of commemoration by slaves themselves. Some slave 
descendants have an interest in omitting, forgetting and/or not reproducing a painful 
past (Klein 1989). Since some groups contest their slave status the researcher has to 
read between the lines of any narratives (Gaibazzi 2010) in order to be able to 
reconstitute it.  
Thirdly, the perceived lack of commemoration of slavery in Africa stands in sharp 
contrast to the extensive and visible commemoration practices of descendants of 
transatlantic slaves on African soil (Argenti & Röschenthaler 2006). Victims of this 
trade engaged in ‘roots tourism’ (Schramm 2007) or claims for reparations (Howard-
Hassmann 2008) and commemoration sites have been recognized by UNESCO (Austen 
& Warren 1997).50  
Fourthly, Shaw (2002) argues that the silences and non-commemoration of the 
indigenous slave past in (West) Africa is not due to a lack of tribute but rather to the 
fact that these commemorations take place in non-discursive ways. She therefore called 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Accessed August 2010. 
48  Journalist Sambi Toure in Info Matin, no. 2770-2771-2772, 9-11 December 2009: ‘Le code, le régime 
L’Islam et le Mali (XVII/XVIII)’, ‘L’Islam et le maintien de l’esclavage’. Journalist Gamer Dicko in 
L’Essor, September 2005, ‘Victims collaterals de l’independence 1-6’.  
49  There is no official website so far, but for more info on TEMEDT, see for example: 
http://www.ashoka.org/iagidbaltanat, accessed December 2010 
50  For example, Ghana’s slave castle on the Cape Coast (Mullen Kraemer 1997), the Maison des 
esclaves on Senegal’s Gorée Island (Hinchman 1997) and Benin’s Slave Route in Ouidah (Law 1997). 
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on scholars to look for non-discursive ways of remembering slavery and directs aca-
demic attention to embodied commemorations of slavery through dance, cults and song. 
Several academics51 have started looking for alternative non-discursive (and preferably 
non-European) sources to access slave experiences past and present. These could range 
from attention to folklore,52 spiritual and/or religious experiences,53 explicit slave voices 
in colonial and Islamic archives,54 and novels by slave descendants.55 Greene (2003) has 
argued for detailed attention to be given to these silences and Hardung (2002) 
emphasizes the importance of body language to reveal past experiences. Rossi (2009c) 
notes that there are strategies to gain access to these histories by creating the right 
environment for interviews, while Stillwell (2001) indicates that those slave groups that 
take pride in their slave past, like royal slaves, are much more enthusiastic than other 
groups of slaves to talk about their past. 
Argenti (2007) argued for interpreting these various non-discursive and ‘belated 
memories’ as experiences of collective psychological trauma resulting from centuries of 
slaving in African societies. These renegotiations over memories have also led to sig-
nificant shifts in the social and political relationships between groups of former masters 
and slaves.  
As the social distance to lived experiences of slavery in the past becomes greater, 
new players are entering the field to renegotiate memories. Grassroots organizations and 
social movements for slave descendants have been emerging among different ethnic 
groups in the Sahel. Botte (1999c) made a comparison between the former slaves of 
three ethnic groups in the Sahel: Iklan56 former slaves belonging to Tuareg; Haratin, 
former slaves belonging to Moors; and Riimaayɓe, former slaves belonging to the 
Fulɓe. He found the Riimaayɓe to be the most ‘emancipated’ because they are the only 
group not to have their own opposition movement.57 However this does not mean that 
discrimination is tenacious for this group (Ibid.: 16).  
Anti-slavery organizations in West Africa, which are described as social movements 
by Ould Ahmed Salem (2009),58 are on the rise. TEMEDT was, for example, founded in 
Mali in 2006 to fight for the recognition of Bella slave descendants in northern Mali 
(Hahonou & Pelckmans 2011 forthcoming). Such organizations are often led by 
intellectuals who, having spent time studying abroad and having got a good position in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51  Among others, the large-scale project by Greene, Brown, Bellagamba & Klein, called Tales of 
slavery, which consisted of several conferences and will result in two forthcoming books in 2011.  
52  Such as Child stories (Argenti 2010), ritual masquerades and dance (Argenti 2007) and surnames and 
patronyms (Pelckmans 2011b).  
53  Such as ancestral cults (Ologoudou 2008; Noret 2008), spirits (Shaw 2002) and shrines (Baum 1999; 
Noret 2008: Evers 2002).  
54  Slave petitions (Rodet 2009), and slave agency in court cases (Roberts 2009) have been revisited in 
colonial archives. For analyses of newly accessible Islamic archives in  (thanks to digitization), see 
Hall (2009) and Daddi Addoun (2005). 
55  See Humery (2001, 2010). 
56  Iklan are also known as Buzu in Niger and Bella in Mali. 
57  Iklan united in an organization called Timidria in Niger (Alou 2000) and Bella came together in the 
Mouvement pour l’éveil du monde Bella au Mali (Lecocq 2005) Harãtin in Mauritania united as El 
Hor (Messaoud 2000; Botte 1999c) and SOS Esclaves (Ould Ahmed Salem 2009).   
58  He refers mainly to SOS Esclaves: http://www.sosesclaves.org and El Hor:  
http://elhor.org/Charteelhor.htm in Mauritania. Accessed August 2010. 
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the national administration, are trying to gain access to funds and international attention 
to fight for ’their’ cause. These causes are paradoxically, however, no longer theirs. 
Some explicitly deny their own slave descent in order to be heard and, as such, confirm 
the cultural field of hierarchy and downplay their slave status. They have however 
booked some success in lobbying for the legal criminalization of slavery and there has 
been an increase in anti-slavery laws in national constitutions (Mauritania and Niger) as 
well as in interregional agreements, such as those in the economic community of West 
Africa (ECOWAS).59  
Several Internet forums address the extent of slave practices in the Sahel and since 
2006 IRIN news has regularly covered slavery in Mali, often at the initiative of the 
above-mentioned TEMEDT movement.60 There are also more sources, such as family 
histories (FF: Taariki) that have recently become available to a larger audience, for 
example the Arab manumission documents from a collection that has been made ac-
cessible online.61 
In addition to these civilian organizations, (West) African scholars (Saibou 2005; 
Sehou 2010; Alou 2000; Nkwi 2011 forthcoming; Perbi 2004; Sy 2010) are starting to 
address the role of African elites in the Atlantic trade and in the (legacies of) internal 
African slave economies. Research on indigenous slavery by African scholars was a 
taboo subject for a long time and remained unthinkable during most of the twentieth 
century (Thioub 2005). Nevertheless, scholars in Mali are expressing their fear of 
studying legacies of slavery in certain areas because this arouses frustration by powerful 
freeborn elites who might engage in vengeance. 
Not only individual scholars but also international human-rights action groups such 
as Anti Slavery International62 (Dottridge 2005; Miers 2003) and Free-the-Slaves63 
(Bales 2000) are increasingly financing research on remnants of slavery in the Sahel. 
Anti-Slavery International financed a cross-country comparison between Mauritania, 
Niger and Mali. The Mali report (Keita 2009) mentions many forms of discrimination 
that slave descendants in Mali encounter today.64 Lastly, the linkages between the 
modernity of slavery in (West) Africa versus modern slavery are being put on the 
agenda, for example in an edited volume by Botte (2003). And new attempts to come to 
terms with universally accepted definitions of exploitative practices have been des-
cribed by Dottridge (2005) and Quirk (2009). 
My central research question is in what ways movement allows slave descendants to 
reconfigure their status and relations with their former masters? The sub-questions 
related to this are: (i) Is the cultural field of hierarchy in rural areas challenged by the 
agency of migrants? (ii) In what ways does mobility contribute to the turnover of 
hegemony to ideology? And, more specifically, when do the distinctive features of race, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59  In 2008 this led to a court case in Niger, see Duffy (2009).  
60  See: Irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=79242. Accessed August 2010. 
61  See: http://ecollections.crl.edu/cdm4/index_.php?CISOROOT=/. Accessed August 2010. 
62  See: http://www.antislavery.org, accessed August 2010. 
63  See: http://www.freetheslaves.net, accessed August 2010. 
64  Anti Slavery International organized an interregional comparative study on legacies of slavery in 
Mauritania, Niger and Mali, coordinated by Romana Caccchioli and Abdel Wadoud Ould Cheickh. 
For Mali, Naffet Keita coordinated the country study (personal communication and draft report 2010).   
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gender and discrimination based on slave status become collective ideology and thus the 
subject of debate? Finally (iii) In what conditions does hegemony become unstable and 
change from anti-hegemonic ideas into an ideological struggle at the cultural frontier of 
the field of hierarchy? 
 
The existing debates tend to focus on the commemoration of (legacies of) slavery in 
West-Africa in historical, legal, social and religious realms. This thesis adds two realms 
of memory that, I think, have been insufficiently addressed to date: These are spatial 
organization (Chapter 2) and mobility as memory (Chapter 7). These specific chapters 
describe how the cultural field of hierarchy is also commemorated through movement 
and spatial organization.   
Zooming in: An overview of the chapters 
The thesis consists of two main parts. The first describes the cultural field of hierarchy 
‘back home’, which is in the home villages of the migrants who are central to the 
second part. The first five chapters demonstrate how in various realms the legacies of 
statutory differences between freeborn and slave descendants continue to be ‘readable’. 
The stigmatized position of slave descendants is based on difficult access to claims on 
the past (Chapter 1), the conflations of place, power and hierarchy (Chapter 2), a lack of 
ancestral lineages and protecting relations (Chapter 3), internalized stereotypes of 
hierarchy as expressed in labour and style (Chapter 4) and hierarchy as resulting from 
the manipulation of legal pluralism and religious ideology (Chapter 5).  
Mobility is central to the second part of the thesis. The ways in which people move 
and the fact that mobility is embedded in social networks and power relations are the 
focus of Chapter 6. Chapter 7 discusses the ways in which place and ritual interactions 
reproduce the cultural field of hierarchy in Bamako. Chapter 8 discusses styles and jobs 
in Bamako, while Chapter 9 focuses on the return of migrants and how their newly 
acquired social mobility plays out back home.   
When zooming in on the chapters of Part 1 of this thesis in more detail, Chapter 1 
demonstrates how there are always different interpretations of the past in the present. 
The chapter focuses not so much on what history is but rather on how it is instru-
mentalized at present: History is seen as a political resource that legitimizes ascribed 
status positions. For slave descendants, history is more difficult to manipulate because 
(i) freeborn status groups have written sources; (ii) freeborn have a vested interest in 
silencing the histories of their slaves to maintain their own position; and (iii) freeborn 
positions were often reinforced by colonial regimes (and colonial archives). Despite 
these impediments, slave descendants increasingly attempt to engage in their own per-
sonalized histories.  
The Haayre region is described in Chapter 2 with an emphasis on social relations 
between the Kingdoms of Joona, Dalla and Booni. What is central is the interrelation-
ship between places where people live and their status and I focus on the village of 
Dalla and its subdivisions with freeborn and slave wards. In the section on the royal 
slave ward I also address the methodology and introduce the key figures in the Kau-
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Dicko network. Finally, I discuss how social status cannot only be read from the land-
scape but also from habitus and the style of social interactions, such as greetings.  
Chapter 3 focuses on relations and indicates how categorical slave status is main-
tained through restrictions on marriage (endogamy). It demonstrates how some slave 
families have managed to integrate in freeborn lineages although the majority of des-
cendants of slaves have not. The Dicko and Kau families became interrelated through 
marriage and thus became family members. However, they remained distinct social 
status groups and this can be observed in the differences in (the ritual styles of) their 
marriage ceremonies. The social organization of the marriages of slave descendants 
continues to accentuate the social boundaries between them and the freeborn Fulɓe. 
This is emphasized by the fact that new marriages between the Kau and Dicko families 
have remained unthinkable even though some other slave groups have managed to 
renegotiate their social position through marriage with freeborn families.  
Chapter 4 describes two main styles on each side of the spectrum of the cultural field 
of hierarchy, which I have named the ‘patriarchal’ and the ‘loyalty’ styles. I describe 
how those who identify and/or are identified as slave descendants are expected to 
behave according to the so-called ‘loyalty style’. In other words, if people who identify 
and/or are identified as slave descendants ‘know their Head’ well, they embody and 
internalize a habitus that corresponds to expectations of the loyalty style. Both styles 
combine in what I label ‘stereostyling’, which is ultimately about the internalization of 
belonging to Fulɓe society. Finally, the chapter considers the social sanctions adopted 
towards those who do not know and/or disrespect their Heads and corresponding styles.  
Chapter 5 discusses how a culture of hierarchy is reproduced in the face of legal 
pluralism. I describe how the plurality of law – Islamic customary law and modern law 
– leads to ambiguities in the legal status of freeborn and slave descendants. The ex-
ample of manumission shows how this form of social promotion in a legal Islamic 
context frees people but does not make them equal to those born free. Secondly, the 
case demonstrates the importance of the (Islamic) legal context, which prevails over 
national state law in defining the cultural field of hierarchy. This chapter also describes 
trajectories of slave descendants in the spiritual realm and how, by specializing in 
religious education, they have obtained esteem and managed to reposition themselves. 
Part 2 reflects the same thematic subdivision as Part I. Chapter 6 considers the 
histories of movement of the status groups in the network described. This chapter points 
out how the ways one moves can reflect one’s social status. Both dependent and 
independent forms of mobility as related to social status are discussed and the chapter 
addresses the (spatial) ‘Roads’ of royal elites and their slave descendants, with a focus 
on those moving into the urban areas of Bamako. Hosting is an important mechanism 
and can reinforce one’s position in the cultural field of hierarchy.  
In Chapter 7 I describe Bamako and how the settlement history of the Kau versus the 
Dicko families again shows how hierarchy is linked to place. The focus is on inter-
actions between the families through an exploration of the work of maids and ritual 
assistance during a baptism in the urban context of the capital. It is a description of how 
cultural fields of hierarchy travel through the styles discussed in Chapter 4.  
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In Chapter 8, the various symbolic Roads to social promotion of the Kau and the 
Dicko family members are considered in the urban context of Bamako. Firstly there are 
those mentioned in Chapter 7 who move ‘on’ or ‘back into’ the cultural field of hier-
archy by engaging in stereostyles during rituals, or assistance more generally. Others 
explicitly move out of the cultural field of hierarchy through what I propose to call ‘exit 
mobility’. Their movement helped them to ‘exit’ from the cultural fields of hierarchy 
back home. This often also means that these migrants decide to not return at all. Active 
contestation of the existing cultural field of hierarchy (moving ‘against’) is only done 
by a minority of people, often through their engagement in associations for human 
rights or against discrimination more generally. This chapter thus gives an overview of 
the wide variety of options slave descendants have managed to engage in over time 
thanks to the socio-spatial distance of their home society. 
In Chapter 9, I describe the return of migrants and how the village remains an 
important point of reference for the diaspora. Do mobile migrants of slave descent 
renegotiate their status when they return home? And if so, how? I address these issues 
by describing the return and reintegration of a freeborn and a slave-descending inform-
ant. Lastly, the case of an intellectual of slave descent, who tries unsuccessfully to 
intervene in the liberation of his cousin, illustrates how although some manage to rid 
themselves of their Heads and Ropes, other choose or feel forced by structural con-
straints to remain tied and bonded in the cultural field of hierarchy.  
Finally, I formulate conclusions on the interrelations between mobility and power 





Present(-ed) pasts  
A disturbing past 
This introductory chapter provides an outline of how the descendants of Fulɓe slaves in 
Central Mali have appropriated their own history and the way they present their past 
today. The first section offers an overview of how a hierarchy was created in the Central 
Malian Haayre region65 in the twentieth century. It describes how social hierarchies 
became institutionalized due to several main political events in Fulɓe history: The pre-
colonial Fulɓe Empire, the colonial intervention, post-independent socialism and the 
decentralization processes of the 1990s. The claims people make on their history today 
are politically loaded and stem from these political events. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, Fulɓe warriors66 had settled permanently in 
Central Mali and became kings67 who established their own slave economies. The 
enslavement and raiding of other (ethnic) groups in the region were legitimized as a 
crusade against disbelievers and undertaken in the name of Islam. During these 
‘civilizing’ missions, power constantly shifted between those ruling and those who were 
ruled. This generated ‘floating populations’ (Warnier 1975: 385). Argenti (2007: 45) 
defines these floating populations as ‘roaming bands that resulted first from raiding and 
later from internal predation and exploitation’. In this pre-colonial period there was a 
‘full house of variation’ in slave statuses and conditions (Ferguson 1999). In addition, 
various trajectories of emancipation were available to different groups or individual 
slaves. 
The emancipation of slaves did not come about suddenly as a result of colonial 
abolitionist measures. Although the French colonial intervention was successful in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65  The Haayre is an area of rocky plateaus in Central Mali that extends from Douentza in the west to 
Hombori in the east. See Chapter 2 for a more detailed description of the area.  
66  For other studies on FulBe pastoralists in this region, see publications by de Bruijn & van Dijk in the 
period between 1994-2003 and Gallais (1975). 
67  I am aware that the word ‘king’ is maybe not the best notion to use here. However, my informants 
themselves use it when they translate the Fulfulde notion of laamiiɗo (French: Roi). I use the notion of 
king instead of ‘sovereign’ when referring to the specific group of former Fulɓe warriors whose status 
group of origin had access to political power in these societies. Also for the territorial areas reigned by 




legally abolishing the slave trade, it did not change the socio-cultural worldview of 
actors in Sahelian Fulɓe society. In the post-colonial era too, national legislation and its 
representatives did not fully succeed in bringing about a radical shift in ideas on 
equality and hierarchy. The first section thus provides a historical explanation of the 
layers of the meaning of slavery over time and explains why legacies of slavery still 
continue.  
To illustrate this variety, the second part of the chapter, on contested histories, 
demonstrates how different groups of slave-descending people understand their history 
today. It analyzes how the past is used as a resource to make claims on the present by 
the heterogeneous mix of statuses and sub-groups covered by former slaves, who are 
called Riimaayɓe68 in Central Malian Fulfulde dialect. Claims to history in the present 
are in practice leading to differential access to social status based on descent and to land 
rights. The chapter closes with a discussion of how legacies from the past continue to 
weigh on cultural perceptions of inequality today. The past still hangs heavy in the 
present. 
The formation of hierarchies in the Haayre region  
@see Map 4 in appendix 
Map 4: The Gandamia plateau of Dalla and its direct surroundings  
This section focuses on the pre-colonial settlement of Fulɓe warriors in the Haayre 
region. It considers the emergence and trajectories of inclusion and exclusion of the 
floating populations in relation to Fulɓe society. The geographic focus is on the Central 
Malian region, which is situated east of the capital Bamako and south of Timbouctou 
(Map 3, Introduction), and specifically on the memories of the inhabitants of Dalla 
(Map 4), one of the Fulɓe kingdoms. Like the neighbouring Kingdom of Booni, Dalla 
was a node69 of Fulɓe influence in the region. Apart from archival documents, many of 
the interpretations of Central Malian history described in this section are based on bard 
Aamadu Baa Digi’s oral memories.70 He is a representative of the social group of 
craftsmen who are loyal to the royal family of Dalla. His oral recitals of the region’s 
history deal mainly with the deeds of the ruling Weeheeɓe (see Angenent et al. 2003). 
The absence or minimal presence of slaves in oral and written traditions is a recurrent 
feature of history in Sahelian slave societies. As Klein (1989: 211) puts it: ‘They are 
mentioned as followers, companions or victims. Traditions are concerned with the deeds 
of leaders, rulers and founding heroes.’ This is why the second section in this chapter 
attempts to counter this bias of slaves as historical ‘passives’ and/or ‘outsiders’. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68  Riimaayɓe is often translated as ‘former slaves’ today. 
69  Gallais (1975: 134) uses the term noyau in French, which I translate here as ‘node’. 
70  I use the word ‘bard’ to refer to a sub-category of craftsmen (FF: Ŋeeyɓe). Within this category, bards 
are praise singers and/or historians attached to the important (royal) families. Amadu Baa Digi was 
such a historian and attached to Dalla’s royal court (Angenent et al. 2003: 2). His descendants are 
engaged in jewellery and leather crafting. His son, Hama Amba Yattara, was one of my research 




Pre-colonial establishment of Islamic master-slave hierarchies  
Baa Digi mentions how raiding Fulɓe warriors occupied the plateaus (FF: Haayre) of 
Gourma in Central Mali from the seventeenth century onwards.71 The Haayre region 
was a zone of internal chaos and turmoil and the presence of slavery in the area from the 
sixteenth century onwards is clear from the vast corpus of Islamic legal documents.72 
Rulers and the ruled were continuously interchanging and constantly at risk of being 
overturned by new political players.  
Warnier (1975: 385) uses the concept of ‘floating populations’ in the Cameroonian 
context73 to describe the constant power shifts that resulted from raiding, internal 
predation and exploitation. His concept aptly describes similar processes in Central 
Mali where there were floating populations on the margins of the Maasina Empire due 
to the presence of roaming warriors.74 An early colonial document75 describes how the 
people of Bambara Maounde migrated because of the plundering Tuareg76 warriors near 
Lake Kuraaru (Map 3). At the end of the nineteenth and the start of the twentieth 
century, Fulɓe warriors were roaming and conquering the Haayre region and generated 
new floating populations there. In the context of perpetually alternating alliances 
between the various warrior groups, the floating populations were both raided and 
protected by the Fulɓe. These populations were obliged to pay tribute but their right to 
protection was only temporary and insecure. The following French colonial document77 
outlines how the original inhabitants of the plateaus became slaves to the royal courts of 
local elites:  
... the Haɓe, inhabitants of the mountain massifs in Maasina, who, having been taken by the Songhay, 
were exploited by all the conquerors of Maasina: Fulɓe, Moroccans, Toucouleurs. After ten centuries 
in this region they became real slaves that patiently succumb to the law of the winner.78 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71  Historical sources mention a Fulɓe presence in Gourma on the right bank of the Niger Delta in Central 
Mali from the sixteenth century onwards (de Bruijn & van Dijk 2001a: 222). Fourteenth-century 
chronicles talk about how the region was first inhabited by cultivators and hunter gatherers (Angenent 
et al. 1998: 15). 
72  The documents written by Ahmed Baaba exemplify this (Lovejoy 2006). 
73  Warnier (1975: 385) develops this concept in his PhD thesis in the context of the Cameroonian 
Grassfields and Argenti (2007: 45) recycles this concept. I use it here as a a metaphor for the shifting 
composition of populations circling around local rulers and elites to whom they deferred.  
74  The Maasina Empire (1818-1862) is also called Diina, an Islamic term (de Bruijn & van Dijk 2001a: 
217). It is nowadays acknowledged as the most important, centralized Islamic Fulɓe reign in the 
history of the Malian nation-state (Sanankoua 1990). Its first leader, Sekou Ahmadou, centralized the 
activities of cohabiting occupational groups of Fulɓe herdsmen, Bozo fishers and Bambara cultivators 
to the advantage of the Fulɓe herdsmen. With the fertile Niger Delta as its central heartland, the 
control of dry areas such as the Haayre region near Douentza was important for the empire because 
they provided cattle grazing when the delta region was flooded. This ecological relationship between 
the Delta and the Haayre remained important (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a). 
75  Archives Nationales Mali (hereafter: ANM), Fonds Anciens (hereafter: FA)-1E-96. Rapports 
Politiques, Bandiagara (1904). 
76  I use the word Tuareg, although the notion of Kel Tamasheq, which literally means ‘speakers of the 
Tamasheq language’ is this groups’ self-denomination. Nevertheless, most of the literature about this 
group in the Malian context uses the term Tuareg (Lecocq 2005, Klute 2005, Giuffrida 2005). 
77  ANM, (FA): 1E-156 (August 1894). 
78  Author’s translation from French in ANM, FA: 1E-156 (August 1894). 
46 
 
Whole populations were subjected to Fulɓe raids in the name of religious conversion. 
The system of enslavement ensured the marginalization of the majority of the popu-
lation. For many of these marginalized groups, the only way to ensure protection was to 
defer to the current ruling raiders. They circled those in power in the hope of gaining 
favours. Argenti (2007: 45) describes how floating populations in the Cameroonian 
Grassfields moved on as soon as they had alternative ‘exit options’ (Hirshman 1970) 
with other patrons elsewhere. The same is likely to have been the case in the Haayre 
region.  
The Fulɓe warlords, known as arduɓe in Maasina, conquered the Haayre region as 
nomadic kings with strongholds of power.79 They then established their own lineages 
with the ancestral name Dicko and became known as vultures (FF: Weeheeɓe) ruling the 
local populations they encountered. Coming from Douentza, they settled in Dalla80 
under the Islamic leadership of the devout Moodi Mboolaye towards the end of the 
nineteenth century when they were incorporated into the centralized Muslim Empire of 
Maasina near the present-day town of Mopti in the western Haayre region (Sanankoua 
2001). The islamization of the sedentarizing Fulɓe warriors in the Haayre resulted in a 
strong hierarchization of society (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 57-59). The Weeheeɓe 
warriors there became allies of the empire’s leader, Seku Amadu (1818-1848) (de 
Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 55), protecting the Maasina Empire from raiding northerners 
by sending soldiers when necessary (Angenent et al. 2003: 176). They also kept the 
Tuareg and Dogon in the Haayre region in check (Gallais 1967: 156).  
The established Fulɓe hierarchy made an explicit distinction between those who were 
freeborn and those who were not. Not being freeborn resulted in slave status, according 
to Islamic conceptions. Slaves became an important social category both demographic-
ally and economically, and Fulɓe society became a slave economy (Finley 1981: 103). 
As Meillassoux (1982: 94) stresses: ‘Slavery was in no way a superficial feature of the 
organization of these societies; history cannot be understood if one ignores it!’ Today 
the number of villages inhabited by slaves’ descendants testifies to the demographic 
preponderance of slave populations in the area.81 Slaves were essential for the economy 
of the Fulɓe kingdoms as they carried out heavy physical labour, such as cultivating the 
land, which the Fulɓe warriors (FF: Weeheeɓe) had appropriated.  
Fulɓe rulers in Dalla and Booni were a constant threat to the area’s peasant popu-
lations because of the raids they undertook for loot such as horses, cattle and slaves. 
Based on a census in Bandiagara District in 1904, Lovejoy (1983: 186-187) describes 
how 35.6% of the male population, 47.7% of the women and 16.7% of the children 
were slaves. As a result of these large numbers of slaves, economic surpluses were 
generated and contributed to the wealth of Fulɓe rulers who, for a long time, even 
expressed their wealth in slaves, although their economic value fluctuated over time. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79  Gallais (1975: 134) mentions Noukuri, north of the Gandamia Plateau.  
80  According to Baa Digi, their common ancestor, Alu Maane, left three sons, each of whom obtained 
his own part of a territory spanning from Bandiagara in the south to Lake Niyangay in the north (Map 
3). Each son headed his own kingdom: Joona, Kanyume and Haayre. Dalla was the centre of the 
Haayre region which then also included the territories known today as Gourma and Seeno. Joona and 
Kanyume are situated in a region now called Guimballa (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 49-50). 
81  For more details on the area, see Chapter 2 and Maps 1-5.  
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the 1920s, a female horse was paid for an adult slave,82 while Bard Baa Digi described 
how ten slaves were equal to the value of a horse in another period (Angenent et al. 
2003: 97). Slaves did not necessarily have fixed owners and sometimes were able to 
bypass this by becoming part of one of the above-mentioned floating populations. The 
trafficking of slaves took place through raiding and capture but also through marriage 
and, as Angenent et al. (2003: 179 Document F) show, in gift exchanges between 
owners and rulers.  
The model of slavery in the Haayre is a variant of slavery that was widespread across 
the West African Sahel. Two main categories of slaves are generally distinguished in 
other Sahelian slavery studies (Lovejoy 1983; Meillassoux 1975; Olivier de Sardan 
1976): Slaves living on slave estates, and domestic slaves. The slaves on the estates, 
who did agricultural work, were often the populations who had inhabited the region 
before the Fulɓe conquered it. Domestic slaves were likely to have been enslaved during 
raids elsewhere and tended to do domestic work. 
Bard Baa Digi described how Moodi Mboolaahi, the first Islamic ruler of Dalla, 
turned many villages in the Haayre region into slave estates. Ownership over these – 
often original – inhabitants of the region was divided among the raiding Weeheeɓe, the 
religious Moodibaaɓe and the pastoralist Jalluɓe families. These estate slaves worked 
the land and generated surpluses but had to give part (frequently half) of their produce 
(millet, cotton) to their master, although the rates were not fixed.83 Upon their conquest 
of the region, Fulɓe warriors forced entire – often Dogon – villages to become agri-
cultural slave estates in their kingdoms. Baa Digi (Angenent et al. 2003) indicates how 
freeborn Fulɓe presented the slave estates mainly as reservoirs of labour, grain and 
animals. The fact that their property could easily be taken away from them is remem-
bered today with indignation and frustration by the descendants of estate slaves living 
on the plateaus. 
In the sedentarized Fulɓe Kingdoms of Dalla and Booni, it were mainly warrior 
families who controlled the slave populations on the estates. The pastoralist Fulɓe 
owned fewer estate slaves because they needed to rely on other freeborn families in 
villages neighbouring their slave estates84 to control their slave populations when they 
were not occupying their cattle camps near these estates.85 
Domestic slaves were another category, the majority of them had been captured 
during raids or wars.86 They could be resold, while those on the slave estates could not. 
They lived in the compounds of their master or the king and sometimes the children of 
the slaves on the estates were taken as domestic slaves or as concubines for their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82  El Hajj Bocoum, aged about 70, Dalla. Interview with research assistant Amadu Amiiru Dicko, March 
2007. 
83  Chapter 4 gives more details of slave labour. On the issue of (land) taxes by ruling elites, see Chapter 
5 on legal pluralism. 
84  Examples on the territory of Dalla are the villages of Torbani and Nani (Map 5).  
85  Due to the pastoralist mobility of these Fulɓe, their estate slaves had to be controlled by others. Such 
was the case for slaves inhabiting the sub-ward of Wuro Birigiri (Map 6 and Chapter 2). However, the 
domestic slaves of pastoralist Fulɓe were incorporated into the families of their masters and joined 
them on transhumance. 
86  Domestic slaves often remember their former family ties less well than the Riimaayɓe on the slave 
estates (Meillassoux 1991). 
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masters. Domestic slaves87 had tasks that included food preparation, fetching water and 
cleaning. Male slaves took care of the horses, fought as soldiers or prepared building 
materials such as wood, mud bricks and reeds. Some domestic slaves voluntarily de-
ferred to powerful and wealthy elites to obtain economic support and ensured protection 
against enslavement by other rulers (Iliffe 1987). 
Although both groups shared the same slave status, their individual conditions 
differed (Meillassoux 1991). Some became trusted persons and historical sources attest 
to the fact that some masters allowed their slaves to trade (Hall 2009; Baier 1980). In 
Dalla, slave descendant Allay Jannginoowo88 was given as a tax payment from a trader 
(FF: Jaawannɗo) to the royal Weeheeɓe family of Dalla. Allay proudly remembers how 
he had the honour of guarding the royal granaries and prisons, a position of trust. In the 
last ten years of his life, he became the head of the slaves (FF: Amiiru Maccuɓe) at the 
royal court of Dalla.89  
Not only the roles and individual conditions of slaves but also their possibilities for 
emancipation varied considerably. Since the floating populations continuously changed 
positions and alliances, those enslaved sometimes managed to become rulers. Islam too 
encouraged the redemption and manumission90 of slaves (Lofkrantz 2008; Lovejoy 
2009; Dadi Addoun 2005) and for others marriage with partners in other ethnic groups 
created options to emancipate.91 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Maasina Empire of Seku Amadu was 
overruled by Fulɓe from the west (FF: Fuutankooɓe) led by El Hajj Oumar. Weeheeɓe 
warriors were being raided themselves and to maintain their status and income, they 
oppressed their slaves. This is allegedly why a group of exhausted but powerful warrior 
slaves decided to leave their masters in Dalla and follow a new leader called Maamadu 
Nduuldi who founded the Kingdom of Booni some 40 km to the east of Dalla. Until the 
arrival of the French at the beginning of the twentieth century, Dalla, Booni and the 
Songhay Kingdom of Hombori dominated the political scenery of the present-day 
Haayre region.  
 
Questioning French colonial abolition of slavery 
This sub-section considers how the French colonial abolition of slavery affected master-
slave relations in Fulɓe society and how this policy remained superficial and formal. 
With regard to slave trade and markets, French colonial policy was successful but not 
when it came to domestic slavery and socio-cultural perceptions of slavery. As a result 
of reliance on indirect rule, French policies often strengthened Sahelian slave societies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87  See Chapter 4 on stereo styles for more about stereotyped slave labour.  
88  Allay Jannginoowo, born around 1935, interviews with research assistant Umu Sangare, Dalla, 
November 2001-May 2002.  
89  See Chapter 4 for more about Allay’s life history and his position as the chief of slaves. 
90  For more on (Islamic) manumission procedures in the region, see Chapter 5. 




Occasionally, and especially towards the end of colonial occupation, the French ad-
ministration drastically inverted existing hierarchies.92   
The first French base on present-day Malian territory (then called the French Sudan) 
was established in Bamako in 1883 (Roberts quoted in Lovejoy 1983: 175). Anti-
slavery measures were part of the motivation for and legitimization of the colonial 
regime’s civilizing mission. The first official treaty between the colonial powers was the 
Treaty of Brussels in 1889, which resulted in rendering slave markets and the trade in 
slaves illegal in oversees colonies. However, slavery as an institution was only abol-
ished by French colonial legislation in 1905 (Klein 1998; Kopytoff & Miers 1977; 
Klein & Miers 1999a: 4; Botte 1999a: 15). There was much regional variation in the 
effectiveness of French abolitionist policies. Since the Haayre region, which is central 
to this study, was part of a vast territory governed by only one French commander, 
French colonial policies had a marginal effect. 
When French commanders arrived in Bandiagara, they reported on the many raiding 
groups in the area, sketching a situation of turmoil, unrest and repression, and a 
flourishing slave trade. 
The trade of non-free persons is effectively very active in the region. Sarafere is a market where 
people from the North come to buy. Since the beginning of the month, I counted 43 non-free (people) 
being bought by various individuals in this market in order to take them to Timbouctou () and 
Goundam. Women and children are the ones feeding the market mostly. Where do they come from? 
Some say they are Mossi, others say they are from Maasina and still others say they come from the 
South.93 
Colonial documents also mention the trading of eunuchs to Turkey94 and regional 
slave markets in the towns of Bandiagara (Lovejoy 1983), Hombori and Dori.95 Slaves 
were transported south via Douentza and Hombori96 to Dori and on to the British Gold 
Coast colonies until the French blocked this trading route in 1885.97 
Elderly slave descendants recount memories of how their fathers and mothers were 
captured. Allay Jannginoowo,98 an elderly slave descendant, was visibly emotional 
when describing how his grandparents ‘were sold at the market with ropes around their 
necks, like animals’. Slaves were either captured collectively during raids or kidnapped 
as individuals in adjacent areas, such as Mossi from Burkina Faso, Hausa from Tera in 
Niger.  
French abolitionist measures that rendered slavery illegal resulted in the return of 
captured slaves from many areas to their regions of origin.99 Others – often first-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92  Various examples are mentioned by Berndt (2008) for Guimballa; by Lecocq (2005) for Northern 
Mali and Klein (1998) for Maasina and the West African region more generally.  
93  Author’s translation of an excerpt from ANM, FA: 2E-04; cercle Bandiagara, 1899-1907. Politique 
Indigène.  
94  ANM, FA: 2E-04; cercle Bandiagara, 1899-1907. 
95  Today Dori is in northern Burkina Faso near the border with the Central Malian Seeno (Map 3).  
96  Hombori used to trade with the coastal regions to the south, such as Ghana and Ivory Coast. 
97  ANM, FA: 1E-102; Gourma-Hombori (1912). 
98  Allay Jannginoowo, born around 1935, various interviews with interpreter Umu Sangare, Dalla, 
November 2001-May 2002.  
99  The best-known example in Mali (or at least best described) is the exodus of slaves from Banamba (in 




generation slaves – left their masters and founded their own villages (FF: Debere) 
(Griep 2005; Riesman 1977: 120). From 1897 onwards, the French encouraged this 
emancipatory movement of slaves they wanted to free. To do so, French policy offi-
cially created so-called liberty villages (French: Villages de liberté) (Bouche 1968). 
Slaves complaining about bad treatment by their master and/or slaves taken by illegal 
traffickers could live in these liberty villages where they were given land to cultivate. 
They had to stay for at least three consecutive months to obtain a certificate of liberty 
that would prove their freedom on release and allow them to settle as freemen in their 
village of origin or elsewhere.100 In the Haayre region, no such villages existed; the 
archives only mention liberty villages in Bandiagara101 and Goundam (Map 3).102 
Abolitionist measures in French Sudan were poorly institutionalized and the absence of 
liberty villages in the Haayre region underlines how French policy was almost absent 
here. 
By 1910, the trade in slaves in French Sudan as a whole had decreased significantly 
and slave markets had been successfully abolished. The French colonizers had new 
goals, such as responding to the political realities in Europe and the First World War. 
Abolition became less central as slavery from then onwards was supposedly non-
existent. After 1911, references to slavery were markedly absent from colonial archives. 
The French colonial government decided that making a distinction between freeborn 
and slaves in legal documents was discriminatory and against the law. French ad-
ministrators thus no longer listed slaves who inhabited liberty villages but instead kept 
track of the ‘nominative state of former servants in refugee villages, who are authorized 
to return to their country of origin’.103 Instead of only documenting the fact that they 
were slaves, their sex and their age, administrators now described slaves as freeborn 
subjects and registered their place of birth, residence and names. 
Another measure that clearly reflected the official denial of the continued existence 
of slavery is the fact that, from 1911 onwards, the French colonial administration 
stopped issuing liberty certificates to runaway slaves. In the National Malian Archives 
the silence on the issue of slavery is most tangible between 1911 and the 1940s.104 The 
French administration’s change in wording, which was directed at the international 
community, effectively veiled the fact that slavery had only nominally been abolished 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100  For more on the certificates of liberty issued after a stay in such villages, see Chapter 5.  
101  In Bandiagara, the first liberty village was set up in 1898. From 1903 onwards, the coming and going 
of people was registered, with 59 persons living in the village throughout the year. In 1905 the totals 
were 82 versus 96 for the first and second semesters respectively. In December 1906, the French 
administrator in Bandiagara registered 116 inhabitants. From 1906 onwards, the totals are given per 
month and differentiate between men, women and children. Source: ANM, FA: 1E-123: Etats numé-
riques de villages de liberté, Bandiagara (1897-1911).  
102  ANM, FA- 1E-171: Correspondances sur les villages de captifs libérés-Goundam (1897). 
103  Author’s translation of archival document ANM, FA- 1E-171. Goundam (1897). 
104  The studies before 1911 are: ANM, FA: 1D-2 (1894)/1D-35-4 (1910)/1E-156 (1894-1904)/\1E-167 
(1908)/1E-181 (1904)/1E-182 (1905-1906)/1E-183 (1895-1904)/1E-184 (1908)/\1E-292 (1903). The 
studies after are in the ANM, NUM: 1E-1246 (1957)/2D-1983 (1958)/1E-1871 (1918). The only 
exception is the discussion on pawnship (French: Mise en gage) in the 1930s as described for example 
in ANM, FA-1D210: 6 (1957)/2D-1983 (1958)/1E-1871 (1918). The institution of human pawnship 
(whereby a person serves as a guarantee replacing a value) was finally decided to be neither slavery 
nor trade in persons.  
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(Meillassoux 1975: 12). A typical colonial change in terminology was the replacement 
of the term esclaves with that of captifs, servants (Meillassoux 1989) or non-free.105 
Some informants attributed the emergence of the term Riimaayɓe, literally meaning 
‘freed persons’, as a new qualification for slaves previously called Maccuɓe to the 
French ‘liberation of slaves’. Today the word Riimaayɓe is commonly used as a generic 
term to refer to the whole group of people of slave descent within Fulɓe society. It has 
become the word to describe a heterogeneous social group. Some informants distinguish 
between Maccuɓe as slave descendants still linked to (FF: Maraaɗo) their masters from 
Riimaayɓe as independent descendants of slaves.106  
French influence in the Haayre region increased only after the First World War. On 
one of his tours in the region in 1911, French Lieutenant Matras described the following 
situation:107 ‘I noted that: 1. All the Dogon (Habes, sic) or Rimaibes (sic) villages in the 
mountains are excessively poor 2. Mortality is very high here, especially amongst the 
children.’ The first decade of the reign of King Yerowal Nuhun Mbaabi (1911-1966) in 
Dalla coincided with an increased French presence in the region. Baa Digi describes 
how Yerowal received a letter in the 1920s insisting on the complete abolition of 
slavery in all its forms (Angenent et al. 2003: 99-101). 
The Fulɓe no longer traded in slaves, but continued to dominate them. You take advantage of your 
dependants, make them work for you and have them registered as yours. This situation continued for 
years until a letter from the French forbade all forms of servitude. No person was a slave to any other. 
All men are free, which is what we call a democracy. This really worried the Fulɓe.108 
It was difficult to abolish slavery in daily practice because at least 30% to 50% of the 
economy was based on it (Meillassoux 1975: 17). Slave-holding elites resisted abolition 
for fear of losing their labour supply and revenue (Klein & Miers 1999a: 4-5; Meil-
lassoux 1975: 13) and as the French depended on the powerful local elites through 
indirect rule (Klein 1998), abolition of slavery in all its forms was impossible. Yerowal 
maintained much of his power because he collaborated superficially with French 
colonials109 and, like other rulers in the area, the French accorded him special favours. 
These included the right to land ownership, which concurrently guaranteed him conti-
nued control over the labour of so-called ’former’ slaves (Klein & Miers 1999a: 6; 
Klein 1993a: 24). Yerowal continued to abuse the floating populations well into the 
twentieth century.110 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105  An early example of a change in wording is Circulaire no. 92, 17 Mars 1897 (ANM, FA-1E-177) that 
describes how the term captive (French: Captif) had to be replaced by the term non-free (French: Non-
libre).  
106  This corresponds to my typology of Riimaayɓe Haayre versus Maccuɓe Wuro described below. 
107  ANM, FA: 1E-102: Hombori, 8 September 1911, number 136.  
108  Author’s translation of: ‘Alors, les Fulbe ne faisaient plus le commerce des esclaves, mais ils conti-
nuaient à les asservir. Tu disposes de tes dépendants, tu les fais travailler pour toi, tu les récences avec 
toi. Cette situation a durée plusieurs années, jusqu’ a ce que la lettre suivante des Français interdisant 
toute servitude Personne n'est plus l'esclave de son prochain. Tous les hommes sont libres, ce que 
nous appelons une démocratie. Cela a beaucoup souciée les Fulbe.’ 
109  Dalla, for example, assisted the French colonial regime in suppressing the revolt of the Samo in Bobo 
Dioulasso in 1916. 
110  El Hajj Bocoum, 70 years old, village of Dalla. Interview with research assistant Ahmadou Amiiru 
Dicko, Dalla, May 2007. 
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Before then, the French ruled indirectly through King Aguibou Tall111 from the town 
of Bandiagara.112 There was widespread instability among the ruling Fulɓe families 
before the arrival of the French but the situation changed when they installed their 
commanders first in Bandiagara and later in Hombori. King Surgu of Hombori was the 
leader of the region’s Songhay population and befriended the colonial administrators, 
who transferred their main centre of indirect rule from Bandiagara to Hombori. For 
King Yerowal, this shift of power from Bandiagara to Hombori was a relief. He had 
close ties with King Surgu, and managed to negotiate paying less tax (Angenent et al. 
2003: 111). Those who opposed French intrustion, were eliminated. In the kingdom of 
Booni, Allay Yero Maamudu was killed by the French, who replaced this ruler with his 
17-year-old son Hammadu Yero, who was much more maleable.  
Nevertheless, a lack of funds and administrators meant that the French presence and 
control in the Haayre always remained limited. Depending on the system of indirect rule 
meant they had to take into account the interests of existing rulers. The French for 
example informally granted King Surgu113 and King Yerowal permission to maintain 
domestic slaves if they promised to stop raiding. This partly explains why relations 
today between local political elites (FF: Weeheeɓe) and clients descending from their 
former domestic slaves have remained so close and hierarchical.  
Stories abound about how the kings resisted French anti-slavery politics. In 1939 
King Yerowal (Dalla) and king Baa Lobbo (Hombori) cooperated by killing one of the 
locals working for the French. Baa Digi explains how this interpreter had become too 
demanding in terms of corruptive gifts and cows (Angenent et al. 2003: 115). In 
addition to overt forms of resistance, there were ways of hiding illegal slave practices. 
Small-scale trading in slaves continued well into the 1930s, with one of the last slaves 
sold by king Yerowal being the father of Maman Abidjan.114 Yerowal sold this man to 
slave traders but he managed to flee back to Dalla where he died in the 1950s.115 
Corporal punishment was also easy to hide from public control as El Hajj Bocoum116 
recalls: 
When the French came they said slavery was finished: People were no longer allowed to beat or buy 
slaves. They made laws and spread the news everywhere. However, this did not stop the masters from 
treating their slaves badly or re-selling them. The noblemen and leaders did not accept French laws. 
They kept on doing things secretly. Slaves were now asked to beat their fellow slaves inside the house 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111  Aguibou Tall is a descendant of Omar Tall, a leader who came with his Fulɓe army from the west 
(FF: Fuutankooɓe). 
112  Bard Baa Digi (Angenent et al. 2003: 99) remembers how Aguibou and his followers made the local 
FulBe rulers suffer: ‘Ils faisaient tout: Vendre ou tuer ou battre ou emprisonner tout personne a leur 
gré. Ils disposaient des chefs, leur demandaient des captifs’. 
113  Upon his death, King Surgu was replaced by Allay Baa Lobbo, who as an intellectual was even more 
favourably inclined towards the French and their educational system. He encouraged as many family 
members as possible to study in French schools (Angenent et al. 2003: 115). He had a lot of power 
during the French regime and like his father continued to befriend King Yerowal in Dalla (Ibid.: 123). 
This resulted in intermarriages between the two royal courts of Dalla & Hombori. Like King Yerowal, 
Baa Lobbo is remembered as a cruel ruler by the slave-descending populations. Gaillais (1975: 130) 
describes how some groups of slaves and agriculturers revolted against Baa Lobbo. 
114  For more about Maman Abidjan: See De Bruijn & Pelckmans (2005) and Chapter 2 in this book.  
115  Phone conversation 31 August 2009, Amadu Amiiru Dicko, born 1980, Dalla.  
116  El Hajj Bocum, about 70 years old, village of Dalla. Interview with research assistant Amadu Amiiru 
Dicko, May 2007. 
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of their master. To avoid the screaming being heard, a cloth was put in their mouths. To avoid others 
discovering the wounds, these were covered with herbal butter.117 Such punishments made sure that 
slaves would not try again to refuse things. When I was a teenager, I witnessed such secretive physical 
punishments several times in my family. 
The French managed to decrease the trade of and raiding for slaves in much of the 
Western Sudan (Klein 1998; Miers & Roberts 1988) but other forms of extreme per-
sonal dependency remained in place throughout the twentieth century. Studies of the 
droughts in the Haayre by Gallais (1975: 111) and by de Bruijn & van Dijk (1995a)118 
describe how the 1913-1914 drought undermined slavery as an economic institution 
when the slave-holding elites could no longer feed their slaves and sent them away. 
However, relations between marginalized persons deferring in extreme dependence to 
better-off individuals in times of crisis remained a form of social organization. Stories 
by elderly slave descendants paint a picture of slave acquisition and/or the subjection of 
people in personal dependency through human pawnship (Lovejoy & Falola 2003) well 
into the 1930s and 1940s.119 More specifically, Klein & Roberts (1980) argue that the 
Depression was felt in West Africa in 1931 and 1932 with a sharp drop in commodity 
prices that threatened livelihoods. In response, many people in poor families were 
forced to pawn their children, usually girls. These populations thus continued to ‘float’. 
Once the French established themselves in Hombori, they introduced infrastructural 
changes (Angenent et al. 2003: 117-121) using local forced labour to build roads and 
colonial administration buildings (Cooper 1996: 31-43; Klein 1993: 24). Many of 
Dalla’s inhabitants remember how they had to construct a road for the French com-
mandant (Angenent et al. 2003: 119). Although slaves were supposed to have been 
liberated, most slave descendants today describe the French colonial regime as exploita-
tive and enslaving, just like their former masters. Allay Jannginoowo120 remembers how 
he and other porters had to transport a French officer in a chair from Dalla to Booni, a 
distance of some 40 km. Often their local masters cooperated with the French and 
lobbied hard to keep freeborn Fulɓe free from French forced labour sending their slaves 
instead (Angenent et al. 2003: 117). The French realised how they were indirectly 
reinforcing existing hierarchies through these consequences of their indirect rule. A 
report on the recruitment of soldiers by the French mentions:121  
… the land being occupied by Fulɓe (French: Foulbe) and their Riimaayɓe (French: Rimaibes), one 
should not wonder about the recruitment procedure. The Riimaayɓe will give men and the Fulɓe have 
done everything to scare them off. The Fulɓe politics in this district (French: Cercle) have always 
consisted of avoiding a situation where servile populations (French: Populations serviles) and the 
French authorities would have close contact because it is the loyalty of the Riimaayɓe that the Fulɓe 
use to obtain political influence, their power and a large part of their wealth. The day that the 
Riimaayɓe manage to flee from their authority (French: échapper a leur direction) will signal the end 
of Fulɓe hegemony in Maasina. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117  In West Africa this butter is known for its hydrating skin-care qualities.  
118  There are comparable studies for similar societies in the Sahel region: Clark (1999), Ruff (2000) and 
Berndt (2008). 
119  Reports on slavery in colonial archives were replaced by those on pawnship: ANM, FA 1D-
197(Senoufo)/1D-200 (Koulikouro)/1D-211 (Tonomassigui). 
120  Interviews, Allay JannginoowoJannginoowo, born around 1935 in Dalla. With interpreter Umu 
Sangare, November 2001-May 2002. 
121  ANM, FA: 1E-30:Djenne, Rapport Politique, September 1913. 
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Other changes introduced by the French that remained vivid in local memories were 
the introduction of taxes on people and property (including cattle)122 and the recruitment 
of soldiers (French: Tirailleurs) on Malian territory (Mann 2000; 2006) to fight in the 
First and Second World Wars. In Kolongo (Map 4), a neighbouring hamlet to the 
village Dalla, an elder of slave descent123 showed me a picture of himself wearing a 
French army uniform. Like so many others, he complained about still not having re-
ceived his pension.124 Lastly, the French reorganized existing geographical and political 
units (French: Cantons)125 and most of the kingdoms became either districts (French: 
Cercles) or cantons. Much to the indignation of local kings, the French commander 
Bariyatou declared Kikara and Jamweli independent cantons (Angenent et al. 2003: 
115).126  
With the territorial reorganization of administrative units similar to provinces 
(French: Arrondissements) in the 1950s, the canton of Dalla became part of the province 
of Douentza, while Booni obtained the status of an independent province.127 This 
important change explains the declining importance of Dalla vis-à-vis Booni. With its 
independent administrative status, Booni was more influential in national government 
services than Dalla. Many more of its inhabitants received a French education and this 
difference has resulted in different configurations of hierarchy in the respective villages. 
The French turned existing power relations upside down and some slave descendants 
worked as administrators in the French colonial government because they had had a 
French education. In an article on primary-school enrolment among (pastoralist) Fulɓe 
today, Breedveld (2006a) describes how distrust of formal education is not only due to 
economic considerations but is also a historical legacy of colonial intervention. By the 
end of the 1940s, colonial officers were increasingly hesitant about appointing slaves to 
important positions. They knew that some engaged in cruel politics of revenge towards 
their former masters (Klein 1993a: 24). Slave resistance and agency existed mostly on 
an individual rather than at a collective level.128 
The gradual decline in French engagement in the abolition of slavery from 1911 
onwards only started to increase again at the end of the 1950s in the run-up to Mali’s 
independence. Colonial and national reports from 1956 and 1957 describe concerns 
about the continued existence of slavery in French Sudan.129 Forced labour was in-
creasingly being problematized (Cooper 1996) and among the international community, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122  People are still wary of mentioning the number of children and cattle they have. 
123  Burra Baa, about 60 years old, village of Kolongo, Diimaajo. Interview with assistant Hama Amba 
Yattara, Dalla, 2002. 
124  It is well known that the national government retained or at least had difficulties distributing pensions 
to these former soldiers who served in the French army.  
125  See Map 2, Introduction. During French colonial rule in Mali, a cercle was the smallest unit of French 
political administration. It was headed by a European officer and consisted of several cantons, each of 
which in turn consisted of several villages. 
126  This was especially shocking since they lacked the royal drums that symbolize power in the area 
(Breedveld & de Bruijn 1996: 810).  
127  Booni and Mondoro were attached to the province of Hombori (Map 3) but revolted against the rule 
of Hombori’s King Baa Lobbo (Gallais 1975: 130; de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 90). Their revolt was 
taken seriously by the French who finally granted them independent administrative status (Map 8). 
128  For more on resistance in the area, see de Bruijn & van Dijk (2003b). 
129  ANM, NUM (numérique): 1E-1246 (1957)/2D-1983 (1958)). 
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existing UN conventions of 1956 on slavery and forced labour in 1957 were amended 
(Miers 2003) in the decade preceding independence.130 Now that slavery has been 
legally abolished worldwide, the concept of slavery is more often used to obtain 
political concern for practices akin to slavery. Contemporary use of the concept of 
slavery is confusing because it is no longer an existing legal category (Quirk 2009; 
Rossi 2009a). Dottridge (2005: 690, 706-710) demonstrates how the terminology for 
intolerable practices against humanity (forced labour, slavery, trafficking) is defined 
differently by different organizations (the ILO, the UN and others), which makes the 
implementation of anti-slavery policies by international organizations in the West 
African Sahel problematic. 
 
Post-colonial legacies of slavery during socialism and decentralization 
This section describes how various national Malian governments failed to eradicate 
aspects of earlier hierarchies in Dalla. However, social change continued to take place 
in the region and affected the position of those slaves furthest in distance from the 
powerful political and religious elites. As already outlined for the colonial period, the 
success of abolitionist measures depended on the logistics available for implementing 
policies that varied from one region to another. It was just before, during and after 
independence that new efforts to eradicate the legacies of slavery were made. 
Attempts to legally abolish slavery were more effective in the post-colonial era be-
cause they were being made by ‘cultural insiders’ who had obtained positions in the 
national administration and were often former slaves who had climbed the social ladder 
through French educational trajectories. The political regime of the first Socialist 
Republic of Moodibo Keita (1960-1968) managed to effectuate more sustainable 
changes against local inequalities than the French colonizers had. And as many of the 
new politicians were of slave descent, they knew exactly how and on which themes to 
interfere as insiders to remove such hierarchies.  
The Malian government came to be considered an enemy by many freeborn Fulɓe. 
The new socialist regime of Moodibo Keita did quite some efforts to invert freeborn 
political elite’s superior position by raising the social status of former slaves and 
encourage access of slave descendants to national administration. Many Fulɓe continue 
to consider government officials to be descendants of former slaves, a fact that, in their 
eyes, legitimizes their distrust of government today. 
Under the banner of the Secular Republic of Mali, some politicians and administra-
tors of slave descent tried to reduce the role of Islam as a political institution. Berndt 
(2008: 290-291) discusses the way in which they preached the primacy of the national 
judicial system over Islamic law as a way of changing the on-going practice of slavery 
in people's livelihoods as well as in their minds. Nevertheless, Islam remained an im-
portant identity marker in the Haayre region and, more specifically, in Dalla with its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130  The UN’s 1926 Slavery Convention was amended with the Supplementary Convention on Practices 
similar to Slavery in 1956. The abolition of forced labour internationally was also refined with the 
‘Abolition of Forced Labour Convention’ in 1957, in addition to the existing UN Forced Labour 
Convention in 1930 and the Protection of Wages Convention in 1949. See: 
  http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C105, accessed August 2009. 
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renowned imams.131 It also remained important for legitimizing status differences and 
inequality in rights.  
Other attempts to level access to citizenship and politics were undertaken by the 
governing socialist political party, USRDA.132 The opposition PSP party,133 by contrast, 
regrouped traditional rulers (Lecocq 2002: 36-48) and president Keita’s ‘Return to the 
Land’ (French: Retour à la terre) policy encouraged many interregional migrants to 
return home to engage in agricultural labour in their home towns. Returning slave-
descending migrants and intellectuals with knowledge of citizenship and human rights 
had witnessed less strict social hierarchies elsewhere and on their return criticized the 
existing hierarchies in their home towns.134 
With Malian independence, the hegemonic position of the local kings declined. The 
death of King Yerowal Nuhun Mbaabi in Dalla in 1966 was a turning point and the 
power of the ruling elite subsequently faltered due to internal strife. Yerowal’s suc-
cessors had considerably less power (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 91) and the domestic 
slaves at the royal court no longer live with their masters. They have built their own 
houses, a transition that marked the start of their emancipation and, as a result of the 
droughts, acquiring their own land has increasingly become an option for tenants of 
slave descent135 who can call themselves freed slaves (FF: Riimaayɓe) instead of slaves 
(FF: Maccuɓe). The end of Yerowal’s reign was the beginning of many changes for the 
Riimaayɓe in Dalla.  
On the national political scene and only two years after Yerowal's death, Moussa 
Traore, a member of the main Malian ethnic group of Bambara, seized power in 1968. 
His dictatorial regime (1968-1991) negatively impacted on socialist efforts to discard 
hierarchical ways of thinking in two ways. Firstly, the administrators of slave descent 
who started to initiate changes in social hierarchies from within by addressing religious 
beliefs were removed from positions of power. And secondly, Moussa’s regime co-
incided with two severe droughts (1971-1973 and 1983-1984) which, due to poor 
management of national distribution channels and of production more generally, made 
many slave-descendant populations either return to their masters or face food and water 
shortages. Despite increased interference and the presence of both the government and 
international community in the hitherto isolated Haayre region, the socio-economic 
position of the Fulɓe did not improve in a sustainable manner (de Bruijn & van Dijk 
1995a: 540). 
In brief, the first thirty years of independence from France saw Mali as a failed 
socialist state and, later, as a dictatorial regime. This resulted in economic and political 
decline that stagnated or even reversed the newly acquired independence of some slave 
descendants who decided to defer to their wealthy former masters as a form of social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131  Dalla is an important site for pilgrimage because the imam is a descendant of the once-famous Islamic 
scholar Moodi Tawhidi who is considered as an almost holy person (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 92). 
See Chapter 5 for more on the impact of Islam on hierarchy and slavery. 
132  Political party USRDA: Union Soudanaise - Rassemblement Démocratique Africaine.  
133  The PSP (Sudan Progressive Party: Parti Soudanais Progressiste) is an affiliate of the French 
Socialist Party. 
134  The links between hierarchy and mobility are central in Chapter 6. 
135  Mauxion (2008) describes this process in detail for the Gao region to the east of the Haayre. 
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security. Many poor and marginalized people merely disappeared: Some may have 
managed to achieve social mobility, while others died. 
Following a coup led by Amadou Toumani Touré (popularly known as ATT) in the 
early 1990s, a transitional government laid down the legal foundations for Mali's return 
to multi-party democracy and Alpha Oumar Konaré was elected president in 1992. He 
initiated an ambitious programme of decentralization aimed at strengthening democracy 
by bringing the government closer to the people (Mamdani 1996). This also proved to 
be an effective strategy in countering the threat of secession in the northern regions, 
mainly by Tuareg (see Lecocq 2010), because this strategy provided greater autonomy 
to lower administrative levels. During the 1990s, 10,000 Malian villages were re-
grouped into 703 municipalities.136 However the ‘crisis in citizenship’ (Geschiere 2004) 
that these kinds of decentralization policies brought about intensified struggles all over 
West Africa.  
French colonial political reforms turned kings into chiefs, who were in turn replaced 
by communally elected mayors from 2002 onwards (de Bruijn & Pelckmans 2005). 
Despite the decentralizing policies, which in principle made it possible for all status 
groups to participate in politics, the existing hierarchies have not changed as much as 
expected. Today, the villages of Dalla, Booni, Joona and Kanyume are still ruled by 
chiefs from the Weeheeɓe lineage who possess the royal drums (FF: Tuubal).137 The 
present village chief, Hamidu, does however complain that his power is waning and 
perceives as a serious decline in the ruling power of the so-called ‘Rois tambours du 
Haayre’ (Angenent et al. 2003; de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 91). His brother Musa 
Dicko was elected mayor and has managed to initiate a promising comeback for the 
former ruling Dicko families in the national administration and politics. Musa’s children 
are currently gaining influence in national politics (see Chapters 6 and 7) and many 
slave descendants belonging to the royal court of Dalla continue to defer to their former 
masters. Some assist the Dicko family in politics but no one has yet dared to propose his 
own candidacy. Engaging in politics is still considered highly inappropriate for 
descendants of slaves.138 
The international expectation that decentralization would induce radical changes and 
generate equality for all citizens has had a paradoxical impact. On the one hand, local 
political leadership seems to be even more firmly in the hands of the former elites in 
Dalla (de Bruijn & Pelckmans 2005). On the other hand, however, hierarchical political 
power constellations in the region are increasingly being challenged by decentralization 
(Nijenhuis 2003). They are being contested within an existing historical context and in 
combination with the socio-economic changes that have taken place over the past 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136  Based on Loi n.96-059 ‘Portant création des communes’, November 1996. For more on decentrali-
zation in Mali, see Diarra (1999); Kassibo (1997); Sy (1998); Fay et al. (2006) and on decentralization 
in West Africa more generally, see Blundo & Mongbo (1998). 
137  On the importance of drums as symbols of (royal) power in the wider sub-region, see Breedveld & de 
Bruijn (1996: 810).  
138  See Chapter 4 & 9 for more details on slave descendants and politics. 
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decades (Mauxion 2008).139 However, many of these changes were already emerging 
and preceded municipal elections.  
The emergence of former slaves becoming political leaders in decentralized political 
units such as municipalities of Fulɓe communities in West Africa have been explicitly 
adressed by Leservoisier (2005b) for Mauritania, Mauxion (2008) for northeastern Mali 
and Hahonou (2009) for northern Benin and Niger.140 Within traditional political elite 
groups, internal shifts in favour of intellectuals with positions in the national admini-
stration have taken place, which is how Musa Dicko was elected mayor instead of his 
older brother, Chief Haidu. A more detailed explanation of such shifts and changes in 
power positions as lived in the daily practice of the municipal community of Dalla are 
described later (see Chapter 2/9). 
In the descriptions of hierarchy over time, the word ‘change’ comes up time and 
again. Some changes in social hierarchies such as the abolition of the slave trade were 
permanent, while others were superficial, such as the prohibition of the use of slave 
labour. Others were temporary, as emancipation, for example, collapsed during times of 
drought. The historical outline in this first section has grounded ‘change’ as a unilinear 
trajectory over time. Justice has not been done to history by presenting it in a linear 
way, but addressing major political events in a linear way141 allows for a stronger 
argument in the following section. Central in the second section are precisely the 
contestations of change as a unilinear path from tradition to modernity. Trough an 
analysis of how history was and still is instrumentalized by different groups to 
legitimize or improve their current social position, this section describes the 
heterogeneous approaches by which the past can be (re)presented today. The main 
argument is that the past is not a fixed entity and generates a patchwork of variation 







It is the ‘powerful’ who are at the centre of historical legends. 
(Guichard 1998: 195, author’s translation from French) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139  Mauxion (2008: 153) describes the effects of rice-farming intensification on local power constel-
lations in the wake of the droughts in the 1970s and 1980s, demonstrating how the changing players in 
the elections are the outcome of three decades of socio-economic change rather than the elections 
themselves. 
140  Other authors describing the impact of decentralization politics on local power constellations in 
different ethnic groups in Mali include Zobel (2004); Fay (2002); van Dijk & Hesseling (2005) and 
Kassibo (1997). The impact of decentralization policies on land relocation in Douentza is described 
by de Langen (2004/2005). 
141  The history of the area, with a focus on control over mobility, is described in Chapter 6.  
59 
 
Many can tell you where their fathers came from, but some cannot or will not tell even that. In a 
sense, servile informants can say a lot about ‘the world the masters made’. They tend to say 
very little about ‘the world the slaves made’. 
(Klein 1989: 211) 
These quotes indicate how slaves have very little place in history. This section considers 
how the silent ways of slave groups to deal with their history, are shifting. Different 
groups of former slave descendants have different ways of making claims about their 
slave past. Some groups nowadays more explicitly make claims with respect to the past 
to legitimize their status in the social hierarchies of the present.142 Historian Vansina 
(1985: 94) remarked that historical messages are social facts and that oral traditions 
underline a certain collective conscience. Starting from this idea, Jansen (1995) 
demonstrated how in Mali’s Mande Mountains, history can be considered as a 
‘revolving well’. In his study of interpretations of the Sunjata epos, he described how 
oral traditions cannot be used as sources of historical knowledge in an uncritical fashion 
as they are revolving around the well of history, in which everyone digs his own bucket. 
History is a flexible vehicle for contemporary political claims and in the process of 
appropriating and representing history, social groups in the present claim history in 
various ways. 
Rossi (2009a: 2) points out that because today ‘the ideology of slavery loses its grip 
on the way people think and act, it becomes possible for slave descendants to talk about 
their ancestry’. These new possibilities are also generating confusion and there are 
conflicting views of the past among slave descendants. Some distance themselves as far 
as possible from the stigma of their enslavement by being outspoken about the slave-
raiding rulers of the past, while others choose to remain silent about the atrocities their 
ancestors experienced. This explains why the position and personality of King Yerowal 
has been evaluated both positively and negatively by different slave descendants in 
Dalla. Some see him as ‘the last king of Dalla’, stressing his power and ability to rule 
Dalla: ‘Yerowal took good care of the drums (FF: Tubal) symbolizing his power and 
paid the religious scholars well for working with him’.143 Others are overtly negative 
about Yerowal's reign, claiming he was unnecessarily cruel and terrorized their ances-
tors.144 These different representations of the past are the focus of this section.  
There has always been a ‘full house of variation’ (Ferguson 1999: 80) in (re-) 
interpretations of the past and it is important to shed light on these (re)negotiations to do 
away with stereotypes of slaves as ‘people without a history’. Patterson (1982: 4) des-
cribes how slaves: ‘Had a past, to be sure. But a past is not a heritage. Slaves differed 
from other human beings in that they were not allowed freely to ... anchor the living 
present in any conscious community of memory.’  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142  Baldus (1977) convincingly demonstrates how specific Fulɓe slave groups in northern Benin devel-
oped creative ideological adaptations by which these groups internalized their subordination. 
143  Macca Maiga, born around 1958, Dalla (Wuro Mango). Interview with interpreter Umu Sangare, 
Dalla, 2002. 
144  Hassan Tambura, born around 1952, Dalla (Wuro Burram). Also interviews with Riimaayɓe living on 
the Gandamia Plateau near Dalla. Interviews with assistant Burra Yero Cisse, in villages on Ganda-
mia, February 2002. 
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Historian and anthropologist Trouillot (1995) developed a theory about how any 
production of history inevitably generates silence: Historical accounts are always partial 
and coloured. This partiality necessarily leaves other interpretations unrepresented or, 
Trouillot’s words, ‘silenced’. When applying Trouillot’s ideas to the Haayre region, it is 
clear that the religious and political elite define regional history hegemonously: It is the 
history as sung by the bard Amadou Baa Digi (Angenent et al. 2003). In the Haayre 
region, both the ethnic group of Fulɓe and Songhay have historical ‘statements’ (Ibid.: 
52) archived in written documents (FF: Taariki).  
The history of slaves and slave descendants in Fulɓe society remained marginalized 
for a long time (Pelckmans 2003). Nevertheless, a slave history has always existed and 
most slave descendants in the Haayre region remember their origins as freeborn (de 
Bruijn & Pelckmans 2005: 90), as do slave descendants in other Sahelian societies 
(Hardung 2002; Botte 1994: 115; Rossi 2009a). Descendants of slaves in the Haayre 
continue to be excluded today because their slave ancestors lacked written sources and 
due to freeborn religious ontological interpretations of race. Fulɓe often claim to have 
fairer skin than most Bambara and Dogon populations and so in freeborn Fulɓe ide-
ology, Fulɓe are either white (sedentary freeborn) or red (nomadic herdsmen), while 
slaves are ‘black’. Being black is considered a sign of inferiority and lesser moral 
worth.  
The voices of slaves in Fulɓe history have been largely silenced. When asked about 
their history, Fulɓe slaves in Dalla tend to recite the oral history as it has been told by 
their masters, incorporating ideas of their own inferiority but ignoring stories about the 
suffering of their own ancestors. When trying to obtain the histories of slave descend-
ants themselves, the way in which they are approached is important. Methodologically, 
a relationship of trust is needed and this has to have been built up over time to enable 
people to talk about their own personal history. Firstly, the obstacle of silences and 
taboos needs to be overcome. Hardung (2002) mentioned the importance of noting body 
language and silences when interviewing slave descendants in the Fulɓe society of 
northern Benin, such body language can give us more insights into the emic perceptions 
of what is shameful and what is not. Anthropologists, and gender theorists in particular, 
also acknowledge the importance of studying silences and not focusing on words alone 
(Smith-Rosenberg 1985: 11, 26). Silence is not a ‘non-reaction’ but just a different 
reaction and can be equally telling.  
Secondly, a relationship of trust is important because the wrong questions can lead to 
shame. To avoid such shame, it is often bards who ask for names and relations between 
ancestors. For example, if a researcher asks someone with no father for his father’s 
name, this could elicit feelings of shame for the individual involved. Being a ‘bastard 
child’ is, according to Riesman (1977: 79), a very shameful thing in Fulɓe society: It is 
the worst insult possible. Working with intermediaries like bards, can help to avoid such 
shamefull situations.   
Thirdly, secrecy is a powerful instrument for all parties involved. Encouraging 
people to share their secrets is facilitated by trust and reciprocal interaction. Most 
Riimaayɓe and Maccuɓe today know a lot about their own history. Over the years there 
have been changing reasons for the silences regarding their history. One reason is 
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precisely because, in the process of their emancipation, their history became that ‘of 
those who would rather forget’ (Klein 1989). For those who have only recently 
managed to distance themselves from the restraining chains of their past, its 
reconstruction is not a priority. Today, addressing the past has become less difficult 
emotionally because of the passing of time. This is facilitated by the fact that the older 
generation who had personal experiences of slavery are now dying.145 
The growing ethnic consciousness of various slave-descendant groups explains why 
the noble families of Dalla now more than in the past are hiding written historical 
documents that describe which families obtained which slaves and on what occasions. A 
member of the ruling family in Dalla said: ‘once Riimaayɓe know how and from where 
they came, they would probably no longer respect our supremacy and go back to their 
ancestral lands’.146 The ruling freemen want to silence their slaves’ history for fear of 
losing control. Since knowledge is power, the nobility keeps their documents well 
hidden as a way of avoiding revolt, contestation and a revival of the past. In addition, 
the national administration (which in Dalla is in the hands of the Weeheeɓe elite) 
forbids any history of slavery on the school curriculum147 as it is considered to be too 
sensitive. All these measures have obstructed or even silenced the production of a slave 
history.  
However, silence is not necessarily being imposed by the elites. This would imply 
that Riimaayɓe are being denied agency. The nature of their history as outsiders has for 
a long time been stigmatized and undervalued, rendering it shameful. Some have 
subscribed to the stigma of their past and have thus relegated it to the realm of silence 
themselves. This does not mean that former slaves do not have a history or that it is 
excluded from their daily lives.148 What it does mean, however, is that in the public 
domain if one asks a former slave about his/her ancestry, hardly any Riimaayɓe will be 
proud of their slave or foreign origins. This is information that has been relegated to the 
realm of public secrets. Zempleni (1996: 33) described how secrets involve ‘knowing 
how to keep silent’ (French: Savoir taire) and that ‘a large part of social peacekeeping is 
founded on the forbidding of saying what one knows’.149 
The crucial point is that ‘the law of silence does not forbid the sharing of knowledge 
but it is a joint enunciation by those holding the secrets towards those to whom the 
secret is addressed’150 (Zempleni 1996: 36). This convention of silence is reproduced by 
some Riimaayɓe parents who prefer not to tell their children about their slave past 
precisely because it is likely to generate an inferiority complex. Most informants 
confirmed that they knew where and how their grandparents became enslaved but added 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145  Five of the elderly informants of slave descent who I interviewed in Dalla in 2001-2002 have since 
passed away: Allay JannginoowoJannginoowo, Maman Abidjan, Asse Kau, Kumbaare, Allay Kau, 
Diougal and Pooro Weleende. All were Riimaayɓe who served at the royal court of Dalla (Wuro 
Mango ward). 
146  Interview, Almaami Dalla, aged about 45, with assistant Amadu Amiiru Dicko, Dalla, May 2007. 
147  Attempts to voice this history in the educational curriculum in Chad have resulted in violent con-
frontations. Two village children were beaten to death by their teacher for being critical of the history 
of slavery as it was taught in school (Personal conversation, de Bruijn, 2004). 
148  Some historical details are recounted in songs (Klein 1989; Diawara 1989). 
149  Author’s translation.  
150  This author’s translation; emphasis as in the original. 
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that they will only talk about it in private. The silencing works two ways: A hegemonic 
forced erasure of the slave past (consciously silenced in the interests of the former 
masters) as well as a strategic and deliberate silencing of history (by Riimaayɓe 
themselves) to free the road to upward social mobility. 
Reasons for present and past silences on slavery are not only due to the hegemony of 
the dominant groups in societies. Instead ‘these kinds of collective secrets could be 
analysed as principles of social organization ... Silencing the secret of the origins of 
one’s lineage fulfils an inverse, but comparable social function as the genealogical 
recitation’ (Zempleni 1996: 36). Rossi (2009a: 1) describes how some descendants of 
slaves consciously ‘bury their slave past in memory’ to emphasize their successful 
incorporation into the society of freemen. And Meillassoux (1991: 125) mentions how 
the ‘very fact that an individual’s servile origins were known, showed that he or she had 
not been integrated into freeborn society. Only silence on the subject of these origins 
could prove enfranchisement in the full sense of the term.’ As I argue elsewhere (Pelck-
mans 2011b forthcoming) names are often subject to manipulation to conceal slave 
descent. 
A final consideration is the ‘defensive secret’ (Zempleni 1996: 39) in the ethno-
graphic relationship between informants and their ethnographer. By keeping secrets, 
informants try to fend off public secrets from the gaze and/or understanding of the 
intruding ethnographer. Over time, the ethnographer might be able to draw conclusions 
from hints (called ‘secretions’ by Zempleni 1996: 24) s/he has been given or observed 
and that might reveal well-kept public secrets. Time and trust, as mentioned earlier, are 
two fundamental issues in this process. This is why, in writing this ethnography, it was 
methodologically necessary to stick to one social network of people with whom I could 
interact over a long period of time (2001-2010).  
 
Contested origins and land rights 
The way history is (re-)interpreted is important to understand changing identities and 
power constellations in the region. In today’s Haayre region (Maps 1-3), the stories 
about people’s origins involve migration: Everyone has come from somewhere else. 
Dogon claim to have come from the Mande area and Fulɓe from the Inner Delta of the 
River Niger or further west from Fuuta Tooro (present-day Senegal). Songhay claim to 
be the first settlers in parts of the region, living there since the Gao Empire (1340-1591) 
(Hunwick 1988). Most groups have no concrete proof of where they come from. This is 
not particularly important as the relevant issue is the political motivation behind their 
claims. Some have been more successful in claiming their space in the Haayre region 
than others, and have effectively monopolized natural resources and control over peo-
ple. 
In their version of history, freeborn Fulɓe emphasize how their warrior ancestors 
conquered those already in the Haayre during the nineteenth century. The subjection of 
these populations is justified in Fulɓe oral traditions as a religious crusade against non-
Muslims. Most populations that were subordinated or enslaved in this period were of 
Dogon origin. As Angenent et al. (2003: 69) put it: 
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Moodi transformed all the Dogon into slaves (Riimaayɓe). He says, you Dogon, I will transform you 
into dependants. If I transform you this way, Islamic law will be ‘light’ on you. Stay in your houses, 
do not move your cultivated hamlets. You will be the owners of your fields and your gardens and all 
that you own. All that my people find with you, will remain yours. 151 
Bard Baa Digi’s quote above shows that the newly settled Fulɓe recognized rights 
over land and even over the possessions of the first settlers. It was not land, which at 
that time was not scarce, but rather control over people that they sought to underline 
their nobility.152 Slaves, like cattle, contributed to freeborns’ prestige and wealth. In the 
past, land was abundant and not a source of power in itself (Goody 1971). Baa Digi 
(Angenet et al. 2003) explains how Riimaayɓe consisted mainly of Dogon populations 
who settled there first and therefore maintained their land rights but had no say over 
their children: ‘If a freeborn (pullo) does not have a slave, his nobility cannot be 
complete ... We will take your children in order to have ourselves served by them. Once 
they will be adults, they will be returned to you. We take your daughters to serve our 
women’ (Angenent et al. 2003: 69; author’s translation). 
Land has since become a scarcer resource and as rights to it are closely tied to 
membership of specific communities, membership is increasingly being contested and 
negotiated and can change over time (Kuba & Lentz 2006: 1). Today, Weeheeɓe and 
Moodibaaɓe elites in the Fulɓe kingdoms of the Haayre have converted social and 
political capital into control over land.  
Over time and in connection with political events, land use and property changed. 
The incorporation of Dalla into the Islamic Fulɓe Maasina Empire resulted in radical 
changes in land use. The formerly pastoralist warriors created slave estates and put a 
system of surplus production in place. However, French colonizers interfered in pro-
perty rights as can be seen from the following excerpt:153 
The slave (Dimadio) is not an autochthon in origin, he has been captured by the conquerors. This is 
why once the Markas (an ethnic group) had been chased, the slave cultivates the land. What he 
cultivates is not for him, but for his master who is the only free person and the only one who has 
rights. This is at least the indigenous thesis that dates back the coming of the Fulbe to the area in the 
seventeenth century. Subordinated to the Foutanke Empire in Bandiagara and compelled to go and 
live in Kounari, they obtain, after the French conquest, from monsieur the Governor Grodet, the right 
to return to the lands that have been theirs for ages, in the same social status as before their servitude. 
Because even until now, none of the slaves (Rimaibe) ever contested the right of the Fulbe (peul) to 
be the owners of the land. 
As they granted land rights to the first settlers, the French no longer accorded 
Yerowal property in hamlets on the Gandamia Plateau.154 This contributed to the eman-
cipation of the Riimaayɓe hamlets on the plateau, many of which emphasize today how 
they were the first real settlers in the area even before the Fulɓe warriors (FF: 
Weeheeɓe) arrived. They insist that they are the only rightful owners of the land under 
cultivation (de Bruijn & van Dijk 2001a: 232) and refuse to pay taxes. They reinterpret 
official Weeheeɓe accounts of enslavement, explaining how they were never enslaved 
and were simply tricked by the religious elites who wrote their Riimaayɓe names down 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151  Author’s translation. 
152  See also Goody (1971) & Kopytoff (1987). 
153  ANM, FA: 1E-30/fev.1910/Djenne/pp. 7-8. 
154  These hamlets are Muniyol, Gaana, Bunti, Bula, Orowel and Baanikaani.  
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as property in the historical documents of the freeborn Fulɓe. Their current claim to 
indigenous rights is thus being renegotiated in relation to land. This is an important 
aspect of their relative emancipation from an inferior position in the social hierarchy.155 
They are reinforcing their claims to rights over land by pointing to their pastoralist 
masters who profited from non-territorial livelihood strategies to negotiate belonging 
(van Dijk 1997; Diallo 2002). 
Different groups of slave descendants in the Haayre region are thus renegotiating the 
past in the present. A first example described here is the way the inhabitants of Ko-
longo,156 a hamlet near Dalla (Map 4), are contesting the freeborn Fulɓe’s interpretation 
of history. They explain how the term Riimaayɓe should be translated as ‘free’ instead 
of ‘freed’ people because they are independent and own their own land. They claim that 
their original historical documents were stolen by the French and were never returned to 
them. This is why they lost their customary rights as first settlers, and thus landowners. 
They also insist that the national government mistakenly placed a board on the asphalt 
road pointing to where Dalla is situated rather than to Kolongo. Freeborn Fulɓe in Dalla 
ignore this interpretation saying that the inhabitants of Kolongo only came down from 
the hills a few decades ago and that their occupation of the land is quite new. Never-
theless, the mayor of Dalla was not comfortable with my visits to this small hamlet and 
instructed my host, Suleymane,157 to forbid me and my research assistant from returning 
to interview the villagers of Kolongo ‘who don’t know anything’. We however conti-
nued going there once more and encountered no problems. 
A second case illustrates how contestations over land rights are not unique to former 
slave groups.158 Boumbam, a hamlet south of Dalla which has fertile land (Map 4), is 
another site of current conflict concerning land claims and negotiations over history. 
This conflict is not between former slaves and their masters but shows similarities in the 
way latecomers, much like slaves, have had to negotiate access to land with freeborn 
Fulɓe rulers in Dalla. The son of the chief of Dalla explains the emerence of a conflict 
between low status Dogon and the ruling Fulɓe elite of Dalla. The Dogon in the hamlet 
Boumbam were originally hosted by the ruling Dicko family in Dalla.  
Two family members of the politician Samba Ongoiba, members of a low social status group among 
the Dogon, wanted to set themselves up in Dalla. My father’s father (King Yerowal) lent them some 
land in Boumbam but, over time, these Dogon families multiplied much faster than the Fulɓe in Dalla. 
This is why there was increased demand for cultivable land (FF: leydi). Due to Ongoiba’s position in 
the national government (he was a deputy under Moussa Traore), his family members are now trying 
to legalize their claims to being the first settlers at the court in Douentza. They deny having been lent 
land by Dalla’s ruler in the past. To legitimize their claims, they bribed lawyers in Douentza court and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155  Mauxion (2008) similar processes tot eh East in the Gao region. There he describes the emergence of 
local entrepreneurs (some of slave descent) who, by providing land to landless peasants and managing 
irrigation systems, are playing an increasingly important role in the local political organization. It is 
due to their manipulation of land ownership that they have achieved political influence.  
156  Interview, Burra Baa, born around 1950, with assistant Hama Amba Yattara, Kolongo, February 
2002. 
157  For more information about my host Suleymane, see Chapters 2 and 8.  
158  Nijenhuis (2009) describes how conflicts over land in the Haayre should not be interpreted as typical 
conflicts between herders and farmers, nor as conflicts between first-settled versus later-settled. 
Instead these conflicts are often between autochthons to the detriment of migrant farmers or those 
who settled later. Land is often part of conflicts over power. 
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also bribed the mayor of Dalla, who accepted their gifts and complicated matters for the chief. Before, 
poor peasants like them would never have thought of going to court or to make claims to the land; 
they would not have stood a chance because they had no status or influence whatsoever. 
Outside Dalla, similar negotiations are taking place too. In the neighbouring King-
dom of Booni, Riimaayɓe are also contesting dominant interpretations of history. They 
deny having been submitted to the Fulɓe ruler of Booni (King Maamadu Nduuldi) and 
instead claim they assisted him on their own initiative in his war against the Tuareg (de 
Bruijn & van Dijk 1994: 103). The way in which Bilaali, a sixty-year-old slave 
descendant, recounts the history of the area demonstrates his attempts to align himself 
with the heroes of the past.159 He emphasizes that he is a proud follower and descendant 
of Maamudu Nduuldi and stresses the heroic legacy of King Maamudu Nduuldi. Bilaali 
is thus actively assimilating his ancestors into the heroic history of Fulɓe freemen like 
Maamudu Nduuldi. In contrast, the French archives and more marginal groups of slave 
descendants emphasize how Maamudu Nduuldi ravaged the area and violated local 
populations.  
The fact that Bilaali is now considered the hamlet’s leader makes it possible for him 
and his wife to deny their slave backgrounds and to claim never to have been linked to 
any master. Nevertheless his mother ‘gave’ one of her daughters to her master, a trader 
(FF: Jaawannɗo) in Dalla but Bilaali’s position today allows him to deny this past 
relationship. This illustrates how people overwrite their history by adapting it to their 
present status and although they do not document such claims on paper, some groups 
are trying to have their oral claims legally sustained, like the inhabitants of Boumbam 
did with their bribes.  
The ways in which certain groups have appropriated alternative readings of history, 
such as the Riimaayɓe of Kolongo, reflect the weakening radius of power held by the 
elites at the heart of the kingdom. The relative spatial distance of the Riimaayɓe in 
Kolongo to the royal court has allowed them to develop their own counter-discourse 
away from the centre of power at the royal court of Dalla. Nevertheless, the occasional, 
self-proclaimed independence of Riimaayɓe in practice needs to be taken with a pinch 
of salt. The ruling family in Dalla continues to levy slave taxes on their most loyal 
former slave families (Riimaayɓe slave descendants). The emancipatory discourse on 
belonging and land concerning slave descendants does not necessarily remove the 
existing legacies of slavery although some are more successful than others in bypassing 
them.  
It is important to note how conditions for assimilation and/or autochtonization have 
changed over time. Lentz (2006: 3) describes how:  
The former processes whereby immigrants were gradually autochtonised have come under pressure. 
Moreover bureaucratic decentralization and the international debate on the rights of indigenous 
peoples have contributed to the growing importance of land in the on-going struggle to assert be-
longing and political rights. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159  For a more detailed description of this case, see de Bruijn & Pelckmans (2005: 84-87). 
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In the Haayre region, as elsewhere in Africa and beyond,160 claims of belonging and 
autochthony flared up after the elections in 1997 that were organized in the context of 
political decentralization. The decentralization process generated a new context for legal 
claims to democracy and constitutional rule. In practice, claims of belonging depend on 
the ways in which one manages to avoid the risk of not belonging, or even of being 
accused of making false declarations. In the Haayre region, such claims have not yet led 
to outbreaks of violence as has been seen in other regions in Africa.161 
These processes of ‘rooting in the soil’ as a primal form of belonging are not specific 
to the Haayre region and have also been documented in several other West African 
countries (Luning 1997; Kuba & Lentz 2006). As Lentz (2006: 8) mentions:  
Access to land was, and still is, mediated by membership in specific communities and groups, which 
is based on descent, shared histories of migration or flight, physical proximity and political allegiance. 
The boundaries of these groups, however, were and continue to be notoriously fuzzy, meaning that 
membership needs to be negotiated. The ways in which these negotiations take place, depends on the 
possibilities and creativity of those involved. 
The fuzziness and different outcomes of negotiations of membership come to the 
fore in terminology and this is discussed below.  
 
Explaining diversity among slaves (and their descendants)  
The group generically referred to as Riimaayɓe in Fulfulde language broadly incorpo-
rates all people who have ever been classified with a slave status, whether they were 
actually enslaved by Fulɓe or not. In Fulɓe society, Riimaayɓe are in the majority and 
constitute the most heterogeneous social group. Although they are considered part of the 
Fulɓe ethnic group, the category of Riimaayɓe has been interpreted by some (both in an 
emic and etic sense) as an ethnic group rather than as the specific status-holding social 
group within the Fulɓe ethnic group (Hardung 1997: 138; Hahonou 2011).  
The generic term Riimaayɓe veils an enormous diversity among those populations 
who self-defining or being defined by others as Riimaayɓe. To draw attention to this 
diversity, I adopt Ferguson’s concept (used to describe local and cosmopolitan 
mineworkers in the Zambian Copperbelt) of the ‘full house’ or ‘bush of variation’ 
(1999: 80).162 This metaphor aptly highlights the importance of diversity instead of 
dichotomous models in which masters are opposed to slaves, freeborn to non-freeborn 
and Fulɓe to Riimaayɓe. Nevertheless, informants dichotomize their worlds in such 
ways themselves. Both freeborn and slave descendants tend to describe the differences 
between them in dualist and strict categories. As opposed to Riimaayɓe who have 
different terms for variations and sub-groups among them, freeborn Fulɓe stress that 
RiimayBe are all the same. There is no difference between the two groups because both 
still belong to them. In the Haayre Fulfulde dialect, the term for ‘those we own’ (FF: 
Jeyaaɓe) is still used among freeborn Fulɓe. Some adopt the euphemism ‘those we see’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160  Similar struggles over belonging are taking place in other parts of the African continent too. See for 
example, Geschiere & Gugler (1998) and Geschiere & Nyamnjoh (2000). 
161  For example in northern Ghana, as described by Wienia (2009). 
162  Ferguson (1999: 80) argues that ‘at every historical point, the evidence suggests that a wide range of 




(FF: Yiiyaaɓe) for public use to indicate those that they still see as theirs, those still 
under their tutelage. By homogenizing all Riimaayɓe, they cover up differences in 
power and status that in some instances threaten their authority. So even though 
informants themselves resort to dichotomies in emic terms, this does not mean that they 
do justice to the necessary multiplicity of reality. 
To understand the emergence of this multiplicity, this thesis focuses on variation and 
diversity in Riimaayɓe status by examining seven main dimensions that have co-shaped 
this variety past and present. Firstly, there is diversity in ancestry that accounts for 
diversity in a person’s current status. Fulɓe were likely to treat court slaves they cap-
tured from the Bambara court in Segou much better than young slave children captured 
in a non-prestigious village. In other words, often, the former status of people before 
enslavement, did play a role  
Secondly, the diverse ways of incorporation into Fulɓe society of various Riimaayɓe 
groups also explains their diversity. Most Riimaayɓe ancestors were incorporated in 
Fulɓe society as slaves, and the enslavement of individuals from the floating popula-
tions described earlier has resulted in different kinds of slaves. Domestic slaves or 
Maccuɓe were captured in wars (de Bruijn 2001a: 231), while Riimaayɓe were either 
the first inhabitants or refugees in the region who were forced to convert to Islam by 
Fulɓe kings. Others were pawned, kidnapped or exchanged as tax or commodities by 
family members and/or traders. A final way of incorporation could be the circumstances 
which forced people to defer to local elites, sometimes as a result of extreme need, for 
example in times of drought.  
These newcomers, since settling in a Fulɓe community, have been labelled Rii-
maayɓe because, as relative outsiders, their status came closer to that of slaves on the 
estates (FF: Riimaayɓe) than to that of domestic slaves (FF: Maccuɓe). Such 
newcomers were often only allowed to marry slave women, since other status groups 
were strictly endogamous and, for some, this assimilation through attribution of the 
Riimaayɓe status (see Chapter 9/ epilogue) remains difficult to accept or is a way of 
denying slave origins elsewhere.  
Thirdly, insertion and incorporation in Fulɓe society was different for everyone. 
After the ‘natal alienation’ that brought about the ‘social death’ and ‘secular excommu-
nication’ from their former home society (Patterson 1982: 4), slaves who initially had 
an ‘outsider’ status (Finley 1981) were incorporated into their host society. Kopytoff & 
Miers (1977: 16) describe slavery as ‘the institutionalization of marginality’, empha-
sizing that although the ‘willingness to absorb people’ in kinship systems is ample 
(Ibid.: 14), they have remained less incorporated than insiders of their host society 
(Ibid.: 15-16). The time frame is important here. The earlier on a specific Riimaayɓe 
group became part of Fulɓe society, the higher the level of incorporation they tend to 
exhibit today.  
Fourthly, individual characteristics of specific groups or individuals within the Rii-
maayɓe group have resulted in multiple ‘conditions’ (Meillassoux 1991) and privileges 
for some. Social climbing and assimilation were possible and differed even among 
slaves of the same generation who lived side by side (Ibid.: 125). The strategies of some 
were to buy slaves (FF: Soodtaaɓe) themselves. Others became higher-status court 
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slaves (FF: Maccuɓe wuro) who were promoted to the prestigious function of ‘right 
hand’ to the chief or to ‘chief of the slaves’. This difference in status among slaves 
depended on their master, generation, age and origins and has meant that, for some 
Riimaayɓe, their individual status prevailed over the collective status of the Riimaayɓe 
group (Hardung 1997: 109).  
Fifthly, there are as many different kinds of master-slave relations as there are 
individuals. The degree of affection and interaction between master and slave in the past 
has to some extent co-shaped current relations between their descendants. This will be 
analyzed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
A sixth point is related to the intensity of the master-slave bond in the past. Some 
slave descendants today continue to orient themselves primarily to social relations with 
their former master’s family. This overemphasis on vertical relations with freeborn 
results in a downplaying of horizontal relations among slave descendants and partly 
explains the continued lack of strong social cohesion among Riimaayɓe.  
The last point, which to some extent explains the ‘bush of variation’ in Riimaayɓe 
status, is place. The places in which Riimaayɓe have lived (close to or far from their 
respective former masters) has co-shaped the way they are associated with or associate 
themselves with slave status. This last point will be illustrated in more ethnographic 
detail in the next chapter. 
These dimensions all explain why Riimaayɓe are hosting a ‘full house’ of statuses 
and ‘variations’. Today many inhabitants of the plateau villages and hamlets are 
outsiders who have been absorbed into Fulɓe society as Riimaayɓe. Alongside the 
descendants of the slaves of Fulɓe, other ethnic groups, such as Tuareg, Dogon, 
Songhay and Mossi, all co-habit with Riimaayɓe in the Haayre today (Angenent et al. 
2003: 12-16; de Bruijn & Pelckmans 2005: 83-87). The generic term Riimaayɓe is 
sometimes even stretched to include all those who are marginal to Fulɓe society: 
Groups as diverse as impoverished Fulɓe but also slave descendants of Tuareg,163 
Dogon and Songhay origin.164 All these groups have been labelled or assimilated into 
the Riimaayɓe category but their only common denominator is that in some way or 
other they arrived as relative outsiders and were by choice or coercion absorbed into 
Fulɓe society (Fanchette 1999: 191). 
Summarizing these seven dimensions demonstrates how the simple binary equation 
of Riimaayɓe status, being equal to a (former) slave, obscures more dimensions than is 
desirable. These seven dimensions of variety in my view explain why there is no com-
munal history or oral traditions among Riimaayɓe. Due to internal differences in status 
and social hierarchy among the different groups and individuals of slave descent, it was 
difficult for a long time to formulate a common source of identification, let alone a 
communal history.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163  Bella is a concept often cited in the (colonial) literature. In Malian Tamasheq dialect of the Tuareg 
however, this group calls itself Eklan (Lecocq 2005). In Burkina Faso the word Iklan is used (Bouman 
2003: 52, 58-62), which in Niger is strictly forbidden (Hahonou 2009: 155) because of its negative 
(and stigmatizing) connotations linked to slavery. The word Bella is derived from the Songhay 
language bellay and was translated into Fulfulde language as Bellaaɓe. 
164  For examples, see Angenent et al. (2003: 12-16) and de Bruijn & Pelckmans (2005: 83-87). 
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Social boundaries and fragmentary identities among Riimaayɓe slave descendants  
Not only history but also social boundaries have been contested and reinterpreted over 
time by various Riimaayɓe sub-groups, such as Riimaayɓe, Maccuɓe and a smaller 
group of Kommongalluuɓe. The inhabitants of the Haayre region explain the differences 
between these sub-groups as follows: Those who still defer to a master (FF: Maccuɓe) 
are not the same as those who do not (FF: Riimaayɓe). Riimaayɓe live on the plateaus in 
independent villages (FF: Riimaayɓe Haayre), while Maccuɓe live near their masters 
(FF: Maccuɓe Wuro). And Kommongalluuɓe are the descendants of slaves with no spe-
cific masters.  
Kommongalluuɓe have been called ‘noble Riimaayɓe’ in the colonial archives.165 
Some explain this by the fact that they obtained their freedom fighting as soldiers or by 
buying their freedom through the payment of their economic worth or trade price (FF: 
Soodtooɓe) to their masters.166 Others claim that Kommongalluuɓe167 never had per-
sonal masters but deferred to whom they chose. Kommangalluuɓe in the region of 
Booni168 voluntarily sought the protection of Maamudu Nduuldi at the beginning of the 
twentieth century when there was unrest in the area. Many claim to have volunteered in 
his army and since noble freeborn consider deference a form of slavery, Kommongal-
luuɓe also used to be considered as slaves, but with a higher ranking.  Kommongalluuɓe 
today take pride in granting themselves a more independent social identity and distance 
themselves from any reference to slavery or slave status. They take offence at being 
called or categorized as Riimaayɓe; have different privileges; are free to make their own 
sacrifices during the sacrificial feast of Tabaski; and try to maintain their slightly higher 
status by resorting to endogamy among themselves. They look down on both Riimaayɓe 
and Maccuɓe 
The social boundaries between Riimaayɓe and Maccuɓe are often explained in terms 
of spatial occupation. Most informants explain the differences between Riimaayɓe and 
Maccuɓe as reflecting their different origins in terms of space:169 Maccuɓe live next to 
their masters in villages, while Riimaayɓe live in the bush and cultivate for their 
masters.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165  ANM, FA 2E-4: Politiques indigènes. Correspondances-cercle de Bandiagara. 1899-1907. ‘Les 
rimaibes de Loro, nokora, Bassari, Ourou-Ngayrou and Badaga sont appelés Komogalloubes qui 
signifie rimaibe nobles. Ils étaient tous les captifs du seul fama de boni et en tirent un supériorité sur 
les riimaibes des pauvres, sur lesquels ils peuvent exercer une certaine influence.’ Signée: R. Poin-
celet, Hombori, 4 July 1904. 
166  For more on manumission procedures, see Chapter 5. 
167  In the region of Maasina north of Mopti, there is a herding territory (FF: Leydi) called Kommongallu. 
However, none of my informants ever referred to it to explain their background. See Map 28: Les 
Leydi du Macina in Pouget (2000: 241). The archives (ANM, FA: 1E-30/nov. 1910/Djenne) also 
mention a canton called Komongallo in Maasina. 
168  Most Kommongalluuɓe live near Booni, about 40 km from Dalla in the villages of Girimarie, Gegi, 
Gai, Nokara, Wurangerou, Looro and Douena-Banaga. 
169  Breedveld & de Bruijn (1996: 808) also indicate how ‘what remains is the spatial division between 
groups. The elites live in villages, the pastoral Fulɓe live in semi-nomadic cattle camps and those who 
used to be slaves either cohabit with their former masters, either they live in their village of origin, or 




Riimaayɓe Haayre claim to have been settled when the Fulɓe warriors arrived, as 
opposed to Maccuɓe Wuro who were captured as war booty and brought into the area 
by their masters. Maccuɓe Wuro are descendants of those born as slaves in their 
masters' house. They live in the central village (FF: Wuro) with elite families to take 
care of the domestic labour.170 Riimaayɓe Haayre, on the contrary, lived on the slave 
estates where they worked their own land as cultivators. They are of either slave or free-
farmer tenant descent but both groups were economically dependent on the land owned 
by the freeborn elite. They cultivated the elite’s land and/or assisted in herding cows in 
the surrounding hamlets. It is an extremely heterogeneous group since most strangers 
and migrants have been categorized as Riimaayɓe as well.171 
Freeborn Fulɓe tend to homogenize perceived differences among Riimaayɓe. The 
word Maccuɓe, according to the former mayor of Dalla, Moussa Dicko,172 was used in 
the past to identify slaves. Due to the declining power of their masters, some Maccuɓe 
managed to start cultivating and identifying themselves as Riimaayɓe. The former imam 
of Dalla,173 a representative voice among religious scholars (FF: Moodibaaɓe), empha-
sized how Riimaayɓe and Maccuɓe both remaineattached (FF: Maraaδo) to their 
masters too date. 
Maccuɓe and Riimaayɓe recognize the perceived differences between themselves but 
are most concerned with status differences within their respective sub-group. Maccuɓe 
Wuro are extremely heterogeneous because they had more opportunities to climb 
socially than Riimaayɓe Haayre. Their status differed according to occupation, gender, 
age and, above all, the status of their masters in the freeborn hierarchy. Slaves adopted 
the prestige of the status of their masters: The slaves of the chiefs thus looked down on 
and commanded the slaves of the traders (who were inferior to the chiefs).  
But even a single sub-group of slaves belonging to the same freeborn family can 
fragment hierarchically among themselves. An example is the way in which some 
slaves were appointed by their masters to act as chiefs over their fellows. In the past, a 
chief of the slaves (FF: Amiiru Maccuɓe) divided the tasks given to him by his master 
among his fellow slaves.174 
Today Riimaayɓe Haayre claim to be more independent from Fulɓe than Maccuɓe 
Wuro, who continue to live next to their former masters. The Riimaayɓe Haayre there-
fore feel higher in status than Maccuɓe Wuro. Maccuɓe Wuro and Riimaayɓe Haayre 
have marked the social boundaries between themselves through marriage prohibit-
ions.175 Although both groups maintain strong claims to the perceived status differences 
between them, these boundaries have blurred.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170  Meillassoux calls this ‘partial organization’ and questioned whether talking about slaves is appropriate 
for these groups. According to his definition, slaves are those who have been incorporated through 
violence, thus excluding birth.  
171  Slaves have been described as ‘the perfect strangers’ by Simmel (1923/1950: 407) in Kopytoff & 
Miers (1977: 15). 
172  Moussa Dicko, interview with de Bruijn, Douentza, 2002.  
173  Almaami Dalla, taped interview by Hama Amba with Almaami, 2002. Translated by Hama Amba and 
Burra Yero Cisse. This imam died in 2007 and his successor is considered less powerful.  
174  This title is described in more detail in Chapter 4. 
175  Chapter 3 elaborates on the endogamous practices of slave descendants.  
71 
 
Maccuɓe claim that Riimaayɓe are as enslaved as they are because once French 
colonials controlled the area at the beginning of the twentieth century, Fulɓe could no 
longer go raiding and were forced to find slaves in nearby Riimaayɓe villages. Maccuɓe 
Wuro claim that this is how Riimaayɓe Haayre were reduced to slaves, much in the 
same way as they themselves were once captured during wars. Secondly they emphasize 
how during the droughts of 1912-1913 (FF: kiitaanngal) and the 1970s and 1980s (FF: 
Yolbere), many Riimaayɓe Haayre (who used to have pastoralist masters who were then 
poverty-stricken themselves) began to defer to rich (freeborn elite) families in bigger 
settlements. They offered their children as pawns to work as domestic slaves in 
exchange for food.176 The royal family too recruited Riimaayɓe women from the 
villages on the plateau as concubines, wives or housemaids. That their children and 
wives always had to be available just like domestic slaves (FF: Maccuɓe Wuro) 
contradicts the claims of greater autonomy made by Riimaayɓe Haayre when comparing 
themselves to Maccuɓe Wuro.  
In their approach to the past too, the social boundaries between these sub-groups of 
Riimaayɓe are clear-cut. Riimaayɓe Haayre and Maccuɓe Wuro have different ap-
proaches to memories of their past. Most Maccuɓe Wuro’s ties with their original home 
areas have faded. In interviews they insisted that they never knew their ancestors 
because they were very young when captured. However, other people in the village 
could remember something about the precise origins of their families. In two interviews, 
my interpreter confronted the informant with what we knew about her slave past but in 
both cases the (female) informants177 denied everything. 
Other, in contrast, often take pride in preserving and recounting the memory of their 
ethnic group of origin, for example as Dogon, Hausa, Mossi, Songhay or Bambara. 
Some even returned to their regions and families of origin before enslavement. Diougal, 
one of the eldest slave descendants at the royal court in Dalla, was told by his father 
about the origin of their family. His grandfather had been taken as a slave in a raid in a 
Bamana village in the Inner Delta of the Niger near Konna. De Bruijn & van Dijk 
(1995a: 59) describe how he and his father went back to their village of origin and 
found some of the children of the brothers of Diougal’s grandfather there but did not 
stay.  
El Hajj Bocoum’s father, a freeborn tradesman, went to look for the descendants of 
some of his slaves who fled their master during the colonial occupation. Family 
members of slaves who fled or went back to their region of origin often kept in touch 
either with their master or family members they had left behind. It was through such 
family contacts that El Hajj’s father managed to trace his former slaves in Burkina Faso. 
These cases demonstrate how differently slave descendants can deal with their past. 
There are however various other options: Some went back to their regions of origin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176  Interview, Allay Jannginoowo, born around 1940, with interpreter Umu Sangare, Dalla, 2001-2002. 
Interview in Bamako with Moodi, born around 1950 in Dalla, February 2007. 
177  Interview with Kumbel Dauda and interpreter Musa Dicko jr. in Bamako, 2007. Interview with Asse 
Kau Dicko, with research assistant Umu Sangere and Asse’s co-villager Dikoore Samba, Dalla, 2002. 
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before enslavement, while others decided to reconstruct their genealogies (Cf. Schmitz 
2009) thereby erasing all traces of slavery.178 
 
Presenting and performing slave status: Audience and time frame 
Apart from the instrumental use of history and the different claims by the sub-groups of 
Riimaayɓe in Fulɓe society, the ‘audience’ to which each social group presents its his-
tory makes a difference. History is ‘performed’ according to the audience. In retrospect, 
my interaction with slave descendants during my first fieldwork period in 2001-2002 
was clearly a performance to persuade me of the righteousness of their claims. Only 
after several interviews over a longer period of time did I discover just how much some 
informants had tried to manipulate their representation of the past so as to be seen 
differently by me, a naïve outsider. To understand how status is performed and staged, 
it is important to consider the context and audience.  
Apart from the audience, the time frame in which specific claims about history are 
made matter too. To illustrate this, the case of Musa Dicko’s family is taken here. Musa 
Dicko was a son of King Yerowal and his mother Faata was a concubine of slave 
descent who was courted by the king and bore him children (see Figure 2). Faata’s 
grandmother was a Songhay who had been captured at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. As the King of Dalla took Faata as a concubine, this connected her enslaved family 
members to the family of the Fulɓe rulers. Musa’s mother’s family (Riimaayɓe Haayre 
from the hamlet of Onga) became kinsmen of the lineage of King Yerowal through this 
marriage. They feel justified in claiming the history of the royal lineage group with the 
patronym Dicko as their own. As long as nobody talks openly about their family’s 
inferior role in Yerowal’s family nor about the dependency relations they used to have, 
their invented narratives of belonging are upheld. Claiming free origins vis-à-vis 
newcomers and strangers allows them an independent, less stigmatized identity but it 
remains a fragile and undefined claim. When asked whether they are free, some openly 
express their doubts, feeling they have to confess that they have never been freed before 
God.179 Islam, in emic terms, is thus considered a very important element for the status 
and positioning of slaves.  
Chapter 4 will present this Riimaayɓe family that openly asserts a historical master-
slave relationship with the royal family and a privileged position vis-à-vis other slave 
descendants. By reclaiming this historical relationship, they recall duties180 the nobility 
has towards dependants. Slave descendants can also choose to activate these memories 
of slavery because that relationship with wealthy freeborn potentially provides them, as 
a less powerful family, with access to development agencies, the courts and the national 
administration. Influential wealthy freeborn families, such as the royal lineage of Dalla, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178  See Noret (2008), Ologoudou (2008) and Zempleni (1996) for genealogical manipulation processes 
among other ethnic groups in Benin and Ivory Coast. In Pelckmans (2011b forthcoming) I describe 
how not only a return to one’s roots by reconstructing genealogies but also a move away from these 
roots by manipulating genealogies was, and still is, common. 
179  Chapter 5 describes how religion is central to identification and underscores status differences be-
tween the free and non-freeborn.  
180  Chapter 2 and 4 consider the content of such duties in more detail.  
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provide ‘bureaucratic assistance’ that can be much needed since the national 
government fails to provide for its citizens.  
In addition to the context of the moment, whether or not slave status is performed 
explicitly also tends to be related to perspectives of the younger versus the older gene-
ration. Chapter 4 deals with young people and their reproach of the older generation for 
their naïve conservatism and for still ‘believing in slavery’.181 Some young Maccuɓe 
Wuro in Dalla accuse their parents of working for free for those who they naïvely 
consider their former masters. Many elders in turn stress that it is important to respect 
one’s ancestors and rebuke the youngsters for denying their ancestors and being 
ashamed of their slave origins.  
Conclusions: Presenting the past over time 
The manipulation, negotiation and thus the ‘performance’ of the history of slavery are 
all contested. Memories of slavery, like slavery itself, are inherently relational and 
therefore necessarily heterogeneous, reflecting multiple views from various social per-
spectives. By discussing the presented pasts of slave descendants in the Haayre region 
today, this chapter has focused on discursive memories of Fulɓe slave descendants, with 
their negotiations of history as a case in point.182 
This chapter has discussed how ‘change’ is emerging as an ever-increasing variety of 
choices over meanings attributed to hierarchy over time. Each change has added new 
layers to slave-master relations, transforming them and blurring their former specificity.  
The first section outlined the gradual changes in Fulɓe hierarchies in the Haayre 
region over the course of the twentieth century, as presented by Bard Baa Digi who 
voices freeborn historical oral tradition. For local hierarchies, a first and very profound 
change was the sedentarization of Fulɓe warlords in kingdoms in the nineteenth century. 
Their settlement allowed them to organize labour surpluses through the establishment of 
a slave economy. Fluctuations as to who was marginal versus who was dominant were 
discussed in the context of Warnier’s (1975) concept of floating populations. The 
second change in Fulɓe hierarchies was the abolition of the slave trade and slave 
markets by the French colonial state but official legal abolition did not change the 
socio-cultural worldviews of their subjects. Colonial and post-colonial abolitionist cam-
paigners were divided by power relations between actors with conflicting agendas. 
Legally, most ethnic groups can be considered as post-slavery societies since slavery 
was abolished in 1905. In practice, however, socio-cultural legacies of slavery have 
remained important. 
The third political event discussed in the first section of this chapter was the emer-
gence of Mali as an independent nation-state. Attempts to abolish slavery by national 
legislation have not profoundly altered ways of relating in the Haayre region. The First 
Republic only had eight years to impose its socialist policy of secularization and edu-
cation and after that the dictatorial regime of Traore did not insist on such matters. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181  Bellagamba (2009a) describes similar processes for the Gambia.  
182  Pelckmans (2011b forthcoming) describes how surname changes reflect Fulɓe slave descendants’ 
attempt to contest legacies of slavery. 
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Constitutional legislation has hardly gained any ground. As will be demonstrated in 
Chapter 5, religious ideologies based on slavery and inequality have remained the basis 
for socio-cultural organization in the Central Malian hinterland.  
Lastly, the chapter mentioned the decentralization policies of the 1990s, which 
initially promised change by emancipating citizens and granting equal access to political 
functions for all. In the former Fulɓe Kingdom of Dalla, which is now administratively 
classified as a rural community, decentralization did not lead to significant changes in 
local hierarchies. The ruling Weeheeɓe family in Dalla for much of the twentieth 
century managed to maintain their favoured position in the Fulɓe hierarchy while other 
groups looked for mobility within or outside these hierarchies. They did so through their 
own agency (clearing their own lands and establishing new settlements) or by 
connecting with external opportunities (access to political positions, education and 
mobility), most of which had been created by the French colonial government. 
The second section in this chapter dealt with discursive reflections of slave des-
cendants on their past in the present. Initially the control of the freeborn over slaves was 
not necessarily obtained through territorial power and land distribution. Instead they 
gained prestige thanks to their wealth in people (slaves) and a monopoly over historical 
representation. Freeborn Fulɓe monopolized freeborn status by appropriating written 
sources that continue to underscore their historical narrative, while silencing other slave 
voices and versions of history. Slaves and their descendants often lacked the right tools 
to validate their claims to the past. Today the hegemony of the elite’s interpretations is 
waning and oral contestations by Riimaayɓe have been successful.  
Power within the group of slave descendants is articulated differently in what can be 
perceived as the centre (the village) versus the peripheries (satellite hamlets beyond the 
village). Geographical distance between the ruling elites and the floating populations on 
the periphery sometimes translate into greater social distance, which has allowed some 
slave descendants to make more solid claims concerning their own history. Many 
groups with a slave identity in Fulɓe society are classified with a homogenizing generic 
collective terminology (Riimaayɓe, Maccuɓe), reflecting the stigma of slavery. In prac-
tice, some of these groups have rid themselves of all aspects of slavery. 
The multiplicity of claims over historical alliances echoes the multiplicity of the 
social positions of slave descendants. Many have developed their own narratives as to 
who they are and why, which are reflected in their attempts to claim land rights and in 
historical interpretations of autochthony (as first settlers). These claims not only differ 
among different ethnic groups but also within each sub-group of slave descendants.  
Slave descendants lack a common narrative because they are not a homogenous 
group. In addition, written evidence and source material to claim a position in history 
are missing. Nevertheless, there are ways in which they effectively (re)present and in-
strumentalize their past today. A common strategy to avoid talking about their inferior 
role in history is to identify with a proudly presented history of the freeborn (their 
former masters). In appropriating freeborn history, slave descendants claim a common 
belonging to the Fulɓe community (FF: Pulaaku) but others, such as the inhabitants of 
Kolongo, are contesting existing histories of land and origins. Turning stigma into an 
asset is not always possible and many are continuously reminded of the weight of their 
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history on their shoulders. For them, their history is a constraint. Finally, explicitly 
maintaining silence can be a conscious strategy to ‘pass as non-slaves’ (Rossi 2009b: 
182). The silences, which may illustrate power inequalities over historical representa-
tion, are in this case instrumentalized by slave descendants themselves to relegate 
history to the realm of secrecy and the ‘unspoken’. 
This chapter outlined how the Haayre region has always been a region in constant 
flux with populations moving in and out of the area. If any one feature could define the 
area, it is its hybridity in many realms of life. In the following chapter, the way in which 






One of the first people I met in the village of Dalla was Maman Abidjan. Although she 
was an enthusiastic talker and had a wide vocabulary, Maman Abidjan expressed 
frustration about the way she had been received when she returned to her home village 
after living abroad for forty years. She was amazed how, despite her social, socio-
economic success in Abidjan, she was put ’in place’ again once back home. She was 
upset about the associations people make between social status and place of residence, 
and reflected on how my interpreter and I, as relative strangers in Dalla, immediately 
identified her as a slave descendant in our first meeting because she lived in a former 
slave ward. We took her back to the past and literally put her ‘back in place’ because of 
stereotypical associations with her ward. She felt that her new status and social mobility 
had been undermined from the moment she returned home. 
Such perceived constraints and frustrations work the other way too. Seydu Dicko, a 
freeborn son of Musa Dicko, grew up in Bamako and speaks better Bambara than 
Fulfulde. When discussing a recent visit he made to his father’s home village of Dalla in 
2007, Seydu described his annoyance at his mother’s instructions about dressing in an 
expensive traditional costume (French: Boubou), while he prefers his jeans and a shirt. 
She wanted him to maintain his status as a prince, while he is uncomfortable with being 
treated as such. The moment he gets out of his vehicle in Dalla, someone of slave 
descent takes his suitcase, sends a child to bring him water and makes sure he is accom-
panied all the way to the family compound. Seydu finds himself in an awkward situ-
ation, and one he would prefer not to have to deal with.  
Both of these stories illustrate how hierarchy is forced upon people when they are 
(back) in their home village: Seydu and Maman are ascribed a given status even though 
in the urban contexts they were socialised in they have developed a different habitus 
and identify themselves differently. Once physically present in a village, it is difficult to 
change historical patterns of belonging that have been established through an existing 
cultural field of hierarchy. As Maman Abidjan pointed out, hierarchy and the position 
one can take are inscribed in the landscape, literally in the place one is allowed, forced 
or expected to occupy. Hirsh & O’Hanlon (1995) argued that landscapes are not simply 
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backdrops to action but an integral part of it. Places are invested with moral value 
despite the anthropological denunciation of ‘localizing’ cultures (Hastrup & Olwig 
1997). They cannot be reduced to mere voids: They always obtain meaning and merge 
with local ideologies and relating practices. This chapter describes how places are in 
themselves sites of memory. 
My line of argument is that places are thus an alternative form whereby the history of 
slavery is remembered. As has been noted by several scholars, written sources of slave 
voices are generally lacking,183 so academic descriptions of the external and the internal 
slave trade in the West African region have increasingly focused on alternative ways of 
remembering to nevertheless represent slave voices and agency in written history. 
Various academics tried to get closer to these ‘slave voices’ by studying non-discursive 
and therefore radically alternative sources of slave memories. Shaw (2002) was the first 
to describe how several religious cults in Sierra Leone, continued to make reference to 
the slave past. Argenti (2007) has described the trauma still embedded and embodied in 
mask performances, song and children’s storytelling. Hardung (2003) addressed how 
memories of slavery are still being practised in the ritual labour of Riimaayɓe in north-
ern Benin.  
As mentioned in the introduction, several other scholars discussed more institution-
alized memories in the public sphere, such as religious institutions & cults (Argenti & 
Roschenthaler 2006), cultural heritage festivals (Schramm 2007) and museums (Bella-
gamba 2009). Attention has also been given to discursive claims of slave descendants 
who are fighting over access to cults (Noret 2008), ancestral tombs (Evers 2002) and 
family lineages (Ologoudou 2008), which in the respective societies remained for a long 
time the exclusive realm of the freeborn. This recent wave of studies demonstrates a 
growing body of alternative approaches to commemoration practices of slave descend-
ants. In this chapter I argue that geographical organisation of specific places, can be 
seen as another form of non-discursive memory of slavery. 
 
Inscribing social hierarchies from above and below 
In a sense, the social and the geographical space are conflated in experience. It is 
impossible to ‘think away’ the actual geographical location of social life, lives are 
always grounded. 
(Hastrup 2005: 145) 
As Hastrup suggests, the geography of a specific space is important to an understanding 
of the social life of its inhabitants. At the same time, social relations identify places as 
being meaningful. This chapter focuses on how hierarchy ‘takes place’ in the general 
spatial organization of the Haayre region and, more specifically, in the residences of my 
network of informants in Dalla. It describes how the organization of places, both in a 
geographical sense (place of residence) and social sense (interactions), implicitly de-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183  Although many historians are doing an excellent job in reading or retrieving slave voices in Arabic 
correspondence (Hall 2009) and in court cases (papers by Roberts & Rodet as presented at the ‘Tales 
of Slavery’ conference in Toronto in May 2009. 
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fines people’s positions in hierarchical social relations, considering how hierarchy is 
‘mapped’ in a physical place. It addresses the ‘grounding’ of social life in the physical 
landscape. 
In his essay entitled ‘Walking the City’, De Certeau (1988: 92) described how ele-
vation, the view from above like Icarus’s view when looking down on the world, makes 
one into a voyeur with a ‘celestial eye’. This chapter provides the reader with such a 
view. This celestial (bird’s-eye) view first maps and describes the spatial organization 
of the Central Malian Haayre region and its capital city, Douentza. After a short review 
of the literature on the interrelationship of spatial arrangements and hierarchy more 
generally, the third section provides a different perspective by taking the reader for a 
‘walk’ through Dalla and by zooming in on the various neighbourhoods, each of which 
has a role in the village’s hierarchy. Dalla is presented as a concrete material landscape 
that structures and contextualizes the ways in which people relate and make their living. 
On the walk, we will inevitably encounter people. Since the village of Dalla is home 
to the social network central to this thesis, a fourth section ‘casts’ the main informants 
who live in one of the wards and I describe the social network of the Dicko and the Kau 
families and present their links to the past based on the genealogies of both families (see 
Figure 2 and 3). When encountering people on a walk, greetings are exchanged and I 
demonstrate how basic interactions, such as greetings, are imbued with the cultural field 
of hierarchy and literally ‘put people in their place’. The anthropological method of 
participant observation trained my eyes to ‘read’ hierarchy from the interaction between 
people. In the final section, important ethical issues when engaging in research on hier-
archical interactions between different social groups are presented and the methodolo-
gical choices taken during my field research are described.  
Reading hierarchies from the Haayre landscape  
The development of the cultural field of hierarchy is intertwined with the Sahelian 
environment in social and ecological terms (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a). The inward 
ecological fragility of the area demands exchange systems between pastoral and agricul-
tural groups as the environment is poor in terms of natural resources. Its exploitation is 
mostly through pastoralism, and agriculture to a lesser extent. In areas where the Fulɓe 
established their empires, rivers and highlands were sources of wealth and the Fulɓe 
elites exploited these resources through their dominance over other people (Gibbal 
1994; de Bruijn & van Dijk 2001a). One way of incorporating people into their society 
was through the submission of villages and another was to capture people from outside 
the region. 
Today, Mali is divided into eight regions and one capital district, Bamako. Each 
region is in turn subdivided into 50 cercles, the smallest unit of political administration 
that was set up by the French.184 At independence the cercles were renamed as prefec-
tures and subdivided into smaller administrative units called cantons, which have been 
restructured in so-called rural and urban communes since the 1999 decentralization 
reforms.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184  The first administrative unit called Cercle of Bafoulabé was created in Mali in 1887. 
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The fifth region, Mopti, is one of the poorest in the country and includes the ad-
ministrative unit of the Douentza cercle (Map 2). Douentza is the capital of the Haayre, 
a region that is named after its rocky plateaus: Haayre in the Fulfulde language means 
‘rocks’. Located in the central Malian Sahel, sand dunes and plains dominate the 
irregular but impressive rocky plateaus. The Haayre is situated on the southern bank of 
River Niger, known as the Gourma in Fulfulde (Gallais 1975: 2),185 and to the north of 
the Daande Seeno region, which can be literally translated as ‘the border of the sandy 
zone’. This is also the meaning of the word Sahel, which means ‘the banks (edges) of 
the desert’ in Arabic (Gritzner 1988: 1). 
The Haayre region has a semi-arid climate with a maximum annual rainfall of 300-
600 mm. Rainfall is concentrated in three months of the year (July-September) and 
fluctuates even within a single zone. In August 2009, for example, Dalla and nearby 
Nokara were unexpectedly flooded, while there was no rain at all in neighbouring 
Douentza and Booni. The flooding was a disaster for Dalla and destroyed 129 houses, 
seven latrines and part of the tarmac road.186  
The region consists of two main ecological zones: The plains, where water is 
relatively scarce, and the mountains where water is accessible most of the year. The 
unpredictability of the climate and the extreme local climate variations result in regular 
crop failures,187 high numbers of cattle deaths and hunger. In January and February the 
Harmattan blows its hot desert winds (FF: Henndu, see picture 3)) over the plains, 
bringing dust, eye infections and spoiling food. From March to July, the sun scorches 
the earth and the intense heat makes life difficult, draining people’s energy and leading 
to an increase in influenza, infections and scorpion bites. The long-awaited but 
unpredictable rains between July and September result in harvests by October or 
November, if they are not first destroyed by birds (as in 2001) or locust plagues (as in 
2004). 
The area’s ecology makes agriculture an unreliable source of livelihood and may 
explain why the kingdom's economies were based on a slave-raiding economy (de 
Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a; Finley 1981; Lovejoy 1983). Being able to rely on people and 
having access to a social network is of utmost importance in an environment that 
renders people highly vulnerable.188 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185  See also the Carte morphologique du Gourma in his study. Gallais (1975: 3) also describes the 
Haayre region as the ‘Gourma of the Mountains’ (French: Gourma des monts), squeezed between the 
High Gourma (French: Haut Gourma) up north and the sandy Gourma (FF: Seeno-Gondo) down 
south. See Map 3. 
186  Personal phone communication, Amadu Amiiru Dicko, August 2009. See also: 
http://www.primature.gov.ml/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2821&Itemid=1. 
Accessed end of August 2009. 
187  Often also due to or combined with plagues. For Douentza, the locust plague in 2004 was a disaster: 
http://www.irinnews.org/IndepthMain.aspx?IndepthId=18&ReportId=62747. In 2001 birds destroyed 
much of the harvest: Observations and interview, Burra Yero Cisse, Douentza, 2002. 
 188 The 1995 study ‘Arid Ways’ by de Bruijn & van Dijk focuses on issues of identity, vulnerability, 
climate variability and livelihood. They describe the region in more geographical, geological and 
climatic detail (1995a: 41-47). Bouman (2003) confirms the importance of social networks in order to 
survive in a region of northern Burkina Faso which has a similar climate. 
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Within the current national context of Mali, the Haayre region, like its original 
nomadic Fulɓe inhabitants,189 has been marginalized. And apart from cattle, there are no 
notable resources. In her work on indigenous communities and deforestation companies 
in Indonesia, anthropologist Tsing (1993) demonstrated how the marginality of such 
‘out-of-the-way places’ is not only the product of a political system and an economic 
structure but also consists of an ideological vision and an outsider gaze that construes 
exclusion. Not only in terms of physical distance but also in imagination and repre-
sentation, Central Mali is far from the capital. Despite being accessible from Bamako 
along the main tarmac road (913 km) since 1985, some continue to see it as being 
remote because the road is not well maintained and it takes a full day to reach the area. 
Local elites and wealthy tourists prefer to take internal flights to Mopti, Mali’s ‘Venice 
of the North’, from where it is still another 280 km by car to Douentza. Mopti has a 
harbour at a strategic junction of the Niger and Bani Rivers, where the Niger Delta 
starts. Bozo fishermen, agriculturalists of Bambara or Riimaayɓe background and pasto-
ralist Fulɓe herdsmen share this ecological niche. 
The main ethnic groups in the Haayre region are Fulɓe and Dogon. During the nine-
teenth-century Fulɓe hegemony, Dogon were enslaved by Fulɓe. Among the Dogon, a 
distinction is made between those occupying the plains and those living on the plateaus. 
Those on the plateaus retreated there in the past for protection from the slave-raiding 
Fulɓe in the area, while those living on the Seeno Plains historically had more contact 
with the Fulɓe, which explains why most of them are Muslim. By contrast, Dogon 
refugees living on the plateaus maintained their folk beliefs or were converted to 
Christianity by European missionaries (van Beek 1993, 2004, 2005).  
Although some villages are clearly Fulɓe or Dogon in origin, others have been hete-
rogeneous from the outset. During the course of the twentieth century, some slave 
families took their new position as freed persons seriously, leaving their masters’ vil-
lages, clearing their own land and forming new hamlets across the plains of the Haayre. 
Debere, Kolongo (Map 4) and the hamlet of Serma are examples of Riimaayɓe 
settlements established by those who had left their masters’ villages. As described in de 
Bruijn & Pelckmans (2005), Serma is a conglomeration of rainy-season cattle camps 
and a Riimaayɓe hamlet that also serves as a market place. Serma is not a proper village 
but a collection of houses, with no streets and sometimes even no paths from one house 
to the next. It is made up of diverse families, the majority of whom consider themselves 
to be Riimaayɓe, some of whom are descendants of impoverished noble Tuareg and 
pastoral Fulɓe families, while others (FF: Kommongalluuɓe) claim a special position as 
royal soldiers from the past.190 The families in this hamlet are related to a greater or 
lesser degree, but not through historical family relations. What links them most closely 
is the fact that they no longer want to be considered as slaves. They each formulate, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189  Many actors reinforced ideas of Fulɓe pastoralists as marginal populations: Academics, colonial 
officers and Fulɓe themselves. They all contributed to the perceived marginal integration of Fulɓe in 
the national socio-political economy (Azarya 1996). 
190  By refusing a Riimaayɓe identity, this group denies having been Fulɓe slaves because they voluntarily 
offered their services as soldiers to the royal Fulɓe armies. Chapter 1, section 2.  
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their own way, a short history of themselves that attests to their free status. Their 
settlement and occupation of space underlines their emancipation. 
For the past century, Fulɓe have been the dominant ethnic group in the region. Some 
sedentarized in the course of the twentieth century, while others remained pastoralist 
cattle herders and settled in the Haayre when the Niger Delta flooded. However drought 
brought about significant changes not only for slaves but also for their pastoralist 
masters. The Fulɓe pastoralists went to towns to try their luck with aid organizations 
who distributed food191 and similar patterns of pastoralists sedentarizing in small towns 
took place in other parts of the Sahel (Boesen & Marfaing 2007).192 Not only 
pastoralists but also groups of slave descent, such as Riimaayɓe and Bellaaɓe, 
increasingly settled in Douentza in order to have access to schools, healthcare and 
employment. 
 
Douentza: A bleak town? 
Douentza is the capital of the Douentza Cercle and a co-passenger on a bus once 
described it as ‘the gateway to the north’. It is literally a gateway to the rocky plateaus 
of the Malian Sahel and the desert to the north.193 New roads have increased Douentza’s 
strategic position, with an asphalt road linking Bamako and Gao since 1986 and, more 
recently, the Peace Road (French: Route de la Paix)194 connecting Douentza with 
Timbouctou to the north since 2002. The town has developed at a constant rate because 
of its role as an administrative centre and being the capital of the Cercle. In 1998, 
Douentza Cercle had a population of 152 185195 and, according to the 1996 census, 
Douentza had 495 800 inhabitants (Zondag 2005: 175).  
People of all the major ethnic groups in northern Mali are to be found there, each 
with a history of assigning some of its members to a slave category. In Douentza, 
members of all ethnic groups hold slaves in low esteem. The economic diversification 
that accompanied the steady growth of this town has created new options for people of 
slave descent, many of whom left their former masters. Slave descendants continue to 
engage in occupations stereotypically assigned to slaves and their descendants, such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191  The droughts in the twentieth century resulted in the changing ownership of cattle stock. Cattle were 
no longer owned by the family-based and subsistence-oriented pastoralist enterprises but by urban-
based commercial workers, wealthy traders (often migrants) and civil servants from elsewhere (de 
Bruijn & van Dijk 2001b: 5). Today one can see many compounds in Douentza with the reed huts of 
former pastoralist Fulɓe who are trying to make a living in town. Pastoralist families saw themselves 
increasingly obliged to settle in the urban centres (de Bruijn & van Dijk 2003a). 
192  Van Steenbrugge (2005) mentions Koutiala as an attractive pole in southern Mali and other examples 
can be found in Boesen & Marfaing (2007). 
193  The biggest plateau in the area is situated southeast of Douentza and known as the Bandiagara Cliffs 
or the Dogon Plateau, referring to the major ethnic group living there. North of Douentza is another 
large plateau, the Gandamia, which is less well known but central to the settlement history of the 
inhabitants of Douentza and its surroundings. Further east is a plateau in the form of ‘the hand of 
Fatima’ near the former Songhay Kingdom of Hombori.  
194  This road increased access to Timbouctou, which used to be difficult to reach and accessible only by 
boat, plane or four-wheel-drive vehicle. The construction of the road boosted tourism in the Douentza 
area, which became the newest gateway for tourists wanting to visit ‘the hand of Fatima’, the pink 
dunes of Hombori or the increasingly popular annual music Festival of the Desert in January. 




brick making, housemaids and butchering meat. Labour migration has created new 
opportunities, first by aligning people with new masters but also thanks to new 
occupations such as trade, and through the accumulation of wealth. 
Some migrating slave descendants became wealthier than their former pastoralist 
masters because they engaged in wage labour, while their masters lost substantial parts 
of their herds during the droughts in the 1970s and 1980s. As some slave descendants 
became wealthier, the hierarchical distinctions between freeborn nobles (FF: Rimɓe or 
the broader notion of Fulɓe) and slaves (FF: Riimaayɓe) remain social labels that do not 
correspond to their current economic positions in the local hierarchy. The label of slave 
status or being of slave descent, which is an inferior social position, no longer neces-
sarily translates into an inferior economic or class status. Chapters 6 and 7 will highlight 
how slave descendants who migrated have managed to hide their origins, and some 
changed their identities altogether.196 
Douentza ranks very low in national school enrolment figures and students used to 
have to travel long distances to attend school. Although the number and accessibility of 
schools has increased over the past decade (Breedveld 2006: 145), enrolment has re-
mained low, especially among pastoralist Fulɓe who have historically rejected state 
institutions.197 
At the start of the twentieth century, colonial administrators created new opportu-
nities for people to enrol in French education and slaves were initially enrolled by their 
masters. Later, when the elite discovered education was important for contact with the 
powerful French colonial rulers, noblemen decided to enrol their own children in French 
education too. King Yerowal of Dalla sent his son Musa Dicko198 to a French school but 
this was exceptional as the kings were in general reluctant to have their own children at 
schools run by the ‘colonial enemies’ and preferred them to have an Islamic education. 
They also rejected formal education because of distrust of modern educational projects. 
This suspicion has remained and most pastoralist parents today still prefer to give their 
children an Islamic rather than a French education. 
To cooperate with French colonial officers, being able to read and write in French 
became an asset. For example, the princes in the royal Dicko family in Dalla who 
received a French education are today wealthy and influential in both national and 
village politics.199 Education became indispensible not only to cooperate with French 
officers but later also to gain access to development projects and state politics. All the 
interpreters and research assistants working on this research had enjoyed a formal 
French education and were teachers themselves. Umu Sangare was my interpreter in 
Dalla in 2001-2002. Umu studied and graduated in administration, after that she has 
been teaching in different places (Debere, Mondoro) in the region. In 2001 we (me, 
Umu and her six-month-old child) would leave each Monday morning from Douentza 
to the village of Dalla and return at the weekend. Burra Yero Cisse, who has a long-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196  They do so by changing their name or ethnic affiliation. See Pelckmans, 2011b forthcoming.  
197  Breedveld (2006: 163-164) describes how this suspicion towards modern education dates from 
colonial times. 
198  Musa Dicko, born 1932 (†2008), Dalla. Interviews 2001-2002; 2006; 2007.  
199  Chapter 6 elaborates on this argument by focusing on the princes from three Fulɓe kingdoms in the 
Haayre region: Joona, Dalla and Booni. 
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standing position as a research assistant (for de Bruijn, van Dijk and several of their 
students)200 also assisted me in Douentza and had been trained as a Fulfulde teacher by 
a local NGO in Douentza in the 1980s. Those students from small villages in the Haayre 
region who want to receive higher education all spend several years studying in 
Douentza, which is an important hub for educational trajectories in the region.  
 
 
Image.1: Scan from excerpt from Bradt travel guide to Mali (Velton 2000: 155) 
 
 
Douentza is also an important centre for healthcare but, similar as with national 
rankings for education, the region of Mopti scores badly (Hill 1985).201 Douentza’s 
medical infrastructure is poor although there is a hospital and a reasonably well-
equipped dispensary run by Save the Children. Access to the hospitals and dispensaries 
remains problematic for many, especially for poor pastoralists in isolated villages 
(Randall 1993: 293). Many people are reluctant or afraid to consult doctors and few 
women give birth under medical supervision in a hospital. When they do go to hospital, 
it is often only because of last-minute complications. On one of my trips in a taxi-
brousse, a woman in labour was lying in the middle surrounded by other passengers and 
although the bus headed directly for the hospital, news spread the next day that she had 
not survived the complications of her pregnancy.  
Douentza, in spite of its poor infrastructure, is booming and is far from ‘the rather 
bleak town’ it was once considered to be (Velton 2000: 155; Image 1). Between 2001 
and 2007 the number of hotels and campsites in Douentza grew from two to at least 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200  Burra Yero Cisse was the main research assistant of De Bruijn & van Dijk (1995a) who subsequently 
put him in touch with their student researchers, such as for example Griep (2005), Nijenhuis (2009) 
and myself. 




eight and today tourists can be seen walking around the weekly market on Sunday. 
More and more houses are being built of brick and restaurants, shops, bars and small 
businesses appear to be flourishing.  
The main trading hub was moved out of the city centre to along the tarmac road 
leading from Bamako to Gao and Menaka where new bars, restaurants and shops selling 
western clothing, CDs, DVDs and cell-phone accessories are opening up. Merchants, 
tailors, photographers and female food traders who used to work in the central market 
downtown but lacked space have moved to the roadside bus stop (Zondag 2005: 189). 
This is a good location to serve travellers on the major bus companies who stop over for 
dinner, breakfast or prayers. Most newcomers and migrants to Douentza try their luck as 
traders: Mauritanian traders sell carpets and Ghanaian hairdressers have brought in their 
knowledge of the latest hairstyles. Although there are many ethnic groups cohabiting in 
Douentza, the lingua franca in the zone remains Fulfulde.  
 
Mapping Dalla as a ‘typical’ Haayre village 
Some 35 km from Douentza, Dalla is a village strategically located at the foot of the 
Gandamia Plateau, which provided natural protection from raiders and warlords in the 
past. Nowadays the plateau makes it impossible to pick up mobile-phone signals in the 
centre of the village. Wealthier members of the ruling Dicko family in 2009 have there-
fore paid an extra antenna on the plateau to allow the villagers to receive calls and get 
online. In 2011 the ‘chattering sphere’ of the mobile phones made its entry in the village 
as it obtained its own antenna that ensures stable connections for phoning.  
The rural community of Dalla spreads across a large territory that is divided by the 
Gandamia Plateau (Map 5). To cross the plateau from Dalla to the north takes at least 
two days on foot and one needs to take enough water as the infamous guinea worm lives 
in the waterholes of the isolated villages in the hills.202 There are some small Riimaayɓe 
cultivator villages and seasonal Fulɓe hamlets too (Maps 4 & 5). Like Booni and Joona, 
also sedentarized Fulɓe villages that used to be kingdoms in the past, Dalla is 
surrounded by hamlets, seasonal pastoralist camps and permanent cultivator settle-
ments.203  
@ see Map 5 in appendix 
Map 5: The official territory of the municipality (“commune rurale”) of Dalla  
Shifts in land ownership and territorial organization took place in what, according to 
the national administration, is now called the ‘rural community’ of Dalla. Before, during 
King Yerowal’s reign (1911-1966), the territory of this Fulɓe kingdom went from Gana 
to Bunti to the independent village of Kikara (Map 4, Chapter 1). In the 1940s, Yerowal 
had a conflict with the French colonial Commander Bayiratou, who declared Kikara and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202  Due to their inaccessibility, many of these villages have never been visited by NGOs or sanitation 
projects. While their isolation in the past guaranteed safety, it now has the opposite effect. Some of 
them (Kolongo, Ama and Bara Aoussi) have split in two, with some of the villagers coming down 
from the plateaus to live on the plains at the foot of the plateaus in order to have easier access to 
services and markets. The neighbouring Dogon have done the same.  
203  Examples of such settlements on the territory of Dalla are: Boumbam (2 km), Naani (15 km), Aoussi 
(10 km), Bara-Aoussi (9 km), Torbani (15 km), Ama (10 km) and Diayel (15 km). Maps 4 and 5.  
85 
 
some neighbouring villages204 to be independent cantons. Yerowal complained about 
having lost this part of what he considered his territory, and his loss was compensated 
for with some new villages205 along the road (Angenent et al. 2003: 117). 
When Dalla obtained administrative status as a rural community in 1999, its territory 
became more or less fixed (Map 5). According to the Annuaire officiel 2001,206 the rural 
community of Dalla has 4823 inhabitants. While the elite glorify the history of their 
royal hegemony in the area, Dalla is today a medium-sized village and one of the 
smallest rural communities along the tarmac road. Roughly a-third (about 1500 people) 
of its inhabitants are slave descendants (FF: Maccuɓe Wuro).207 This corresponds with 
observations made by historians Klein (1998: 53-54) and Lovejoy (1983) that slave 
descendants in the Sahel often constituted an average of 30% to 50% of the total popu-
lation (Botte 1994: 112-114). A majority of the slave population in the village belonged 
to the ruling Dicko family (FF: Weeheeɓe). 
Various ethnic groups cohabit on Dalla’s territory: Songhay (FF: Sonhaykooɓe), 
Dogon (FF: Hummbeeɓe), former Fulɓe slaves (FF: Riimaayɓe Haayre/ Kommongal-
luuɓe),208 Bella (FF: Bellaaɓe) and small groups of semi-nomadic Fulɓe cattle herders 
(FF: Egga-Hoɗaaɓe/Jalluɓe). The heterogeneity of the populations, homogeneously 
categorized as non- Fulɓe (FF: Haaɓe) by freeborn Fulɓe is reflected in the housing. 
Some are made of mud bricks produced by Riimaayɓe, while other settlements are 
temporary and homes are made of millet stalks, reed mats or cloth. Although many of 
the Dogon have settled on the plains, they used to make their houses in caves on the 
plateaus. Most nomad huts are round while mud-brick houses built by Riimaayɓe are 
generally square. Some have several rooms, others just one, and they can be well kept 
or hopelessly dilapidated and neglected. The different forms of housing and the internal 
decoration of a house (FF: Suudu) indicate differences in wealth, occupation and ethnic 
background.  
In Fulɓe literature, Boutrais (in: Botte et al. 1999: 32) describes how: ‘Fulɓe pay 
much attention to the placement of people and things. Their pre-colonial state-forma-
tions functioned in social spaces, bundling correlations between positions and social 
relations.’209 Bierschenk (1999: 196-197)210 describes how the spatial organization of 
Fulɓe in northern Benin:  
... represents a constitutive element in the social process. It makes possible and at the same time 
delimits social actions. At the same time they have an objectifying function: They make all who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204  The new cantons are Muniyol, Gaana, Bunti, Bula, Orowel and Baanikaani.  
205  The new villages are Peetaka, Sigima, Allaɓenguma and Gooma. 
206  Association des municipalités du Mali, 2000. Annuaire Officiel, Bamako. Excerpt: pp. 108-109: 
Name of the commune, mayor, number of inhabitants: Dalla - Musa Dicko - 4823. These figures tend 
to be low because not everyone registers in Douentza or elsewhere to avoid paying head tax.  
207  Maccuɓe wuro are descendants of former house slaves living in the village.  
208  Riimaayɓe Haayre are descendants of slaves living on slave estates, Kommongalluuɓe are slave 
warriors who would only work in the service of the king upon his request. 
209  ‘Les peuls accordent une grande attention a l’emplacement des gens et des choses. Leurs formations 
étatiques précoloniales fonctionnaient sur des espaces sociaux, des faisceaux de correspondances entre 
des relations de positions et des rapports sociaux.’  
210  Bierschenk (1999: 197-203) describes the spatial ordering of things but much less so from a 
perspective of social hierarchies and with a focus on pastoralist Fulɓe. Dupire (1970) describes the 
spatial alignments and orientations of cattle camps and Fulɓe habitats. 
86 
 
inscribe themselves in these spaces believe that social facts are ‘natural’ and, as such, inevitable 
although they are products of history and culture. In this sense, spatial structures have to be 
considered as the ‘unconscious biography’ (Lewis 1979: 12) of a society.211 
Bierschenk mainly focuses on pastoralist Fulɓe settlements.212 Pouget (2000: 103-
158) compares the spatial organization of the Fulɓe societies of Adamawa (North 
Cameroon), Maacina (Central Mali) and Fuuta Djallon (Guinea) and demonstrates that, 
in spite of strong social-spatial correlations, there are many differences among Fulɓe 
and Riimaayɓe settlements across the Sahel. Fanchette (1999: 191) points out how the 
typical spatial hierarchy in the Senegalese Fuladu region between the freeborn Fulɓe 
villages and slave-descendant Maccuɓe villages213 has disappeared due to the inter-
mixing of the groups over time and is correlated in part with seasonal labour migration. 
This is much less the case in the Haayre region where spatial organization reflects past 
social hierarchies in the present. 
From a bird’s-eye perspective, the village of Dalla is situated in the midst of its 
surrounding clients: Tenant-farming Riimaayɓe Haayre, pastoralist Fulɓe who defer to 
the local political rulers and Dogon who used to be incorporated in the Fulɓe kingdoms 
as tenant farmers.214 The ruling Weeheeɓe families settled in the royal court, which is in 
the heart of the territory (FF: leydi). The floating populations settled in a more or less 
concentric spatial organization around it such that freeborn were at the centre. 
This spatial division between freeborn and slave-descendant Fulɓe is reflected in 
local toponyms. A village politically controlled by Fulɓe is called a wuro.215 A village 
inhabited by cultivating Riimaayɓe is called a Debere.216 By extension, Fulɓe call all 
villages inhabited by cultivating non-Fulɓe Debere. Similar spatial divisions in Fulɓe 
communities are described for the region of Fuuta Djallon in Guinea by Botte (1994: 
111) who explains how the relative separation of slaves in their villages from the 
freeborn ruling political elite facilitated their emancipation. The geographical distance 
from their masters made it easier for them to be critical of their rulers and to function 
independently. Land ownership and management of resources by the elite tended to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211  Translated from French: ‘Les structure spatiales répresentent un élément constitutive du processus 
social. Elles rendent possible, en même temps qu’elles délimitent, les actions sociales, tout en 
remplissant par excellence une fonction objectivante: Elles font croire a ceux qui s’inscrivent dans ces 
espaces que les fait sociaux sont «naturels» et ainsi inévitables alors qu’ils sont des produits de 
l’histoire et de la culture. Dans ce sens, les structures spatiales peuvent être considérées comme la 
« biographie inconsciente (Lewis, 1979: 12) d’une société.’ 
212  The same goes for de Bruijn & van Dijk (1995a: 151-164) and Dupire (1970) who described spatial 
and social organization among pastoralist Fulɓe. 
213  Freeborn villages in Fuuta Djallon are known as Miisiide versus Ruunde (Fanchette 1999: 191). 
214  These Dogon were generally ascribed a status similar to that of FulBe slave descendants living on the 
estates (FF: Riimaayɓe Haayre). 
215  This word is derived from the verb ‘to live’ and indicates co-residence. Nevertheless, who cohabits 
with whom and the exact meaning of the word wuro depend on the Fulɓe context (Botte et al. 1999: 
21). A wuro often indicates a more permanent settlement. Temporary Fulɓe settlements of nomadic 
herdsmen in the Haayre region are called Koggi or Honnde Fulɓe. 
216  Riimaayɓe villages (FF: Debere, plural: Debeeje) are called saare in the Fulfulde dialect of Maacina. 
The word saare according to Pouget (2000) refers to mud-brick houses built by Riimaayɓe. 
According to Berndt (2008: 10), working among Fulɓe in the Guimballa region, a saare is the 
cultivator’s district of a village. In Guinea Riimaayɓe, villages are called Runnde and its Riimaayɓe 
inhabitants are called Runndeeɓe. 
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less enforced further away from the centre of the kingdom. Further away from the 
political heart of the kingdom, there was less control imposed by the ruling Fulɓe 
families, which underlines the interrelationship between place and power. 
An important spatial source of authority and hierarchy today is the claim to land. At 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the French administrators saw the need for a 
territorial reorganization to eradicate master-slave relations. In 1910 General Fasstier 
remarked:217 
I would have wanted to establish written contracts of land lease between the proprietors and the 
Riimaayɓe (rimaibe), but I encountered bad will on the part of the Fulɓe (peul) based on the pretext 
that the ownership of land is not individual. On the part of the Riimaayɓe (I encountered) an 
incredible apathy, resulting from the blind confidence they have in our verbal decisions. Therefore (to 
combat the bad will of the peul) I ordered all the chefs of the Fulɓe tribes to describe the division of 
lands between every family of the tribe. This division will be registered in the historical books (Tarik) 
held by the imam (cadi) of this group and it will be transmitted to the Cercle, which in turn will have 
it translated and conserved in its archives.  
From this excerpt it would appear that the French underscored the importance of 
proving land ownership by historical documents (FF: Taariki) and the national 
administration. However, the documents that would prove who owned what lands in the 
Kingdom of Dalla have now disappeared as they were handed out for settling a national 
court case on a border dispute between the Haayre and northern Burkina Faso early 
1990’s. Despite various efforts, they have never been returned.218 
In the Haayre region, indigenous, Islamic, colonial and later national customs re-
garding land rights overlapped.219 In the nineteenth century, Weeheeɓe warriors estab-
lished a monopoly over land in the Kingdom of Dalla. Land-lease rights were accorded 
by the political chief (FF: Amiiru), who had the ultimate authority over who had access 
to land. Land rights were also partly regulated by Islamic law, which is why the 
religious Moodibaaɓe elites have their say in land division in the region. The French 
colonizers tried to alter prevailing ownership relations but rarely managed. In 1917, 
after some administrative visits (French: Tournées) to the different cantons of Maacina, 
the French administrator Parouks concluded:220  
Above all, a cantonal reorganization becomes necessary ... (T)he population is composed of peul 
(Fulɓe) and Riimaayɓe, the latter being the liberated slaves of the Fulɓe. With time, their liberation 
makes them leave their masters villages and they settle sometimes rather far away from their place of 
origin, on good cultivable terrains that are still virgin. A lot of villages were constituted in which the 
inhabitants continue to take part administratively in the central fief (chief-lieu) of their canton where 
they used live before in captivity. It is in this way that, for example, a small village in the territory of 
the canton Sosobe-Guile depended administratively on the canton of Dipoule, because the people of 
this village before, used to be the former slaves of the Fulɓe from Dipoule. This state of affairs, (..) is 
the supplementary cause of anarchy in the country because it opens up possibilities for the rich and 
influent Fulɓe to claim contributions in nature from their old serfs (French: Anciens serviteurs) ... 
which is why I propose to: 1. Reorganize the cantons, following the geographical emplacement of the 
villages ... without considering origin or race. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217  Archives Nationales Mali, FA-1E-30/letter 15 March 1910. 
218  Personal conversation in 2006 with de Bruijn & van Dijk. See also de Bruijn & van Dijk (1995a). 
219  Ownership of land is increasingly contested by various groups, each with its own interpretation of 
customary law based on historical claims. The example of the inhabitants of Boumbam shows how 
some managed to get their claims on land accepted by (legal) administration. 
220  Archives National Mali, Anciens Fonds-1E-30. Djenne (1917). 
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Signed 28 November 1917 by Agard Parouks 
This quote indicates that the French administrators knew that their own admini-
strative structures for legalizing land rights reinforced the dependency of slave villages 
on elite settlements. This problem of dependency on elites for access to land for the 
‘floating populations’ (see Chapter 1) remained unaddressed for a long time. In general, 
the colonial authorities intervened as little as possible on local land tenure issues and 
largely ignored the landless masses. At independence, customary tenure officially 
became regulated by the national administration (Marie 1989), which resulted in a 
curtailing of the power of chiefs over land in favour of the new Malian administration 
that made new bush land legally available to the landless.  
Nevertheless, even with the decentralization politics of the 1990s, the political Fulɓe 
rulers of Douentza still have more assets to gain access to land (De Langen 2004). Most 
slave-descending Riimaayɓe on the hills surrounding Dalla continue to depend on land 
leased from their masters but since land can now be bought, some slave families who 
became wealthy have managed to buy land from impoverished pastoralist Fulɓe. The 
most powerful families own the best agricultural lands. Although both colonial and 
post-independence national administrations have tried to formulate laws to provide 
access to such goods (land, political authority) for former slave groups, these laws have 
often remained unimplemented in practice. De Langen (2004) demonstrated how de-
centralization and the redivision of land in Douentza reinforced the power of the ruling 
elites. Those former slaves who bought land did not receive it in property in the end. On 
paper, they had equal citizenship rights but in practice they did not. In Dalla, only the 
wealthy slave descendants (FF: Maccuɓe Wuro) who formerly belonged to the freeborn 
traders (FF: Jaawamɓe) managed to buy land from their former masters. None of the 
members of the Kau family of slave descendants have bought land from the Dicko 
family to date. I will not further detail land-tenure relations between the Dicko and Kau 
families because Kau family members still lease land from the Dicko family. Unlike 
some other rich slave descendants, they have not yet managed to negotiate ownership.  
Another reason for not going into details of other tenure relations in Dalla is because 
they are extremely diverse: For each rule there are exceptions that came about by spe-
cific social interrelations. De Bruijn & van Dijk (1995a: 62-63, 338-342) underlined 
how the plurality of law in relation to land-tenure systems on the periphery of the 
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221  Nijenhuis (2009) details how land claims are problematic between Fulɓe and Dogon in the Haayre 
region. For a description of access to land and divisions of land in the Fulɓe hamlet of Serma, see de 
Bruijn & van Dijk (1995a: 309-312). 
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organization in the Haayre 
Few authors, except Hahonou (2009: 156) and Breedveld & de Bruijn (1996: 808), have 
explicitly linked spatial organization with the hierarchical organization of the Fulɓe 
communities they describe. This is the focus of the remainder of this chapter, starting 
with a description of the convergence of social and spatial stratifications in the ideology 
of the hierarchy of inhabitants of the Haayre region.  
Although they are subdivided into different administrative regions,222 the main 
former Fulɓe Kingdoms of Kanyume, Dalla, Booni and Joona (Map 3) are believed to 
share a common ancestry and are historically related to each other in a hierarchical 
manner. This is conveyed in the way people talk about their interrelationships in kinship 
terms: The villages are represented as older and younger brothers vis-à-vis each other. 
In the eyes of the inhabitants of Dalla, Kanyume and Joona are the older brothers, as 
they were the first established and are thus considered the elder brothers to both Dalla 
and Booni. Booni is the most junior of these present-day rural communities.  
The hierarchy corresponding to the emergence of these former kingdoms is also 
reflected in the social relations of the freeborn inhabitants in the villages. For example, 
Dallanke (inhabitants of Dalla) respect Joonanke and Kanyumenke as older brothers. 
Dallanke are in turn respected as older brothers by Booninke. The hierarchical relations 
between the villages described above come with restrictive moral codes of behaviour 
related to honour and shame. For example, interviewing a person from Joona with an 
interpreter from Dalla could be problematic because Dalla ranks lower than Joona, even 
though the interpreter was of the same rank as the interviewee. In short, the hierarchical 
relationship that holds between these villages is translated into rules of morality 
governing behaviour. 
Spatial hierarchies had methodological consequences for this research project. 
Interviewing slave descendants living in villages that were spatially separated from the 
villages and towns inhabited by their masters, felt less restrained by the social control of 
their former masters. Slave descendants did not seem to feel ashamed about actively 
approaching me rather than waiting for me to approach them, like many freeborn did. 
Freeborn Fulɓe displayed some reserve, as is expected of them according to restrictive 
moral codes of behaviour for freeborn noblemen (FF: Ndimu).223 Sometimes informants 
refused to be interviewed and suggested we asked our personal questions about their 
status, age, amount of children, names and so on to bards. 
Although I first thought such refusals had to do with the hierarchies related to gender 
or age, informants themselves would point to shame rather than age or gender to explain 
it. The following example of an interview between me, a senior member of the royal 
family from Joona (called Mawludu Dicko) and a younger male interpreter from the 
royal family of Dalla (Demba Dicko) illustrates this. Demba explicitly respected 
behaviour related to hierarchical relations between elder versus youngster, by not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222  Kanyume is administratively part of a region called Guimballah in the sixth region, while Joona, Dalla 
and Booni are part of the fifth Mopti region. Unlike Joona, Kanyume is part of Douentza Cercle, but 
only Dalla and Booni are part of what people refer to as the Haayre region.   
223  For an analysis of the term Ndimu (ndimaaku) in the Haayre context, see Breedveld & de Bruijn 
(1996: 808-809) and de Bruijn & van Dijk (1995a: 202-207). 
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looking into his uncle’s eyes and never contradicting him. However, he also explicitly 
respected their feelings of shame (FF: Yaage). Despite the fact that his senior uncle 
Mawludu insisted time and again that, since he had been living in Bamako for decades, 
he really would not mind if Demba would eat or drink in front of him or look him in the 
eye, Demba never succumbed and refused the water, bananas and anything else we were 
offered. We could never stay for too long due to Demba’s avoidance of shame in the 
potentially tense relationship between them.  
Shame is an important emotion that Fulɓe have to observe in close relationships. 
Yaage224  literally means withdrawal from interacting publicly with someone in a 
superior or rival (equal) position (related to age, gender, descent, family). For example: 
A father and his eldest son practice yaage because the eldest son will take over his 
father’s tasks and as such will become his rival.225 Practising yaage means avoiding 
certain interactions with specific persons in public, such as speaking, eating, showing 
emotions and greeting in public. De Bruijn & van Dijk (1995a: 212) emphasized how 
yaage can only be felt among people of the same social status.  
Ideas about shame and hierarchy can also be applied to relations between villages. 
One day I planned to interview my interpreter’s peers from the royal Dicko family in 
Joona. Upon our arrival, we exchanged greetings and then my interpreter, to my 
frustration, was in a hurry for us to leave. Afterwards he explained that he felt unable to 
interview his peers due to shame relations between him as a noble Dicko from Dalla and 
his noble Dicko peers from Joona. He explained that, besides the discomfort of not 
being allowed to eat, drink or express any emotions or bodily needs, the most prob-
lematic factor was that our questions might cause shame to both him and his peers.  
Yaage is also practised among slave descendants who formerly belonged to the same 
status groups of freeborn masters. In most Fulɓe strongholds in the region, royal slave 
descendants tend to mimic elite behaviour by being quiet, in control and dressing nicely. 
The fact that they live in close proximity to their former masters allows them less 
freedom of behaviour than those slave descendants living in satellite villages (FF: 
Riimaayɓe Haayre). Griep (2005: 133) observed the subtle differences between the 
behaviour of slave descendants in Debere and those in Joona. Debere is a village near 
Douentza that was founded and thus ruled by slave descendants and she contrasts the 
lively and noisy behaviour of slave descendants there with the silence and passivity 
among slave descendants co-habiting with their former masters in the Fulɓe stronghold 
of Joona. The ruling Dicko family (Weeheeɓe elite) in Joona continue to put their stamp 
on appropriate behaviour for status groups. The authority of freeborn elites who impose 
noble behaviour in the public space is lacking in villages like Debere. The geographical 
distance from one’s masters translates into a certain social distance and differences in 
behaviour. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224  For an analysis of this term, see Breedveld & de Bruijn (1996: 809-811) and de Bruijn & van Dijk 
(1995a: 207-214). 
225  Relations between in-laws (FF: Esiraaɓe), husband and wife, elders and youngsters, locals and 
visitors are marked by the application of shame. ‘it is thus precisely in their home that one runs the 
greatest risk of committing an error’ (Riesman 1977: 131-132). 
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This does not mean that villages of people of slave descent can easily be distin-
guished from Fulɓe villages. Only to the trained eye and ear are differences between 
freeborn and slave-descending Fulɓe villages apparent. Derman (1973: 257) claims it 
was only after a while that he realized that he was doing fieldwork in a former slave 
village and describes how this was not his intention. According to him, it is almost 
impossible for an outsider to identify the differences between such villages.  
There are no obvious physical or visible sings to distinguish a former serf from Fulɓe villages. Only 
much later in my stay did I come to perceive the differences between the two. The differences were 
more the carriage of the body, dress, and bearing than actual physical differences. 
The importance of being able to read subtleties of existing status differences in 
spatial arrangements practices will be outlined in the following section. 
Walking the village of Dalla  
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Maman Abidjan complained about how 
her place of residence immediately links her to the slave past. To explain this in more 
detail, this section ‘walks the village’ of Dalla, mapping it out not from a bird’s-eye 
view but rather from a more grounded perspective, focusing on the lived reality of how 
the spatial organizes the social. In 2001-2002 I walked the village of Dalla with four 
different informants: My female neighbour of slave descent Dikoore Seydu,226 my male 
host of slave descent Suleymane Dauda,227 my female interpreter from Douentza Umu 
Sangare, and my male research assistant from the Ŋeeyɓe (FF) caste group Hama Amba. 
For the sake of consistency, I blend the different walks I made with them into one here. 
The description of Dalla is thus the description made through the eyes of my pedestrian 
informants walking their village and commenting on it. To visualize the spatial 
organization of Dalla, Map 6 shows how the village is organized more or less 
concentrically. At the heart of the village is the royal court called Galbal (Map 6: 
Situated in the bigger ward of Wuro Mango) of the former king and surrounding this 
centre of power are the various sub-wards of slave descendants, craftsmen, traders and 
freeborn scholars. 
	  
Map 6 (see appendix): Subdivision of the village of Dalla in three main and various 
subwards (based on a drawing by the author)  
When walking into Dalla from the main tarmac road, one sees the remnants of a 
stone brick house built at the beginning of the twentieth century by the former French 
colonizers. These days it offers shade near the road and has become a transit zone where 
people sit while waiting to catch local transport. To the east of it is a spot, which, at first 
sight, looks like nothing more than some greenery and trees. It is, however, a cemetery 
and a possibly dangerous place, especially for women, who are never allowed to go 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226  Dikoore’s husband is Seydu and she is thus often referred to as Dikoore (married to) Seydu. For more 
on the importance of naming, see Pelckmans (2011b forthcoming). 
227  Suleymane’s father is Dauda. The name of the father is often added to a person’s first name. 
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there. There are three different cemeteries in Dalla. One is across the tarmac road in 
Boumbam (Map 5), a hamlet south of Dalla, where the ruling Weeheeɓe elite and their 
wives (including slave concubines and their families) are buried. The second is the 
graveyard east of Dalla, which has separate areas for slave descendants and freemen but 
nevertheless unites them in the same space. And lastly, west of Wuro Burram near the 
plateau, there is a special cemetery for young children. Among the Soninke ethnic group 
in west Mali, hierarchies are explicit about the places were people are buried. Although 
Soninke villages have separate graveyards for free and slave-descendant families,228 this 
is not exactly the case in Dalla. 
For the visiting outsider, order in the chaos of the village of Dalla is initially hard to 
see. Upon closer inspection and with the help of my co-walkers, the patchwork of the 
village compounds gradually emerges as an organized landscape in which people and 
things are accorded their own place. All four walks revealed surprising, different and 
meaningful elements in the landscape, such as the sandy dune in front of the house of 
Bard Hama Amba. It was described as a ‘heavenly soft bed’ by a group of village 
youngsters and what looked like empty land on the left-hand side of the entrance to the 
royal court turned out to be the tomb of King Yerowal. 
To external appearances, the people in the different status groups all look alike and 
even their housing appears similar. The houses are made of dried mud bricks with reed 
roofs and provide a monotone yellow-ecru background that contrasts nicely with peo-
ple’s colourful clothes. This monotony is however only superficial. There are large and 
small family compounds and differences in their upkeep betray both the wealth and the 
well-being of the different families. The compound of the Islamic scholars and that of 
the political elite, for example, stand out because of their spaciousness, as opposed to 
the patchwork of small compounds of their slave descendants.229 To be given a place to 
build a house, one needs the chief’s permission and the land on which people’s houses 
are built is under his control. This can be problematic as the following example shows. 
One of the ruling Weeheeɓe family members decided to construct his own house in 
the vicinity of his paternal kin but found there was not enough space. His solution was 
to make one of the slave-descendant families living next to his father’s compound pull 
down the compound in which they had been living for two generations. This family of 
slave descent did not feel they had any right to protest since their house was built on the 
chief’s land. They tore down their own houses and moved out. The fact that they 
followed orders demonstrates the fragility of their position. It also indicates the 
increased demand for space in the overcrowded village of Dalla. Although this case is 
exceptional, land ownership remains problematic and prevents the independence of 
descendants of domestic slaves (FF: Maccuɓe wuro). 
Dalla can be subdivided into three main wards, corresponding to its three main 
freeborn status groups: Weeheeɓe, Jaawamɓe and Moodibaaɓe (Map 6, supra). The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228  Personal conversation with Umaar N’Diaye (Mauritania), Paris, Spring 2005. Personal conversation 
with El Arbie Ould Saleck (Mauritania), Paris, Spring 2005. 
229  These bricks are made of local mud enriched with animal dung and straw (French: Banco), Banco is a 
common building material in much of the Malian Sahel, the city of Djenne being famous for this style 
of architecture (Schutyser 2003). Banco is put into moulds and then baked in the sun. The  slave 
descendants often make these bricks. 
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tradesmen (FF: Jaawamɓe) form the majority in the ward of Wuro Ferro (meaning tiger 
bush, which used to grow there). The ward of the Islamic scholars or Moodibaaɓe is 
called Wuro Burram. Burram means fertile and protected land, which is due to its 
location near to the only water spring on Dalla’s territory. Wuro Mango (meaning big 
ward) is at the centre of the village and hosts the majority of the ruling political families 
(FF: Weeheeɓe) and arts and crafts groups (FF: Ŋeeyɓe). Each ward is mixed to some 
extent through the hosting of immigrants, friends or administrators who have 
temporarily ended up in Dalla. The division of sub-wards of freeborn and slave-
descendant groups is reflected in the political organization of Dalla and each ward has a 
chief who represents the freeborn and one who represents slave descendants.  
These three main wards are then sub-divided into sub-wards, confusingly also called 
wuro. The term wuro is thus used for at least three levels of socio-spatial organization: 
A sedentarized village controlled by Fulɓe, the main wards of such a village and thirdly 
the sub-division of the main ward (which I call sub-wards here).230 In Dalla, these sub-
wards often have a freeborn family with their slave descendants residing next door. All 
freeborn Fulɓe families in Dalla used to own domestic slaves (often children) and 
although they lived in their masters’ compounds, they have now settled (often after 
marriage) in wards neighbouring their masters’ wards on land that is still owned by their 
masters. This is why to date most slave-descendant compounds are separate but situated 
next to those of their freeborn former masters.  
Generally, however, freeborn masters and their former slave groups are being cate-
gorized as one single sub-ward. Each sub-ward has a freeborn population with their 
former domestic slaves living nextdoor. There are two exceptions to this rule. The first 
is the sub-ward of Wuro Maccuɓe, which is only inhabited by slave descendants. In 
Dalla the royal court had so many slaves that they could not all be included in the royal 
ward and thus occupied their own separate ward, which is nevertheless clearly located 
right next to that of the royal court. Clark (1999: 93) describes a similar spatial division 
for the Bundu region in Senegambia: ‘most slaves lived in their masters’ compounds or 
in a particular part of the village reserved exclusively for Maccuɓe’. Wuro Birgire is the 
second exception and is inhabited by slave descendants only. This is because most of 
their pastoralist Jalluɓe masters abandoned Dalla sometime in the 1960 and never 
returned. Some of these slave descendants married slaves of the royal Dicko family, 
some Dickos ‘adopted’ these slave descendants as their own. More specifically, the 
youngest brother of Musa Dicko and his children claim to own these Riimaayɓe, adding 
that their grandfather was descended from those pastoralist Jalluɓe families who left and 
once owned these slaves. That they consider them ‘their slaves’ shows in how they 
expect them to be loyal and to vote for this branch of the Dicko family. 
Walking from the main road, one comes to Wuro Ferro, the first of the three main 
wards. This one is home to recently built institutions such as the town hall (1998), the 
medical post and the local school (1982). Today this ward has four waterholes, two of 
which have pumps. My neighbour Dikoore and research assistant Hama Amba re-
member how these buildings were built on what was left of a ward called Wuro Lowe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230  Sometimes a ward is called Daande (instead of wuro) when it indicates that the ward borders some-
where else. Daande seeno for example means: ‘Bordering the sand plains’. 
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that used to host the cavalry of the royal court. These soldiers all died during the 
drought (FF: Kiitaanngal) of 1913-1914, but for a whole ward to completely disappear 
was exceptional.231 
Wuro Ferro is considered the strangers’ ward. As well as Jaawamɓe traders and their 
Riimaayɓe, the director of the school (a Songhay from the north), the male nurse (a 
Bambara from Bamako) and Tuareg leather craftsmen (FF: Gargasaaɓe) live in this 
ward. The majority of freeborn in Wuro Ferro are Jaawamɓe with their former slaves.232  
Within Wuro Ferro is the cattle market, which consists of some trees to which the 
pastoralists attach their cattle, goats, donkeys and camels. In the centre of Dalla, on the 
edge of Wuro Ferro and Wuro Mango wards is the main market (FF: luumo). The 
market place is recognizable, as in every other Malian town, by the wooden sticks that 
are covered by plastic cloth or bundles of cane on market days. On the other days, the 
market space hosts some pastoralist Fulɓe women from the surrounding villages who 
sell goats’ or cows’ milk from their calabashes at dawn and again at dusk.233 Other per-
manent market traders are the descendants of traders (FF: Jaawamɓe) but also slave 
descendants. Male slave descendants are generally the one who butcher and sell meat 
and female slave descendants specialize in the preparation and selling of food. The 
permanent shops (FF: Bitiki) sell daily necessities like cooking and lamp oil, dried 
dates, tea, sugar, soap, cigarettes and batteries. Each of the shops has its own clientele 
and personal social networks.  
Market days are the liveliest days of the week and offer an occasion for the exchange 
of news, personal visits and also new encounters between boys and girls. As the market 
is such an open and public arena,234 activity there is forbidden for married noble women 
(of the ruling and religious elite). I observed how women from the royal Dicko family 
used to send someone (a young child or a woman of slave descent) to the market on 
their behalf. Sometimes they complained how difficult it was to find an adult woman of 
slave descent to help them out. This is so because most food is produced, prepared and 
sold by local slave-descendant women, who rely on the market for an estimated 50% of 
their cash income. Women of slave descent thus have an interest in maximizing their 
profits by selling their homemade foodstuff, such as baked millet pancakes, roasted 
peanuts and bean beignets. 
The quantity of the items bought and sold are probably the best indicator of the 
fragility of the local economy. One does not buy 500 grams of red beef but assembles a 
small pile of different parts of an animal by price: A tiny piece of brain, 2 cm of 
intestine, a grey stomach piece the size of a cola nut and at the bottom, the ‘real stuff’ 
i.e. fat covered red meat. The price of these piles ranged from FCFA 50 to FCFA 500 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231  Periods of extreme loss of cattle, wealth and people due to drought and famine which have been part 
and parcel of this environment for the past century. 
232  The sub-wards of Wuro Ferro are Wuro Kaaje (Jaawamɓe and their Riimaayɓe), Wuro Karbi (Jaa-
wamɓe and their Riimaayɓe), Wuro Ibbel (Jaawamɓe and their Riimaayɓe), Gaande Tombo (Jaa-
wamɓe only) and former Wuro Lowe (now uninhabited). See Map 6. 
233  The distances some travelled from their hamlets in the mountains just to sell two litres of perishable 
milk for a maximum of FCFA 500 in total (€ 0.75 in 2007) is striking. 
234  See Boesen’s analysis (1998) of how Fulɓe in northern Benin construct their alternative identity 
(French: Alterite) as pastoralists in the public sphere of the markets in cultivators’ villages.  
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on my last visit in 2007.235 Tomato concentrate is sold by the teaspoon, garlic by the 
clove, lamp oil in quantities of 10 cl bags, cigarettes and Maggi236 by the piece. These 
incredibly small amounts and the recycling of almost everything (cutting off the 
opening of a small plastic bag containing peanut sauce in order to tie up five grains of 
pepper) makes one realize exactly what ‘petty’ traders are.  
In contrast to the lively and colourful larger market in the neighbouring village of 
Booni,237 Dalla market is neither big nor especially varied. According to Burra Yero, 
my research assistant from Douentza, this is because Dalla is hostile to strangers. Some 
Douentza traders bring cloth, sugar, cookies, batteries, cases, buckets and so on. For 
items that are unavailable in Dalla, people go to Douentza, on foot, by donkey cart, 
motorbike or on public transport. Although Dalla is in many ways close to Douentza, it 
is important in itself for the surrounding villages and hamlets because of its school, 
medical post, market, shops and access to transport on the tarmac road. 
Northeast of the market is the mosque, one of the most important local landmarks 
and oriented towards Mecca in the east. The tombs of its religious intellectuals (FF: 
Moodibaaɓe) made Dalla an important site of pilgrimage in the past.238 The father of the 
current imam was highly respected in the region (De Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 92). In 
the last few years before he died in 2007, he was attentively cared for by his slave-
descending Riimaayɓe who washed him, gave him massages and were available to 
provide anything he asked for. People came from faraway to visit him, hoping to get 
their share of his divine blessing (FF: Barke).239 Seydu240 explains: ‘People, even those 
living in Bamako, sent him gifts in order to obtain blessings. My brothers and sisters in 
Bamako241 send about FCFA 100,000 each year. Giving to religious scholars (FF: 
Moodibaaɓe) is thought to bring blessings: You do it for yourself, depending on your 
material wealth and capacities.’ When the old Imam died in 2007, the village could 
barely manage to host all the visitors who came to express their condolences. Even 
President Amadou Toumani Toure,242 who was campaigning in the region, considered it 
worthwhile to make a detour to offer his personal condolences.  
The inhabitants of Dalla strongly identify with their Islamic heritage. They claim to 
have become practising Muslims before the Maasina Empire of Seeku Amadu and the 
importance of religious tradition is illustrated by the recent investment of FCFA 2 
million that the inhabitants of Dalla paid for a new mosque in 2006/2007. Although the 
mayor was offered a mosque by a Saudi NGO, the local chief and imam refused it 
because it was too decorative and would not do justice to the old mosque that they 
consider a holy place. Only in 2009 was it decided to build a new mosque (FF: Miisiide) 
but on condition that it respected local knowledge and materials. They hired and hosted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235  FCFA 655 = € 0.99 in 2007.  
236  Maggi flavour-enhancing stock cubes have conquered much of the West Africa market and are now 
the basic ingredient for many dishes.  
237  Booni became a major hub for selling illegal products through border smuggling from Burkina Faso.  
238  Their graves are in the Boumbam cemetery. 
239  See also de Bruijn & van Dijk (1995a: 182). 
240  Seydu Dicko, born 1978, a beeweejo living in Bamako, interview, March 2007. 
241  Seydu Dicko is one of the sons of Musa Dicko and lived in Bamako until 2008. The brothers and 
sisters he talks about are described in Chapter 6. 
242  Amadou Toumani Toure has been President of Mali since 2002. 
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three architects from Djenne243 to construct a mosque with bricks in the Sudanese 
building style. 
Most of the religious institutions and families are in Wuro Burram.244 Northeast of 
the mosque is Daande Seida, a neighbourhood housing Dalla’s Koranic school (FF: 
Duɗal). Male Fulɓe children in Dalla get basic teaching in the Koran from early 
childhood and although most boys abandon these studies after a few years, some do 
continue studying. In many ways the relationship between a master and a slave has the 
features of that between a scholar (FF: Moodibo) and his pupils (FF: Taalibaaɓe).  
However long his studies, a boy becomes like a son to his master and, as long as he is with him, he 
both serves and depends on him for everything. In fact, should he remain a scholar and choose the life 
of a moodibo (Islamic scholar), it is his master, not his father, who will ensure that he gets married. 
(Riesman 1992: 45) 
Access to religious studies used to be restricted for slave descendants but Islamic 
learning has given some slave-descendant Riimaayɓe the chance to climb the social 
hierarchy.  
Those who excel in Islamic education enjoy local esteem and Islamic scholarship can 
be considered part of the cultural field of hierarchy within the broader framework. In 
addition, Islamic learning generates possibilities for accumulating wealth, which is one 
reason why it has been described as ‘the prayer economy’ (Soares 2005). Islamic 
scholars are paid for their prayers based on Koranic knowledge in the field of law,245 
ritual ceremonies,246 healing and conflict mediation. As well as being paid for consulta-
tions, they receive gifts of food, milk and money from those who, through such offer-
ings, show their respect for him and his family. This religious economy is a funda-
mental aspect of the Sahelian economy more generally247 and is based on mobile 
scholars who teach children entrusted to them by (often poor) parents (Bouwman 2005). 
These young students are obliged to undergo trials and hardship such as begging, pain, a 
lack of sleep, neglect, illness and hunger in their quest for religious knowledge. 
However, as one of the local chief’s sons put it, even violent beating and physical pain 
are compensated for by the virtues and values one gains from enduring pain: ‘It is only 
through suffering that one fully becomes a person’. 
Religion is thus central to the image Dalla has of itself. The religious scholars (FF: 
Moodibaaɓe), like the majority of imams in the region, are part of the Islamic 
brotherhood known as Qadiriyya. The scholars in Dalla have always had a large share in 
local political power positions since their families are wealthy and owned many slaves. 
They also have access to the most fertile lands near Dalla’s spring and during the rainy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243  Djenne, one of the UNESCO World Heritage Sites, is famous not only locally but also internationally 
for its Sudanese architecture (Schuytser 2003).  
244  Wurro Burram is further subdivided into sub-wards: Wuro Burram (Moodibaaɓe and their Riimaa-
yɓe), Wuro Moodibaaɓe (Moodibaaɓe), Wuro Birigi (Riimaayɓe of the Weeheeɓe), Wuro Daande 
Seida (Weeheeɓe and a few Riimaayɓe). 
245  For the role of religious scholars in the application of Koranic law, see Chapter 5. 
246  For more on the role of religious scholars in marriage ceremonies, see Chapter 3. 
247  For literature on Islam and the Fulɓe in Mali: see Soares (2005) on Fulɓe in Nioro du Sahel and 
Berndt (2008) who describes the careers of slave-descending Fulɓe in religious education in the 
Guimballa region. For Islamic education practised by pastoralist Fulɓe in the Haayre region, see de 
Bruijn & van Dijk (1995: 169-194; 2009: 116-127).  
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season, water runs down onto this land from the Haayre Plateau. Wuro Burram is where 
the all-year spring (FF: Dammbaare) is that is used by cattle herders and for watering 
vegetables in nearby gardens. For youngsters, it is a favourite spot to hang out when it is 
hot and on market days it is an ideal location to observe visitors walking down from the 
plateaus carrying goods to trade. 
In the same way that religion is a central feature to Wuro Burram, politics and power 
are key to the most central neighbourhood of Dalla, Wuro Mango, which means ‘big 
village’. The relationship between Wuro Mango and Wuro Maccuɓe is close-knit as 
they host the most powerful groups (Weeheeɓe and Moodibaaɓe) who claim Islamic 
heritage. Wuro Mango is described in more detail here because it is the cradle of the 
social network of informants central to this thesis. 
Wuro Mango 
Wuro Mango has two major parts that are both enclosed by walls: The ward of slave 
descendants (FF: Wuro Maccuɓe) and the royal court (FF: Galbal). Wuro Maccuɓe is 
one of the most densely populated parts of Dalla and the many houses, granaries and 
small alleyways between them give the bewildering impression of a dense labyrinth. 
The best way to get around is to ask children for a specific family compound. From 
November 2001 to April 2002, I lived in Wuro Maccuɓe with my interpreter Umu 
Sangare and her baby in the house of Kodo, a young man with a stigmatized position in 
a family of slave descendants. It was a public secret that Kodo was a bastard but we 
were allowed to live in his house because it was empty during his seasonal migration 
and it was also conveniently situated next to the home of my main hosts, Suleymane 
and his wife Hadiata.  
Wuro Maccuɓe is separated from the royal court by a path and a wall, built by King 
Yerowal after the Second World War, runs between the two wards (De Bruijn & van 
Dijk 1995a: 80). Yerowal needed the political support of the Riimaayɓe during the first 
organized elections and the wall physically separated the domestic slaves from the royal 
compound, symbolically demonstrating the emancipation of the house slaves vis-à-vis 
the royal court. Some informants suggested that it was the French who insisted on this 
wall to underline the physical separation between the two groups.  
When asking a villager of slave descent where he lives, most slave descendants 
prefer to use the euphemism of the ‘big ward’ (FF: Wuro Mango) rather than the name 
of the sub-ward Wuro Maccuɓe (ward of captured slaves) with its pejorative 
connotations.248 The families in this ward are predominantly former domestic slaves of 
the political elite (FF: Weeheeɓe). As a result of virilocal settlement,249 some of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248  It is the Weeheeɓe who use the name Wuro Maccuɓe much more. Wuro Mango is the larger unit in 
which Wuro Maccuɓe is situated and the inhabitants of Wuro Maccuɓe prefer to use the name Wuro 
Mango (big ward).  




king’s domestic slave women have moved out. The male descendants of royal domestic 
slaves over time married slave women belonging to other elite families.250  
Wuro Galbal, the ward of the royal court, is the political heart of the village and 
hosts a large number of Weeheeɓe. It is a public secret that a different branch of the 
Dicko family had political power first but at the beginning of the twentieth century 
another branch successfully forced them out of power.251 Since this particular royal 
Weeheeɓe family is central to my network of informants, I will distinguish them from 
the other Weeheeɓe families in Dalla by calling them the Dicko family. So although 
several other Weeheeɓe families in Dalla use the patronym Dicko, when I refer to the 
Dicko family in this thesis I am referring to the family that lives in the royal compound 
in Wuro Galbal.  
The royal family is no longer as rich as it used to be and only has two horses left. 
Nevertheless, it is still one of the wealthiest in the village and the one to which clients 
from surrounding Riimaayɓe villages defer, for example by visiting and passing by on 
market days. The royal court has a hall to receive visitors, which ensures privacy for the 
compounds inside the royal palace. My neighbour Dikoore explained that this is a way 
of preventing curious visitors from setting eyes on the beautiful noble wives. The area 
has many other functions too and during my stay, I observed female chairpersons of 
local NGO projects counting out their monthly savings there and taxmen calculating 
and discussing the levying of taxes.  
The internal organization of the royal compound reflects social hierarchies through 
spatial arrangements. Each of the king’s wives had her own chamber with a personal 
kitchen and although the king’s slave concubines also live in the royal compound, they 
did not enjoy the same privileges. They had the smallest houses and did not have slaves 
cooking or cleaning for them.Rather, that is what they were expected to do for the other 
freeborn wives of their husbands. 252 
Although I spent time with the freeborn Weeheeɓe women who weave their coloured 
straw mats all day long, it was more difficult to interact with them than with the slave 
descending women in the ward of Wuro Maccuɓe where I was staying. Since the royal 
women of the Dicko family were expected to respect shame (FF: Yaage)253 and nobility 
(FF: Ndimu) as described above, interactions with them were more complex. Some 
Weeheeɓe (both men and women) initially refused to talk to me and my female inter-
preter, feeling more senior and higher in status and thus in a position to refuse to answer 
questions.254 While living in Dalla, my loyalties were ultimately closer to ‘their’ Mac-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250  Although their slave ancestors were not allowed to marry other masters’ slaves, the slave descendants 
of the royal elite married wives formerly belonging to other masters, for example, Jaawamɓe of Wuro 
Ferro (wife of Amadun Dauda), Wuro Gaanare (Altinee of Hamma) or pastoralist Jalluɓe from the 
surrounding Haayre villages (Dikellayya).  
251  Interview in Dalla {2002} with hair-plaiter Kumba Yero, a slave-descending Maccudo from Wuro 
Taan.  
252 See Chapter 3 for more on the issue of slave concubines and their work. 
253  De Bruijn &van Dijk (1995; 212) emphasize that Yaage can only be felt among people of the same 
social group.  
254  Riesman (1992: 199)254 claims that ‘Not only do Fulɓe usually restrain themselves in the way they 
express emotions, but they also hold back in the very expression of meaning itself. In general, they do 
not like to make things explicit.’ 
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cuɓe than to them and later, when I was hosted in Bamako by one of the Dicko family 
members, I became much closer to the Dicko family. 
Wuro Mango has a total of eight sub-wards,255 most of which had close ties with the 
royal court in the past. The ward of Suudu Baa Bunti, for example, hosted the craftsmen 
and bards (FF: Ŋeeyɓe/Maabuuɓe) of old who were attached to the royal court and sang 
the praises of the ancestors of the royal court. Bard Baa Digi, who passed away at the 
start of this century, used to live here and it was his son, Hama Amba, who became my 
research assistant in 2002.  
Wuro Mango is the geographical centre of Dalla and boasts the only two shops (FF: 
Bitiki)256 and tailors in town. The mosque is officially part of Wuro Mango rather than 
the main ward of the religious scholars called Wuro Burram. East of Wuro Mango are 
some small gardens, an empty square where youngsters play football at dusk and the 
chief’s millet fields, one of which is used during the collective prayers for Tabaski. Just 
prior to the 2002 elections, Dalla received a motorized mill to pound millet from 
presidential candidate Amadou Toumani Toure. The chief negotiated for this mill to be 
installed near his compound in Wuro Mango. Amadou Toumani Toure won the elect-
ions and remained popular in Dalla through his connections with some of the Dicko 
family members living in Bamako. When I visited Dalla in 2006, the mill was no longer 
functioning and some inhabitants said it was better this way as there had been too many 
quarrels about who was allowed to use it. The engine’s noise no longer disturbed the 
otherwise peaceful and quiet village.  
Cattle have remained important for sedentarized former pastoralists. The royal elite 
and religious scholars still have a daily diet based on milk and, if there is money, meat 
too. The cows that provide this milk are never far away from the big compounds of the 
important sedentary Weeheeɓe and Moodibaaɓe families in Wuro Mango and Wuro 
Burram. Near the royal compound is the main water hole where the animals drink and 
their dung turns the muddy surroundings green and encourages mosquitoes and flies. 
One thing is certain, Dalla, in all aspects of its lived reality and with its corresponding 
smells, dust, noise and disease, was sometimes impossible to compare with the stereo-
typical postcard-perfect images of rural Mali. However, thanks to its people and their 
gradual acceptance of me over time, my walks through Dalla village at specific times of 
the day even exceeded the idealistic postcard stereotypes.  
 
Setting the scene: The cast of informants  
The walk continues but now in the form of social encounters. Having mapped the region 
of Haayre, its various interrelated Fulɓe strongholds and the lived spatial organization 
of the village of Dalla, this section casts some of my main informants from the network 
of people central to this thesis. The majority of my informants live in Wuro Mango 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255  The wards are Wuro Taan (trading Jaawamɓe and their Maccuɓe), Wuro Misside255 (Weeheeɓe, 
different lineage as current chief), Wuro Sokkara (trading Jaawamɓe and Riimaayɓe (Maccuɓe no 
longer attached to them), Gunu Ganaari (Weeheeɓe, different lineage as current chief and their 
Maccuɓe), Suudu Baa Bunti (iron and leather artisans called Ŋeeyɓe, Maabuuɓe), Guntu Ganta 
(Weeheeɓe, different lineage as current chief) and Wuro Buli (Jaawamɓe and Riimaayɓe). See Map 6. 
256  From the French term boutique and assimilated into Fulfulde as bitiki. It literally means ‘shop’, often 
a small part of a house where luxury products such as cigarettes, tea, sugar and petrol are sold. 
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where freeborn informants are the royal descendants of King Yerowal. Most of the 
slave descendants living here are the descendants of a common royal domestic slave 
called Kau who was captured somewhere south of Bandiagara. I made a genealogy of 
Kau’s family from his generation through to the present (Image 2) and my main 
informants are descendants of Kau’s son Dauda who live in the sub-ward of Wuro 
Maccuɓe. They are the descendants of the domestic slaves at the royal court who never 
left their masters, did not flee during the 1913-1914 droughts, and did not move 
elsewhere after the abolition of slavery or following independence. A lot of them take 
pride in their relationship with the royal court and in the prestige of the ruling elite, who 
used to be their masters.   
Although I lived in the slave ward, my relationship with the royal family was very 
good. Both the chief and the mayor were cooperative and welcomed my research. It was 
Mayor Musa Dicko who made sure I was hosted in the ward of Wuro Maccuɓe in 2001, 
as requested by my supervisor Prof. de Bruijn.257 Living among slave descendants, I 
certainly gained their sympathy and had easy access to the confidences of most of the 
people in the ward. However, my close ties with them meant that contacts with other 
slave groups were closed off.258 As Derman (1973: 257) writing on Fulɓe in Fuuta 
Djallon (Guinea) indicated: 
If I had been living in the Fulbe village, they would have classed me with all the other whites who 
hobnobbed with the chiefs and would have assumed I would adopt the attitude of the Fulbe towards 
them. By living in a former serf village I avoided those problems. However, it did not close off the 
world of the Fulbe to me … due ... to the Fulbe’s desire to indicate that they knew more about the 
history and religion … than did their former serfs. 
During my first stay in Dalla (2001-2002), my interpreter Umu Sangare insisted from 
the start that we should go and greet the royal family each morning. We never missed 
this ritual, bringing our personal morning greetings to the royal Dicko family, and the 
chief in particular. At first I considered it a waste of time as these greetings took up a lot 
of time because of their ritualized lengthiness with a series of questions about family, 
work, health and the weather, which are not expected to be answered truthfully. Greet-
ings are a formalized way of establishing communication, which is why my interpreter 
and I invariably went to greet the royal family and our informants each morning, a 
group that increased in size considerably over time and by the end of my stay it took up 
the first hour and a half of each day. Interpreter Umu explained that doing so would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257  On my arrival in 2001 in Dalla, I presented a letter from my supervisor de Bruijn to then-Mayor Musa 
Dicko, explicitly asking him to host me in Wuro Maccuɓe. This letter was important and prevented 
him from hosting me with his own family. He was surprised that I would prefer to live in the dirty and 
chaotic compound of their slave descendants rather than in the more luxurious royal compound but 
when I explained my research was about this group, he agreed and appointed one of his most loyal 
assistants, Suleymane Dauda, as my host. 
258  Examples are descendants of slaves who formerly belonged to the trading Jaawamɓe. The head of a 
women’s association in the ward of Wuro Ferro from the outset outrightly refused to allow women 
from her association to talk to me. Slave descendants living in the hamlets on the plateaus (FF: 
Riimaayɓe Haayre) who had bad memories of being harassed by the royal slaves of the Kau family 
also only talked to me when I was not accompanied by a member of the Kau family. This was the 
reason for my four-day trip visiting villages on the Gandamia Plateau accompanied by my partner and 
by Hassane who was a slave descendant from Dalla’s imam family and Burra Yero Cisse, a slave 
descendant from Douentza. 
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significantly increase the quality of our future interviews as greeting contributed to our 
respectability.  
Umu Sangare was born in 1975 in Mopti but had been living in Douentza for quite 
some time and her surname, Sangare, identifies her as part of the Fulɓe community 
associated with southern Mali (Wassoulou region). Since she is from a different Fulɓe 
clan, she was considered ‘neutral’ in many ways in Dalla. Umu became a good friend 
and I admire the way she has always managed to get paid jobs as a teacher somewhere. 
In 2006 she travelled with her baby all the way to Mondoro on the border with Burkina 
Faso to teach. Umu took her six-month-old baby with her during the week when we 
lived and worked in Dalla. Returning to Douentza at weekends gave me the opportunity 
to write up interviews, and for Umu it was important to take care of her husband, her 
oldest son and the household. She always joked how the weeks in Dalla were a holiday 
for her compared to her busy weekends. 
Rokiatu Dicko was how I was baptized by my research assistant Burra Yero Cisse on 
arriving in Douentza in 2007. Burra proposed the name Rokiatu because of the similar 
‘o’ sound (as in Lotte-Rokiatu), which is not very common in Fulɓe names. He con-
vinced me to take the patronym Dicko if I was to work in the Dicko network of Dalla. 
This white researcher posed a real challenge for some in Dalla. What should they think 
of someone who looked like a woman but was not married and did not have children, 
and on top of that sometimes behaved like a man by wearing trousers and a wristwatch, 
smoking and being constantly on the move? Such a peculiar species was definitely 
worth spying on for the local children. Fortunately, ‘our’ house was right at the back 
and one had to cross many other compounds to get there. Umu and I were thus rela-
tively well shielded from curious passers-by, although the radio trottoir did not prevent 
curious visitors from coming to see for themselves. We were the best theatre for years 
and living together as two women with one baby, we came closer to being a comedy 
duo than anything else. 
Also in interviewing people, our strange ways were awkward. Asking individuals 
personal questions is often delegated to specific groups in Fulɓe society. Asking ques-
tions more generally is thus considered inappropriate in the first place, let alone when 
two young women set out to interview an older man in his own house. Since Umu tried 
hard but never felt comfortable about this, I started working with bard and ironworker 
(FF: Ŋeenyo) Hama Amba if he was around. With Hama, I was able to interview the 
imam and other respected elders because, being a bard, it was his duty to keep himself 
informed and so people expected him to ask questions. 
Most of Dalla’s inhabitants (FF: Dallanke) were charmed by Umu: She (and her 
baby Najoum) had the ability to win people’s trust in a very natural way and, with Umu, 
I interviewed 35 inhabitants of Wuro Mango and conducted a total of 81 interviews in 
six months in 2001-2002, usually in their own compounds. In general, we first made an 
exploratory visit, which could last from ten minutes to several hours and only in a 
second visit did I ask whether I could note things down. We mostly worked with semi-
structured interviews and recorded some conversations that I transcribed verbatim at 
weekends in Douentza. From these transcriptions I extracted new questions that 
emerged for each individual informant. Over time we learned about strategic moments 
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that would allow us to speak with them in private. Maman Abidjan, who could not walk 
anymore, was often lonely in the early morning, but not on market days because her 
house was full of visitors then. However, privacy during interviews remained a chal-
lenge: There were always people and children who continued to ‘assist’ in our activities, 
and elders were a special challenge as they were constantly surrounded by others. 
Luckily some informants themselves over time felt the need to organize more privacy 
when we had an appointment. My fieldwork periods were always arranged to coincide 
with the dry season (November-April), which is a relatively quiet season since no culti-
vation needs to be done.  
Mayor Musa Dicko appointed Suleymane Dauda, one of his most loyal assistants, as 
my host. A host-guest relationship is often a relationship that lasts a lifetime.259 Over 
the years Suleymane has continued to be my respected host and I owe him a lot. 
Suleymane Dauda is, as his name suggests, one of the many sons of Dauda who in turn 
was one of the sons of Kau, the ancestor of the biggest family of descendants from the 
royal house slaves of the Dicko family. They are at the same time the biggest family in 
Wuro Maccuɓe.  
 
Image 2 (see appendix): Specific branch of domestic slave descendants formerly 
belonging to the Dicko family in Dalla (genealogy) 
 
As the genealogy of Image 2 indicates, Suleymane is the youngest of Dauda Kau’s 
six children. Suleymane married the daughter of one of my main informants, Allay 
Jannginoowo (†2009) and his brothers and sisters will be discussed time and again in 
the chapters to come. Suleymane’s elder sister, Kumbel Dauda, for example, will be 
described in Chapter 7 on Bamako, as the assistant of a noble woman who was 
mourning her deceased husband. Asse Kau, Suleymane’s oldest aunt is the main 
informant who in Chapter 3 describes the life of her sister Pendolde Kau (Image 2). 
Pendolde Kau used to be married to King Yerowal as a slave concubine. Thanks to her 
marriage with the king, this particular slave descending family called Dauda became 
kinmembers of the freeborn Dicko family of the King. Dikelayya, the wife of one of 
Suleymane’s oldest brothers (Hama Dauda), is related to Burra Yero Cisse (†2007), one 
of my research assistants from Douentza. This proved instrumental as Burra would 
always have a proper host whenever we visited Dalla.  
The network of people central to this thesis and whom I have known intimately are 
in the genealogies of both Image 2 and 3 (see below). Many of them lived in Wuro 
Maccuɓe and were neighbours, friends and key informants at the same time, although 
most of my key informants have since died of old age. Some of Suleymane’s siblings 
have settled in Bamako, others in Segou (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 describes how Amadu 
Hama Dauda, a son of Hama Dauda, delivers bread in Bamako and hosts many young 
people from Dalla. And I also mention Beidary Dauda and his family who live humbly 
and quietly in a marginalized ward in Bamako. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259  I describe the importance of the hosting institution called Njaatigi in Chapter 6. 
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I have tried as sincerely as possible not to abuse people’s names and identities in this 
thesis and have respected their decision to remain anonymous if they requested this or 
clearly had an interest in remaining anonymous. It is difficult to maintain the balance 
between professional curiosity and respect for a person and his/her feelings, and al-
though my informants gave me their informed consent to use the data from our inter-
views, it would not be fair to do away with the attempts at social climbing of some by 
bluntly using their names and backgrounds. On the other hand, I have tried to be as 
specific as possible about their personalities and their relationships as they deserve to be 
mentioned as important contributors to this work as informants. In short, this dilemma 
is one I have dealt with by taking my own conscience as a guideline. ‘There has been 
much talk about “multiple authorship” in recent debates about ethnographic writing. In 
this study, the authors of statements or texts are identified and whenever possible, 
named. But I shall not burden them with authorship in the sense of being the ones who 
present this story to a public and therefore have to take a responsibility for its anthro-
pological findings and implications’ (Fabian 1990: xv). 
 
Image 3 (See appendix): Specific branch of royal Dicko family in Dalla (genealogy) 
Most of the main characters of noble descent that I describe are the descendants of 
King Yerowal Dicko and, more specifically, the descendants of Yerowal’s sons Musa 
(†2009) and Haidu Dicko (†2010) (Image 3). Mayor Musa and Chief Haidu Dicko have 
already been mentioned (Chapter 1) and more features of the political organization of 
Dalla will be described in Chapter 4. Musa’s children live in Bamako, Kayes, Paris and 
elsewhere and Madame, Samba, Kadji and so on are present from Chapter 6 onwards. 
For most of my interviews in Bamako, Chief Haidu’s son, Amadu Amiiru Dicko, 
worked as my research assistant from 2007 onwards and before then I mainly worked 
with his cousin Musa (the son of Musa Dicko’s younger brother) who was my inter-
preter and research assistant during much of my 2005-2006 research period in Bamako. 
Having an interpreter of freeborn status added a certain ‘colour’ to interviews with 
informants of slave descent, which I will try to illustrate when referring to interviews in 
the chapters to come. In general, both freeborn and people of slave descent exaggerated 
their loyalty or authority when someone of the other status group interviewed them, 
tending to give socially acceptable answers according to the dominant discourse of 
hierarchy. At the same time, the artificial micro-encounters that I sometimes established 
in this way became concrete observations on the interactions between the status groups 
and how different generations proceed. Finally, working with a freeborn interpreter was 
due to the practical considerations of language, behavioural style and logistics. I had 
difficulties finding an interpreter of Riimaayɓe status who spoke French well enough to 
assist me. It was only near the end of my stay in 2007 that I met a youngster of slave 
descent who was born in a hamlet in the rural community of Dalla. His father used to be 
a slave on the estates of the royal court and in the 1960s set himself up in Douentza. All 
his sons finished school and since they lived in neighbouring compounds in Douentza, 
they grew very close to Musa Dicko’s freeborn family. The boy was thus well ac-
quainted with both the Kau and Dicko families but was busy finishing his studies and 
lived on the opposite side of Bamako. Furthermore, the few times we did set out 
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together, he had difficulty overcoming expectations of hierarchy related to shame, age 
and gender. He was so polite and deferring that we did not get to talk to people at all. 
This is a more general feature of interpreters of slave descent from the Kau family: 
Most of them, out of loyalty, would refuse to impose themselves on those they con-
sidered their superiors. A last and very practical concern that influenced my choice for a 
freeborn interpreter was the fact that I needed someone who knew how to get to the 
different family members’ compounds in Bamako by motorcycle. Most youngsters of 
slave descent in Bamako do not have a motorbike, work long hours and are only in 
town temporarily, and consequently do not know the city very well. 
 
Greeting is placing people 
People move through the landscape throughout the long day. Inhabitants of Dalla walk 
round their village every day and greetings have a central place in their lives. De-
pending on how well they know each other and how often they have already greeted 
others that day, such greetings can be between three and twenty sentences long. Apart 
from occasional encounters, people also actively set out in the early morning to go and 
greet the people they consider part of their social network.  
It is impossible to deny the importance of greeting for social cohesion. Fagerberg-
Diallo (1984: 1-2) in her Maasina Fulfulde course book opens with a ‘cultural note’ on 
the importance and use of greetings: ‘Few things will be more important to you in your 
rapport with people than knowing how to greet properly’. In a spatial sense, the daily 
tours of morning greetings most people make to those they respect are imbued with 
detailed information. In general, the one who arrives will start the greeting, even if he 
interrupts an ongoing conversation. If people meet somewhere, the oldest person will 
start greeting but many things (also the length of the greeting) depend on factors such as 
how well the participants know each other, how long it has been since they last met, 
their respective ages and social status. Fagerberg-Diallo (1983: 2) points out how: ‘the 
appropriate tone of voice and gestures are determined by the respective ages and social 
status of the people greeting, so it is difficult to give any simple rules’. 
Tracing who greets who is useful for tracing social networks. When living in Dalla in 
2001-2002, I observed about fifteen people coming to greet our neighbour Yaya Kau 
(†2002) between 5 am and 8 am. Just before he fell sick in 2002, Yaya, by then the 
oldest man of the ward, was the head (FF: Amiiru) of the slave descendants in Wuro 
Maccuɓe.260 He was respected by many and daily greetings were the most appropriate 
way of expressing this. Later more visitors from farther away and with higher statuses 
(the village chief and his family members) dropped by to show their respect. I am sure 
some considered it to be a great opportunity as well to observe the whereabouts of the 
curious white person (FF: Tubaaku) living there. And this allowed me to get to know 
the visitors, who with time also greeted us (my interpreter and myself) more exten-
sively. 
Those deemed of lower status, such as young people or slave descendants, make the 
effort to greet those they consider higher in status such as elder people, and political and 
religious freeborn families. Ideally, young people visit elders and slave-descending 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260  For more about the political function of the chief of the slaves (FF: Amiiru Maccuɓe), see Chapter 4.  
105 
 
Maccuɓe visit ruling Weeheeɓe. Nevertheless, there are exceptions whereby such hier-
archies can be reversed. In the case of Yaya’s illness, the village chief visited Yaya 
instead of the other way round. Burra Yero was very angry when my host in Douentza 
failed to visit him when he was sick for more than a week. Not visiting a sick person is 
a serious insult and deviates from the concern people expect from one another. 
Lastly, the kind and quantity of questions inform the observer about the relational 
closeness between two persons, their families and their social status. Concerning con-
tent, following Hardung (1997: 129), I observed how greetings among slave descend-
ants would always contain questions about work (FF: Golle), while questions about 
different family members seem more central in Fulɓe greetings. Obviously, moral ide-
ologies are subject to change. According to Demba Dicko,261 differences in social status 
these days are not reflected as much as before: ‘When greeting today we don’t consider 
someone’s social status anymore. We greet each other as family members. Today Mac-
cuɓe and Weeheeɓe have a kind of kinship relation. I no longer consider you as my 
slave, but as my parent because ever since our grandparents’ generation we have been 
close.’262 
Nevertheless slave descendants in Dalla go and greet their former masters’ families 
rather than vice versa. If I were to make a functionalist analysis of greeting practices, I 
would say that choices over who greets who can be interpreted as calculated future 
investments, comparable to a gift. Maccuɓe women of slave descent greet the Weeheeɓe 
in the royal court each morning and often literally give a gift or make a gesture, such as 
bringing along a bucket of water or offering some hours of their labour to pound millet 
to underline their deference to the influential Dicko family.  
In short, greetings put people in place through unwritten moral codes and expecta-
tions. Greeting visits are thus indexical with belonging and provide people with oppor-
tunities to strengthen relations and identify with respectable members of the commu-
nity. 
 
Taking places in everyday life interactions and ritual occasions  
Amadu Diallo, a Pullo (FF: Singular form of Fulɓe) from the Kayes region in western 
Mali263 describes how, when entering a Fulɓe village, one can discern at a glance who is 
noble and who is not. When I asked him how, he mentioned three points: Dress, skin 
colour and the ‘place occupied’. When asked about the place they occupy, Amadu 
detailed how slave descendants are not allowed to sit at the same height as freeborn and 
will sit on a mat while the freeborn sits higher, such as on a tree stump or a chair. 
Such discourse on the symbolism of place with respect to social status underlines the 
unease expressed by Maman Abidjan and Seydu in the introduction to this chapter. 
Besides her place of residence, Maman added that ritual occasions in Dalla put her in 
her place. She details how she experienced that, despite her respectable age and migrant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261  Demba Dicko, 1979, a youngster from Dalla studying in Bamako. 
262  Literally in French: ‘Aujourd’hui on ne regarde pas ça {salutations} parce que tu es mon maître. Mais 
aujourd’hui on va dire que c’est mon parent et c’est pour ça qu’on va saluer. C’est comme ça qu’on 
dit, on prend ça sous une forme de relation parental, ce n’est pas mon captif, c’est mon parent, parce 
que c’est depuis les ancêtres qu’on est soudé.’  
263  Interview {2006}, Amadu Diallo, aged about 35, village of Melga in the west Malian Kayes region.  
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status, on ritual occasions in the Dicko family she is still expected to act as a legal 
minor, offering assistance instead of observing and being served. Others writing on the 
relationship between slavery, memory and hierarchy also highlight how it is in the ritual 
sphere that hierarchy remains obvious.264  
The places occupied by different actors on ritual occasions are highly symbolic of 
the social position they are ascribed. Typically noble freeborn occupy central positions 
on ritual occasions, while groups of slave descent assist by working on the peripheries 
of the geographical space occupied during the ritual. During a baptism for example, 
noble freeborn women sit next to the new mother in a closed circle. The slave descend-
ants who assist at the ceremony sit in the outer circles far from the new mother if they 
are not cooking or engaging in other tasks.265 During marriage ceremonies, the Riimaa-
yɓe pound away in a back corner of the compound of the married couple. Maman 
explains that the scandal for her was to sit with the other poor slave descendants, com-
pared to which she, as a manumitted, wealthy slave felt much higher in status. When 
Maman Abidjan describes her frustrations over ‘being put back in her place’, she is 
therefore referring to the fact that she no longer wanted to sit with slave descendants on 
ritual occasions. After 40 years of upward mobility in Abidjan, she no longer identified 
with her former slave status.  
Conclusions: Dalla puts everyone into place 
The saying ‘everyone has his place’ (French: à chacun sa place) was often used by 
informants to explain why they accept their social position but also how it is made or 
takes place in a performative sense. I described how migrants Maman Abidjan and 
Seydu Dicko questioned the way in which they were put in place through the per-
formative acts of their co-villagers. They expressed a desire to change their ascribed 
place in the existing hierarchy of their home village. For both, this proved difficult in 
practice because (memories of) specific ways of hierarchical relating have been mapped 
onto concrete places. The way in which Dalla village is inhabited and organized contri-
butes to the subtle reproduction of hierarchies. The argument was that precisely because 
hierarchy is implicit in the spatial organization of the landscape it renders explicit 
contestation difficult for insiders (inhabitants of this place). 
By approaching the region and the village of Dalla from two different perspectives, I 
have demonstrated how the culture of hierarchy is inscribed in the landscape and is 
reproduced implicitly. The large number of former slave villages in the region as well as 
the number of wards inhabited by slave descendants in former Fulɓe strongholds, such 
as Booni and Dalla, are evidence of the past importance of slavery in the region. The 
hamlets of floating populations surround the rural communities (former Fulɓe King-
doms) of Booni and Dalla concentrically. The further away from the centre of power 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264  Shaw (2002) describes how slave societies continue to embody hierarchy in ritual. Hardung (2003) 
emphasizes how former exploitative labour relations are ritualized and Argenti (2007) describes the 
ways in which masks, songs and play symbolize relations of power between kings and their floating 
clients. 
265  Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrate how the use of space by different social categories reflects the ideology 
of hierarchy in the urban context of Bamako.  
107 
 
they are, the less inclined slave descendants are to defer to centres of power. The cul-
tural field of hierarchy is not only respected between settlements of freeborn and slave 
descendants but also among inhabitants of interrelated Fulɓe villages. The former 
Kingdoms of Kanyume, Dalla, Booni and Joona are related to each other in a hier-
archical manner. This hierarchy is reflected in a status discourse (Jansen 1996) between 
the inhabitants of these villages: Freeborn Dallanke respect freeborn Joonanke as older 
brothers and, in turn, are considered as older brothers by Booninke. The village walk in 
Dalla painted a picture of important public spaces, such as the market and its local 
economy, the mosque and the importance of religious life, and the royal court at the 
political heart of the village. The three main wards corresponding to three main freeborn 
status groups, who all have their former house slaves (FF: Maccuɓe Wuro) living next-
door, were also identified. Due to their physical proximity, these groups of slave 
descendants have had a harder time refusing demands than those living on the slave 
estates (FF: Riimaayɓe Haayre). 
Lastly, the focus on greeting and ritual occasions revealed how the culture of 
hierarchy is not only inscribed in the social landscape but also reproduced in much more 
explicit, though subtle, ways. To illustrate the value of participant observation, I des-
cribed how greeting practices index belonging and/or dependence. The social action of 
greeting in itself reconstructs the social and hierarchical difference between people. The 
culture of hierarchy recreates social groups that ‘take their place’ in a performative 
sense to the detriment of others who feel ‘put in their place’. Being put in place is a 
power relation implicitly recalling the hierarchy of slavery. The (re-)creation of hier-





Relating to other social status groups 
C’est dans le mariage que la mémoire de l’esclavage c’est accentué.  
(Umar, a teacher of slave descent, village of Fatoma, Mali, 2007)	  
Getting married 
It promises to be another hot day in Dalla. It is early morning and I can hear music. The 
sun is rising and is shining on a delegation of women accompanied by musicians 
playing flutes and drums who are heading in the direction of the ward of Wuro Ferro in 
the village of Dalla. The musicians are frequently away from home because they can 
make more money playing at the weddings of elite families in Mopti and Bamako but as 
the husband-to-be, Kodo, is himself a drum player, his comrades have made an extra 
effort to be present here. 
Apart from the music, there are also gunshots, a common noise when important 
events are taking place. Today Kodo, a member of the Kau family living in the ward of 
Wuro Maccuɓe is going to marry Mariam, a young girl of slave descent who lives in 
Wuro Ferro (see Map 6, supra). The delegation sent by Kodo’s parents (in this case his 
grandmother who adopted him) consists of two groups. The first is the family of the 
groom, who are bringing gifts for the family of the bride. After receiving these one or 
two well-grilled goats and three or four bundles of millet, the bride’s family will start to 
prepare a meal that will be eaten at dusk when they throw a party, literally a ‘flute’ (FF: 
Fijo), when the drummers and flute players invite the unmarried women and men to 
dance.  
The other part of the delegation brings items that allow the young bride to leave her 
parents’ house: A pair of shoes and two sets of cloth. One cloth will be used to cover 
her hips, the other to cover her face,266 while the plastic shoes are for her ‘journey’ to 
her new home, which is undertaken either on foot or on the back of a donkey or by bus, 
motorcycle or car (depending on the distance and the wealth of the families involved). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266  The woman who covers her face and hips is a trustworthy woman who ideally has never been di-
vorced and has never left her home after fighting with her husband.  
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In this case, young bride Mariam walks from her house in Wuro Ferro to the house of 
Kodo’s grandmother267 and cries all the way to express her anxiety at leaving her 
family’s compound although the music sometimes drowns out her loud sobbing. Her 
best friends accompany her and present her to each family member and to her new 
neighbours in the new ward she will inhabit.268 
Kodo managed to collect the money for the wedding (FF: Nafaayi) by migrating to 
Burkina Faso and Segou to work in construction and as a painter. He divorced his first 
wife, with whom he had a daughter, and his hopes are high that Mariam, as his second 
wife, will give him a son.  
On her arrival, Mariam spends a week in her new house (Kodo’s grandmother’s 
house) and various events take place. She is constantly accompanied by her female 
friends, is given food and presents and is visited by friends, family and her new in-laws. 
On the seventh day, she leaves the house for the ‘day of the big washing’.269 She, her 
friends and other youngsters collect all the dirty clothes in the village and start to wash 
them at the public well in Wuro Maccuɓe. Mariam has to wash her husband’s pants but 
symbolically refuses although in the end she will agree to do so and also to washing the 
rest of her co-villagers’ clothes. Then she will go back to her parents’ house, only to be 
returned to her new husband’s house by the old woman who covered her up on the first 
day. It is only now that she will spend her first night with her husband. It is very 
important that she can prove her virginity, which is shown in the form of blood on a 
white cloth the next morning. Since Kodo found Mariam to be a virgin (FF: Muntari), 
she was allowed to return to her parents and, as a sign of respect, Kodo butchers a billy 
goat and spills its blood at the entrance to their house. Mariam is given presents by her 
own and her husband’s families to underline her respectability.270  
What a contrast there is between this lavish ceremony and the way Mariam and 
Kodo’s parents who used to be slaves, were married before. The older generation of 
royal slaves in the Kau family had to accept that marriage was arranged for them by 
their masters and the choice of partner and the actual wedding ceremony (if there even 
was one) were entirely in their masters’ hands. Bridewealth was missing since the 
master was already giving away his source of labour. In fact, his giving of a slave as a 
bride was considered to be bridewealth in itself. Nevertheless, Kodo’s uncle, Allay 
Jannginoowo, remembers how as a privileged slave of the king, one of the king’s wives 
lent him some of her jewellery and he was even allowed to marry two wives, which was 
exceptional for slaves. 
Kinship was an important aspect of slaves’ exclusion from their new host societies. 
Being able to trace the genealogy of members of one’s family over several generations 
is a source of honour and pride. The longer the genealogy, the more respectable the 
family. In a way, long genealogies that stretch far back in time, testify to the free origins 
of a family and allow to distance oneself from the social stigma that surrounds slave 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267  As Kodo was adopted by his grandmother, she fulfils the parental role here. 
268  This ‘presentation of the bride’ is not a part of the wedding ceremony of the freeborn Weeheeɓe.  
269  Although one might associate the washing of her co-villagers clothes with slave labour, this ritual is 
also part of the marriage ceremony of the freeborn villagers.  
270  If the girl is not a virgin, she will become the subject of gossip and will not be shown signs of respect 
in the form of gifts and visits by her in-laws. 
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status. However, genealogies and origins have always been manipulated. Given the fact 
that the overwhelming majority of the population in these societies were bonded or 
controlled through slavery or pawnship, it is technically almost impossible today to 
claim a family genealogy without any trace of non-free members. Although they would 
certainly deny it, most contemporary freeborn families in Fulɓe society must have had 
some ancestors who were bonded at some point in the past. Nevertheless, ‘pure’ 
freeborn origins are an important rhetorical means of claiming political status today. 
The rhetoric of the importance of royal ancestry, whereby social status matches that of 
one’s political and economic position more generally, was taken up and arranged by the 
colonial administration itself. This could explain why enquiring into a person’s social 
origins is such a taboo topic, and is often embedded in the haze of ambiguity. In Fulɓe 
society, as in many West African societies (see McCaskie 1995: 99), the main way to 
change status legally was by binding assimilation into freeborn (host) lineage groups.  
The main way in which slaves’ marginality was institutionalized was through 
restrictions on their access to social relations (socio-cultural inclusion) and kinship to 
exclude them from attaining corresponding rights in persons (juridical inclusion) 
(Kopytoff & Miers 1977). Slaves were not entitled to start their own families, had no 
say over their children and their marriages, and could only take a restricted number of 
wives from within their own limited group. 
Changing one’s status legally implied marriage within the right kin group but was 
not easy as slaves and slave groups were not allowed to marry people from groups other 
than their own. For precisely the opposite reason, namely the maintenance of social 
status, the freeborn elite had an interest in matrimonial discrimination and controlling 
endogamous marriage rules. Legally, there is only one accepted form of marriage 
whereby, at the initiative of freeborn men, marriage can take place with someone from 
an inferior status group. Freeborn men can marry women of slave descent (hypergamy) 
but a freeborn woman is not  allowed to marry a man of inferior status (hypogamy).  
The emphasis on endogamy by the freeborn in Fulɓe society has been explained as 
preventing former slaves from benefiting from such alliances through juridical inclusion 
and from taking revenge for earlier domination (Leservoisier 2009b: 142). As long as 
slaves remained legal strangers and were not part of freeborn ancestral lineages, they 
could be excluded from strategic positions. And as they were excluded from formally 
marrying freeborn members of society, most groups of slave descendants in the Haayre 
region to date organize their marriage alliances and ceremonies in a different way from 
the freeborn.  
The institution of marriage endogamy has been described by many authors 
(Meillassoux 1986; Botte 1994: 124; Schmitz 2009: 97; Leservoisier 2009b: 142-143) 
who view Sahelian Fulɓe societies as being a core ideological tool with which to 
preserve the stigma of slave status. Patriliny dictates the rights, duties and privileges of 
individuals in society. Therefore access to powerful patrilinies is important. Ideally this 
goal can be reached through strategic marriage alliances, but the cultural field of 
hierarchy is very clear about the importance of endogamy.  
In the first section of this chapter, I illustrate the marriage strategies and ceremonies 
of the Kau compared to those of the Dicko family and in the second, I describe how 
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endogamy is organized by different social groups and how marriage is an institution 
controlled by the freeborn elites who instrumentalize it to exclude slave descendants 
from their own kin groups. A third secion will describe the legal exception to 
endogamy: slave concubine marriages. Marrying slave concubines was a legal way for 
the freeborn Dicko family to bypass endogamous rules. While this was widespread 
practice during colonial occupation, it has waned among the current generation of 
Weeheeɓe in the Haayre. The third section therefore focuses on the specific ways in 
which the Kau family became integrated in the Dicko family through King Yerowal’s 
marriages to slave concubines. A fourth section describes how semi-freeborn children 
from these specific marriages became influential as chiefs and mayors in the villages of 
Dalla and Booni. 
Finally, I describe how some slaves have found ways to overcome the social 
boundary of endogamy, as the analysis of alliances in the fifth section demonstrate.The 
struggle for incorporation in Fulɓe society is very specific to each subgroup of slaves 
and their descendants. Some achieved it by marrying (noble) women from other ethnic 
groups (such as Bambara, Bozo) and settled in distant regions, while others, often 
migrants who are already wealthy or influential, openly defied endogamy and have 
managed to marry noble Fulɓe women. Such hypergamous marriages between slave 
descendants and freeborn have been criticized and are considered socially deviant.  
Different marriage styles in the Kau and Dicko families 
Freeborn groups used to dictate the marriages of their slaves. A colonial document of 
1910 describes some of the legal entitlements of masters to their slaves in terms of 
marriage. 
Mister Governor Clozel has decided, because of the incessant reclamation of the Riimaayɓe of the 
cercle of Djenne, that all personal servitude, resulting form the older state of captivity, such as: The 
obligation of the dimaajo to give his kids to be elevated until they grow old by the old peul master, the 
absolute right for the old peul master to marry as he wants these kids and even to take the dotte 
(French: Form of bridewealth) that has been brought in by one of the marriage partners of his 
slaves.271 
In this section I explain how this has resulted in differences in the marriage practices 
of the social status groups that continue to be identified as dependent former slave 
groups (FF: Maccuɓe Wuro). Their marriage ceremonies and practices differ signifi-
cantly from those of the freeborn Dicko family in terms of religious integration, 
bridewealth, authorization, timing, legal acceptance and displays of wealth. 
Although Mariam and Kodo’s marriage can be qualified as lavish when compared to 
those of their enslaved parents and ancestors, it appears less special when contrasted 
with marriages as organised in their freeborn former masters’ families. Today the Kau 
family organizes their own marriage ceremonies but in a different way from the 
freeborn Dicko. Most slave descendants copy aspects of their own masters’ marriage 
ceremonies as far as possible, which means that the Kau family as part of the ruling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271  ANM, FA-1E30/Letter 15 March 1910. 
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Weeheeɓe have copied their masters’ ways of intermarrying rather than those of other 
Fulɓe groups, such as the pastoralist Jalluɓe.  
When asked for the differences, the freeborn Dicko family claim that their ritual 
occasions stand out in the way they respect Islamic rules of conduct.272 Secondly, they 
tend to stress how their ritual festivities are much more prestigious since they spend 
more money as they have more responsibility and more hosts/clients. Anthropologists, 
such as Hardung (1997, 1998), N’Gaide (1999: 161-162) and Botte (1994: 122-123) 
also point to such differences in marriage practices between freeborn Fulɓe and their 
slave descendants. Nearer to the Central Malian region, Riesman (1992: 75-86) des-
cribed such differences in Fulɓe communities in northern Burkina Faso and de Bruijn & 
van Dijk (1995: 367-395) describe them with respect to pastoralist Fulɓe and their slave 
descendants in the Central Malian Haayre region. 
Marriages generally have four or even five important stages: The proposal, the reli-
gious union, the engagement party and the actual union. Today, civil marriage is 
sometimes also added, especially by elite families in urban areas. Slave descendants in 
Dalla celebrate the engagement (FF: Nafaayi) as the core ritual event of the alliance. In 
freeborn Weeheeɓe marriages, the celebration of the actual union is central (FF: 
kurtungu). While for the freeborn, the engagement (FF: Safannde) is just the 
confirmation phase of an arranged marriage,273 for the descendants of domestic slaves 
(FF: Maccube wuro) it has become the main celebration that confirms the union 
between man and wife. Although gifts are exchanged and animals are slaughtered to 
mark the occasion, both groups confirm that the Kau family does not have a proper 
marriage ceremony or pay bridewealth the way freeborn do, which is reflected in the 
different names and translations of their ceremonies. The emphasis by slave descending 
Riimaayɓe on what the freeborn consider the engagement has probably emerged 
because their official union continues to be controlled by the Weeheeɓe elite in five 
different ways.  
The first is the way marriages among the Maccuɓe Wuro like the Kau family are 
controlled by their masters concerning the religious aspect of the ceremony, which is 
supervised by the bride’s former master. While it is the parents of the groom among the 
freeborn Fulɓe who arrange the religious ceremony at their own compound, the Kau 
family in Dalla arrange the religious ceremony either in the compound of the girl’s 
former master or in a public space, for example at the mosque. For freeborn in general, 
the religious ceremony is conducted by the imam himself, while weddings of slave 
descendants are presided over by one of his representatives or assistants. In the freeborn 
Dicko family, the religious marriage ceremony is paid for by the family of the girl, but 
among the Kau slave descendants it is the former (Dicko) master of the bride who pays. 
Elder Kau family members indicate how religious legislation needs to be respected, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272  Islamic legislation emphasizes different ritual observations for noblemen and slaves (see Chapter 5). 
A slave is, for example, only expected to observe half the mourning period of a noblemen, the 
seclusion of a wife who has just given birth has to be respected by a noble woman, but not for a slave 
woman, and so on.  
273  It consists of the meat of a cow being sent to the family of the girl who has reached the age of puberty. 
It is prepared by those who sent it, with the flank and a back leg going to the girl’s mother and the 
other three legs to the father.  
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which is why they continue to give part of their bridewealth to their former master. At 
the same time, some youngsters consider this religious aspect of marriage to be a 
symbol of their continued subordination to their Dicko master. The religious marriage 
of Mariam and Kodo deviated from this because Mariam’s family is no longer formally 
attached to their former masters (Jaawamɓe tradesmen) and do not have to pay this 
symbolic sum to their former masters. 
Secondly, a marriage ceremony involving matrimonial compensation  (FF: Futte)274 
is non-existent among slave descendants. For the Kau family, the engagement gift 
mainly consists of goat meat, but bridewealth among freeborn Weeheeɓe, depending on 
the wealth of the families involved, consists of at least one or two cows for the bride 
and an additional engagement sum275 (FF: Safannde) of FCFA 50,000 to FCFA 100,000 
is divided between the categorical mothers and fathers of the bride.276 Riimaayɓe have 
no bridewealth, although some consider the symbolic sum of FCFA 2,000 to FCFA 
5,000 paid to their former master as a form of compensation for having lost a depen-
dent/slave to be an alternative form of bridewealth. 
A third difference between marriages in the Dicko and Kau families is that most Kau 
family members consult their former masters’ family for authorization about the date 
and validity of their marriage. Although Kodo refused to do this, his grandmother did 
consult the chief on the matter and the older generation of slave descendants in Dalla 
still believes in the need to obtain their former masters’ permission before their children 
marry. Although they agree that this is not compulsory today, most of the Kau family 
continue to do so because ‘they know their head and want to stay in their skin’ (part of 
the tradition of respect). Youngsters of slave descent still consult ‘their freeborn coun-
terpart’ to agree a date for their wedding.  
A fourth difference between the Kau family and the Dicko family is that Kau des-
cendants only consider a marriage officially binding when the bride has given birth to a 
first child. Two months before giving birth, she goes to live with her parents and it is 
only when she comes back that her house will be finally furnished with the necessary 
items, such as a wooden bed and cooking utensils. A bed and a necklace will be given to 
her by her father (to a value of about FCFA 50,000) and her mother’s youngest sister 
will provide blankets. The point when a marriage is considered legally binding is 
different in the two families. For the Dicko family it is when the bridewealth is paid, 
while for the Kau family it is when a child is born.  
A final difference between marriage ceremonies is the amount of wealth displayed 
and the differences in marriage transactions.277 Girls of slave descent are given wooden 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274  The Futte consists of the animal(s) given by the husband to his wife when they get married. It is the 
transfer of property rights over cattle from the husband to his wife (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 376) 
and is different from bridewealth (FF: Safandde) and dowry (FF: Hurto). 
275  The name for the engagement sum and the engagement ceremony itself are thus the same. The timing 
of this payment varies: sometimes it happens right after the engagement and sometimes during the 
religious ceremony. 
276  Apart from the money, in freeborn and slave descendants’ families, the sisters of the groom also make 
a contribution such as ointments, soap, bras and shoes. Only among freeborn is there the gift from 
‘older age mates’ (French: Cadulets maude) of 60-70 pieces of cloth. 
277  The gifts exchanged among the freeborn Dicko for the engagement party only, are for the Kau family 
the total sum of their wedding ceremony. In Dalla today an engagement in the Kau family costs about 
114 
 
bowls and calabashes, while more expensive iron cooking utensils and woven carpets 
are typical gifts for freeborn women. Some freeborn still feel these differences should 
be maintained but an informant from the hamlet of Torbani indicated that ‘today every-
one does as he pleases, especially those Riimaayɓe who have become very wealthy’. 
However Demba Dicko, a youngster from Dalla who is living in Bamako, criticized 
slave descendants who decorated their houses with expensive carpets, reproaching them 
for ‘not knowing their heads, putting on airs and being conceited’. He felt it was bad 
(French: Malvue) that they did not respect their ancestors’ traditions (FF: Tawaanga;). 
So far I have described how some ceremonial aspects are different when comparing 
the marriages of freeborn with those of slave descendants.278 Searing (2002: 150) des-
cribes how endogamous groups of slave descendants have turned into a ‘pseudo caste`. 
However, different groups of slave descendants within these ‘pseudo castes` claim 
social boundaries between their and other groups’ wedding ceremonies, differences that 
are related to whether or not one has a master. I refer here to those who have maintained 
ties with their masters as dependent groups of slave origin and will also refer to those 
who no longer want to be associated with their former masters anymore as independent 
groups of slave origin. Obviously this dichotomy between the two groups is artificial 
since most individuals opt in and out of dependency. 
During King Yerowal’s reign, the slaves living on estates in the Haayre hills were 
under his tutelage, which is why religious weddings would have been held in King 
Yerowal’s compound. These Riimaayɓe used to pay a symbolic bridewealth to their 
master but after King Yerowal’s death, the practice declined and slaves became more 
independent of the ruling Dicko family. 
The marriage ceremonies of families of these rather independent slave descendants 
are called Caworɗi (FF) and resemble more closely the wedding ceremonies of the 
freeborn than those of the Kau family and other Maccuɓe Wuro (see Table 1]. Like 
freeborn Fulɓe, well-off independent slave descendants slaughter a bull for their brides, 
in contrast to the much cheaper goats that the dependent slave descendants slaughter for 
a wedding or engagement (FF: Nafaayi). Independent groups of slave origin call their 
wedding ceremony caworɗi instead of nafaayi, which is the term used by dependent 
slave descendants such as the Kau family.  
Hama Adja, an independent slave descendant from the hamlet of Kikara (Map 4, 
Chapter 1) explains: ‘A Diimaajo bride (slave descendants of the hills) spends one week 
separated from her husband, just like a Dimo (freeborn) bride would. A Maccuδo 
(dependent slave descendants) bride on the contrary only spends three to four days in 
seclusion.’ It is worth noting that Hama Adja himself makes the comparison with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
FCFA 50,000 to FCFA 75,000 plus two goats and ten units of millet. By contrast, the bridewealth that 
the freeborn pay costs between FCFA 75,000 and FCFA 150,000 plus at least one bull and money to 
pay for the transport and labour of all the different groups of clients (griots, Riimaayɓe, Maccuɓe). 
For both groups, prices have gone up dramatically in the past ten years. Note that FCFA 50,000 = € 76 








Table 1. Overview of different stages and names of marriage ceremonies, differing from 
one status group to another. 
 
Social status group of 
the families involved in 
the union 
Weeheeɓe such as 
Freeborn Dicko  
family (Figure 2) 
Maccuɓe wuro such as 
dependent slave 
descendants of Kau 
family (Figure 1)  
Riimayɓe Haayre, such 
as independent slave 
descents, for example in 
village of Diayel (Map 
5) 
Engagement Safannde (money paid 
by groom’s family) 
Nafaayi Caworɗi 
 









Marriage gifts  Futte (transfer of cattle 
from husband to 
mothers, matrimonial 
compensation) 
Hurto (comparable to 
dowry or mother’s gifts 
to daughter (consisting 
of a bed and household 
equipments(such as 
ceramic  cooking pots 
and plates). 
Rather small (no 
ceramic cooking pots 
and plates for example) 
and less prestigious 
dowry when compared 
to Hurto that is given 
among freeborn Dicko. 
Among Kau family 
hurto is given by family 
and friends and not only 
mother, but see point 4 
raised in text (childbirth 
results in gifts by 
father) 
No Futte 
But a substantial Hurto, 
that is comparable to 
the mother’s gifts 





Mariam spent a week in seclusion because her family is independent and they no 
longer belong or defer to their former masters. However no bull was slaughtered for her 
because groom Kodo belongs to the dependent Kau family and was not allowed to 
slaughter one by his former master. If he had done so, his own peers, family members 
and the ruling Dicko family would have accused him of not respecting tradition. 
Mariam and Kodo’s wedding ceremony was in many ways a complex negotiation of 
honour and styles of relating between their respective groups within the overarching 
cultural field of hierarchy.  
Endogamy 
Endogamy was and still is an important institution in regulating and maintaining social 
boundaries between freeborn and other status groups, and endogamous rules in the 
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Haayre region are reinforced by Islamic ideology and legal prescriptions. The ideology 
of endogamy is an important instrument for freeborn members of society to institu-
tionalize the marginality of former slave groups and to reinforce the links between 
nobility, lineage descent and freeborn ancestry. It effectively maintains the boundary 
between different social status groups who as such reinforce their exclusive claims to 
nobility and delegate others to the sphere of marginality.279 Fulɓe, as so many other 
ethnic groups in the sub-region, recognize three main (mostly) endogamous strata: 
Freeborn elites (FF: Riimɓe), clients and craftsmen (FF: Ŋeeyɓe) and slave descendants 
(FF: Riimaayɓe). Among themselves, freeborn Rimɓe are endogamous and there is a 
preference for women from their own patrilineage, class and/or occupational status.	  280	  
Due to the cultural field of hierarchy, which is related to descent and ascribed status, 
marriage partners and the purity of one’s lineage and clan remain important. The 
freeborn Dicko family had a vested interest in controlling the reproduction of their slave 
women (FF: Hoorɓe) and prohibited marriage between their (female) slaves and slaves 
of other freeborn families. Endogamous marriage rules are sustained by the belief that 
such alliances would be dangerous and bound to fail (Botte 1994; Hardung 1997).  
Freeborn Moodibal Dicko281 explains this principle as follows:  
Because slave descendants of the Dicko family are higher in status than the slave descendants 
belonging to the traders, we (freeborn Dicko) did not accept their intermarriage because it would 
make us lose control over their children. These days slavery itself is over, but it continues to be 
considered somehow. Now it is only there culturally.282  
He indicates how it used to be impossible for slave descendants to marry slaves of 
other masters but the case of Kodo and Mariam demonstrates how, today, members of 
the Kau family marry women from slave groups that became independent of their 
former masters (Jaawamɓe283 or pastoralist Jalluɓe284).  
 
In general, the ruling freeborn Weeheeɓe preferred to marry among themselves or 
into Moodibaaɓe families. In the 1970s it was unthinkable for Weeheeɓe to marry 
Jaawamɓe. Also, for a woman from the ruling Weeheeɓe will prefer not to marry a man 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279  Kopytoff & Miers (1977: 18) defined power as the power to define and decide over what is marginal 
and what is not. 
280  Religious Moodibaaɓe, ruling Weeheeɓe and pastoralist Jalluɓe. There is a class difference between 
the sedentary Moodibaaɓe and Weeheeɓe and the pastoralist Egga-Hoddaaɓe, which is for some free-
born mothers a strong argument against such marriages. Dicko Djunu, a Beeweejo woman from the 
royal court of Dalla, born 1974 for example protested a lot when her son married with a pastoralist 
woman. (Interview with interpreter Burra Yero Cisse, Douentza, 2007).  
281  Moodibal, interview (in French) without interpreter, Bamako, April 2007. 
282  In French: ‘Parce que les Riimaayɓe des Weeheeɓe sont au plafond des Riimaayɓe de Jaawamɓe. Ils 
se marient, mais ils se glorifient d’être plus que les autres. Oui ils se marient depuis longtemps. Avant 
on n’acceptait pas que notre femme esclave se mariait avec un esclave des Jaawamɓe. Mais on donne 
les femmes de nos esclaves à eux pour élargir. Mais actuellement l’esclavage même est parti, 
maintenant c’est la culturellement seulement. Mais c’est vrai que ça joue.’  
283  Examples are the wife of Amadun Dauda who as a Maccuδo slave formerly belonged to Jaawamɓe in 
Wuro Ferro and the wife of Hama Maiga who as a Maccuδo slave used to belong to Jaawamɓe in 
Wuro Gaanare.  
284  Such an intermarriage was for example the case for Dikellayya who as a Maccuδo slave formerly 




of pastoralist Jalluɓe: Although they are both noble, their class and occupational status 
diverge too far. In the same vein, it was impossible for the Kau family to marry slave 
descendants of the trading Jaawamɓe, or slaves of pastoralist Jalluɓe. The Kau family 
looked down on these slave descendants, just as their Weeheeɓe masters looked down 
on Jaawamɓe. Like the Dicko family, the Kau family prefer parallel cousin 
marriages.285 
Slaves used to be married off by their masters without bridewealth and the fact that a 
slave was allowed to marry made him indebted to his master. The children from these 
marriages were seen as compensation and were supposed to engage in domestic labour 
for these masters. Often masters married off their slaves among each other to maintain 
authority and control over their children. So slaves of different masters hardly ever 
intermarried.286 It was only with the end of the reign of King Yerowal in Dalla towards 
the end of the 1960s that the Kau family started to intermarry with slave descendants of 
other masters. The fact that the Dicko and Kau families now had familial relations 
through marriage definitely helped allow these ‘exceptions’. 
Allay Jannginoowo,287 a slave descendant living in the former slave ward of Wuro 
Maccudo, had exceptionally been allowed to marry two wives by the Dickos. The first 
one was a slave who once belonged to the Dicko family. She became crazy and Allay 
was given a second wife of slave descent who formerly belonged to the family of 
religious scholars (FF: Moodibaaɓe) in Dalla. As this second wife had been 
manumitted, her master had no claim to ownership over her children. My host 
Suleymane married one of Allay’s children (with his second manumitted wife) in the 
1980s.  
Slave descendants of the Kau family (like Suleymane) over time started organizing 
their own marriages amongst themselves. In the past, their masters would not accept 
such marriages but today Maccuɓe Weeheeɓe marry Maccuɓe Jaawamɓe. Many 
Maccuɓe Jaawamɓe, such as Mariam’s family are relatively rich because they are 
traders who went to Equatorial New Guinea, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast. Secondly, 
the Maccuɓe Jaawamɓe are more independent of their former masters and are able to 
put on ‘freeborn airs’ without being insulted or stigmatized.288 The example of Kodo 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285  Parallel cousins are either a mother’s sisters’ children = ego’s maternal aunt’s child or father’s 
brothers children = ego’s paternal uncle’s child. In the Dicko family there is a preference for marri-
ages between freeborn parallel cousins. Today most youngsters no longer accept the marriage partners 
their parents deem most appropriate and there are more exceptions to this rule.  
286  And if they did so, this could be done when both freeborn families agreed on the ownership of the 
children. Often they had to pay for it, as the following archival document suggests: ‘When a domestic 
slave (French: Captif de case) wants to marry a captive from another house, he has to pay a fixed sum 
of 10,000 cauris to the master of the woman in question. The children always remain for the master of 
the wife. The father does not have anything to say about them (French: Le père ne les commande pas). 
A bought slave (French: Captive de vente) can marry another captive while paying 5,000 cauris but 
even while living with her husband, she continues working for her master and her children are also for 
her master. The children never become free. When a free man marries a captive de case, the day that 
she gives birth to a child, she is free. The Bambaras, Toucouleurs, Rimaihbes often marry their slaves. 
The Fulbe only very rarely marry their slaves, the Habe never.’ ANM, FA: 1E-156. (August 1894). 
287  See also Chapters 1 and 4. 
288  For more on insults and stigma, see Chapter 7 and Hardung (2009). 
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and Mariam’s marriage illustrates how intermarriage between descendants of different 
freeborn families is complex but not impossible.  
 
While increased intermarriage among slave groups with different masters is possible, 
slave descendants rarely have access to freeborn marriage partners. They have in fact 
become an independent endogamous group or a ‘pseudo caste’.  
Within the group of slave descendants, there is a heterogeneity in the form of internal 
differentiation and a striving for status. There are marriage restrictions and endogamous 
groups within this pseudo caste but over time they have developed their own lineages 
based on their common belonging to patrons and the same ancestors. There is an in-
ternal stratification between these groups (Riimaayɓe, Maccuɓe, Kommongalluuɓe), 
each claiming superiority vis-à-vis the others. 
In the eyes of the slave descendants living on the plateaus (FF: Riimaayɓe Haayre), 
those living in the village next to their masters (FF: Maccuɓe wuro) are still enslaved 
because they have little negotiating power, work for free and always assist their former 
masters on ritual occasions. The independent Riimaayɓe emphasize how Maccuɓe Wuro 
are dependent on their masters’ goodwill when it comes to access to land, religious 
piety and even marriage, which is why independent slave descendants today look down 
on the Kau family. Nevertheless, Kau family members explain that it is because they 
used to command the Riimaayɓe Haayre and could take their products or children away 
that their relationship is tense. This tension has been translated into a refusal to inter-
marry. Manumitted slave descendants are very close in status to the Riimaayɓe Haayre, 
but in general these groups do not accept intermarriage.   
Hama Adja, himself an independent slave descendant from the village of Kikara near 
the Gandamia Plateau, describes the differences between the endogamous groups of 
slave descendants as follows:289  
We (Riimaayɓe Haayre) marry among ourselves, we are not used to marrying Maccuɓe Wuro. We 
have our own land, we built our own houses, we pay for our own marriages, all of which the Maccuɓe 
Wuro don’t. We don’t intermarry but there are some exceptions. Sometimes we might decide to marry 
those among our women we considered badly educated with dependent Maccuɓe Wuro. Even so, 
these marriages are subject to insults and gossip. 
Not only Riimaayɓe Haayre but also Kommongalluuɓe jealously guard their privi-
leged position within the social group of slave descendants through endogamy. Hama 
Adja explains that:  
We (note: Riimaayɓe Haayre) don’t marry Kommongalluuɓe, they feel higher in status than us and 
claim nobility because some had their own slaves. This is why we Riiimayɓe cannot marry them. The 
slaves of the Kommongalluuɓe (FF: Maccuɓe Kommongalluuɓe) only marry among themselves. 
The social boundaries are maintained and intermarriage between freeborn and slave 
descendants (hypergamy), but also among several groups of slave descendants, are 
legally and morally prohibited. However, there is room in Islamic law for one legal 
exception: The case of concubine marriage.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289  Hama Adja, interview, Bamako, 2007. 
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Legal hypergamy: Concubine marriage 
Although different status groups are highly endogamous, the ideology of slavery al-
lowed the freeborn elite to use the sexuality of their slave concubines at will. Sexual 
intercourse was something slave women could not refuse their masters, whether they 
were married or not. Today, male freeborn youngsters explain how their first sexual 
experiences were with girls from families of slave descent. Some informants in Dalla 
mentioned that certain members of the royal court have sexual relations with (married) 
women of slave descent.  
Islamic legislation allows for freeborn to marry slave concubines, on top of the 
maximum of four freeborn wives. In practice, the option of marrying more than the four 
women, as is legally permitted in the Koran, was only open to men of the highest 
ranking. There are examples of such marriages among religious Moodibaaɓe scholars 
and ruling Weeheeɓe families, but not among Jalluɓe pastoralists. In the mid-twentieth 
century, Fulɓe chiefs in Dalla and Booni, but not in Joona, married their slaves as fourth 
or fifth wives and only elite ruling Fulɓe families married their slave concubines. Other 
freeborn groups (religious scholars, pastoralists and traders) did not.290 The ruling 
Weeheeɓe could afford to take any slave as a concubine because they ruled over all the 
inhabitants in their kingdoms.291  
Islamic legislation allows for one exceptional form of hypergamy, whereby male 
members of freeborn families (in Dalla only the ruling Dicko family) were allowed to 
marry slave concubines without breaking the rules of endogamy. On the other hand, 
hypogamy, when a freeborn woman marries a man of slave descent, is legally and 
socially unacceptable in all forms. If a freeborn wanted to marry his slave concubine, he 
had to manumit her first. Another option described in the Koran is not to marry or 
manumit one’s slave but simply to legally recognize her children as part of the father’s 
freeborn patriliny.292 A slave concubine who is married or whose children by a freeborn 
are recognized is called a taarnaajo (FF).293  
Apart from the king, no other members of the Dicko family in Dalla married their 
slave concubines. People other than the king did so in Booni, but then only freeborn 
Weeheeɓe. Booni’s former chief294 married a slave concubine by whom he had a lot of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290  This contrasts with the Maacina region where religious scholars married their slave concubines. An 
example is the famous religious scholar of Dogon origin in Konza (near Mopti) who married four 
wives: One Pullo, one Dogon and two Riimaayɓe women. Interview with Belco Tamboura, Bamako, 
2007. 
291  Taped interview with Burra Yero Cisse, Douentza, 2007. In French: ‘Un chef, c’est pour tout le 
village, n’importe de quelle Diimaajo il a envie, il peut la marier!’ 
292  If one legally recognizes children fathered by a freeborn man with a slave concubine (slave mother), 
the concubine will be manumitted on the master’s death. It is by leaving her freeborn husband’s 
compound on his death that the slave concubine gains back her freedom (McDougall 2007: 172, 
Footnote 8). See also Chapter 5. 
293  Singular: Taarnaaδo, plural: Taarnaaɓe; Taarnugol is also used. These terms are derived from the 
verbal root Taarn-uude (to transform). The transformation is, in this case, that of a female slave (FF: 
Kordo) into a woman who has been freed from her (inferior) social slave status. In northern Came-
roonian Fulɓe society, Sehou (2010) mentions that such slave concubines are called Soulado (FF).  
294  This chief was Amadu Hamadun Dicko. 
120 
 
children.295 In Dalla it was in his interest as king that Yerowal married wives from 
various status groups to reinforce strategic political alliances. He married a freeborn 
Songhay woman from the Kingdom of Hombori and, by so doing, forged ties with 
Hombori’s ruler who in turn had close ties with the French colonial regime. His second 
wife was a freeborn pastoralist woman. During the French colonial regime, many 
Jalluɓe left Dalla to live elsewhere. Here again we see how certain alliances were, due 
to crisis, brought closer through strategic marriage. 
The same goes for the two slave-descending women Yerowal married. He reinforced 
his political support from his slave populations by these marriages as he badly needed to 
have good contacts with the slave population as a result of French colonial abolition 
policies and the growing threat of emancipation for the majority of his slaves and their 
descendants. Yerowal was the last ruler of Dalla to marry two slave wives from 
Riimaayɓe villages in his kingdom: Faata Legal from Onga and Pendolde from Siguiri 
(Map 5). While King Yerowal was alive, Faata and Pendolde worked for their co-wives, 
and were stigmatized and discriminated against within the royal harem.296 Their marri-
age to the king legally manumitted them but, in practice, this was only symbolic and 
gave them no new entitlements. Compared to Yerowal’s freeborn women, they had no 
rights of inheritance, nor were they entitled to bridewealth, the labour of other slaves or 
fixed nights (French: Tour de ménage) with their husband.297  
Faata Legal, Yerowal’s fourth wife of slave origin (see Figure 2), outlived her 
husband (†2009) and all her children, one of whom called Abdul, died very young. She 
became a renowned child healer, probably due to her slave status which is often 
associated with special healing powers when it comes to children (Gibbal 1994).  
Pendolde Kau was also a slave concubine (FF: Taarnaajo)298 married by Yerowal 
(see Figure 1) who died in the 1980s. I interviewed her sister Asse Kau Dicko, who 
described how Yerowal fell in love with her sister at first sight because of her beauty. 299 
The king took her from her slave hamlet of Siguiri to the royal court in Dalla and her 
brothers and sisters (Asse Kau among them) moved to work as house slaves in the royal 
court where each freeborn woman had two young slave children at her disposition. Both 
Asse and her concubine sister stopped working when the king died but other servants 
who were unrelated to Pendolde continued to work there. On King Yerowal’s death, 
Pendolde was automatically set free. Asse Kau emphasized the fact that, as Pendolde’s 
sister, she also became ‘a bit noble’ too but her children were never freed or included in 
the royal patriliny. Asse never married and only had one son. 
In our first conversation, Asse did not mention that slave women were discriminated 
against by their co-wives and only emphasized her sister’s prestige at being incorpo-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295  Burra Baa, slave-descending soldier who fought in Europe (French: Tirailleur) from the hamlet of 
Kolongo. Interview with interpreter Hama Amba, 2002. 
296  Interviews with slave concubine Faata Legal, with interpreter Umu Sangare, Dalla, December 2001; 
with Burra Yero Cisse, Douentza, May 2007; and Allay Jannginoowo, with interpreter Umu Sangare, 
Dalla, 2001-2002.  
297  Interview with youngster Amadu Amiiru Dicko and his father (the chief), Dalla, May 2007. 
298  Being a Taarnaajo slave concubine is not to be confused with being a Taaraajo pastoralist. Taaraaɓe 
are a specific group of pastoralist Fulɓe in the Haayre region and are the only group of pastoralists 
with a joking relation with the ruling Weeheeɓe families. 
299  Asse Kau Dicko, interview with Umu Sangare, Dalla, 2001. 
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rated into freeborn society. She concealed the suffering that was part of this ‘semi 
inclusion’. Only in later conversations did she come up with stories about the frustra-
tions and humiliation they encountered. She recalled how for each night spent with a 
woman of slave decent, the king would spend two with a woman of freeborn descent. 
Her sister Pendolde also had to do all the manual domestic labour herself, while her 
freeborn co-spouses had (children of) slaves to do it for them. Asse’s parents felt it 
degrading that they never received any form of bride price or compensation for their 
daughter Pendolde’s marriage. 
Slave concubines, like Faata and Pendolde, were not passive victims however. When 
Yerowal died, Faata took pride in her new status, which was equal to that of a 
manumitted person. And she changed her name to Fatumata Allay Dicko,300 from the 
more pejorative, typical slave name of Faata Legal (Pelckmans 2011b forthcoming). 
When I met her in 2001 she behaved in the same bossy and authoritarian way as her co-
wives and many of her grandchildren felt she was rigid and unapproachable.301 
Like the other freeborn women, she refused to answer my questions directly as that 
would be unworthy of her status. During my first fieldwork period in 2001-2002, I only 
once managed to talk to her in private. In her search for recognition whereby her slave 
origins had to be silenced as much as possible plus the fact that as an old women she 
was always surrounded by people, it was difficult to get to talk to Faata and she refused 
to answer questions about her slave past, thus defending her honour and respectability 
(FF: Teddungal). 
Although hypergamy is legally accepted in Islam, taking pride in being a slave 
concubine was for both Faata and Pendolde only a reality after the death of their hus-
band. Belco302 explains how ‘The Koran prescribes the precise conditions for marrying 
one’s slave concubine. A certain number of cattle have to be given. It is comparable to 
committing a crime: The Koran tells you what kind of reparations to make.’ His com-
parison of slave marriage with crime seems to suggest that the Koran equates marriages 
to one’s slaves as a sin for which one can make reparations. McDougall (2007: 173) 
indicates though how ‘In Islam, concubinage is completely acceptable. Honourable 
even. However, only slaves can be concubines.’ 
The honour of being a slave concubine was questioned by most of my informants. 
Burra303 said that ‘although a slave concubine in our society is not considered a slave, 
she never obtains the nobility that freeborn women have. She is not as noble as the 
others because she did not have her own slaves to work for her.’ Burra defines nobility 
as having slaves as personal property and, for him, the slave concubine has an in-
between status as she has no rights over the labour of others.  
It was due to these concubine marriages that family alliances developed among 
freeborn Dicko family members and their Kau slaves (see Figure 1 & 2) but the 
inclusion of Kau wives in freeborn kinship networks remained fragmented. They are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300  For more on naming, see Pelckmans (2011b forthcoming). 
301  One of them, Kadji, remembers with anger how her grandmother forced her to tattoo her face accord-
ing to traditional beauty standards. She had it surgically removed in 2007. 
302  Belco Musa Barry, a slave descendant born in Nokara, interview in French without interpreter, 
Bamako, March 2006.  
303  Burra Yero Cisse, interview, Douentza, 2007. 
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symbolically called family (FF: Bandiraaɓe) but do not enjoy the same rights and duties 
as freeborn family members who are full lineage members. Calling slave descendants 
‘family’ is thus a form of discursive inclusion that conceals their exclusion. Botte 
(1994: 124) claims: ‘This is why Fulɓe do not use the same terminology for their 
Runndeeɓe parents-in-law compared to the terminology they use among Fulɓe 
themselves.’304 Stillwell (1999b: 157) in his analysis of royal slaves in the nineteenth-
century Kano Caliphate describes how:  
The ties between royalty and royal slaves were not ‘formal’ or ‘acknowledged’ in the same manner as 
were marriage and family ties within freeborn families and lineages. Royal slaves could not make the 
same political and social claims on these relationships as could ‘real’ members of the family and 
lineages. 
Family members of the last slave concubines of Dalla, who continued living in the 
hamlets of Siguiri (Pendolde Kau) and Onga (Faata Legal) gave away two of their 
wives but hardly ever see their grandchildren. The grandchildren of the union between 
slave concubines and the king rarely visit the village of their maternal (grand-)parents305 
though, exceptionally, Faata’s son Musa was educated for the first four years of his life 
by his grandmother in Onga. Although the alliance between the Kau and Dicko families 
has been beneficial to most Kau family members, they have not allowed them to 
become fully integrated in the freeborn lineage of the Dicko family. They have not, for 
example, gained access to political office, a right that remains reserved for the freeborn 
Dicko.306 
My host Suleymane (also called Suley) is a grandson of one of Pendolde’s sisters and 
a direct cousin of Pendolde’s children. These (semi-freeborn) children call him ‘father 
Suley’ (FF: Baaba Suley),307 which has an affective connotation. Nevertheless this kin 
relation does not give him any specific privileges and does not allow him, for example, 
to butcher his own sacrificial animals, unlike manumitted slave descendants in his 
neighbourhood who can do so. 
Instead of generating unity and social proximity between slave descendants and their 
masters, these marriages have perpetuated hierarchy. Concubine marriage is no longer 
practised in Dalla or Booni and neither freeborn nor slave-descending families see any 
advantage in it although they express different motivations for not having it. Freeborn 
Dicko’s claim that thye want to stick to the traditions of their ancestors and that they no 
longer have money to pay for more than two wifes. Kau family members claim that 
concubine marriages no longer exist because of their own refusal. For example, Allay 
Jannginoowo said:  
We have seen that a Beeweejo man marrying a Diimaajo woman only gives troubles. The slave con-
cubine has to do all the work and is humiliated, even following the abolition of slavery by the French. 
So why should we assume that things would change now? It is more interesting for us to marry each 
other and to have a proper marriage ceremony and baptism for our children.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304  Translated from French: ‘Du coup, les Fulɓe n’emploient pas a l’égard de leurs beaux-parents run-
ndeeɓe les mêmes termes d’adresse que ceux qui sont d’usage entre Fulɓe’ (Botte 1994: 124). 
305  The same argument has been made by Derman (1973: 118) quoted in Botte (1994: 124, Footnote 55). 
306 For more on slave descendants in Politics: see chapter 9. 
307  Suleymane is classified as a paternal uncle (FF: Kau). 
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Dikoore’s husband Seydu308 ads that even if freeborn had been willing to let their 
daughters marry slave descendants of the Kau family members themselves would be too 
scared (FF: Huulaade) to ask their masters for the hand of a freeborn.  
Concubine marriages confirmed the social boundaries for most members of the Kau 
family. For a slave concubine, the only advantage came after her freeborn husband’s 
death but the children of concubines managed to become very influential and their 
status today is equal to that of the freeborn Dicko elite. Interestingly, in both Dalla and 
Booni, it has been the semi-freeborn children of slave concubines who have come to 
occupy the most important political positions: Musa, the semi-freeborn child of Faata, 
became mayor, and Hamidu, Pendolde’s child became chief.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308  Asse Kau Dicko, interview with Umu Sangare, Dalla, 2001.  
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Slave concubines’ semi-freeborn children (FF: Bibɓe Taarnaaɓe) 
Being freeborn but at the same time being a descendant of a  
slave concubine mother can hurt, it is a big question!309	  
It is a public secret in Dalla that both the local chief and the mayor are descendants of a 
slave concubine. Pendolde was the mother of the former chief of Dalla (†2010), while 
concubine Faata Legal gave birth to Musa Dicko, who was democratically elected 
mayor of Dalla (†2008). As indicated in Chapter 2, Musa’s family is central to this 
thesis. Many of the relatives and descendants of King Yerowal’s slave concubines live 
in the ward of Wuro Maccuδo today. Although everyone knows this, it is not supposed 
to be discussed in public and this was made very clear in an interview with one of the 
semi-freeborn daughters of King Yerowal and slave concubine Pendolde. When I asked 
her whether she could give me some examples of slave concubines in her village, my 
assistant, Bura Yero Cisse who is himself of slave descent, refused to ask her this ques-
tion out of respect (FF: Teddungal) and because it would generate feelings of shame 
(FF: Semteende). Despite their inclusion in patrilineal freeborn descent, semi-freeborn 
children are still the victims of discrimination.  
In Dalla, the children of the king who have a freeborn mother emphasized their 
superiority over his children who have a slave concubine as mother. This is why semi-
freeborn children tend to emphasize their ‘freeborn’ patrilineal background. Some, like 
Kadji who now lives in Paris, hates her matrilineal slave background and keeps quiet 
about it as far as possible. Legally, semi-freeborn children of a slave concubine do not 
inherit the status of slave from their mother, have no master to obey and were allowed 
to own their own slaves.310 Meillassoux (1991: 136) describes how the ambiguous 
status of what he calls these ‘half breeds’ (and who I refer to as semi-freeborn) was 
similar to that of manumitted slaves as they shared the same functions and obligations 
vis-à-vis their patrons. Nevertheless, the most important difference between semi-
freeborn, their slave concubine mothers and manumitted slaves was that the semi-
freeborn were truly part of a freeborn lineage and were allowed to marry other freeborn 
women. This remained impossible for concubines and manumitted slaves. 
Whether a person’s ancestors’ slave background is seen as negative depends on the 
generation one talks to. Amadu, the second-generation son of a slave concubine has no 
difficulty discussing his semi-slave background. As the son of the chief, his family has a 
lot of influence in the village and he emphasizes the advantages of semi-freeborn status 
for his father. He became the chief because he could rely on support from both the free-
born Dicko patrilineage and the slave-descending Kau matrilineage. These are 
advantageous alliances and a double form of ‘wealth in people’ that explains why the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309  Burra Yero Cisse, taped interview, Douentza, 2007. ‘Si tu demande est-ce que les Riimaayɓe (slave 
descendants) marient les Rimɓe (freeborn) tant que moi même je suis Dimo (freeborn) d’une mere 
dimaajo (of slave descent), ça peut blesser. C’est une grosse question! Le père est chef, la mère est 
diimaajo taarnaaδo. Un taarnaaδo chez nous en réalité n’a pas un koorδo, ni un maccuδo. A cause de 
son mariage elle est noble, mais pas si noble que les autres femmes du roi.’ 
310  McDougal (2007: 172) gives the example of a slave-descending semi-freeborn slave descendant of 
Moors (Arab: Haratin) who had his own slaves in Mauritania. 
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most influential political functions in Dalla and Booni are occupied by the families of 
semi-freeborn. The former chief and former mayor of Dalla as well as Nassuru Amiiru, 
the former mayor of Booni, all had a slave-descending concubine mother.311 In the 
literature on other slave societies in West Africa, the advantage of semi-freeborn 
occupying royal and/or important political positions is also mentioned.312 
Musa Dicko, one of King Yerowal’s slave concubine sons became mayor at the start 
of the twenty-first century. Legally he is not allowed to marry a slave concubine like his 
father did. In addition, Musa, as the son of a slave woman, did not inherit slaves from 
his mother and has no personal slaves in the way his freeborn peers in the royal 
compound do. He did, however, inherit his father’s slaves as part of the family fortune. 
He can point to ‘my slaves’ in the plural but it is impossible for him to point out ‘one 
individual slave’ as being his personal property, often because some of them are his 
maternal family too.313 He would not have been interested in marrying into his maternal 
family and instead married a noble princess at the court of Joona and one in Booni. 
Both these wives enhanced his social position and helped him to become the elected 
major of Dalla in 2002 (De Bruijn & Pelckmans 2005).  
To conclude, the semi-freeborn children of slave concubines often made huge leaps 
in intergenerational mobility (Kopytoff & Miers 1977: 19) but the option has now been 
abandoned. Nevertheless, several factors have contributed to some individuals’ daring 
decisions to break with tradition (FF: Tawaangal) and marry the partner of their choice.  
Breaking away from one’s past position 
Marriage used to be an important resource and institution for the organization of social 
difference, control over social mobility, alliances and reproduction. Most informants 
agree that changes coincided with the end of the totalitarian reign of King Yerowal in 
1966. In addition, the droughts in the 1970s and 1980s reduced the power of other free-
born as well as reinforcing their position through endogamy. The son of Dalla’s chief314 
indicated that:  
These days things have become worse. People do whatever they want, even if it goes against tradition. 
If it was not for the droughts, a male slave descendant would have never been able to marry a freeborn 
Beeweejo woman. The old men say that when a rich slave descending man marries a freeborn woman, 
all their property disappears. This actually happened before. To prevent such misfortunes, it is better 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311  She was a Diimaajo belonging to the family of Arsukeeru, Nassuru Amiiru’s uncle. 
312  Perbi (2004); Hahonou (2009: 152-153, & 2011); Vereecke (1994) on Niger; and Valsecchi (2011 
forthcoming) on Ghana. 
313  Burra Yero Cisse, Diimaajo, Douentza, 2007. Taped interview in French : ‘Les enfants de ces unions 
sont consideré noble, mais seulement entre eux. Celui (l’enfant) de la mère peule se glorifie devant 
celui (l’enfant ) d’ une mère diimaajo. Mais on ne peut pas effacer le nom du père, et lui il est noble. 
Quand tu deviens chef et ton père avait des esclaves, on peut hériter ses esclaves (comme une 
fortune). Mais Musa Dicko ne peut pas dire celui la ou celle la est pour moi. Donc Musa Dicko ne 
peut pas dire que se sont ses esclaves, il peut le dire «mes maccuɓe» mais pas «mon maccuδo», parce 
que sa propre maman vient des maccuɓe. Musa sait très bien que sa mère n’a jamais possédée un 
koorδo (female house slave), donc on ne peut pas marrier ce qu’on n’a pas.’   
314  Amadu Amiiru Dicko, born 1985, the son of the chief of Dalla, studying and living in Bamako and 
Sevare. Interviews in French, March 2007. 
126 
 
that, even if you are rich, you ‘stay in your skin’ (French: Tu te reserves dans ta peau). You simply 
take a slave descending Diimaajo woman and keep silent and calm.315 
In this freeborn interpretation, it was the demise of the nobility that gave the slave-
descending Riimaayɓe room for manoeuvre. Slave-descending informants, on the con-
trary, insist on how they constitutionally now have the legal right to make their own 
choice regarding marriage partners. They are no longer dependent on their masters for 
the right to have a family.316 
To avoid stigmatization based on a lack of honour (Klein 2005), slave descendants 
try to upgrade or change their lineage by manipulating their (collective) history to their 
own benefit317 or by marrying women from higher status groups or other ethnic groups. 
Below is an outline of how descendants of slaves, other than the Kau family, have con-
tested and manipulated endogamy thanks to various capitals, such as senior positions at 
work, wealth, beauty and education.  
Since the Kau family did not bypass endogamous marriage rules but some other 
groups of slave descendants in the Haayre region did, the section below describes their 
‘scandalous marriages’, namely those alliances that have received attention because 
they defy existing endogamous rules. My interpreter uses the term ‘mediatized marri-
ages’ to describe such extra-legal, non-endogamous marriages, explaining that these 
marriages are ‘mediatized’ on the ‘pavement radio’ (French: Radio trottoir), the most 
effective medium for spreading rumour and gossip (Ellis 1989: 321).318 Although most 
freeborn fiercely contest such intermarriage because it means that their women are 
incorporated into the male lineage of their former slaves, exceptions to endogamous 
rules are increasingly being seen. 
From the 1970s onwards, these marriages were frequent among Dallanke who had 
left their villages and gone to live in towns and cities like Douentza and Bamako that 
offered more protection against or at least a comfortable social distance from slander, 
gossip and social exclusion. Informants in Dalla and Joona indicate how it was mostly 
the slave-descending inhabitants of Booni who bypassed the rules of endogamy. Most 
informants deny that exogamous marriage existed in their own village because they 
probably do not want to give out sensitive or taboo information about their co-villagers. 
However, the differences between these three villages are also due to structural factors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315  Amadu Tambura, Diimaajo, Douentza. Taped conversation in French, March 2007/‘Mais actuelle-
ment vue que les choses se détériorèrent, les choses n’ont plus leurs chances. les gens se permettent. 
Sinon avant, un Diimaajo ne va jamais prendre une femme noble. Les vieux ils disent que quand tu 
vois un homme Diimaajo très riche, quand il se marie a une femme noble, tous ses biens vont 
disparaître, des cas ont existé ... en tout cas, tous ce que tu as, tu ne le fera pas. Tu te réserves dans ta 
peau ... Tu prends une femme Diimaajo, tu te tais, tu restes tranquille. Tu ne vas pas prendre une 
femme peule.’ 
316  Sidibe et al. (1997: 227) attribute the increased flexibility of endogamous marriage rules between 
Fulɓe and their former Riimaybe slaves in the Issa Ber region of Central Mali to the droughts and the 
exodus of pastoralist Fulɓe to cities where alternative ideologies and options for relating prevail. 
317  See Chapter 1. 
318  Ellis (1989: 322-323) defines the ‘pavement radio’ as: ‘Related to a phenomenon known in all so-
cieties at all times and generally called by pejorative names such as “rumour” or “gossip” ... pavement 
radio in Africa operates within an essentially oral culture ... In part, their credibility depends on who 
recounts them and in what context. Over time pavement radio selects the most credible rumours and 
repeats them, helping to form popular consciousness.’  
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The differences in the maintenance of the cultural field of hierarchy between Joona, 
Dalla and Booni emerged over time and were expressed in hierarchical kinship lan-
guage as a metaphor for social positions. Booni is the ‘younger brother’ village but 
seems to have leapfrogged over the more conservative, elitist and older villages of Dalla 
and Jooni. As described in Chapter 1, Booni became an independent administrative 
division much earlier than Dalla and Joona, which also gave it an advantageous position 
in national politics.319  
Secondly, the people of Booni had a school in the village two decades before Dalla 
and Joona did and education clearly influenced many slave descendants’ ideas about 
hierarchy. Thirdly, Booni is a flourishing centre economically because of its thriving 
market due to the illegal border trade with Burkina Faso. The influx of money is 
creating more possibilities for migration to study or trade elsewhere. Many of those who 
migrate come back with a good job, money and new ideologies. In general, Booni’s 
inhabitants have a more worldly orientation than the people living in Dalla and Joona. 
Fourthly, both Dalla and Joona have strong social control over influential religious 
scholars. Chapter 2 highlighted the importance of religion when describing the ward 
Wuro Burram of Dalla. Hama Adja,320 a slave-descending Diimaajo from the village of 
Kikara explains:  
In Dalla it is the Moodibaaɓe (religious scholars) that are extremely conservative. They are the ones 
who behave as if slavery was still there. They consider us Riimaayɓe (slave descendants) as slaves. 
According to them, the Koran forbids giving one’s freeborn daughter to a slave. 
The emancipation of slave descendants in Dalla and Joona is lagging behind that in 
Booni. 
For reasons explained above, most of the ‘scandalous marriages’ described here 
involve inhabitants of Booni. One of the first exogamous marriage that took place in 
1989 was particularly shocking as it was not only a case of exogamy but also a 
hypogamous marriage between a freeborn woman who we will call Kumba321 and a 
male Diimaajo called Diougal Tambura. Two factors made the marriage possible: The 
fact that Diougal had money and a good job, and that they lived in Douentza where they 
were less harassed than they would have been in Booni, their home village. Diougal is 
descended from slaves who used to work for an influential Weeheeɓe family close to 
the royal Dicko family in Booni. He now lives and works in Douentza where he earns a 
good salary as the director of a communications business. Diougal is not particularly 
handsome but has studied and became very wealthy thanks to his business activities, 
which have made him an influential person in the region. Kumba is the daughter of an 
impoverished freeborn family and a lot of people ignore her. However their relationship 
has become increasingly accepted, especially as they seem to have been immune from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319  Members of all three Dicko chiefdoms had positions in national politics, education and administra-
tion.  
320  Various taped interviews with slave descendant Hama Adja Tambura, born in Kikara in 1974, with 
interpreter Muussa Dicko Junior, Bamako, 2005 and 2007. 
321  All the names here have been changed to protect the privacy of the persons involved. So in this 
section I don’t use the extra * to emphasize anonymity. 
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bad luck: They have a lot of children, all of whom are thriving and the eldest son is now 
studying at university.  
A second case involves a freeborn Beeweejo from Booni called Idrissa who was born 
in 1969 and married a Diimaajo girl called Altinee in 2006 as his third wife. The girl is 
a so-called natural child (French: Enfant naturel) or illegitimate child, which is a highly 
stigmatized position. Illegitimate children often cannot find good marriage partners. 
Since Altinee was not part of the slaves formerly belonging to Idrissa’s family, she 
could not be accepted as a legal concubine according to Islamic legislation either. So 
this marriage was a double scandal: The girl was born outside wedlock and the marriage 
was deemed illegal according to Islamic legislation. 
Nevertheless, at the time of their marriage in 2006, both the imam and the girl’s 
former master authorized the marriage. Gossip has it that the fact that Idrissa was very 
rich and had a good position in the NGO sector gave him the power to bypass endo-
gamous rules. After their marriage, Idrissa built a new house for Altinee. This made the 
scandal even bigger for the inhabitants of Booni, who were outraged that he did not set 
her up outside the village, out of sight of his co-villagers and at a greater physical 
distance, for example in Douentza.  
Some social sanctions were taken. Idrissa’s mother and brothers decided never to 
enter this new house, never to talk to her and to insult her in front of others. Idrissa’s 
mother insists she will never talk to Altinee, who is suffering as a result of the insults, 
not only those from her in-laws but also those of her own family and peers. Crossing 
social boundaries is often socially sanctioned and not complying with the rules means 
that a person can be subjected to severe social scrutiny. 
A third case is the recent union in 2006 of Hama, a freeborn Jawaanδo from Dalla 
and slave-descending Penda from Booni. Penda was renowned for her beauty and had a 
lot of men courting her but she became pregnant while still unmarried, which severely 
damaged her reputation. Some say that she is lucky to have got married at all. Hama and 
Penda had a religious wedding and she gave birth to a daughter. What is most prob-
lematic in their marriage is the way it stigmatizes their children. The daughter is being 
cursed (FF: Huɗeede) by both families because she was the result of illegal hypergamy. 
Secondly, prior to her marriage, Penda had already given birth to another child who has 
been expelled from her family. Hama’s family does not accept the child either and even 
Hama was supposed to curse her child. In this exceptional case, some family members 
have more or less accepted the child but only with the passing of time. However the fact 
that she is illegitimate has been archived forever in collective memory. My research 
assistant,322 who wrote his Masters thesis on the stigmatized status of illegitimate 
children in the Haayre region, uses the metaphor of ‘female archives’ to indicate the 
tenacity of female memory in the region. As he mentions: ‘The memories of women are 
the best archives: Women never forget. They keep track of each and every error and 
remind everyone of them. They are capable of insulting the children and even the 
grandchildren of “mediatised” marriages.’  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322  Amadu Amiiru Dicko, born 1985, the son of the chief of Dalla, studying and living in both Bamako 
and Sevare, March 2007. 
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The last example of a mixed-status marriage is that of an inhabitant of Dalla and a 
woman from Booni. Demba is a freeborn animal trader (FF: Jallo) from Dalla who 
married Pooro, a slave-descending woman from Booni. They met because Demba used 
to leave Dalla to go and trade in Booni every week and for years he spent time with 
Pooro in Booni. Demba used to visit her family so it was almost as if they lived together 
and Pooro finally convinced him to marry her. Their religious wedding was held in 
2004 but was seen as scandalous, not only because it involved hypergamy but also 
because it took place when they were both much older and Pooro would probably not 
have been able to give birth anymore as she had passed the age of menopause. Here 
again it was the children who suffered most from this unusual union.  
Pooro’s and Demba’s children have been insulted and excluded by their peers due to 
their parents’ marriage. Pooro’s children tried hard to dissuade her from engaging in 
this ‘crazy’ marriage for two reasons: Firstly because they deemed their mother too old 
and secondly because, as a second wife with slave status, she would be inferior to 
Demba’s first wife of freeborn status in Dalla. However, Pooro felt that this was not a 
problem as the two wives do not live in the same village. Here again we see that resid-
ence can ease some of the more direct consequences of social control. Now that he has 
officially married Pooro, Demba continues to divide his time between his two wives in 
different villages. 
These cases show how, despite a strong discourse on the non-existence of exceptions 
to the rules of endogamy, exceptions do in fact exist. Despite the freeborn discourse 
about the purity of their blood and lineages, these examples demonstrate how people’s 
individual decisions have always created exceptions to the rules. The ‘hard’ social 
boundary of endogamous rule separating slave descendants from freeborn is increas-
ingly being challenged. While in the 1970s, hypergamous marriages of a male freeborn 
to a female slave descendant were exceptional; today these marriages are on the in-
crease and are slowly challenging the existing norms. On the other hand, hypogamy, 
where a female freeborn marries a male slave descendant, has remained more difficult 
even if wealth, beauty, education and professional position are favourable.  
These examples demonstrate how both mobility (the couple’s place of residence) and 
the passage of time are crucial in creating a safe distance from stigmatizing gossip and 
sanctioning social controls. Residing in bigger towns, such as Douentza, which is at a 
safe distance from the gaze and comments of direct family members, has helped some 
to survive their exogamous marriages. Time has also helped. Some previously scandal-
ous marriages now seem to be accepted as normal and the passage of time, preferably in 
combination with geographical distance, is making it increasingly difficult for people to 
remember the leaps in the genealogies of certain families. Camara (1995: 23) also 
describes how although the origins of most Mauritanian Fulɓe families have not been 
forgotten, social climbing through marriage is possible over several generations.  
A final strategy, which only Maman Abidjan from the Kau family in Dalla has suc-
cessfully applied, was to present herself as being from a slightly higher status group 
when abroad. On arriving in Abidjan, she claimed to be a descendant of bards (FF: 
Ŋeeyɓe) to hide her more stigmatizing slave status and, by so doing, was able to marry 
her Senegalese husband, the son of a Fulɓe man and a European mother. This strategy 
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has been described by other informants323 as well who indicate how slave-descending 
families in Maacina typically claim the status of arts and craft groups (FF: Ŋeeyɓe) to 
try to marry women in these social status groups and specialize in their activities 
(woodcarving, music making, etc). Processes of social promotion are typically guarded 
in the realm of public secrets within the ethnic group as the status one claims depends a 
lot on the credibility of historical claims that families can validate. 
This section has demonstrated the structural conditions needed to bypass endoga-
mous marriage rules. As well as personal characteristics, these conditions include 
wealth, education, beauty, the passage of time and, preferably, geographical distance 
too. For those who do not have these various capitals, moving up the social ladder 
through alliances with freeborn women in other ethnic groups is sometimes considered. 
Paradoxically, this is easier than marrying someone of higher social standing in one’s 
own ethnic group. The social control of genealogies and ancestry among ethnic groups 
is much weaker (and also more complex) than within one’s own ethnic group.  
Conclusions: Reshaping the cultural field of hierarchy through marriage 
An important aspect of the social immobility of slave groups and their descendants is 
that their access to upwardly social relations is blocked by the freeborn institution of 
endogamy, which is patrolled by social control. Different groups of slave descendants 
belonging to different freeborn families in the area have developed their own specific 
ceremonies and moralities on relating. 
Some slave descendants have improved their position through their marriage 
strategies but the room for upward manoeuvring is different for the various status 
groups among slave descendants. For the Kau family, concubine marriage proved a 
specific niche for some of its members. The legal institution of hypergamous concubine 
marriages did not necessarily defy the dominant cultural field of hierarchy but the semi-
freeborn children of slave concubines in Dalla and Booni have been legally freed of the 
stigma of slave status. This has even led to their accessing political office. Semi-free-
born children have become like nobles. They are allowed to behave like patrons vis-à-
vis other freeborn and family members of slave descent. They did not however chal-
lenge the existing social boundary between slave descendants and their former masters 
but simply trespassed them, often ending up on the ‘other side’. The children of slave 
concubines have obtained access to freeborn lineages and been inserted in the kinship 
continuum (Kopytoff & Miers 1977) and the freeborn culture of relatedness (Carsten 
2000). 
The institution of marriage, and endogamy in particular, has been described by many 
as an ‘ideological weapon’ in post-slavery societies where the stigma of slave status has 
remained. Within the social boundaries of their home societies, slave descendants from 
Dalla and Booni have challenged existing norms of endogamy thanks to their accumu-
lated capitals, such as wealth and education. Often personal characteristics, like beauty 
and the courage to defy the social order, have proved crucial. And lastly, the more 
structural context of economic decline during the droughts that impoverished several 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323  Dinda Sarre, Bamako, 2007; Belco Tambura, Bamako, 2007; Musa Tambura, Bamako, 2007; and 
Burra Yero Cisse, Douentza, 2007.  
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freeborn families, in combination with the opportunity for education in areas such as 
Booni, contributed to new ways of reshaping the existing cultural field of hierarchy 
regarding marriage. Compromises are still being made between actual practice and 




Expectations of stereo styles 
in the cultural field of hierarchy  
Assisting in style 
The Harmattan winds are showing no mercy in Dalla today and are blowing the yellow 
Saharan sand around. It is January and the harvests are stored safely in the granaries so 
the dry season is the ideal period for ritual celebrations. Tabaski, the sacrificial Muslim 
feast, has just finished and many other celebrations, such as circumcisions and wed-
dings are still to come. My interpreter Umu and I are to assist in several of these rituals 
but today Kumba Dicko’s son Nassuru is getting married so the members of the Kau 
family are helping the Dicko family. I observe how my neighbour Dikoore is bringing 
buckets of water and her husband Seydu and Kodo are stripping the skin off the bull 
that has been sacrificed in honour of the young Dicko bride. Seydu’s son Samba is off 
collecting firewood. Always optimistic, fifty-year-old Pooro is singing and clapping to 
encourage the young slave-descending girls in her neighbourhood with their millet 
pounding in the royal compound.     
Only women of slave descent pound millet for festivities in the Dicko family and it 
has become an ‘identity marker’ connecting someone to his/her slave ancestry.324 In 
many ways, ritual assistance symbolizes the continuity of a past relation in the present, 
a form of commemoration in the present. However not all Kau family members will be 
working today as some are in town and others have manumitted325 themselves. Various 
other people will also be helping, for example, Bella women of slave descent among 
Tuareg (FF-Bellaaɓe) are contracted during the dry season as seasonal labourers and 
engage in domestic activities for the royal family of Dalla and they will also pound 
millet today. Elder Kau slave descendants who help the royal Dicko family with similar 
chores are not rewarded in cash although the seasonal Bella immigrants are. Such 
inequalities in rewards demonstrate the complexity of today’s hierarchical relations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324  Hardung (2003: 94) made a similar observation during a wedding ceremony in northern Benin.  
325  In Chapter 5 I explain how manumission works. 
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Master-slave relations have never been uniform nor have they evolved unilinearly from 
slavery through clientelism into contractual relations. Analyzing changing hierarchical 
relations according to such modernization theories is futile. Instead, relevant questions 
in relation to legacies of a hierarchical past in the present are those that do justice to the 
wide variety of responses to their status by people of slave descent and their freeborn 
former masters. This variety depends on the time, place and the socio-political 
dynamics: Stigmatized status was forced on to newcomers such as Bella for example, 
others such as Kau family members managed to opt out by migrating and finally there 
are those like Pooro who temporarily (re-)engage in and benefit from relations of 
dependency. 
When the guests arrive in the afternoon even the dust cannot hide their bright 
coloured clothes. Some of the male visitors are wearing spotless white outfits with gold 
plaited stitching. The contrast with the outfits of the working slave descendants of the 
Kau family is striking: My neighbour Dikoore is not even wearing sandals, one has to 
guess the original colour of Seydu’s outfit and young Samba is wearing a T-shirt full of 
holes. They are clearly not wearing their best garments for work but even when they 
have finished work and changed for the party, the contrast remains. Differences in status 
between slave-descending Dikoore and royal Kumba Dicko can be seen from the 
differences in their dress, haircuts and behaviour. Dikoore’s outfit is of an inferior 
quality and the design of the cloth and the style of her clothes are somewhat outdated. 
My host Suleymane is dressed in white, which Dikoore’s husband Seydu describes as 
‘putting on airs and graces’ as he himself would never dress so ostentatiously. However, 
even Suleymane in his flashy white garment lacks the golden stitching that most mem-
bers of the Dicko family can afford and the appearance of the slave-descending Kau 
family is not as impressive as that of the freeborn Dicko family members. 
Observing my neighbours in relation to their patrons (their former masters in the 
Dicko family), I am surprised by their modest appearance but also their humble 
behaviour. Instead of their familiar noisy quarrels, I see them as silent observers who 
only move when asked to render service to a freeborn, for example taking a crying 
(freeborn) child, serving water or distributing cola nuts among the guests. While my 
interpreter and I are given a place at the centre of events, my Kau neighbours take seats 
faraway at the back, echoing the argument that status positions correspond to the places 
occupied.  
Although for me as an outsider it took time to become acquainted with certain sty-
listic preferences, once I had more or less mastered them, I realized how ritual cele-
brations326 undeniably underscore difference. They are a magnifying glass through 
which the social boundaries between social status groups can be cast. The above 
observations reveal how activities (work), behaviour, place and appearances are 
influenced by people’s relative status in their society.  
Central to this chapter is the way status positions come with expectations of style in 
the cultural field of hierarchy. The preceding chapters have demonstrated how inequal-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326  I analytically separate ritual contexts from other work contexts realizing that this distinction is not 
tenable in practice. Rituals can only be understood as daily lived realities of their actors (performers). 
Bell (1992) underlines this by taking a processual approach of ritual, which she calls ‘ritualization’. 
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ity of status was widely accepted in pre-colonial, colonial and in post-slavery Fulɓe 
society. The introduction to this thesis identified the cultural field of hierarchy as a 
common ground of belonging and identification for freeborn and slave descendants, and 
this Chapter discusses how the cultural field of hierarchy generates expectations regard-
ing specific styles that people ideally have to abide by in accordance with their ascribed 
social status.  
The first section of this Chapter analyzes how belonging to and partaking in the 
‘cultural field of hierarchy’ is done on a continuum of two variable styles: The patri-
archal style and the loyalty style. They complement and reinforce each other, which is 
why I have coined them ‘stereo styles’. The second section describes possibilities for 
mobility within and between these styles. I use here the typology of social promotion 
proposed by Kopytoff & Miers (1977: 19) called ‘informal affect’ or ‘affective incor-
poration’. Affective incorporation is a change in status that occurs in the personalized 
sphere of emotions and sentiments as opposed to legal changes in formal status. Af-
fective mobility has to do with the esteem and affection in which people are held in 
practice. Although some slave-descending Kau family members are treated with the 
greatest respect, they may not be entitled to the basic rights many less-respected com-
moners in society enjoy. Their legal incorporation does not correspond to their affective 
incorporation. Two main aspects of this affective dimension of social mobility for the 
Kau family in Dalla will be described: Link-up and chiefly positions for slaves. This 
affective dimension offers social mobility to those who maintain ties with their former 
master and is the major difference with the dimension of worldly success.  
The third section is a form of social promotion that Kopytoff & Miers (1977) called 
‘worldly success’. It is the dimension of change that becomes possible outside the direct 
relationship between the Kau and the Dicko families. In fact, this dimension is 
composed of those changes in social mobility of slave descendants that are not related 
to their formal and/or affective incorporation (the two other dimensions). The so-called 
worldly mobility of the Kau family with case material on floating patrons, the mone-
tization of labour and emigration are also described.  
‘Stereostyling’ the cultural field of hierarchy:  
The internalization of belonging in Fulɓe society 
It is my second month in Dalla and I am starting to recognize faces and make con-
nections between people. At the market, I recognize the butchers who sell meat as the 
husbands of the slave-descending women I have interviewed in the ward where I am 
staying. Further down, near the well, I recognize my neighbour Seydu and his son who 
are making mud bricks. Later on, I realize that this is quite common: In Fulɓe villages in 
the Haayre region, most of the brick makers and butchers are of slave descent (and/or 
seasonal immigrant workers) and do physically demanding jobs that are looked down 
on and that the well-off would never engage in. Also, these are activities that are asso-
ciated with and are overtly qualified by some as ‘slave labour’.  
Their work makes arranging interviews with my neighbours of slave descent more 
difficult than those with members of the royal or imam family. Freeborn Dickos have 
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their daily activities but always seemed to be able to make time for me. If they felt like 
it, most of them could arrange for someone else to do what needed doing.  
Noble women, like Kumba Dicko, invariably spend their days in their houses en-
gaging in tasks that do not involve much physical effort. Kumba Dicko spends most of 
her time plaiting colourful reed mats, has her millet pounded by a Bella worker and on 
market days, orders what she needs from one of the slave descendants who come to 
great her in the mornings. What a contrast from Dikoore and Pooro who are busy 
pounding millet, grinding peanuts and preparing and selling foodstuffs either at home or 
at the market.  
While butchering and brick making are typical activities among the male members of 
the Kau family, their women engage in domestic chores and sell prepared foods at the 
market. The Kau family thus continually engage in labour that links them to their not-
too-distant slave past. 
To understand how the cultural field of hierarchy was shaped and internalized over 
time by the Kau and Dicko families, I will briefly describe the history of labour rela-
tions during King Yerowal’s reign (1911-1966). Chapter 1 discussed the differences in 
labour between those slave groups living in Dalla who mainly engage in domestic 
labour and the slave-descending Riimaayɓe on the slave estates who are mainly engaged 
in cultivation. This is a very general feature of the organization of slave labour in the 
Sahel (Kopytoff & Miers 1977: 43; Meillassoux 1989; Klein 1989). These two slave 
groups both belonged to the Dicko family but had different rights and duties. While 
most estate slaves (Riimaayɓe Haayre) were allowed to keep their land as first 
settlers,327 their harvest was taxed by the nobility. Their main occupation was 
cultivation, although some specialized in cotton weaving or music making.   
In contrast, house slaves (FF: Maccuɓe Wuro) had no entitlements to land and rarely 
cultivated it either. Their occupations were more geared towards giving personal assist-
ance to the ruling family in terms of tax collection and guarding the royal palace, its 
granaries and the prisons. The royal slaves of the Kau family also took care of the 
horses, provided water and wood, and maintained the palace buildings. The slave wo-
men at the palace were either concubines or domestic workers. The most trusted among 
them worked as intermediaries and had public functions: They were the king’s mes-
sengers and, as such, commanded other (subordinate) slave groups in the kingdom. 
Many slaves on the estates remember how the royal domestic slaves (Kau family) came 
to take their property or children on the king’s orders. To date, the relationship between 
families of slave descendants on the estates (Riimaayɓe Haayre) and the royal descend-
ants (Maccuɓe Wuro) are tense, a tension that shows in their refusal to intermarry.  
During much of the twentieth century, possibilities for social mobility for the king’s 
slaves were largely determined by their masters’ social status. The slaves of Jawaanδo 
traders were likely to trade for their masters, while the slaves of warriors became sol-
diers. As Kopytoff & Miers (1977: 40) put it:  
The master sponsors the outsider’s placement in the social structure and the master’s position deter-
mines through what gates the outsider may enter it. The outsider’s subsequent status and style of life 
are a function of this point of entry ... The Kau family entered through the gate of the political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327  As first settlers, they were allowed to occupy these lands (de Bruijn & van Dijk 2001a: 232). 
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representatives of Fulɓe society. This why they occupied the position of political representatives 
among slaves. 
Different slaves occupied different kinds of jobs in the past depending on the posi-
tion and specialization of their masters. 
At King Yerowal’s court, the royal Dicko family exploited Kau family labour. They 
were not rewarded for their work but there were few forms of protest since their masters 
had the monopoly on violence (beating, resale, rape). In Chapter 1, El Hajj, a freeborn 
informant pointed out how corporal punishment was the normal way in which his father 
‘educated’ his slaves. Most Kau family members recall how their ancestors feared not 
only their masters’ violence but other threats as well. There was the fear of sale (of 
relatives) to worse masters and the threat of one’s kin being sold to a master in another 
country. The option of flight was not a viable alternative for most as running away 
resulted in either death or being enslaved by another kingdom.328 In short, many forms 
of (symbolic and real) coercion worked because there were not many exit options open 
to slaves.  
French abolitionist policy originally intended to eradicate all forms of slavery but in 
practice the French rarely intervened in domestic slaves’ problems and focused on 
abolishing the trading in slaves and having slaves on the estates. In bard Amadu Baa 
Digi’s memories, the abolition of slavery resulted in a redefinition of work relations. As 
Angenent et al. (2003: 101) put it: 
The following letter from the French prohibited slavery. People were no longer the slaves of their 
neighbours. All men are free, which we call a democracy. This troubled the Fulɓe a lot ... because they 
did not know how to work the land and their wives did not know how to take care of the household: 
Crushing, cooking and fetching water. Everything was done for them by their slaves. The French 
repeated that slavery no longer existed.329 
Although several Fulɓe groups were forced to start working for themselves, the royal 
elite kept their domestic workers. French colonizers tolerated domestic slavery among 
the ruling elites because they needed their cooperation and authority over their citizens. 
This is the reason why the exploitation of slave labour at the royal court in Dalla 
maintained the status quo during King Yerowal’s reign. Older informants, born in the 
1930s and 1940s,330 remember the corporal punishment they received as (child) slaves 
at the royal court. Allay Jannginoowo (†2008) was one of these child slaves at the royal 
court. Although when I interviewed him in 2001-2002 he took pride in the fact that he 
was given jobs requiring trusted persons, such as guarding prisoners and the granaries, 
his memories of being a child slave were less positive and he recalled with indignation 
how one of Yerowal’s wives once humiliated him by using his back as a board to wash 
clothes on. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328  The region was unstable due to raiding groups. More generally, the Sahel was characterized as a 
frontier zone for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This was the focus of a paper by 
Camille Lefèbre, which she presented during a workshop on ‘Slavery and Mobility’ in Liverpool, 
May 2010.  
329  This is author’s translation. See for the French text: Angenent et al. 2003: 101. 
330  The following of my elder informants have passed away in the meantime: Allay Jannginoowo, Asse 
Kau, Kumbaalde. To my knowledge Macca Maiga is still going strong. 
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It was only after Malian independence in 1960 and the death of King Yerowal in 
1966 that the Dicko family started working their own fields themselves. The elite’s 
perception of the innate impossibility of changing labour roles, as required by the 
French, met considerable resistance. Praise singer Baa Digi (in Angenent et al. 2003: 
101) used the following metaphor: ‘It is as if one gave a mortar to a European woman 
and told her to pound millet to prepare a meal. After only a day, her hand will swell and 
even start to bleed.’331  
After independence, Mali’s national government gave people of slave descent the 
same rights as any other group in society, at least on paper.332 Slave descendants are 
entitled to own their own property, have authority over their own family and if injustice 
is inflicted upon them, they can turn to the courts. For the Kau family, the main switch 
from formal slave status to a more clientelist status is only now starting to take shape. 
With King Yerowal’s death, the power of the royal Dicko family over their domestic 
workers came under close scrutiny and was increasingly undermined by national admi-
nistrators, who were sometimes of slave descent themselves. However, although the 
Dicko family lost its monopoly on violence to French and national Malian administra-
tors, from 1966 onwards the Dicko family replaced this with a monopoly on access to 
certain ‘goods’ (land, political authority) and continued to institutionalize forms of their 
former slaves’ marginality.  
A youngster from the Kau family333 who is currently studying in Segou confirmed 
that his family only started to emancipate slaves after independence. When asked for a 
concrete example, he describes how his uncle, Saalumaane Adu, was one of the first to 
actually take pride (FF:nayiraade ) in the fact that they were considered equal to the 
Dicko family: 
Saalumaane is considered a rebel by many because he was one of the first to refuse to do what the 
chief asked him to. At a certain point in time, the chief asked his Riimaayɓe (Kau family members) to 
make bricks for him and repair the entrance to his compound. Saalumaane was the only one who 
openly refused to do so. All the other Riimaayɓe in Wuro Maccuɓe obeyed. 
When I asked Alu why Saalumaane did so, he explained:  
Saalumaane no longer took pride in his relationship with his former masters. Often the people who no 
longer take pride are the ones whose master is poor and worthless. For us (referring to the Kau 
family), thank God, we get all that we ask from our former masters (referring to the Dicko family). 
They reward us for everything, we never lack anything. Since the beginning of the 1990s, we have 
even been paid for building a house. Nevertheless, we continue to do many small tasks for free. 
Interestingly, it was at this point that my freeborn interpreter Musa Dicko Jr inter-
vened. He was well aware that Alu considered him his ‘patron’ and therefore assured 
him that he should not feel ashamed about whatever he wanted to say. He encouraged 
Alu to behave as if he (the interpreter) were not there. But Alu did not change his loyal 
tone and continued to express pride in walking in the footsteps of his ancestors.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331  This is author’s translation. See for the French text: Angenent et al. 2003: 101. 
332  In remote areas, such as the Inner Niger Delta, there are villages where people of slave descent are 
still working their fields without being able to keep any of the harvest for themselves. It is claimed by 
their former masters. In one village, people of slave descent started to work at night to store their 
harvest in their granaries before dawn. Seku Bocoum, personal communication, Bamako, 2006. 
333  Alu Paate Tambura Jr, interview with interpreter Musa Dicko Jr, Segou, March 2007. 
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Since my grandfather obeyed your grandfather, I take pride in doing the same. When I am in Dalla for 
the feast of Tabaski, I always assist the Dicko family with their sacrifice and butchering their animals. 
That is how my ancestors found things (FF: Tawaangal) and this is why I continue to do them this 
way. 
Alu’s discourse demonstrates how he is more conservative than his older uncle. The 
past alliance between master and slave remained central for Alu, while other youngsters 
of his generation have slowly started to take different directions offered by alternative 
alliances and possibilities. It is often the mobile youngsters or migrants who have most 
possibilities and are least dependent on maintaining ties. Bard Hama Amba explains 
how the younger generation heard stories about the atrocities of their (grand)parents' 
enslavement but they do not have such personal memories or experiences. There is no 
longer a personally embodied experience in which their memories of hierarchy are 
incorporated, which explains why the current generation of youngsters no longer feels 
respect (FF: Teddungal) for their parents’ former masters. They have fewer difficulties 
in asserting their independence and refusing orders.  
Age and generation are not unilinearly defining the position and attitude of members 
of the Kau family. Slave descendants are a heterogeneous and diversely emancipating 
economic group. Despite homogenizing stereotypes in which both freeborn elites and 
slave-descending clients stress continuity, current labour divisions are diversely carved 
out by personal historical trajectories and contingencies. Some, like Alu, continue to 
defer to those who they consider their former masters, while others, like Saalumane, 
explicitly do not. The ways in which the relationship between freeborn and slave des-
cendants are shaped today vary according to individual characteristics, historical tra-
jectories, wealth, perceptions of opportunity as related to one’s stage in life, gender, 
social control of the surrounding context and kin obligations.  
The cultural field of hierarchy as performed in ‘stereo styles’334 
Chapter 1 defined styles as performances of identity (see Ferguson 1999). I have used 
these in combination with the notion of sub-cultural style to describe the behaviour, 
rituals and, more generally, the way in which Riimaayɓe have (not) integrated into 
freeborn society. In this section, the two main styles that together make up the ‘cultural 
field of hierarchy’ are central: The patriarchal style and the loyalty style. The first style, 
which corresponds to the behaviour of many freeborn, is called the patriarchal style and 
is defined as comprising all those performances that bring the performer closer to the 
‘patriarchal ideal’ described by Manchuelle (1989b). The patriarchal style comes with 
an ideology of ‘nobility’ (FF: Ndimu), which is linked to the capacity to delegate mo-
bility, physical labour and immoral behaviour to others (clients). I define the opposite 
style as the loyalty style. It is the style by which clients try to obtain favours with an 
influential or wealthy patron.  
A combination of the loyalty and patriarchal styles is what I propose calling ‘stereo 
styles’, which complement and are dependent on each other. I add the word ‘stereo’ to 
Ferguson’s (1999) style concept for two reasons. Firstly, both styles are based on deeply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334  I defined my use of the notion of sub-cultural style as informed by Ferguson (1999) in the intro-
duction to this thesis.    
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rooted stereotypes of a common slave history. The cultural field of hierarchy ultimately 
often romanticized an ideal division of labour and behaviour among different groups in 
the area and, for example, linked slaves to land in ideological opposition to freeborn 
Fulɓe who are stereotypically associated with cattle and/or world and religious power. 
These stereotypical distinctions are an important legitimization for the cultural field of 
hierarchy in the discourse of many informants. Although these stereotypical distinctions 
have hardly ever corresponded with actual practice, they are instrumental in defining 
belonging to Fulɓe society.335  
The second reason for using the additional prefix is that each style exists by virtue of 
the other. So the patriarchal style can only be performed to the fullest by loyal followers 
who engage in the loyalty style, and vice versa. So the patriarchal style and the loyalty 
style reinforce each other. The word ‘stereo’ metaphorically reflects how, in combina-
tion, these styles ‘sound’ better. The two styles share common elements and it is 
possible for a person to act somewhere between the two extremes and to draw on both 
styles in different contexts. As Ferguson (1999) describes for the cosmopolitan versus 
the localist style, one does not move from one style to another in a day. The cultural 
competence to engage in each is something that takes time, effort, resources and various 
forms of social capital. Although the social status of slave descendants is stereotypically 
expected to be specialized in the loyalty style rather than the patriarchal style, within 
their own status group and family context they often ‘perform’ the patriarchal style as 
well. On the other hand, mighty patrons ideally perform the loyalty style vis-à-vis God, 
for example. The most loyal client in a one-relational context (vis-à-vis one’s master) 
can be a very authoritarian patriarch at home.  
The two styles come with certain expectations and morality. I will describe how 
deviant styles are socially sanctioned and therefore important aspects in the socializa-
tion and internalization of the cultural field of hierarchy.  
The patriarchal style 
In daily life it is important for an individual in Fulɓe society to ‘have people’. 
The presence of Yimɓe am, which means ‘my people’, is narrowly related to 
one’s social position and status in society. 
 (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 137) 
‘Having people’ is an important principle of social organization in the patriarchal style 
and in understanding people’s positions in the Fulɓe culture of relatedness. The cultural 
field of hierarchy, and more specifically of nobility, is a moral order closely associated 
with adulthood generating responsibility over dependants. The people one has respon-
sibility and therefore authority over, namely dependants, are called koreeji (FF) in the 
Haayre dialect. Only adults can have koreeji as the term refers to the spouse or children 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335  Many slave descendants do not only engage in cultivation and those who become wealthy often be-
come owners of large herds. In the past, not all slaves were only cultivators and some herded cattle 
with their nomadic masters. Even Allay Jannginoowo, who used to occupy an important position as a 
royal slave, spent most of his life herding cows with the former chief of Dalla (†2010). In practice, the 
activities of the various groups have always blended and shifted.  
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of an adult man or woman, and defines adulthood and adult responsibility (Berndt 2008: 
164).336  
In Fulɓe society, the family is a kin unit with a patrilineal bias. The ’ideal’ compound 
consists of a man and/or several of his brothers, their wives, children and their child-
ren’s spouses. This family ideal has however always been subject to an enormous vari-
ety of relationships. Not everyone was related through blood to the compound head 
because compounds have always drawn in immigrants, clients with debts, sons-in-law, 
cousins and so on. However within the compound there is a hierarchy where strangers, 
youngsters and women are defined as juniors in relation to the senior head of the 
compound. The head was responsible for the well-being of its members and heading a 
compound with dependants was impossible for slaves. They were denied access to their 
own offspring and ‘having people’ was never recognized for them, and was even 
impeded, through the institution of endogamy (Chapter 3). 
While slaves were not entitled to establish their own families and thus lacked 
authority, they were ideal clients who were forced to contribute to the authority and 
nobility of others. Slaves were necessary for the freeborn nobility. Sharkey (1994: 189-
190) describes how in Sudan:  
... elites had relied on some slaves to farm their lands, though they valued slaves as a whole for a 
loftier reason: The enhancement of status and proof of power that the possession of slaves could bring 
... Indeed, the greatest service that slaves may have provided to their owners in the 19th and early 20th 
century - through the eyes of the owners themselves - was not so much to ... boost their regional 
economy, but rather to enhance their social status and prestige. 
Patrons are persons (usually male) who, by using their authority,337 delegate less 
prestigious tasks, functions and styles more generally to their clients. So a father 
delegates the making of tea to his son, like a mother delegates the sweeping of the 
compound to her daughter. This system applies across layers of society and is strongest 
for heads of families and compounds but is also played out in hierarchical differences 
between older and younger unmarried persons and between the genders.  
A central aspect of power and nobility in the Haayre region was control over the 
mobility of others (mobility capital). From the outset, enslavement meant that a person 
was forced to go and live elsewhere and this removal following capture was an explicit 
form of ‘forced migration’ (Lovejoy 2009). The first and probably most important 
aspect of the patriarchal style that still defines labour relations is the extent to which 
patrons (freeborn elites) control their clients movements. While mobility has been 
described as the norm rather than the exception among Fulɓe cattle herders (de Bruijn et 
al. 2001), immobility became a luxury to strive for among the sedentarized Fulɓe of 
Dalla but was only possible by controlling the mobility of their slaves and other clients 
like herdsmen, traders and craftsmen. Freeborn Fulɓe controlled the mobility of their 
slaves and used them to deliver messages, cultivate their fields and gather forest pro-
ducts or wood for construction. The ruling Weeheeɓe still have most of their tasks in-
volving movement delegated to their former slaves: The collection of taxes, assistance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336  Koreeji in other Fulɓe groups refers to neighbours rather than kin. For more on Fulaaɓe in Mauri-
tania, see Ciavolella 2008. 
337  Descent and genealogy are important in defining one’s authority and status. 
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during travel, the distribution of voting cards, and so on. The immobility of the elite has 
been possible due to their control of the mobility of their clients.  
Besides controlling one’s own mobility and that of others, the ability to have others 
working for oneself is frequently mentioned by informants as the single most defining 
feature of nobility and authority in the patriarchal style. Burra Yero Cisse defines 
nobility as the possibility to use slaves as one’s personal property: ‘The slave allowed to 
the freeborn person (FF: Dimo) to preserve his noble ideology (FF: ndimaaku) by 
limiting as much as possible his contacts with manual work’ Camara (1995: 14). And 
McDougal (2007: 173) explains that ‘because the issue was not “freedom” versus 
“slavery” but rather “freed” versus “non-freed”, the acquisition of rights to slave labor 
or slave ownership affirmed one’s non-slave status.’ Outsourcing certain forms of 
labour liberated not only freeborn men but also freeborn women from the need to work 
or move around in order to survive. In the memories of hierarchy recounted by the local 
bard, the (gendered) division of labour was part and parcel of being noble.  
Moodi (an Islamic scholar who brought Islam to Dalla) stressed that the nobleness of the nobility is 
not complete if black people cannot be enslaved. People say ‘you, you are a noble woman: Enter your 
house, do not work, do not ground the millet, do not prepare the food!’ But if there is nobody to work 
for you, your nobility cannot be real. If you do not have a servant, you are obliged to work yourself ... 
The law says that noble women are supposed to sit down but the law does not forbid slave women 
from going out to work.338  
To date, there are concrete ideological rules related to the patriarchal style that limit 
the mobility of freeborn women. A freeborn married woman, like Kumba Dicko, is only 
allowed to leave her compound on important occasions.339 Going to the market as a 
married noble woman remains taboo. This is why outdoor activities are delegated to 
clients or youngsters (a female slave descendant or young noble child), who will be sent 
in their place. Other tasks, such as preparing a baby’s food or fetching water, are also 
delegated to former slaves. In 2007 I interviewed another noble woman called Dicko 
Djounou. We met in Douentza and as she insisted that nothing had changed in relations 
between the Kau and Dicko families since King Yerowal’s reign, I asked her what 
forms of assistance her former slaves give her today. She explained how the porridge 
she was feeding her child at that moment had been prepared by one of her domestic 
assistants (French: Une de mes captives) the night before.  
Clients need patrons and patrons have to behave in certain ways. Their clients will 
leave and thus ‘punish’ them if they do not comply with expectations. Patrons also 
therefore have their obligations to respect. The saying ‘nobility obliges’ (French: 
noblesse oblige) is especially relevant for noble women. It is in the female realm that 
the cultural field of hierarchy as based on status differences is proudly guarded.  
The patriarchal style is not something one naturally has but it needs to be activated 
on the basis of not only ascribed status and authority but also wealth and influence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338  Translated from French: ‘Moodi a compris que la noblesse des nobles n’est pas complète, si les noirs 
ne peuvent pas êtres faits des esclaves. Si on dit, toi, tu es une femme noble: Entre dans ta maison, ne 
travaille pas, ne pile pas, ne prépare pas le repas, s’il n’y a pas quelqu‘un pour piler, préparer et 
travailler pour toi, ta noblesse ne peut pas être véritable. Parce que si tu n’as pas de servante, tu es 
obligée de sortir et travailler toi-même ... La loi dit que les femmes nobles soient assises, mais la loi 
n’interdit pas que les femmes servantes sortiront pour travailler.’ (Angenent et al. 2003: 69) 
339  This would also encourage their becoming lighter skinned and fatter. 
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Moreover, being freeborn was never a fixed boundary for being able to have clients. 
McDougall (2007) describes how the defining criterion for being a master of slaves in 
Mauritania, according to Islamic interpretation, was not necessarily the fact that one 
was freeborn but rather that one had been freed from the duty to be loyal to someone 
else and that: ‘to be master did not necessitate being ‘free’, only being ‘freed’ (Ibid.: 
172). This is why the children of slave concubines and slaves owning slaves could 
develop patriarchal styles themselves in Dalla. Some patrons, like the Dicko family, are 
better capable than others of accumulating clients and the position of patron is an almost 
self-fulfilling prophecy for this family. Since they managed to maintain an influential 
position through education and political occupations throughout the French colonial 
occupation, they were able to keep the monopoly on important status resources such as 
land, wealth, authority and movement. These resources, in turn, reinforced their position 
as patrons and they even attracted the slave descendants of other impoverished patrons 
who became their clients. ‘New’ clients such as these underscore the flexibility in 
patron-client relations.  
The loyalty style 
Most slave descendants of the Kau family behave very modestly in relation to their 
former masters. In the Haayre region, being modest is expressed in Fulfulde by the verb 
that also literally means to make something smaller (FF: Fanɗinkinaade). If someone is 
modest, he makes himself small (FF: omo fandini). Modest slave-descending Riimaayɓe 
know their place (FF: Anndude hoore) and thus avoid being reproached for behaving in 
a superior manner.340 
‘To their host communities, slaves often represent a subversion of familiar concepts 
of place, culture and bounded community. By their very definition they transcended 
locality’ (Argenti & Röschenthaler 2006: 38-39). Slaves were often encouraged, or at 
least expected, not to behave in a way deemed noble. Dancing, singing and music 
making are thus stereotypically ‘slave’ activities. Negative attitudes towards dancing 
and music are explained by reference to the religious conventions prescribed by Islam. 
So married noble women are not supposed to dance (or at least not for too long), while 
slave-descending women can dance for as long as they like and generally behave unlike 
nobility (Riesman 1977: 127-130).341 Slaves, and by extension slave descendants, are 
less restrained in their behaviour and have fewer rules to observe (Riesman 1992: 216; 
Griep 2005: 131). However in relation to their patrons and former masters, slave 
descendants’ behaviour is subject to constraining rules and they have to respect their 
place in the social order.  
Each style comes with restrictions but people strive for honour in both. When I was 
collecting old slave songs (FF: Direre/Guluro), older people of slave descent confirmed 
that they knew such songs but did not want to sing them because they now consider 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340  Not knowing oneself and one’s position is expressed as maani aɗa anndaa hoore (FF) and behaving 
too grandly is maani ada ganda (FF). 
341  Hardung (1998: 207) gives a detailed account of the ways in which Fulɓe slaves in Benin were forced 
to behave contrary to the rules of Pulaaku. 
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themselves good Muslims and no longer want to lower their status by doing a shameful 
thing, such as singing. Singing, according to one of them, would be like ‘breaking a 
promise towards God’ and is thus a moral issue.342  
Slaves were supposed to be loyal and modest and the relationship between a noble 
master and his soldier of slave origin could be very affective and close. Loyalty is 
idealized in the oral history of Silaamaka and Pulloori. Silaamaka is the noble master 
and the story ends when Pulloori, his personal slave assistant, decides to give his life to 
save that of his master Silaamaka (Seydou 1972).  
Abu Lughod (1986: 79) explained the same mechanism in her study on honour in a 
Bedouin society. She described how, in a hierarchical system, those who cannot comply 
with social honour, or only partially so because they find themselves in a dependent 
position, have an alternative ‘code of modesty’ to resort to. This voluntary modesty is 
crucial for obtaining social honour in a bottom-up approach. 
One way for those at the bottom to resolve the contraction between their positions and the system’s 
ideals, is by appearing to defer to those in authority voluntarily ... What is voluntary is by nature free 
and is thus also a sign of independence. Voluntary deference is therefore the honourable mode of 
dependency. (Abu-Lughod, 1986; 104)343  
Acceptance of a marginal place within the dominant culture of relatedness was the 
best way for descendants of domestic slaves like the Kau family to maximize their own 
interests. A concrete application of the loyalty style is the naming of one’s children after 
a wealthy patron. My host Suleymane, for example, named one of his sons after his 
patron Musa Dicko, the former mayor of Dalla. Other examples are the daily greetings 
and small gestures (bringing water, pounding millet), which are strategic acts of defer-
ence to maintain contact and ‘smooth the difficult hands’ (FF: Junngo makko ina tiidi) 
of a patron.  
While Islamic legislation has encouraged forms of integration and turned slaves into 
clients, such clients were equally expected to exhibit the loyalty style of behaviour. 
Islamic ideology encourages the loyalty of slaves towards their masters and masters to 
be good patriarchs (see Chapter 5). In Dalla, the religious elite encourage clients to 
defer to their former masters who, in turn, will defer to God. Being loyal to a master is 
believed to include serving God well too. Loyalty to a master was encouraged with the 
promise of manumission.344 Such forms of religious institutionalization of deference 
and loyalty are discussed in the next Chapter. 
Loyalty can thus be defined as working in the service of someone else, but another 
aspect is that one is explicit about compensation. The idea of begging (French: que-
mander) and asking for help, food or gifts is associated with the loyalty style and 
working for someone else and asking for favours are forms of behaviour that have a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342  The old man finally sang some of these songs because of his grandson. In Fulɓe society, grandsons 
have privileges and this is why my research assistant Amadu contacted his best friend, a maternal 
cousin to his and a grandson of the old man. It was Amadu’s cousin who managed to convince his old 
grandfather to sing some songs. 
343  Such voluntary deference also exists among freeborn and is expressed in ideas and behaviour related 
to the concept of shame (FF: Yaage).  
344  Manumission is the freeing of a slave by his master. According to this legal Islamic procedure, the 
freed slave obtains the status of client. See Chapter 5. 
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negative connotation in the patriarchal realm. For those like the Kau family, performing 
the loyalty style is an honourable way of making a living and they take pride in their 
loyalty and deference.  
Applying stereo styles to the family networks in Dalla 
When applying stereo styles to the Kau and the Dicko families, one could say that while 
the Kau family has incorporated the loyal (humble/subservient) style, the Dicko family 
has engaged in the patriarchal style. Both styles reflect memories of hierarchy and 
expectations that are often directly related to interactions over past decades.  
Engaging in the patriarchal style was almost impossible for most of the slaves of the 
Kau family during King Yerowal’s reign and most of them were not entitled to have 
their own families, had no say over their children (or their marriage) and could only 
take a restricted number of wives within their own group. Access to social relations with 
a restricted number of other low status groups contributed to their immobility. 
Being a patron and leader does not only depend on ascribed social status (descent) 
but on the ability to outsource labour and mobility. Chapter 1 described how slave 
soldiers (FF: KommongalluuBe) acquired property as a result of assisting the elite in 
raids and some even ended up buying their own slaves. However King Yerowal was 
furious when one of his wealthier estate slaves bought himself a slave, thus violating the 
loyalty style that was expected of him. Here the difference between legal and affective 
status comes to the fore. Buying one’s own slaves was impossible for royal slaves (the 
Kau family) but some slave groups managed to become patrons themselves by buying 
their own slaves. One’s capacity to patronize has thus always depended on the ability to 
provide the necessary resources (wealth, authority) to clients. As a result of various 
floating trajectories in the past, there is even more variation in today’s post-slavery 
relations among Fulɓe and their former slaves, ranging from almost master-slave 
relations at one end of the spectrum of patron-client relations to a reversal of the hier-
archical relationship, which has turned former clients into patrons at the other end.  
Over the generations, the Kau family obtained more rights and has been able to 
climb to important positions in which the loyalty style was especially rewarding and 
they take pride in their close ties with the Dicko family. Some gained the trust of their 
master and became soldiers, while others were entrusted with guarding prisoners or 
granaries. 
Stereo styles kept the Kau family dependent on their former masters and these same 
stereo styles have kept their masters in a patron position vis-à-vis their former slaves. 
Stereo styles are thus a fundamental and functional aspect of the cultural field of 
hierarchy and have been internalized by the descendants of slaves and their masters who 
uphold these styles depending on their formal social status. Internalizing styles contri-




Sanctioning not knowing one’s head 
Central to knowing who you are (knowing your head) is respect for the rules of conduct 
in society. If not shown deliberately, such respect can also be enforced through social 
sanctions. Suleymane offers a clear example of this: He is not as modest and loyal as 
most of his peers in the Kau family and on returning from working elsewhere, he 
adopted his own style of doing things. This was why, earlier in this chapter, we found 
him wearing a white outfit when, according to his peers, this was too ostentatious for 
someone in his social position. Suleymane is exceptional in many ways, being the only 
one in the Kau family to send his daughters to school.  
In 2001-2002 I observed how non-compliance with existing rules and expectations 
was immediately signalled and corrected. There was an incident between Suleymane 
and the Dicko family during the annual Tabaski celebrations when they were all taking 
pride in the number of sheep they would butcher for their wives and family. I then asked 
Suleymane how many animals he would slaughter and, to my surprise, the answer was 
none. It was not because he lacked the money but rather because, according to the 
Dicko family, his Kau family members were of slave descent and were not supposed to 
make their own sacrifice due to their status. However he added that when he was in 
Burkina, he would always butcher a sheep in honour of his freeborn wife Hadriatou.  
Some days later, Suleymane informed me that he had decided not to butcher his 
master’s sacrificial animal anymore and would send his cousin Kodo to do it in his 
place. This would allow him to butcher his own animal right after morning prayers on 
the first day of Tabaski. I still wonder to what extent my conversation with him 
influenced his decision: This is a methodological concern that is difficult to answer. 
When I asked him, he told me our conversations had had nothing to do with it but there 
were several moments like this during my fieldwork when I sincerely wondered 
whether it had been my questions that had triggered changes in the behaviour and ideas 
of informants. My interpreter agreed with me on this point.  
On the first day of Tabaski, right after morning prayers, members of the Kau family 
walked up to the royal compound. Suleymane however was missing: He had gone home 
to change his clothes and butcher his own animal. This appeared to cause a lot of 
discussion between the then chief of the slave descendants, Allay, and the Dicko chief 
and mayor. In the midst of the consternation, Kodo was sent to find Suleymane, who 
ended up butchering animals for Mayor Musa Dicko’s family. My interpreter Umu 
suggested that we leave the Dicko compound once Suleymane arrived to avoid in-
creasing his feelings of shame. In the coming days, Suleymane was insulted and re-
proached both by his own and Dicko family members for his disrespectful behaviour. In 
the end he only sacrificed his own animal on the third day of Tabaski.  
Suleymane returns several times in this chapter as his progressive and rather deviant 
ideas have often caused him trouble. Over the ten years I have known him, I have 
witnessed how he increasingly started to give in to his co-villagers’ expectations. He 
became more modest, realizing that the loyalty style would yield more results than 
sticking to his deviant principles. Not only did he experience pressure from the Dicko 
family and was reproached for not sticking to the loyalty style, he also experienced 
constant pressure from his own family and his peers. The most striking example was the 
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recent marriage of his daughter Aafi. Suleymane’s family did not approve of his at-
tempts to educate his eldest daughter but, thanks to his close ties with the well-educated 
mayor of Dalla, Suleymane managed to have her live with the Dicko family in Dou-
entza so that she could complete her high-school education. According to traditional 
ideas of marriage, Aafi had been promised to the son of Suleymane’s eldest brother 
Hama (a parallel cousin) and for years Hama had been insisting on the marriage taking 
place because he felt the girl was becoming too old to get married. Since Mayor Musa, 
who had been hosting her, died in 2008, his widowed wife had not been supportive of 
her education either and in April 2010 Suleymane finally gave in to pressure from his 
older brother. Aafi married Hama’s son in Dalla in May 2010 and she will now never be 
able to complete her education even though she was expected to graduate in June 2010. 
Suleymane’s case outlines how knowing oneself is not only a matter of personal 
stylistic competence. Style is performed within the limits of what is socially acceptable 
and can be reinforced in practice by officious rules of social control and morality. The 
cultural field of hierarchy incites people to stick to tradition and to know their position 
in society. Moral rules of behaviour related to the social organization of hierarchy make 
it difficult to remove the Riimaayɓe’s stigmatized status. There is a discourse about 
respect for ancestors: People are supposed to walk in the footsteps of their ancestors and 
to respect ‘what is found’, i.e. to respect their ancestors’ example. Most references to 
tradition (FF: Tawaangal) underscore the importance of transgenerational continuity. 
The son of the chief in Dalla pointed out that not respecting customary rules is ‘like 
taking off the pants of your old man (father)’. It would dishonour one’s father in front 
of other family members and be shameful. The best way of avoiding shame is by con-
forming. Conformity is enforced through strong social control in both styles, and social 
control reminds people that being considered pretentious is a social sanction in itself. As 
Riesman (1992: 200) put it: 
It is important to recall, for instance, that not only are Fulɓe and slave descendants aware of 
differences in what their behavioural patterns express, but also that they are constantly calling 
attention to them in everyday conversations. These everyday references serve not only to keep certain 
images constantly in people’s minds, but also have the weight of sanctions: Fulɓe who act like slave 
descendants degrade themselves, while a Diimaajo (singular form of slave descendant) who acts like a 
Pullo (singular form freeborn Fulɓe) would in many contexts be considered uppity.  
Although many informants insist that education and the passage of time have 
changed many things, it remains difficult for the younger generation to defy the autho-
rity of their elders. Their room for manoeuvre is still restricted, as I demonstrate with an 
incident Musa described. Musa Tambura is a 25-year-old descendant of slaves (FF: 
Riimaayɓe Haayre) from the village of Sigiri (Map 5). His father had made a lot of 
money, set himself up in Douentza and became the neighbour of former mayor, Musa 
Dicko, in Douentza. When his father died, Musa was adopted by Musa Dicko who en-
sured he received an education and he went on to study at university in Bamako. He 
described the following incident to illustrate how the generational gap is hard to over-
come for his generation.  
I was on a visit to Dalla with Vieux, one of my Dicko friends. We came from Douentza and when we 
arrived at Vieux’s house (the royal Dicko family compound), Vieux ordered a person of slave descent 
called Bilal to go and fetch water so that he could wash himself after the journey. Bilal however 
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refused to do so and Vieux decided to get the water himself. On seeing this, Vieux’s uncle got really 
angry. He told Vieux – in the presence of Musa and Bilal – that, after all, slaves (FF: Maccuɓe) were 
born to take care of the needs of others. He explained how slaves are like dogs and that you have to 
train them to obey you. Then he ordered Vieux to hit Bilal. Vieux refused to do so. (Here Musa added 
that Vieux had refused to do so because he had been to school.) To save his authority, Vieux also 
added that if one day Bilal should ever need him, he would not help him. (This was his punish-
ment.) Vieux’s uncle was not satisfied however and ordered Bilal to bring the requested water. 
With a deep sigh, Musa added that the man of slave origin did go and get the water. 
For him, the case demonstrated how in some contexts and with some conservative 
elders, it is still complex for him and his peers to change the cultural field of hierarchy.  
However, not only the loyalty style of slave descendants is controlled by others. 
Patrons and freeborn noblemen are equally subjected to gossip, insults and sanctions if 
they do not respect the cultural field of hierarchy. The expression noblesse oblige seems 
accurate in this context.  
With the following case of Musa Dicko Jr, I show what repercussions can follow 
from not respecting differences in behavioural styles. The case demonstrates how the 
weight of sanctions works. Musa Dicko Jr is a youngster of the royal Dicko family 
studying in Bamako. While on holiday in his home village Dalla in 2006, he was shown 
that he had crossed the social boundaries and was reproached for not respecting the 
moral rules related to his ‘patriarchal’ noble style because he had eaten rabbit meat. He 
went out hunting with his slave-descending friends (FF: Maccuɓe Wuro) but because of 
his freeborn status, Musa was not allowed to give in to his hunger (a bodily need) and 
eat rabbit as it is considered impure. Since he was hungry and his friends were eating 
with relish, Musa decided to taste some. This was much to his regret later on because 
the ‘bad mouths’ (FF: Hururuy) gossiped. Musa was insulted by co-villagers, both free-
born and slave descendants, for behaving ‘like a slave’. Gossip sanctioned his mistake, 
i.e. the non-realization of bodily control. He had crossed the moral boundary of the 
ideology of nobility (FF: Ndimu). People insulted him for his ‘slave behaviour’ and 
when he walked by people would call him ‘slave’ (FF: Maccuδo) in public and some 
even considered Musa to be cursed (FF: Huδaaδo). 
Musa was sanctioned for not maintaining the patriarchal ideal. It is not only people 
of one’s own social status groups who ‘protect’ the social boundaries and sanction each 
other. Slave descendants can just as easily sanction the freeborn if the expected 
patriarchal style is not respected. The notion of ‘difficult hands’ directly refers to the 
threat of social sanctions by clients over their patrons. If a patron is greedy and is not 
reciprocal in the way clients expect him to be (as related to status, wealth, power, 
gender and seniority), people will ‘dirty his name’ (FF: Bonude innde makko). If a 
patron is not as generous as would be expected according to his position, he will be 
sanctioned with reproaches and social control. 
Maintaining a good (moral) reputation in the face of the community is controlled by 
(mostly discursive) sanctions in the public sphere. A person who crosses the social 
boundaries (Musa, Suleymane and Bilal in the above-mentioned examples) is insulted 
for putting on airs and graces (FF: maani aɗa ganndaa) and not ‘knowing himself’ (FF: 
Maani anndaa hoore). Sanctions involve gossip and insults, which are sources of shame 
(Riesman 1977: 77-79; Riesman 1992: 29, 46-49). As described in Chapters 2 and 3, 
148 
 
shame is an emotion that needs to be avoided at all costs (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 
212-213). Insults referring to characteristics associated with slaves, non-Muslims345 and 
blacks,346 such as impatience, lying, selfishness and ingratitude, are especially powerful 
insults for noble freeborn.  
Religious curses (and blessings) also effectively prevent people from crossing certain 
boundaries (Hardung 2009: 119-123; N’gaide 1999). During interviews, informants 
started whispering when discussing sensitive issues in the hope of avoiding being 
cursed for passing on secret information. They thus underlined how God hears every-
thing. And finally, repercussions for not respecting tradition and ancestral customs (FF: 
Tawaangal) are often expressed by using the powerful idiom of witchcraft (FF: Su-
kunya) (Botte 1994: 115-116).  
All the above-mentioned forms of social control are common and the effect of dis-
cursive sanctions in the form of stereotypes, insulting jokes, pejorative vocabulary and 
degrading remarks should not be underestimated. Social control and sanctions are an 
important mechanism for understanding socialization and the internalization of the 
cultural field of hierarchy. They contribute to social control and the maintenance of the 
hierarchical status quo, which is reflected in the stereo styles at either end of the 
spectrum. This section has demonstrated how the cultural field of hierarchy is inter-
nalized and maintained through social control by knowing oneself and performing the 
right stereo styles. The following sections describe how stereo styles have been adapted 
and manipulated in the practice of affectionate relations between people. 
Affective mobility within stereo styles 
Based on Kopytoff & Miers’s (1977: 18-20) analysis of the ‘dimensions of marginality 
in relation to mobility’, this section describes how changes in degrees of social mobility 
among slave descendants occur in the dimension of informal affect. I prefer to use the 
concept of informal affective stretch of social status, which refers to the fact that 
although inequality between ascribed status groups is recognized, it does not necessarily 
result in unequal treatment per se. The strictly legal content of social status was stretch-
ed and slaves and their descendants were incorporated thanks to personal relations of 
affection that developed over time.  
Historians and anthropologists alike, such as Hall (2009, 2011 forthcoming/ Miers & 
Kopytoff 1977), point to affective elements in master-slave relations in the past. Hall 
(2009) for example concludes from nineteenth-century correspondence between slaves 
trading for their wealthy masters that they enjoyed a great deal of respect and were 
accorded relative freedom: They were allowed to study, had books, married freeborn 
women from other ethnic groups and managed their own family compounds. These 
slaves became important traders with a more-or-less independent status and are ad-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345  In the Haayre region, it is especially the Dogon that are referred to as people who do not pray (FF: 
Heeferɓe) (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 215). To be categorized as such is a grave insult. 
346  The Fulfulde term Haaɓe (sing. Kaaδo) literally means bitter and with the term Baleeɓe (the colour 
black) is used to refer to other African ethnic groups such as Dogon, Bambara and Bozo. The terms 
Haaɓe / Baleeɓe thus refer to all African populations considered inferior by Fulɓe. The exceptions are 
Arabs, Songhay and Tuareg.  
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dressed in respected terms in the letters. The trust bestowed on them demonstrates how 
their affective status corresponds more with that of freeborn clients than with their 
formal status of slave. However, according to their formal status, they could legally still 
be resold. In other words, within the legal status of ‘slave’, there has always been room 
for individual appreciation and exception, which I propose to call ‘affective stretches’ in 
the cultural field of hierarchy.  
When it comes to contemporary literature, forms of affective stretch in hierarchical 
relations are mentioned by Janson (2002: 158), who analyzed patron-client relations 
between Mandinke praise singers (French: Griots) and their patrons in Gambia and 
describes them as hierarchical relations imbued with affection. In her description of 
labour relations between people of slave descent and local freeborn Fulɓe in northern 
Benin, Hardung (1998: 214) uses the concept of asymmetrical, institutionalized rapport 
(French: ‘rapports asymétriques institutionalises’).347 In my view, a combination of 
these concepts would come closest to the affective mobility some groups of slaves and 
their descendants in the Haayre region enjoyed. The hierarchical relations between the 
Kau and Dicko families can be characterized as asymmetric and hierarchical but they 
were imbued with affection too. Emotional affect in practice thus ‘stretched’ the boun-
daries of slave status considerably, contributing to social mobility in this category.  
Although many slave descendants have been formally recognized as freeborn citi-
zens by the Malian nation state, such rights in Fulɓe society are overshadowed by the 
central importance of Islamic legislation and ideology. Despite their immobility in the 
legal Islamic realm, slave descendants in Dalla enjoy considerable social mobility in 
their affective relations with their former masters or patrons. Affective mobility is the 
esteem and affection in which people are held. Although some slave descendants may 
be treated with the greatest respect and affection legally, they may not even be entitled 
to the basic rights many less-respected commoners in society have. Legal incorporation 
does not always correspond to affective incorporation as actual forms of incorporation 
can explicitly diverge from legal status. The affective status of most Kau family 
members is much higher than their legal status, which still corresponds to that of a 
slave. Some have tried to gain recognition for their higher status by requesting manu-
mission according to Islamic prescriptions but this legal procedure to upgrade the rights 
and entitlements of slaves is hardly ever granted and does not lead to freeborn status.  
So although some slave descendants of the Kau family enjoy great respect and af-
fection, according to Islamic legal practice they are not even entitled to the most basic 
rights many less-respected commoners in society have.  
Affective stretches in ‘link-ups’ between the freeborn 
Dicko and slave-descending Kau families 
That slave descendants of the Kau family are still considered to be the property of the 
freeborn person they are linked to is explained by informants from different back-
grounds in Dalla through references to animals: The owner of the cow is the owner of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347  She specifically refers to the asymmetrical institutionalization of work relations in which inequality 
remained and became part and parcel of making a living in daily life.  
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its calves. As Olivier de Sardan (1975: 117) noted for the Songhay society in Central 
Mali, this comparison is commonly used in informants’ discourse and in juridical 
Islamic prescriptions (Brunschwig 1960).348 Another freeborn informant described how 
the rope (French: la corde), which used to tie slaves together is still present (de Bruijn 
& Pelckmans 2005).  
This idea of slave descendants being personalized property belonging to individuals 
is institutionalized by important Fulɓe families. Most freeborn youngsters in the royal 
and imam families349 are given and/or appointed someone of slave descent and often of 
the same age.350 This is what I propose to call a ‘link-up’, an arrangement either made 
officially at birth or as a present at the time of circumcision. Link-ups used to be 
publicly announced on major ritual occasions and today such linked-up pairs (a young-
ster of slave descent from the Kau family and a royal youngster from the Dicko family) 
will spend most of their youth playing together, going hunting, learning how to seduce 
girls, sharing their secrets and in their teens sleeping together in so-called boys’ houses. 
However within these friendships, each person is expected to behave according to 
stylistic performance: The link-up can be seen as the ultimate institution that matches 
two individuals who ideally end up performing in stereo style.  
Most of these linked-up pairs remain close friends for the rest of their lives. An 
example of a link-up from the older generation in Dalla is that between Macca and the 
former chief (†2009). As a child, Macca was linked up with the chief and they went out 
herding together and typically adhered to the same political party (called ADEMA). 
Macca performed the loyalty style by hosting the chief’s visitors and in 2002 when 
Macca assisted the chief on his annual taxation tour in Dalla, the chief performed the 
patriarchal style by rewarding Macca with a goat for his loyalty.   
Another example of a link-up in the younger generation is that between Samba 
Dicko (Yerowal Dicko’s grandson) and Suleymane Dauda (Kau’s grandson). Suley-
mane and Samba both emigrated but engaged in different trajectories: Samba Dicko left 
to study while Suleymane went to work. Samba these days works for the World Bank in 
Bamako, while Suleymane worked as a cultivator in Burkina Faso and then returned to 
Dalla to educate his children at home. They are still in touch but as they do not live in 
the same locality, Suleymane started to assist Musa Dicko, Samba Dicko’s father and 
the former mayor. After the mayor’s own link-up assistant died, Suleymane became the 
mayor’s right hand and he engages in more or less the same tasks as Macca: Guiding 
taxmen in the villages near Dalla, hosting the mayor’s personal visitors, supporting the 
same political party (PSP) and so on.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348  Both cattle and slaves are symbols of wealth and are metaphorically interchangeable. Many stereo-
types draw an analogy between slaves in their relations with Fulɓe masters. 
349  This historical link-up as forged between former masters and slave descendants is not applied between 
masters and slaves of all status groups. In Dalla, the religious elite of the imam’s family and the ruling 
Dicko family follow this tradition. Among the freeborn traders’ families in Dalla, there is only one 
family (Alu Bah Kaado & Umaru Boolo Bocoum) who also have their own Maccuɓe linked up. 
During Tabaski celebrations, their link-ups will, for example, butcher their sacrifice for them.  
350  Interviews with Amadu Amiiru (aged 26), Seydu Dicko (aged 29), Aai Dicko (aged 18), without 
interpreter, Bamako, Mopti 2007. 
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Another task that most of the male linked-up slave descendants of the Kau family 
provide the Dicko family with is ritual assistance. On important occasions in the Dicko 
family, descendants of the Kau family help with typical ‘slave’ tasks: Butchering and 
barbequing an animal, cooking and fetching wood and water. Like their male counter-
parts, noble Dicko women are also linked up with a personal slave descendant from the 
Kau family.  
In Dalla, noble Dicko women may be assisted by their link-up assistant at important 
transitional points in their lives: When they become a widow351 or after giving birth. 
Not only the linked-up peer but often also older women of slave descent are asked to 
assist the noble mother for at least 40 days with the feeding, dressing and care of the 
baby. In 2002 they received the then standard reward of a length of cloth352 and FCFA 
500 for such assistance.  
Maintaining good link-up relations and demonstrating one’s loyalty can be done by 
greeting and visiting one’s link-up partner regularly. Many slave-descending woman of 
the Kau family greet the royal Dicko family every morning and in many ways the 
linked-up couples look like friends, but legacies of master-slave relations have remained 
in these stereo-styled relations. The exchange of labour is not reciprocal but uni-
directional. A Dicko woman would never assist her slave-descending link-up friend 
when she gives birth to her first child. Assistance in the form of labour is typical for the 
loyalty style and will be rewarded by the patron in kind. Slave-descending men and 
women claim that they are not ‘formerly enslaved’ by this link-up relation because they 
are not rewarded in cash. Most of them, on the contrary, express pleasure in maintaining 
close relations with ‘their’ patron and appropriate the loyalty style as a source of pride. 
The elite are conscious of the asymmetry of this link-up relationship. This is under-
lined by Amadu,353 who explains that it is increasingly difficult to openly claim in 
public that a certain person is being ‘given’, and thus belongs, to you. This is why his 
father and other members of the Dicko family now use a different vocabulary when 
officializing the link-up between two persons. They avoid offending slave descendants 
by calling them Maccuɓe in public and use different, less shocking words to talk about 
those they consider their slaves. They speak of ‘those we own’ (FF: JeyaaBe) or more 
euphemistically ‘those we see’ (FF: Yiiyaaɓe). Such language reproduces the cultural 
field of hierarchy precisely because it is so implicit and the contestation by those 
stigmatized is less overt. This use of language demonstrates how hierarchy became 
increasingly delegated to the sphere of less tactile and more subtle social boundaries. 
And although the cultural field of hierarchy may have been relegated to the sphere of 
secrecy and taboo, it is omnipresent but with a subtlety that is difficult for outsiders to 
interpret.354 
Not only the older generation but also freeborn Dicko youngsters in their twenties 
used to be linked up with personal assistants. Some have migrated and are no longer in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351  Chapter 7 describes how Kumba, a noble woman whose husband died, was supported by her linked-
up female former slave during the period of mourning. 
352  Known as pagne in French (FF: Disaare), this is a length of printed cotton cloth. The cheapest quality 
printed cotton in Douentza cost FCFA 1500 in 2002. 
353  Amadu Amiiru Dicko, interviews in Bamako, Mopti and Dalla, 2006-2007. 
354  See also Zempleni (1996). 
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touch on a daily basis but, even in the diaspora, the majority of freeborn men and 
women from the royal (and Islamic) court in Dalla have been linked up with at least one 
personal slave descendant at birth or at their circumcision.355 The children of intellectual 
members of the royal family who live in the mayor cities of West Africa and in Europe 
remain linked up with such an ‘assistant’. There is flexibility as to who exactly is going 
to fulfil the function of the linked-up partner. This becomes clear if we look at the case 
of Amadu, the son of the chief of Dalla who is studying in Bamako and Mopti, who was 
linked up with ‘his diimaajo’ at the time of his circumcision. However since this person 
lives in Torobani (Map 4) they did not often spend time together. Over time Amadu got 
along better with his schoolmate Nou, who is of slave descent. Today, Amadu always 
hangs out with Nou and both of them became stereopartners.  
Nou is working for the customs in Mopti and whenever Amadu is on a visit to Mopti 
they spend time together. Nou shows his loyalty by accompanying Amadu for hours or 
while waiting at the bus stop to return to Bamako or to travel on to Douentza. By so 
doing, Nou risks losing his well-paid job but explains that being with Amadu is more 
important. Many people consider them to be the typical Dimo-diimaajo pair and they 
behave in stereo style.  
Another example of the same generation (youngsters in their twenties in 2007) is that 
of freeborn royal Moustique Dicko who is studying in Bamako and his linked-up 
assistant Alou who is studying in Segou. When we visited Segou in 2007, Alou offered 
us his services, insisting on his loyalty by saying he was prepared to do ‘anything’ for 
us. He arranged a motorcycle for Moustique and helped us trace and arrange interviews 
with informants from Dalla. When we spent time together, he would invariably be the 
one making the tea, bringing water and so on. 
An example of a link-up in the diaspora is the relationship between Ibrahim and 
Bilal. Ibrahim is the 12-year-old son of Oumar Dicko, an important politician from the 
royal Dicko family of Joona, and was linked up with Bilal, the son of a slave-des-
cending Tambura family from the village of Joona. The two children are always to-
gether and could be considered best friends, but their friendship is embedded in 
structural differences. Ibrahim Dicko (Oumar’s freeborn son of royal descent) is study-
ing and wears smart clothes, while Bilal (his linked-up friend of slave descent) does 
domestic work in the service of Oumar’s family (like his parents) and is dressed far less 
well.   
The link-up relationship between the Dicko and Kau families continues to be attri-
buted a great deal of importance: It is an institutionalized way of perpetuating the 
cultural field of hierarchy by matching pairs of people who are ideally expected to 
perform in stereo style. If the link-up is successful, affective stretches and the social 
promotion of slave descendants can result.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355  Chapter 7 discusses the distance between linked-up clients and patrons (due to migration) and how it 
can be overcome by paying for transport. For example, Madame, the eldest daughter of the former 
mayor of Dalla, pays for her personal assistant to go to Bamako if necessary. This demonstrates how 
those performing the patriarchal style regulate the mobility of their clients.   
153 
 
Chief of slave descendants  
The most respected way of social promotion for individual Kau family members is to 
become the chief of the slave descendants. So within the Kau family, a chief (FF: 
Amiri) is chosen, usually the oldest man in the group.356 There is no official ceremony 
to enthrone this chief and changes in the position are made public by the village chief. 
Some suggest that it is a position that was created by the French to organize forced 
labour. In an early French archival document of 1894 however, the function of the chief 
of slaves (FF: Amiiru Maccuɓe) is described.  
As I already mentioned before, the slaves of the Fulɓe are grouped in their villages, but near the Fulɓe 
huts. They have a chief, a captive like them who is an intermediary between captives and the chief of 
the Fulɓe village concerning the questions that are in the communities’ interest.357  
This does not necessarily suggest that it was a French colonial invention as the 
colonial administrator in the excerpt describes it as a peculiarity among the Fulɓe. How-
ever it may be, each ward of slave descendants in Dalla358 still has its own chief (FF: 
Amiiru Maccuɓe). The Maccuɓe of Wuro Ferro have Pate Baa and in Wuro Burram it is 
Sambo Baa. Reflecting the hierarchy among freeborn Fulɓe families, all of these ward 
chiefs are under the command of the chief of the Kau family in Wuro Mango. The ward 
chief of Wuro Mango is not only the chief of the royal slave-descending Kau family, 
but also of other slave descendants formerly belonging to freeborn families (traders, 
religious scholars) living in Wuro Mango.  
Born in the 1930s, Allay Jannginoowo was one of the most loyal slaves of king 
Yerowal. In the 1990s he occupied the position of Amiiru Maccuɓe in Dalla and the 
social mobility he achieved in his lifetime (†2008) is remarkable. In my 2001-2002 
interviews with him, Allay359 described himself as a privileged court slave who directed 
other slaves. He became linked to the royal court as a slave because his grandfather was 
given as a pawn to King Yerowal to cover a missing tax payment. The story goes360 that 
because there was a conflict between two Jaawamɓe families, both of which were 
striving to get close to the royal family, one of them advised the king to tax his rival 
extra. The king did so and ordered the trader (FF: Jawaanδo) to sacrifice his most 
beloved slave as a tax payment, which is how Allay’s father became a slave of the royal 
Weeheeɓe family. Some informants indicate how this story is shameful as being 
pawned is the least honourable way of becoming enslaved. It is more heroic when one 
can claim to have been violently captured against one’s will in a decisive war. 
However, this less honourable way of enslavement does not seem to have affected 
Allay’s personal career or his chances of promotion. As a child, Allay started working 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356  Author’s translation from taped interview with Moodibal, Beeweejo, Bamako, April 2007 in French: 
‘Le chef des Riimaayɓe, c’est le plus âgée d’entre eux. Ils lui donnent cet honneur. C’est comme le 
chef de village, le seule critère à part son âge, c’est que sa mentalité soit bien (s’il n’est pas fou quoi). 
Chaque quartier a un chef Riimaayɓe. Eux aussi ils se sont organisé, ils voient le plus âgée d’entre eux 
ou bien celui qui est le plus proche des Riimaayɓe, on va lui donner la chefferie de Riimaayɓe.’  
357  Archives national du Mali, FA-1E-156/August 1894. 
358  Other Fulɓe villages in the area, such as Booni and Joona but even big towns like Mopti and Dou-
entza, still have their Maccuɓe wards headed by an Amiiru Maccuɓe.  
359  Allay Jannginoowo (†2008), interviews, Dalla, 2001-2002. 
360  Email from Musa Dicko, April 2006. 
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for King Yerowal and milked the royal family’s herds, took the cows to the bush to 
graze and taught the sons of the chief and the king how to herd. (Hence his nickname of 
‘teacher’, FF: Jannginoowo).361 The king liked him and entrusted him with additional 
responsibilities, such as guarding the keys to the granaries and the prison. Allay became 
one of Yerowal's most trustworthy councillors and gained prestige and influence vis-à-
vis other slaves. In 1968 when Yerowal died, he was linked up to Hamidu, Allay’s best 
friend among Yerowal Dicko’s children. Hamidu Dicko some years later became Dal-
la’s chief, which obviously helped to improve Allay’s career too. 
Allay Jannginoowo occupied the position of chief of the slaves for about ten years, 
which meant that on ritual occasions he used to coordinate the activities of his fellow 
slave descendants. He decided which slave descendant would slaughter the goats and 
sheep for which freeborn and which women would prepare what and when for whom. 
Not only on ritual occasions but also for other kinds of labour, such as the construction 
of houses or the harvesting of a field, did the village chief generally ask Allay to 
organize labour for him. Moodibal Dicko explained how he called on Allay who was 
then the chief of the people of slave descent (FF: Amiiru Maccuɓe) when he needed 
labour in his fields.   
During the rainy season I did not have enough labour in my own family, and thus I presented myself 
with the chief of the slaves and told him I needed him to send people to help me cultivate my fields. 
Amiiru Maccuɓe sent me some of them to assist me. 
Although Allay always emphasized how he took pride in this prestigious position as 
mediator between the Kau and Dicko families, after some months of regular interviews, 
discussions and visits he increasingly began to voice his frustrations at the matrimonial 
rules of endogamy (whereby his kin do not have access to freeborn women). In an 
interview in 2002, he described how he had tried to manumit himself in about 1995 and, 
despite his lifetime loyalty to the Dicko family, was not granted this according to 
Islamic legislation. The more trust my interpreter and I built up, the more Allay started 
to make use of the discursive space offered him to be critical of the way his slave status 
had marginalized him. He was frustrated because he had enjoyed social mobility 
through his affective relations with the Dicko family but this had not affected his formal 
status or that of his children. There would still be limitations on who could marry his 
children and how things are organized. His voicing of his frustration is a methodolo-
gical dimension that came out on several occasions and proves the importance of rela-
tions of trust between informants and the ethnographer on such sensitive issues. 
The task of this chief to convince people to work for the royal family has become 
increasingly arduous. Many youngsters in the Kau family no longer see the advantage 
of working hard for patrons who do not reward them as they used to. When I was in 
Dalla in 2001-2002 and Allay was Amiiru Maccuɓe, there was some conflict because 
many of the slave descendants he had told to butcher for their former master had not 
gone there straightaway after prayers. Allay as chief of Maccuɓe had to send those who 
did turn up to go and get the others. Those who had not come on their own initiative, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361  Interview with youngster Alu Paate Tambura, Segou, 2007.  
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indirectly demonstrated their resistance vis-à-vis a relation that no longer suits them by 
delaying their ‘duties’ as stereopartners.  
Allay was the chief of slaves until 2003 when he had to stop for health reasons. 
Diougal, one of the eldest Maccuɓe in the ward and who had been manumitted by his 
master, replaced him but he went blind and has been replaced by Suleymane who still 
occupies the position. Today Suleymane divides most of the tasks among his fellow 
slave descendants. He is also the appointed intermediary in cases of conflict, such as 
when herds go onto Riimaayɓe fields and destroy their harvests. Whenever there are 
important gatherings in the Dicko family, Suleymane is the one who invites all the 
inhabitants of slave descent from Wuro Maccuɓe.  
When asked whether this position is rewarding for Suleymane, people indicated that 
it indeed is, as he gets money to pay for his petrol if he has to drive somewhere. He also 
receives presents from the international visitors and NGO representatives that he hosts. 
That Suleymane benefits from his position can be seen from the number of chickens and 
goats in his compound: He is quite well-off. Social mobility by becoming ‘chief of 
slaves’ is thus an interesting trajectory for a lucky few in the Kau family.  
Not only in the different wards of Dalla are there chiefs of slaves. Even in the Fulɓe 
wards of cities like Mopti and Djenne, one can ask for the chief of slave descendants. In 
Dalla the name Amiiru Maccuɓe has not changed into Amiiru Riimaayɓe and this is 
quite telling for the perceived continuities in hierarchical relations by the elite. The old 
name, which is much more pejorative, has been maintained.  
Social promotion through geographical and relational mobility  
This section describes how the changes in degrees of social mobility of slave descend-
ants occur in what Kopytoff & Miers (1977: 18-20) have called the dimension of 
worldly achievement and success. This includes all forms of social mobility outside of 
or in direct competition with former masters and patrons. These alternative forms of 
social promotion have been obtained by bypassing the ideology of Fulɓe hierarchy.  
Three aspects of worldly mobility are described: The possibility of becoming loyal to 
new patrons; the way emigration has changed perceptions of authority and new forms of 
remuneration. Some youngsters have earned more money by migrating, some have 
obtained political influence as a result of their studies and others have benefitted from 
their ability to maintain their own wealth and have increased their success vis-à-vis their 
impoverished former masters.  
Matching stereo styles: Maintaining, abandoning or multiplying 
alliances 
For the Kau family, the most strategic way of obtaining the ‘informal affect’ (Kopytoff 
& Miers 1977: 19) of the Dicko family has been by specializing in the loyalty style. 
However, the loyalty style is not only used by slave descendants to relate to their former 
masters. Today most slave descendants instrumentalize their freedom to express their 
loyalty to several patrons at the same time. This flexibility in relating to chosen patrons 
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has introduced an element of competition between patrons and could not have been 
played out by slave-descending clients to the same extent before. Slave descendants 
now have more possibilities to strategically enact the loyalty style because there is more 
flexibility concerning who is allowed to relate to whom. Restricted access to social 
relations was what made slaves so vulnerable in the past but opportunities for slave 
descendants to relate to others have increased. 
Even if one’s ancestors never worked as slaves for a particular patron, slave des-
cendants these days have and are taking the opportunity to switch patrons. The case of 
Pooro, a 50-year-old Kau family member is illustrative of how multiple patrons allow 
her to increase her profits. This is most explicit when she engages in the loyalty style to 
several freeborn families during ritual events. When I inquired about her activities 
during the Tabaski ceremonial animal sacrifice362 in 2002, she explained:  
This morning I went to Diki’s (a wealthy trading Jawaando woman in Wuro Mango) to help her cook 
rice. This afternoon I helped people of the royal court do all different kinds of things: I cleaned the 
rice, I fetched water and so on. They (the ruling Dicko family) will probably not give me anything in 
return, they are too mean. But they are the masters of my husband (her husband was working in 
Bamako at that time). Tomorrow I am planning to help the family of the former master of my mother 
(the imam’s Moodibaaɓe family). Today the imam gave me cloth as a reward for my assistance (she 
shows it laughing). Both families are rich, but the Weeheeɓe are rather stingy. I am not quite sure if I 
will go back to work for the royal Weeheeɓe family tomorrow again. It is risky not to maintain good 
relations with everyone though: We are supposed to respect and fear our former masters.363 
The more patrons Pooro can demonstrate her loyalty to, the more she will gain. 
When discussing her choice of patron, Pooro indicates that there is only one patron who 
she does not choose herself: Her mother’s former master’s family. She has to be loyal to 
them because of the historical bond of link-up with them. At the same time, she 
explains that she defers to her husband’s master’s family because this family is so 
influential. Good relations with them are an important asset in times of need. One day 
Pooro’s husband was short of money to pay his taxes but the fact that Pooro had often 
assisted the ruling Dicko family turned out to be an advantage. The Dicko family lent 
them the money to make their tax payments. Pooro finally explained that she assisted 
Diki because the tradeswoman ensured her place at the market where Pooro sells 
roasted peanuts and she had an interest in maintaining her sales spot.  
While royal domestic slaves used to be linked up with only one family, and often 
with one specific individual member, Pooro demonstrates how slave descendants these 
days have obtained more freedom and can opt for showing loyalty to several patrons. 
She herself demonstrated loyalty vis-à-vis three patrons. Since the Kau family is close 
to the Dicko family who rewards them well, Kau family members hardly opted for 
being loyal to new patrons. Their wives, like Keleere’s wife Pooro are necessarily loyal 
to at least two patrons: Their mother’s and husband’s former masters. Most of the older 
slave descendants of the Kau family have chosen to remain dependent clients of their 
former masters, as is demonstrated by Seydu, Macca, Diougal, Hama, Pooro and Dike-
layya.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362  In Mali this is known as Tabaski (French), juulde layya (Fulfulde) and El Aid (Arabic). 
363  Interview with interpreter Umu Sangare, Dalla, December 2001. 
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In contrast to this family, several slave groups of less wealthy and more marginalized 
masters are no longer loyal to their former masters but chose new patrons to match in 
stereo style and became loyal to new patrons. Examples are youngsters who get along 
with individual freeborn who are other than their link-up partner. Pooro’s daughter no 
longer helps her grandmother’s former master and thinks her generation has finally 
understood that they have no obligations vis-à-vis so-called masters who do nothing for 
them. Most slave-descending women of this generation no longer see themselves as 
captured slaves (French: Captives). In Dalla however, it is only the youngest generation 
that would make such bold statements. Another example of those who have switched 
patrons are the Bella slave descendants of the Tuareg (FF: Bellaaɓe) who now do 
domestic work for the Dicko family during the dry season. Domestic labour was the 
task of female slaves (FF: kordo). Since the younger slave descendants are no longer as 
deferential as their parents were, the rural nobility is increasingly contracting seasonal 
domestic labourers from among the Bella,364 who arrive in the Haayre region looking 
for work on their north-south rural-rural migration. Thanks to both unpaid labour by 
voluntary deference of older Riimaayɓe women and paid contract labour with Bellaaɓe, 
noble Fulɓe women in the Haayre to avoid engaging in tasks they consider degrading.  
Personal affective relations sometimes develop between individuals or families that 
spontaneously show the loyalty style vis-à-vis new patrons. These attempts to link up 
however do not come with the same rights and obligations that the cultural field of hier-
archy ascribes to linked-up pairs. Claims to obligations in the form of mutual assistance 
are considered more binding among those who had a master-slave bond in the past. The 
only original masters of slave descendants are those who owned their mother (and/or 
father) in the past. Such masters cannot refuse demands from their slave descendants 
and slave descendants cannot refuse to assist them with their labour either. Recognition 
of the link-up relation is accentuated in situations where social mobility and the inde-
pendence of slave descendants are high, such as in Booni.  
Many more people have attended school365 in Booni, which several informants 
claimed is why people there are less dependent and more assertive. When a freeborn 
asks them to do something, they will insist that they are not obliged to do anything for 
them as there is no link-up from the past and there are no rights of ownership to force 
them to do things. Not only in practise, but also in the more symbolic domain of 
language, more slave descendants in Booni are openly refusing to be called captif, 
maccudo or anything referring to a slave past. In Booni, it is considered insulting if a 
freeborn calls someone of slave descendant a maccudo to his face. Open conflict and 
dispute may arise. This contrasts with the way in which the Kau family in Dalla, which 
enjoys high esteem vis-à-vis other slave groups, stoically accept insults and reproaches 
from freeborn Dickos with no signs of overt defence.  
Pooro and the older generation of the Kau family in Dalla indicated that they need to 
respect la corde with former masters and fear (FF: Hulaade) the repercussions (cursing, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364  These are slave descendants of Tuareg. For more on these group in Northern Mali, see: Lecocq (2005) 
and for the same group in Northern Burkina Faso: Bouman (2003: 27). 
365  The first school building in Booni opened in the 1950s, while in Dalla it was only in 1982. For more 
on perceived differences between the villages: see chapter 1 and 2. 
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insults) from their former master’s family if they refuse to do things. For them, the 
loyalty style is the easiest and most internalized way of ensuring access to relations that 
generate social security. This is why they prefer to invest in the loyalty style vis-à-vis 
several patrons, in contrast to the (royal) slave descendants in Booni who generally only 
display the bare minimum of loyalty towards their linked-up freeborn counterparts. 
Like the floating populations described in Chapter 1, rulers and the ruled have 
switched positions. There was intergenerational mobility whereby groups who used to 
be the patrons now are the clients. This long-term instability in existing power relations 
has kept expectations of social promotion alive and the cultural field of hierarchy has 
been reconfigured by new clients displaying their loyalty to influential patrons. Those 
performing the loyalty style are always looking for patrons with the ‘smoothest and 
easiest hands’. So performing the loyalty style is not something only slave descendants 
do vis-à-vis their former masters. It has become a more general strategy that can be 
applied by anyone willing to develop multiple allies and social networks. 
Conclusions: Reconfiguring individual versus intergenerational 
mobilities 
Most aspects of master-slave relations, based on a monopoly of violence for masters 
and no property rights for slaves, have disappeared over time. Stereo styles have been 
internalized and are sometimes instrumentalized by both groups but for different 
reasons, with both emphasizing their ‘relatedness’ in order to benefit from the cultural 
field of hierarchy in stereo style. Unlike slaves, most slave descendants are now remu-
nerated for their labour and inherit their own property. The internalized cultural field of 
hierarchy nevertheless continues to motivate older people’s activities and labour, even if 
remuneration is low compared to market prices.  
The first section described the cultural field of hierarchy by analyzing two opposing 
stereo styles: The loyalty style versus the patriarchial style and how the Kau family had 
internalized the loyalty style, while the Dicko family specialized in the patriarchal style 
in their relations with the Kau family. Ongoing forms of social mobility for the Kau 
family were considered in the following section. Social relations between slave-des-
cending Kau and freeborn Dicko are asymmetric and hierarchical but offer room for 
‘affective stretch’ at the same time. It was concluded that the institution of link-up and 
the position of the chief of slaves generate potential for affective mobility. Often those 
who have close ties with a wealthy patron prefer to explicitly stick to the loyalty style to 
partake in the wealth and influence of their patron, thus maintaining the cultural field of 
hierarchy and gaining something from it. Many older Kau family members invest in 
relations with their master to ensure a kind of social security. Their loyalty style vis-à-
vis the Dicko family is a form of investment in social capital.  
The third section described how freeborn and slave descendants coped with internal 
and external shifts in their relations. Over time, the exclusive link-up between master 
and slave has had to compete with alternative (patron-client) alliances. Some have 
changed their survival strategies completely by moving away and therefore becoming 
disconnected from relations. Those who have remained loyal to the Dicko family have 
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tried to maximize their profits by performing the loyalty style. Increased access to cash 
has made the younger generations less bound to the kinds of social security offered by 
patrons. They have gradually developed a more independent discourse and identity.  
I described how the status mobility of slaves should not be equated with a movement 
out of slave status because there has never been a single slave status and because most 
forms of social climbing of slaves and their descendants consisted of ‘reconfigurations’ 
(Rossi 2009a) rather than eradication of their status. Affective and/or worldly 
dimensions have generated social mobility for the Kau family in Dalla and between the 
generation of elders and youngsters is the generation of (mostly) married men and 
women in their thirties and forties who are trying to disconnect from their former 
masters, for example by no longer forcing their children to work for their masters.  
To conclude, the loyalty style is no longer seen as rewarding by those Riimaayɓe 
youngsters who have migrated. They have become used to higher, and often cash, 
remuneration and increasingly negotiate what is being exchanged. For the older 
generation, the loyalty style is still a valuable way of ensuring honour. The younger 
generation is specializing in becoming wealthy, which allows them to perform the 
patriarchal style instead of optimalizing an affective stretch in their ascribed social 





Legal paradoxes of the cultural  
field of hierarchy  
Contradictory understandings of freedom  
Slavery is approached differently in every religion (Klein 1993a: 14-15). Islamic scho-
lars in the Haayre region today have opposing ideas and interpretations about whether 
and how to interpret the legacies of slavery and slave status. This chapter demonstrates 
how blurred the boundaries between the freeborn, the freed and the non-free have 
become and shows the paradoxes and misunderstandings this may generate in the case 
of a slave-descending woman from Onga (Map 4, see Chapter 1).366 Talaata’s ancestors 
used to belong to a renowned Islamic scholar from the village of Nokara (Map 3, see 
Introduction) but in 1994, she decided to self-manumit, i.e. to purchase her freedom 
according to Islamic legislation, and prepared a gift by weaving a large number of 
cotton ribbons and added two big rams and some money. However the imam of Nokara 
refused Talaata’s demand and her gifts, quoting the passage in the Koran that says that 
God considers people to be equal (FF: yimɓe fuu potti). In his interpretation of the 
Koran, as opposed to that of the imam in Dalla, Talaata has already been freed by State 
Law. Placing national State Law above Islamic Law, he insisted she need not resort to a 
costly process of self-manumission.367 Often however, the contrary is true and many 
imams in the Haayre region, such as those in Dalla and Booni, continue to accept and 
reinforce differences in social status in their interpretation of Islamic legislation. 
Talaata’s story demonstrates not only the plurality in personal opinions among 
Islamic scholars but also underlines the paradoxes generated by the different legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366  Research assistant Burra Yero Cisse, interview in French, Douentza, 2007.  
367  According to informant Burra, the story goes that when Talaata arrived, the imam was absent and she 
was put up by his family. Although the imam refused the gifts, his family members made the woman 
give the money and cotton ribbons to them. They made her keep the rams, which she took home. 
Unfortunately Burra did not know exactly why Talaata decided to liberate herself and how she felt 
once it was clear she would not obtain her freedom on paper. Since Talaata passed away, I could not 
verify this either. 
161 
 
contexts for slave descendants themselves. For some, being freed is something only 
God can provide. Only the religious realm enables them to be freed with dignity in the 
eyes of the community and God. They believe they can only be liberated before God 
and his Divine Law. Others accept liberty as being based on the secular ideas in the 
national constitution.  
Islam has long been an instrumental excuse for freeborn warlords and religious 
scholars to conquer non-Muslim populations in the Sahel. Several FulBe kingdoms have 
been established on this basis: That of Fuuta Tooro by El Hajj Umar Tall, that of Sekou 
Amadou in Maacina in 1818 (Angenent et al. 1998: 11, 42-45) and so on. Sedentarized 
warlords and religious scholars among the Fulɓe in the Haayre region even claim to 
have converted to Islam before the arrival of Sekou Amadou and have a long tradition 
of emphasizing their religious zeal. Other social groups that converted upon conquest, 
such as pastoralists, slaves and their descendants, only joined the faith much later. Islam 
has become an overarching ideology that is widely shared by all groups in Fulɓe society 
and by other ethnic groups in the region. 
Being part of the community of Muslim believers (Arabic: Umma) became central to 
belonging to the Fulɓe community in the Haayre (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 92). The 
Haayre region is seen by outsiders as being Islamic although there is not one central 
leader. Dalla is a renowned old Islamic centre in the Haayre region. The imam who died 
in 2007 was an important figure for many inhabitants in the region: He was the great-
grandson of Moodi Tawhiidi, whose father is considered to have been an almost holy 
person.  
Islam was the elite’s ideology for a long time. Slaves used to do the work and had no 
time to study the Koran, which set the elite free to do so. Pastoralists and slaves in the 
bush only converted to Islam in the twentieth century and a mass of non-believing 
illiterates suited the elite well: Islam provided them with a high status and power (de 
Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a). While slaves were not allowed to establish their own family 
or to study, they contributed to underlining the authority and nobility of others.  
Another reason why slaves in the Haayre region were not allowed to study Islamic 
texts and convert to Islam was that they would then have had to be liberated (de Bruijn 
& van Dijk 1995a: 172). Slave descendants consequently only became part of the 
religious realm quite late on, which has been an added reason for stigmatization. In fact, 
the political elite closely guard their primacy in Islam and do not accept others as being 
more pious Islamic scholars (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 173). They encourage 
difference and discourage demonstrations of piety by their Riimaayɓe. When observing 
the behaviour of people in Wuro Maccuɓe, it is clear that they, and especially women of 
the slave-descending Kau family, do not show signs of piety. They forget to veil 
themselves when leaving their compounds for the market and most do not pray 
regularly. This was in sharp contract with the behaviour of my pious interpreter Umu, 
who prayed five times a day, but was never accompanied by our neighbours in Dalla. 
The stereotype that slaves are not cultivated and are less pious is reinforced and Kau’s 
descendants are ridiculed by freeborn Fulɓe if they demonstrably display religious zeal. 
Slave status constrained access to certain social realms, and piety and religious status 
became the most common denominators for all status groups in Fulɓe society. This 
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chapter focuses on social exclusion in the legal and religious realm. According to 
national jurisprudence, unequal status does not exist but Islamic ideology recognizes the 
unequal social relations that underpinned the institution of slavery. Islam reinforces 
‘stereostyling’ by encouraging a system of begging (French: quemandage) and alms 
giving (Arabic: zakat). In effect, Islamic ideology underscores aspects of the cultural 
field of hierarchy and, in addition, the passing on of descent and the inheritance of 
property are considered the prerogative of freemen. Inequalities in society are explicitly 
recognized.  
This chapter addresses the centrality of religious ideology and practice in Fulɓe 
society. It starts with an explanation of slave status as it is interpreted in Malikite 
Islamic legislation, which is generally applied in the Haayre region. The second section 
explains how legal pluralism has blurred and sometimes reinforced the legal categories 
of freeborn versus slaves (and/or their descendants) and the third section deals with the 
religious trajectories of social promotion for slave descendants as officially recognized 
in Islamic legislation. The final section describes one of these trajectories in more detail, 
namely (self-)manumissions by slave descendants today. Reference is made to two 
manumission documents issued in the 1990s by the imams of Dalla and Booni. The 
central theme throughout the chapter is that legal pluralism generates paradoxes for all 
the parties involved and that the rigid ideological	  opposition	  between freeborn and non-
freeborn is untenable when considering legal status in practice.	  	  
 
Interpretations of slavery in (Malikite) Islamic jurisprudence  
Islamic law insists that all slave owners have to take good care of their 
slaves, by giving them good food, dress them in quality clothes and give 
them good living spaces. Islamic law prohibits minimizing or torturing 
slaves.  
(Hunwick cited in Klein 1993a: 15)	  
Slaves had certain, although limited, rights in relation to their masters. They had for 
example the right to be given food and clothing, and were legally considered part of the 
Muslim community and so were allowed to pray and be Muslim. However, enforcing 
their rights sometimes conflicted with individual masters’ decisions. Some for example 
never taught their slaves the most basic praying verses (Arabic: Surat) and as such were 
excluded from practicing religion. My interpreter could barely hide her shock at being 
the only pious woman who prayed regularly in the ward were we were hosted in Dalla 
(Wuro Maccuɓe).  
‘The justifications for enslavement, and the institutions were those given by Muslim 
law and ideology, so we may label this as Muslim slavery in Africa’ (Manning 1990: 
128). This ‘Muslim Slavery’ was described extensively in Islamic texts and there are 
texts by several scholars in the Malian Sahel region who specialised in legal prescrip-
tions from the 15th century onwards.368 In the Sahara in the nineteenth century, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368  Lovejoy (2006) describes Ahmed Baaba, a scholar from  Mali who wrote on the ‘ethics of slavery in 
Islam’. Lofkrantz (2008: 27-43) describes scholars in the 19th-century Sokoto Empire (in present-day 
Nigeria) debating ransoming in the legal tradition of West African Islam. Lydon (2007) documents 
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sayings of the prophet (Arabic: Hadith) were interpreted in various ways. The Malikite 
doctrine of Islamic Law maintained the most elaborate body of rules concerning the 
rights of slaves (Lydon 2007: 391) and Malikite Law distinguishes between two cate-
gories of persons: The free and those who are not free (Hurault 1994: 91; Brunschwig 
1960: 30). Unlike European legislation, which is based on Christian morality, and 
where inequality is unacceptable, this body of Islamic legislation institutionalizes 
inequality as a legal status and certain groups of people (slaves, migrants) are excluded 
as they are considered second-class citizens.369 In the Sahelian interpretation of Malikite 
Islamic legislation, inequality is not problematized but is even prioritized. Slaves are 
legally denied the same rights as the freeborn, although this does not mean that they 
have no rights. While State Law is organized according to a mono-status ideology, 
Islamic Law is based on multi-statuses.  
Islamic ideology and Malikite legislation profoundly marked Fulɓe society. Islamic 
Fulɓe scholars (FF: Moodibaaɓe) in the Haayre region mainly use legal texts based on 
Malikite Law but customary traditions have intermingled with this body of legislation 
over time. It is not the aim here to disentangle the sphere of customary from Islamic 
legislation, suffice to say that it is a particular mix with its own dynamics as interpreted, 
directed and applied by hereditary lineages of people with the status of Islamic scholars 
in the Haayre. I use the term Islamic Customary Law to refer to this particular hybrid 
mix.  
Talaata’s story indicates how imams preach different ideologies and have differing 
opinions on the legal status of slave descendants. Several scholars in the Haayre370 
today maintain that, legally, only free people can be fully practising Muslims, arguing 
that the legal category of ‘slave’ is recognized in Islam and should be maintained. 
Others contest such readings and emphasize that the prophet preached for slaves to be 
treated with great respect as if they had already been liberated.  
Much therefore depends on the way in which Islamic legislation is interpreted, with 
interpretations ranging from dogmatic to liberal. Both extremes of the same religious 
continuum are described here but more attention will be paid to the more orthodox 
interpretations of Malikite Law because this is most widely practised in the Haayre.  
According to the dogmatic interpretations of the legal body of Malikite legislation, 
the opposition between slave and freeborn could not be overcome. A slave could not 
obtain freeborn status but could free himself from aspects of slavery. Descendants of 
non-freed slaves are legally still treated as slaves but a slave could improve his position 
within the legal category of non-freeborn slave status. Often these legal improvements 
allowed slaves to come close to having the rights and duties of freeborn members of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Islamic legal culture and slave-ownership contests in the nineteenth-century Sahara (Mauritania) and 
Hall (2005a) describes debates on race and hierarchy, based on Islamic text written in eighteenth-
century Mali. 
369  The European legal system introduced a system of second-class citizenship that is external to society. 
As such, the idea of an equal society can be maintained. However, second-class citizenship came into 
existence, especially regarding refugees and migrants. See Fassin (2008) on illegal immigrants in 
France and Geschiere (2009). 
370  But also among FulBe groups elsewhere in the Sahel. See Botte (1999a: 13-14) on Guinea; N’Gaide 
(2003) and Schmitz (2006/2009) on the Senegal River Valley; and Vereecke (1994) on Niger. 
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society because they could, for example, acquire the rights to own slaves themselves, 
buy their freedom and have access to a religious community. Nevertheless, they remain 
categorized as non-freeborn and slave status continues to be stigmatized and hereditary 
regardless of any improvements in one’s (individual) condition. 
Even for those who have improved their condition legally, the legal aspects of 
marginal slave status are not evident on a daily basis and it is only at times of conflict 
and crisis and at ritualized life-cycle moments that formal rights are considered. When 
someone of slave descent, for example, comes into conflict with a freeborn family over 
land rights, he will probably be told that he has no rights over land. And when choosing 
a marriage partner, a person may be reminded that they are of slave descent and are not 
allowed to marry a freeborn because legally they are still categorized as being of slave 
status.  
Scholars at the liberal end of Islamic jurisprudence, like the imam from Nokara, are 
nuanced and do not take the existence of slave status as a given. As Saibou (2005: 863) 
observes for Fulɓe imams in northern Cameroon, these are often Islamic scholars who 
have studied abroad and they do not accept slavery as an institution today. Attempts by 
slave descendants in Malian Fulɓe society (Berndt 2008) to deconstruct slave status as a 
legal category have remained complex. In Mali, as in other countries in the sub-region, 
those scholars who criticize legacies of slavery by deconstructing religious arguments 
are often of slave descent themselves (Ibid.). Their credibility therefore remains prob-
lematic in the eyes of freeborn members of society.371 This is a universal paradox: To 
efficiently criticize a system, one must (have been) fully part of it.  
At the other end of the scale are the Islamic scholars who dogmatically interpret the 
Koran to reinforce the cultural field of hierarchy to their own benefit. N’Gaide (2003: 
709), describing Fulɓe society in the Senegal River Valley, indicates how ‘Islam trans-
forms itself in an element of identification and in a pretext for the re-hierarchization of 
society.’372 In this view, Islam is being instrumentalized by the elite to conserve their 
hegemony on nobility. 
It is important to consider not only by whom and how rights are implemented but 
also when they are applied in order to understand how legal entitlements of different 
status groups do or do not work (cf. Kopytoff & Miers 1977: 52).373 Chapter 1 
discussed how, even though some slaves have enjoyed fair treatment in times of 
abundance, in years of crisis and drought they could no longer depend on their masters 
or rely on their legal bond of care and protection. Mauritanian scholar Ould Ahmed 
Salem (2003: 38) emphasizes that if the question of slavery is still recognized today in 
Islamic law, ‘it is because some have a certain interpretation of the Sharia, an 
interpretation that does not recognize the abolition of slavery and contests it in the heart 
of the courts of modern law.’ It is this tension that is addressed in the following section. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371  Humery-Dieng (2010) describes how Senegalese novelists of slave descent are trying to get their 
stories legitimized. 
372  In French: ‘L’Islam se transforme en un élément d’identification et en un prétexte pour la ré hiérar-
chisation de la société.’  
373  As Kopytoff & Miers (1977: 52) see it: ‘Too much emphasis on legal rules is dangerous because 
reliance on what happens or happened on one moment in time can obscure absolute legal entitlements 
which are only apparent in times of crisis.’ 
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Legal pluralism: Islamic customary versus secular State Law  
Talaata’s case in the introduction to this chapter highlighted how multiple layers of 
legal interpretation have coexisted in the Haayre region. Slave descendants who ‘pay’ to 
be freed (manumitted) are a concrete example of a hybrid practice that, according to 
state law, does not exist. Reliance on Islamic Law is seen as a premise for some citizens 
to gain access to rights accorded by State Law, such as the right to perform the Hajj or 
the right to marry freeborn women.  
The hybrid nature of legal cultures as it is applied in practice is known as ‘legal 
pluralism’ (Tamanaha 1993; Hesseling et al. 2005). Berman (2007: 1155) defines legal 
pluralism as: ‘The complexities of law in a world of hybrid legal spaces, where a single 
actor is potentially regulated by multiple legal or quasi legal regimes’. Legal pluralism 
is almost synonymous with legal anthropology (Hesseling et al. 2005: 9) as it deals with 
the coexistence of law systems for a variety of plural social groups within one sociolo-
gical unit.  
Legal pluralism challenges monolithic conceptions of State Law and points to the 
simultaneity of existing systems, practices and interpretations of the law in social prac-
tice. Rights are thus not given entities but are culturally constructed things that cannot 
be essentialized (Tamanaha 2000). In legal anthropology, legal pluralism is considered 
to be the rule, not the exception. Likewise, in this chapter I indicate how the two legal 
systems are juxtaposed, overlap or even interfere in terms of the rights and social status 
of slave descendants.  
The legal realms that currently coexist in the Haayre region are Islamic Customary 
Law and State Law. A realm that so far has not had any concrete application in the 
Haayre region is that of international bodies such as ECOWAS or Slavery International 
(see below). The potential conflictual nature of legal pluralism has been a topical issue 
in Mali’s public sphere over the past two years. About 90% of all Malians identify 
themselves as Muslims and tensions over Islam in the ‘neoliberal era’ (Soares 2005) of 
the Malian nation are rising. The first draft of the ‘Code Familiale’, which is part of the 
national and secular constitution that deals with family legislation, was rejected for a 
first time in August 2009 by important Islamic scholars and their followers for being too 
secular. Since then, there have been repeated demonstrations against the proposed new 
legislation as it does not include sufficient reference to Islamic ideology.374  
To understand how the multiple legal regimes intersect and can even regulate the 
cultural field of hierarchy in the Haayre region, the historical legacy of each of the co-
existing legal realms in the Haayre region will be considered in what follows.  
Customary Islamic Legislation is a legacy of practices in pre-colonial Muslim West 
Africa, where religious practices used to be the responsibility of hereditary social 
groups with a certain economic standing (Soares 2005: 25). In the Haayre region in the 
nineteenth century, much of the superior justice was performed by religious scholars, 
such as Kadi (FF: Alkaali), who regulated conflict, inheritance and marriage. These 
religious specialists (FF: Moodibaaɓe) were almost always from freeborn lineages with 
a monopoly on Islamic religious knowledge. They were rewarded by other politically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374  As described at: http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=85960. Accessed December 2010. 
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powerful groups for their services by means ranging from patronage to valuable 
commodities such as slaves (Soares 2005: 28). To date, most of these religious family 
lineages (FF: Moodibaaɓe) in villages like Dalla are healers, notaries and mediators.  
Over time, the categories of Muslims and non-Muslims have been subject to change. 
In pre-colonial Central Mali, lineages of slaves and caste groups – some of whom called 
themselves Muslims – did not adhere strictly to religious norms (FF: Juulde) and did 
not have strong traditions of Islamic practice. Some of these lineages of slaves and caste 
groups engaged in new social and economic activities and converted to Islam, adopting 
religious practices such as daily prayers, alms giving and fasting during Ramadan. 
Being a successful Muslim scholar or healer depends on a person’s reputation in 
scholarship, piety and communication, their prodigious powers and the divine force of 
Allah (FF: Barke) (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 175). Having recognized strengths in 
one or more of these areas meant it was possible for an individual to become a 
renowned scholar (Berndt 2008) but, in general, descent from (freeborn) Muslims 
remained important and is valued over a hereditary marginal (servile or caste) social 
status (Soares 2005: 31).375 It was thus possible but at the same time very difficult for 
those of marginal status to insert themselves progressively into the religious sphere.   
Pre-colonial Customary Islamic Law allowed for different forms of liberation. By 
abolishing slave status legally, the colonial administrators juxtaposed their secular legal 
realm next to the religious interpretations of slave status in Islamic Law. The French 
colonial administration did not manage to change the Customary Islamic judiciary 
system and focused on abolishing slavery in the economic realm (Klein 1998; 1999; 
Kopytoff & Miers 1977). In fact, colonial policy paradoxically encouraged the spread of 
Islam (Soares 2005: 66-68) and contributed to a more uniform standardization of Islam-
ic practices and ideologies in the Sahel (Launay & Soares 1999).  
Under the colonial regime, the administration of law was concentrated in the courts 
of justice at the level of administrative units (French: Cercle). In these courts of justice, 
everyone was judged in accordance with the body of law s/he recognized, be it French 
Secular Law, Islamic Malikite Law or Customary Law. Islamic scholars were appointed 
to administer the law for Muslims who appeared before the court.   
Some of the most profound changes during colonial rule were to the distinctions 
between the free and the servile. The legal and formalized end of slavery, as initiated by 
the French colonial regime, accelerated renegotiations over relations between slaves and 
freeborn and distinctions that had existed between ‘slave’ and ‘free’ became more fluid 
(Soares 2005: 63; Pollet & Winter 1971: 371). Juridically speaking however, slave 
descendants continued to be excluded and fluidity was not considered by the Islamic 
scholars who implemented the law. For them, slave descendants maintained their here-
ditary servile status and thus remained the property of their owners. Even if slave 
descendants were no longer considered servile according to French or national Malian 
state legislation, their servile, marginal status persisted in Islamic jurisprudence.  
After independence, only Secular Law was allowed in state courts. The last vestiges 
of Muslim Law, which had already been marginalized during colonial occupation, were 
removed although people continued to consult Islamic scholars for they were cheap and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375  There are few Islamic scholars of slave descent in the Haayre region.  
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easily accessible. Most villagers of the Haayre region only opt for the secular state 
courts as a kind of ‘last resort option’. In Dalla and Booni, most lineages of Islamic 
scholars continue to resolve conflicts in accordance with Malikite Law. De Bruijn & 
van Dijk (1995a: 187) underlined how they no longer have the power to impose their 
judgement and the police keeps a close eye on what happens in Dalla. Since Dalla is 
relatively close to Douentza, this control is effective and conflicts over land or tax 
payments are generally dealt with in a secular court in Douentza. For some Islamic 
scholars, this loss of power was seen as a denial of their expertise.  
French colonial legislation was the basis of Malian State Law and prohibited refer-
ences to slavery and slave status from 1910 onwards. These are absent too from the 
Malian constitution, which is an almost exact copy of the French one.376 Malian State 
Law denies the existence of any legacy of traditional or modern forms of slavery377 and 
it is premised on the equality of all citizens before the law. Unlike the constitutions of 
Niger and Mauritania, which are also based on French legislation, the Malian constitu-
tion does not penalize or criminalize slavery. 378 
Malian State Law is clearly at odds with Islamic Law in its non-recognition of 
inequality in general, and slave status more specifically. It was only after independence 
that Malian national administrators, who were of slave descent themselves (Lecocq 
2005: 53-57), tried to change the preponderant influence of Islamic ideas about libera-
tion. Not only politicians but also intellectuals of slave descent (Berndt 2008) tried to 
raise awareness among slave descendants that they no longer needed to pay for or claim 
their freedom in the religious realm.  
Today, most Islamic Fulɓe scholars (FF-Moodibaaɓe) in the Haayre know that 
Islamic Law (Arabic: Sharia) is not recognized in the secular Malian constitution and 
decentralization politics have diminished the preponderance of Islamic legislation 
slightly. Islamic scholar Burra Moodi from Booni for example reported that over the 
past decade he became increasingly aware of the illegal nature of issuing manumission 
documents379: 
There are people who speak negatively about those who write the manumission documents. They can 
even issue complaints at the level of administration, especially since the decentralization policy was 
implemented in the 1990s. I am scared of the administration, I am afraid of those people in Booni who 
think they are ‘advanced’: They prohibit me from doing my job, are badly educated and feel frus-
trated.380 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376  The French constitution did not penalize slavery either, as opposed to, for example, Belgium and Italy 
that did (Botte 2003: 131). 
377  The Mauritanian constitution criminalized all forms of slavery in 2007 and Niger did so in 2003 
(Botte 2003: 129). 
378  Although there are similarities between Mali and Mauritania in terms of social organization, there are 
significant differences in terms of judicial organization. Mauritania has a much stronger tradition of 
incorporating elements of Sharia Law into Constitutional Law (Ould Ahmed Salem 2003: 42-43). 
379  For more on the issuing of manumission documents in the Haayre region, see Pelckmans 2011a 
forthcoming. 
380  In French: ‘Il y a des gens qui parlent mal sur ceux qui rédigent les textes de libération, ils peuvent 
même porter plainte au niveau de l’administration, surtout depuis la décentralisation dans les années 
1990. J’ai peur de l’administration, j’ai peur des gens de Booni qui se croient évoluée: Ils m’inter-
disent de faire ce que je fais et ils ne sont pas très bien éduquée, ils se sentent frustrées.’ 
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The third area of legislation is the body of law on international human rights and 
regulations. As a result of the ECOWAS international legal agreements, the Malian 
government can be held accountable for violations regarding slavery, especially now 
that there has been a precedent set in Niger (Duffy 2009). However, international 
interventions in legislation concerning slave status in the Haayre region have, to my 
knowledge, not yet arisen.   
To understand why people prefer a certain legal sphere, not only historical but also 
practical considerations need to be taken into account. Access to legal spheres is not 
equal and practical concerns today may prioritize customary Islamic Law over national 
State Law in the Haayre region for some people. Firstly, an important aspect that 
motivates people to gain access to specific institutions is so obvious that one is likely to 
omit it: Knowledge. People need to know not only about the existence of a court, but 
also about the rights they can claim there. In general, State Law is not well known and 
is not a resource or social capital that villagers in Dalla will apply in negotiations with 
their former masters or Islamic scholars.  
Secondly, knowledge goes hand in hand with degrees of literacy. The Haayre has 
one of the highest rates of illiteracy in Mali. For those who have limited literacy, 
national courts are intimidating with their emphasis on the French language and the 
written word. Thirdly, access to state courts is costly and demands the right social 
relations. Marginalized groups lack the social networks needed to access magistrates 
and may often lack the money required as well.  
A final practical aspect in terms of access to specific legal realms is the fact that 
national courts are physically and socially less accessible for Fulɓe in the Haayre region 
than for those in urban areas where State Law is better rooted. Tribunal courts are 
difficult to reach due to physical distance: There is only one tribunal per 141,176 
citizens (Keita 2007: 162). All these factors contribute, as one Malian lawyer381 ex-
plained, to a general dislike of la justice. If possible, conflicts are resolved within the 
community on the basis of Customary Islamic Law and settling a dispute in court under 
State Law is likely to be a very last resort. As a result of its accessibility, Islamic 
jurisprudence is more efficiently implemented than State Law.  
Talaata’s story at the start of the chapter indicates how not only the coexistence but 
also the intermingling of these two legal realms is confusing for all parties. The 
majority of the inhabitants of Dalla are freeborn, illiterate and pious Muslims. When 
someone comes to make the purchase of land official or asks for legal recognition of his 
marriage to a freeborn woman, he may well encounter resistance. There are numerous 
examples In Niger and Mauritania of how Islamic Law has been implemented by judges 
who are supposed to apply secular Constitutional Law in state courts (Ould Ahmed 
Salem 2003; Botte 2003: 133-134).382 The widely reported case in Niger of Hadijatou 
Mani Koroua in 2008 (Duffy 2009) demonstrated how problematic and complex this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381  Amadou Keita, Malian lawyer and scholar, personal communication, Bamako, 2007. 
382  Ould Ahmed Salem (2003) describes how some judges interpret the legal categories of ‘personal 
status’ and ‘equality of citizens’ on the basis of Islamic legislation, which goes against the national 
constitution of Mauritania. Botte (2003) also details how the political interferes with legal realms in 
his analysis of the research conducted by the anti-slavery organization Timidria in Niger in 2003.  
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entanglement of different legal realms has become.383 In Mali, the influence of Islam in 
areas of social life is increasing, as is shown by the demonstrations against the proposed 
new secular Family Law.384  
Multiple claims to legal status in Dalla  
Slaves in the Haayre region could convert to Islam and profess Islamic faith much later 
than freeborn Fulɓe but after Malian independence in 1960, all five pillars of Islam385 
were accessible to slave descendants. Their religious conversion contributed to in-
creased social esteem (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1994: 99) and their desire to go on pil-
grimage to Mecca was huge (Klein 1998: 246-247), but to conduct the Hajj, one had to 
manumit first. 
Manumission, or liberation according to Islamic legislation, remained a precondition 
for slaves and their descendants to be accepted as fully fledged members of the religious 
community.386 Only freed slaves could become true Muslims (de Bruijn & van Dijk 
1994: 99/103). ‘One could redeem oneself with money; legal freedom did not neces-
sitate the Hajj. But one could not make the Hajj without being legally free. It was in this 
act that Islam and freedom intersected, and one came to define the other’ (McDougall 
2007: 175).  
In general, slave descendants who freed themselves went to Mecca. The current 
imam of Dalla387 remembers how the first manumitted slave descendants in the village 
who went to Mecca, only did so after Mali’s independence. This was probably because 
the ‘Muslim policy’ (French: Politique Musulmane) under French colonial rule restrict-
ed even the movements of freeborns (Soares 2005: 56). Conducting the Hajj under 
colonial occupation was problematic due to colonial border controls and the French 
colonial government prohibited its subjects from entering British colonial territories on 
the road to Mecca.  
The current imam of Dalla names the following people as freed slave descendants 
who went to Mecca independently of their masters: AlHajji Belco from Aoussi and 
AlHajji Malick from Bounti who went on foot in 1969. (Both were Riimaayɓe.) Of the 
former domestic slaves in Dalla, only Maman Abidjan has conducted the Hajj. The first 
slave descendants from the region who left for Mecca by plane in 1978 were AlHajji 
Belco Yero from Douentza and AlHajji Issiyaka from Guitiram (Map 5). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383  In 2008 a woman of slave descent in Niger was refused the rights of a freeborn on the basis of her 
slave status in all the legal courts and bodies of national legislation. Backed by Anti-Slavery Inter-
national, she proceeded to win her rights as guaranteed by the interregional ECOWAS agreements 
(Duffy 2009) from the Nigerian government. Her case was successful: she has received excuses and 
financial reparation. See: http://www.interights.org/niger-slavery; also  
http://static.rnw.nl/migratie/www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/region/africa/081028-slavery-
africa-niger-redirected. Accessed December 2010. 
384  See: http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=85960. Acessed in December 2010. 
385  The five pillars of (Sunni) Islam are duties every Muslim has: (i) the profession of faith; (ii) ritual 
prayers; (iii) paying alms; (iv) fasting during Ramadan; and (v) conducting a pilgrimage to Mecca. 
386  However slave descendants are not allowed to make their own animal sacrifice at Tabaski. Only those 
who have liberated themselves, such as Diougal (Certificate no. II) are allowed to make their own 
sacrifice on this occasion. 
387  Interview by Amadu Amiiru Dicko with imam of Dalla, email, May 2009. 
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Today slave descendants have access to Islamic education.388 The first student of 
slave origin, N’gori, started studying in 1930 with Dalla’s former imam Alpha Hamada 
(+2007). He then became an important teacher himself and is the only person of slave 
descent in Dalla to have mastered the Hadith, the Islamic legal textbook. In general they 
did not acquire much fame but taught Riimaayɓe or Dogon pupils (Griep 2005: 129, 
Footnote 3). Slave descendants have tended to consult freeborn Islamic scholars for 
advice and have participated in the same religious ceremonies as their masters (de 
Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 77-78). 
It has remained almost impossible to become an imam in Dalla if one’s ancestors 
were slaves. Even for the former domestic slaves of an imam family who were so-
cialized with Islamic learning, it is still difficult ‘because of religious principles’ as the 
imam put it. It is, he explains, unthinkable for the Koran to have someone of lesser 
status taking the lead over people of higher status, which would be the case if a slave 
descendant ‘directs’ other freeborn in prayers. Several authors also describe how the 
profession of imam remained impenetrable for slave descendants for a long time (Clark 
1999: 103; Soares 2005: 65; Riesman 1992: 51). This doesn’t mean that slave descend-
ants never become imams: Several villages of Riimaayɓe slave descendants in Haayre 
hamlets have imams of slave descent but most have a freeborn imam (Griep 2005: 129). 
It has certainly been impossible for slave-descending scholars to become imams in their 
masters’ communities.  
Instrumentalizing legal pluralism by slaves and masters  
Paradoxically, Islamic legislation underscores the legal inclusion and exclusion of 
slaves. Since slave descendants have difficulties in asserting their authority in the 
religious realm, they have created a tradition of filling niches with a spiritual character 
outside the immediate Islamic realm. Slave descendants have not managed to instru-
mentalize Islamic ideology but have carved out specific occupations that offer them a 
more respectable position. Freeborn religious elites have also had many ways of in-
strumentalizing Islamic legislation and ideology to their own benefit.  
Although persistent discrimination still exists in legal entitlements for slave 
descendants, some have carved out a spiritual space that has challenged the dominant 
Islamic religious realm from the margins. They are healers with different kinds of 
(secret) knowledge (FF: Anndal): While religious scholars who make charms (FF: 
Talkuru) protect people from jealousy (FF: Haasidaare), and even from witches (FF: 
Sukunyaabe), healers who specialized in herbal medicine are called bonngobi in 
Fulfulde language. These bonngobi healers are knowledgeable about plants and herbs 
and are linked to black magic (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 175, 181).  
In Dalla the best-known bonngobis are descendants of slaves that never obtained 
public functions like Islamic Moodibaaɓe scholars but are consulted for minor diseases, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388  Modern education was a road to freedom for some slave-descending Riimaayɓe who could compete 
with their master of higher status. Often their careers made them move out of the orbit of their 
masters. Chapter 8 describes how for those who stayed in the village, a possible way to change their 
condition, but not their legal status, was to compete with their masters in Islamic religious education. 
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especially among children. In the first week of my stay in Dalla, my interpreter’s baby 
was crying all night and everyone insisted we consult Samba, a bonngobi healer of slave 
descent in Wuro Burram. The old man was shockingly thin and rather unkempt, with 
extremely long dirty nails. He was blind so the baby had to be given to him and we 
directed his hands to the child’s head. Samba treated the baby with his own saliva (FF: 
Tutu) while whispering special phrases. From now on, the child would be protected 
against the owl, a bird that is believed to ‘steal’ the spirits of young babies. This form of 
healing with saliva and words is widespread among Fulɓe in the Sahel.389 Bonngobi 
healer Samba had quite a name as a healer in Dalla but from his appearance and his 
compound, it would seem that it had not allowed him to accumulate much wealth. This 
might partly be explained by the fact that esoteric practices have become undervalued 
with the increasing influence of Islam (Soares 2005: 67). 
Another important child healer in Dalla was one of the slave concubines married to 
King Yerowal. Faata Legal treated children in Dalla against evil eyes and spirits for 
many years but also never became wealthy although she was well respected. This niche 
of spiritual healing is one that is frequently adopted by slave descendants. In fact, many 
people fear their power, which is contingent on the secrets (FF: Siiri) they posses 
(Soares 2005: 134; de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 174). Their often foreign origin is 
associated with other spirit worlds that they have mastered. Informants reported going 
to a bonngobi healer first and if that does not work, they will then turn to Islamic 
scholars for treatment and, in very exceptional cases, to Western medicine.  
In addition to bonngobi healers, Riimaayɓe women are responsible for tattooing 
freeborn Fulɓe girls’ mouths and gums, others for cutting and plaiting hair. These are 
specialist jobs that give them a form of prestige and respectability. Other tasks that are 
outsourced to people of slave descent and that give them social indispensability are 
those involving powerful emotions such as crying, singing and expressions of the body, 
such as dance. When someone dies, it are slave descendants who will carry the corpse, 
bury it and lead the mourning by crying loudly. They are the music makers and are 
specialized in dance, but also in fights. In all these activities, slave descendants have 
power and respectability that are beyond the realm of nobility, and of respectability in 
Islam more specifically. These are all specializations that are potential niches on the 
margins of the cultural field of hierarchy, where slave descendants can earn respecta-
bility. To call it a source of rebellion or to see these specializations as resistance to the 
status quo would be an exaggeration. However, it is likely that some forms of healing 
and dance have been performed as an implicit critique of the dominant cultural field of 
hierarchy, but this requires further (historical) research that is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  
In conclusion, the hegemony of the freeborn in the religious realm remains im-
portant, even though slave descendants have niches of influence outside the religious 
realm.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Power and authority of Islamic scholars in the legal realm  
The case of Talaata demonstrated how the coexistence of plural legal systems generates 
paradoxes. These paradoxes and the leeway that exists between the two realms are an 
ideal breeding ground for manipulation. Multiple coexisting layers of law are easily 
manipulated by the most powerful actors in society and those who render jurisprudence, 
such as the imams, have the power to define the way Islamic customary law is 
interpreted and applied. The imams in Dalla and Booni, for example, accept the (self-) 
manumission of slave descendants, although they are well aware of the illegal nature of 
manumission vis-à-vis the nation state. They explain that ‘it are our slave descendants 
who insist on it’, and claim that they cannot but continue to manumit slave descendants. 
Their self-proclaimed altruism and blunt openness about the (self-) manumissions they 
contract almost ‘naturalizes’ manumissions for the benefit of all.  
The hegemony of their discourse once again demonstrates the limited impact of State 
Law. It is not within the reach of those it is supposed to protect and Islamic scholars, as 
guardians of Islamic Law, have room to manoeuvre, manipulate and explain issues to 
their own advantage (Cf. Chebel 2007). 390  An example is the way in which fines are 
not issued to Fulɓe herdsmen whose cattle have destroyed the harvests of people with 
stigmatized slave status. As one informant put it:391 ‘When people find out that they are 
dealing with a herdsman who works for the imam, they will not dare to fine or tax them 
because there is God and you have to accept it. However, if the cattle do not belong to 
the imam, we will fine the owners of the cows.’ Herdsmen taking care of the cattle of 
the ruling elite or an imam’s family will not be fined by Islamic scholars because they 
will want to maintain good relations with them. 
Religious scholars and religious ideology have a major impact on power relations 
and the cultural field of hierarchy. There are definitely asymmetries in rights and 
obligations related to one’s status in the local hierarchy. Islamic scholars and freemen in 
Fulɓe society generally use the argument that it is not man but religion that permitted 
slavery and claim that since the Koran has mentioned these issues, it is impossible to 
change them (Mahamat 2009: 355). 
Obtaining social promotion in Islamic Customary Law 
Conversion to Islam after having been captured or bought was not enough for slaves to 
become liberated. According to believers, the Prophet Mohammed introduced reforms 
aimed at relieving the pain of slaves but never advocated abolishing the institution. 
Instead, he introduced legal ways for slaves to emancipate (Murray Gordon 1989: 24-
25). For slaves and their descendants, there were several legal arrangements in Islamic 
legislation to change their condition and liberate them. In fact, in Muslim jurisprudence, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390  Saibou (2005: 873) working among Fulɓe in northern Cameroon indicated how because liberations 
are so informal, they are extremely easy to manipulate. Freeborn masters will only accept self-manu-
mission if it is to their own financial advantage.  
391  In French: ’Quand les gens qui ont garde les animaux du voleur sachent que se sont les animaux du 
imam, ils ne vont pas amender les animaux du chef parce qu’il y a dieu et tu va accepter. Mais si c’est 
pas les animaux du imam, on va amender les propriétaires de ces vaches.’ 
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slavery and liberation are important topics that are described in detail in many textbooks 
(Addoun 2005), of which Ahmed Baaba’s writings (see Lovejoy 2006) are, for Mali, 
probably one of the largest bodies.  
In Fulɓe customary Islamic legislation, a typical ‘career’ in which a slave could le-
gally upgrade aspects of his condition without altering his slave status per se ranged 
from captive (FF: nanngaaδo) or bought slave (FF: Soodaaɓe) to property (FF: 
Maraaδo, jeyaaδo) to house slave (FF: Maccuδo)392 to client (Arabic: Murgu/mawla) or 
manumitted slave (FF: Dimdinaaδo) or descendant of a manumitted slave (FF: 
Diimaajo).393 None of these legal upgrades in the position of slaves however guaranteed 
access to the rights or duties of freeborn.  
There is a wide variety in rules and contextual conditions described for each of these 
‘upgrades’ in Islamic legal textbooks (Arabic: Fiqh) and the sayings and doings of the 
prophet (Arabic: Hadith). Three main legal arrangements accorded some agency to the 
slave (or his family) to change his condition by himself (thus without depending on his 
master): Clientship (Arabic: Murgu), self-manumission (Arabic: Mukataba)394 and ran-
som (Arabic: Fida). All three procedures allowed people of slave descent upon 
completion to officially engage in the patriarchal style vis-à-vis legal minors. 
The legal arrangement of murgu395 secured the ‘intentional integration’ of slaves 
(Lovejoy 2009: 159). It enabled slaves with skills to work for themselves and, in 
exchange for their relative autonomy; they paid their owners regular, set fees. In a way, 
they became incorporated in their host societies through wage employment and 
increased independence, as they could live on their own. Nevertheless, the fact that they 
were legally entitled to set aside money for their liberation indicates that this was a 
lesser improvement in their condition than manumission itself. In short, murgu ‘pro-
vided income for slave-owners and incentives for slaves’ (Lovejoy 2009: 159). 
Examples of the two other legal options for slaves to upgrade their status are ran-
som396 and manumission.397 Ransoming is the buying out of someone enslaved or cap-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392  As Pageard (1987: 144) mentions, Riimayɓe were the slaves who were in a servile position, often 
descendants of those slaves bought or captured in raids (FF: Maccuɓe). However, Maccuɓe were used 
to denote Riimayɓe of lower status.  
393  Sehou (2009: 11-12) reports a similar trajectory with the same vocabulary for FulBe in northern 
Cameroon. In Senegal and Mauritania, those who were freed by their masters according to Islamic 
procedures are called Daccanaaɓe Allaa (Dacc-an = leave to, to the benefit of). Translated literally, 
this means ‘slave liberated by the will of his master, conform Islamic recommendations’ (Ciavolella 
2008; Pouget 2000: 90). 
394  Reasons for the manumission of a slave on the initiative of the master are described in the Koran 
(Addoun 1998; 2005). There is only a short reference to the possibility of self-manumission. 
395  Defined by Lovejoy (2009: 150) as ‘part of the official and religious policies of assimilation and 
various methods of emancipation, murgu allowed slaves to work on their own account in exchange for 
a payment’.  
396  Lovejoy (2009: 162-163) argues that ‘a system of ransoming effectively enabled those who could af-
ford it to achieve their redemption should they be unlucky and have been enslaved’. See also Lof-
krantz (2008) on ransoming in the Sokoto Caliphate.  
397  Some authors use the term ‘redemption’ (Lovejoy, 2009; Lofkrantz 2008, Akurang-Parry 1998). Re-
demption can be defined as all the actions taken by a slave in an effort to get released. I prefer the 
term (self-)manumission as a specific legal Islamic procedure of redemption. Redemption and manu-
mission are different from enfranchisement, which is defined by Meillassoux (1991: 120) as the pro-
cess by which the slave acquires all the prerogatives and honour of the freeborn. 
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tured by that person’s kin or acquaintances. The difference with manumission is that the 
ransomed slave returns to his original freeborn status and home society (Lofkrantz 
2008: 1, 116).398 Ransoming was mainly practised when there were raids going on in 
the war economies in the pre-colonial period. Historians working on pre-colonial 
Sahelian society describe numerous cases of ransoming but point out how manumission 
was relatively ‘scarce’ (Lofkrantz 2008; Lovejoy 2009). 
Derived from Latin and used in ancient Rome to describe the liberation of slaves 
(Testart 1998: 53), manumission is literally the taking away of the hand of the master 
from his slave. There are two main actors in manumissions: Manumission as initiated 
and paid for by the master versus self-manumission that is paid by the slave (descend-
ant). Some argue that the ambiguous policy of the colonial rulers (and missionaries) vis-
à-vis the buying of freedom reinforced rather than abolished the cultural boundary 
between the free and non-freeborn (McDougall 2007: 161-165). Also, the fact that 
French colonial policy stimulated the emancipation of slaves and had its own liberation 
procedures and documents is likely to have prevented former masters from allowing 
their slaves to engage in existing Islamic emancipation procedures as a form of revenge 
(Soares 2005: 66). 
Although most legal descriptions focus on the reasons for masters to initiate the 
manumission of their slaves, there was an option for slaves to liberate themselves (self-
manumission). In the Haayre region, the majority of current manumissions are self-
manumissions, whereby the slave descendant pays.399 (Self-)manumission is an upgrade 
within the confines of the legal and immobile category of slave status and was a recon-
figuration in which an individual moved out of extreme dependency into a recognized 
client status. (Self-)manumission confirms the client’s loyalty style and deference to his 
patron and/or God. In turn, he is rewarded with a more privileged position vis-à-vis 
other slave descendants and has the possibility to engage in the patriarchal style by 
founding a family and owning slaves himself. Other privileges are freedom of move-
ment (Yacono 1974) and access to basic Muslim rights, such as the Hajj pilgrimage.400 
However besides these new rights, their rights were different from those of the freeborn 
members of society who maintained the exclusive right to marry freeborn women.  
Addoun (2005) indicates how a manumission contract legally turns the master-slave 
relationship into a patron-client one called mawla (Arabic). He adds that the manumis-
sion contract is in fact a contract between three parties: Between a master and a slave; 
between a former master and a new manumitted slave; and between a master and God.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398  Various concepts are used in the literature to designate this procedure, ranging from buying 
freedom (Appiah & Bunzl 2007) to liberating, redemption and manumission (Sikainga 1995). In Fulfulde, 
the verb to denote liberation is rimɗinde but informants mostly used annoblissement or simply liberation 
in French to talk about the procedure. In the French literature, the concepts of anoblissement, 
manumission, affranchissement (Saibou 2005; Bourgeot 1975), liberation (Renault 1976) and rachat 
(McDougalll 2007; Renault 1976; Zuccarelli 1962) are used.  
399  Lofkranz (2008: 3) gives a possible explanation by arguing how ‘colonial reforms ... took the power 
to allow for redemption away from the owners and put it into the hands of the slaves’. 
400  These basic Muslim rights or pillars of Islamic belief and practice are: slaughtering one’s personal 




Meillassoux (1991: 12) concluded that manumission ‘is only designed to serve the 
master’s own interests. A slave was redeemed to make of him a devoted servant, whose 
privileges attached him to his master; or he was redeemed because he was too old to be 
kept on.’ This is why Kopytoff & Miers (1977: 26-27) called Islamic manumission 
‘incomplete’, arguing that ‘the freed slave and his descendants became, in perpetuity, 
the clients of their former master’. 
As early as 1894, French colonial administrators were grappling with Islamic libera-
tion procedures. As indicated in the following excerpt, they did not distinguish between 
clientship, ransoming and (self-) manumission.401 Between the brackets I indicated what 
practice they refere to (=x or y): 
Slavery (French: Servage) is inherited; there are few exceptions to this rule. The Riimaayɓe that were 
the domestic slaves (French: Captives de case) of the first dynasty Fulɓe, ‘les ardo’, have become the 
property of all the kings that have successively reigned in Bandiagara. Not one of them has been 
liberated. The domestic slaves (French: Captifs de case) never freed themselves in Fulɓe society. The 
Bambara, on the contrary, have freed some of them who re-bought themselves, while leaving all their 
possessions (which were considerable) to their master. A very small number of them have been freed 
for having given their master exceptional services. The bought slaves (French: Captifs de vente) could 
free themselves by refunding their masters the price they were paid when acquired, or they tried to 
gain the necessary sum of money for the price of their free days of working for themselves (= Murgu) 
or they are re-bought by their parents (=ransoming). The slaves captured during wars (French: Captifs 
de guerre) are sometimes re-bought by their family after some years (=ransoming). 
During colonial occupation, ransoming lost its significance because raids decreased 
significantly. Manumission still remained possible though and self-manumission was 
encouraged and even increased during French colonial rule (Lofkrantz 2008: 3; Hogen-
dorn & Lovejoy 1989; Klein 1988: 209-211).402 To add to the confusion, French 
colonizers themselves started to issue ‘freedom certificates’, often written in Arabic by 
religious scholars.403 But unlike manumission documents, the French certificates did not 
establish a legal agreement between the three parties central to the Islamic manumission 
contract,404 namely the master, the slave and God (Addoun 2005). Bouche (1968: 156, 
159) describes how the inhabitants of the liberty villages did not gain anything from 
their freedom certificates as their freedom was not recognized by their home commu-
nities because it was not done according to Islamic moral standards. Secondly, they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401  ANM, FA: 1E-156/August 1894. 
402  Hogendorn & Lovejoy (1989) describe it as a means of compensating owners for the loss of slave 
labour in the British colonies. Klein (1988: 209-211) describes how (self-)manumission was related to 
slave resistance and contradicted French colonial abolitionist legislation. 
403  The majority of French freedom certificates were issued between 1905 and 1908 (Klein 1988: 211) 
after a minimum period of three months’ residence in a so-called liberty village (Bouche 1968; 
McDougall 2007). Some of the reasons for being liberated by the French colonial administrators were 
(i) bad treatment of a slave by his/her master (example in: ANM, FA-1E-156: Nioro/1895 letter); (ii) 
victims of trade in persons that were discovered by the French administrators were given their free-
dom (example in: ANM, FA-1E-156: Bamako/April 1895); (iii) a stay of minimum three months in a 
village of liberty, automatically resulted in freedom granted on paper by the French; and (iv) (widows 
of) slave soldiers who fought in Europe (French: tirailleurs) obtained a certificate (see example: 
ANM, FA-1E-165/1895/Tombouctou). 
404  Sometimes the French validated their manumissions according to Islamic legal principle. Yacono 
(1974) described such a case of the French ordering an Islamic manumission in Algeria, which was 
both legally and morally accepted.  
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lacked the moral power to enforce their new status in the socio-cultural realm of their 
societies.  
McDougall (2007:164) concludes that French freedom certificates did not have the 
same socio-cultural validity because they lacked both material advantage and moral 
prestige, and indicates how ‘a culturally “freed slave” still had a role in society, while a 
“free slave” according to French law, did not’ (Ibid.: 176, Footnote 13). Several des-
criptions in the colonial archives confirm that French freedom certificates were not 
accepted by freeborn Fulɓe in the Haayre area. They did not accept the change in the 
legal status of slaves who obtained colonial certificates.405  
The three above-mentioned legal procedures were available to slaves depending on 
the timeframe. Ransoming disappeared with the suppression of slave raids by colonial 
rulers. Manumission on inititative of the master was relatively unpractised because there 
were many other less expensive ways for masters to achieve the same religious 
recognition. Near the end of colonial occupation, masters refused to free their slaves, 
fearing the increased emancipation of their former dependants and possible revenge. 
This also explains why, after independence, it was mainly self-manumissions on the 
initiative of the slave descendants themselves that was practiced. Often self-
manumissions were only accepted if considerable wealth was given to their former 
masters, who would thus make some profit themselves. 
In short, various legal arrangements gave slave descendants new entitlements, 
although they were excluded from entitlements preserved for the freeborn community 
(FF: ndimaaku). Research assistant Burra Yero reflected that406 ‘even when liberated, it 
is impossible to become as noble as those born free (FF: Riimɓe). When a slave 
descendant (FF: Diimaajo) buys his freedom, he becomes a kind of “in between” 
(French: Entre les deux)’. The freed slave is called dimɗinaaɗo,407 while the freeborn 
person is called Dimo. To date, manumitted slaves are not included in freeborn lineages 
by marriage and do not have access to high political or religious freeborn functions as 
long as they remain in their host society. Also in terms of property, discrimination 
remained because a freeborn master inherits from a childless freed slave, but not vice 
versa. The only way to change slave status into freeborn status was to engage in legally 
accepted marriages in freeborn lineages of one’s host society. Chapter 3 explained how 
this was almost impossible with the exception of semi-freeborn children of slave 
concubines who obtained full liberty. 
Instead of being legal arrangements geared at emancipation, these possibilities to 
upgrade one’s condition, as described in Islamic textbooks, thus tied emancipated slaves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405  For example: ‘A dioula does not accept that one of his former captifs married and no longer belongs 
to him as she obtained her certificate of freedom. He threatened to take this case to court in Kayes or 
even St Louis. We imprisoned him for 6 days.’ (ANM, FA-1E-96/1903/Bandiagara/July). A second 
example is that of a former slave (Saidou Mayetake) who was freed by the French because he had 
served them very well as a guide when the French conquered Djenne. This slave came to complain 
with French officers about the fact that since he was now freed, he refused to pay the slave tax (FF: 
janngal). He did however pay the tax of the freeborn (FF: jakka), but this was not accepted by the 
ruler of Maacina (FF: amiiru).’ (ANM, FA-1E-30/1909/A.5/Djenne). 
406  Burra Yero Cisse, Born in Douentza in 1955, interview in May 2007 in Douentza. 
407  In Fulfulde dimɗinaaɗo (sing.): ‘The one who has been liberated’; Rimɗinaaɓe (plural): ‘Those who 
have been made noble/free’. 
177 
 
to their former masters as clients in perpetuity. Manumission became so engrained in 
Islamic legislation and culture that other forms of social promotion became difficult to 
envisage (Addoun 2005: 18). Although the legal condition of slaves could change, it 
was only possible within the confines of non-freeborn citizenship, not out of slave status 
(Kopytoff & Miers 1977: 20). Slaves thus had several legal ways to become freed, but 
they never became free, they could liberate themselves but never obtained liberty in 
Islamic legislation.  
It is important to note that not all slaves or their descendants looked for such forms 
of manumission as neither they nor their descendants could see any benefits. They 
preferred a stereo-style relationship than to face the uncertainties of the future without a 
back-up option of their wealthier master to rely on as a form of social security. Perbi 
(2004) described how liberated slaves in Ghana returned to their masters when they 
needed social security in times of crisis. Yaaya, a 55-year-old descendant of domestic 
slaves who worked at the compound of the Islamic scholars in Dalla, analyzed his 
situation quite clearly, indicating how being ‘attached’ (FF: maraado)to his master's 
family is an obligation. He had no other choice. He knew very well the history of 
slavery experienced by his parents and grandparents but did not see how he could rid 
himself of the situation of bondage in which he found himself. He works his master's 
land and lives in his father's house, which virtually belongs to this master. He does not 
like to be called a Maccudo, or even Diimaajo, but explains that he is not a Diimaajo 
because he did not diimaay (i.e. he did not free himself). As a domestic slave, he will 
never be freed although he realizes he could claim the rights of a freeman under modern 
legislation but does not see any point in doing so. The old norms and rules will not 
change if he does and, in practice, he will always bear the social stigma of being a 
former slave. He says: 
Yes indeed I am free in the eyes of modern law (national constitution) but that does not help me. The 
land I work belongs to the master of my father408 who has become my master, and if he takes back the 
land this will be a disaster for me. As long as I do not upset our relationship, he will not withdraw the 
land, but leave me to live my life. I really hope that my children will marry a Diimaajo, and I hope 
they will have respect for their master. Do we have another choice?” 
This section has demonstrated how although slave descendants are today legally 
considered free under national constitutional legislation, they are not considered freed in 
Customary Islamic Law where slave status is perpetual and hereditary. The section 
below considers why and how self-manumissions, as legal procedures of liberation, 
continue to be practised today and why some slave descendants who, according to the 
national constitution are no longer considered slaves, continue to self-manumit. 
Documenting (self-)manumission in the Haayre region  
Religion is important for identification, status and social recognition in Fulɓe society.409 
Legal abolition by the French colonizers in 1905 (Klein 1998) and later also the ap-
plication of the national Malian constitution (Lecocq 2005: 53-57) did not result in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408  Exceptionally Yaaya Gaalil remained dependent on his father's master, not his mother's. 
409  On the central entanglement of Islam and the ideology of slavery in Fulɓe society, see Botte (1990, 
1994, 1999b, 2000a) and Schmitz (2009). 
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real emancipation of former slave populations. Legacies of slavery exist psychologically 
and socially (Botte 2000b) in what I described in the introduction of this thesis as ‘the 
cultural field of hierarchy’. Non-freeborn ancestry legally classifies slave descendants 
as being of non-freeborn, slave status.  
Post-colonial self-manumissions are one of several strategies that slave descendants 
use today to overcome the stigma attached to slavery. The manumission ceremony 
actually resembles that of a baptism in some ways.410 Apart from a new name,411 the 
manumitted slave descendant receives a new outfit (clothes and shoes) that confirms his 
new status and dignity. Lastly, the manumitted person gains entitlements over the land 
on which his house is built412 and can make a will (Addoun 2005: 15). Manumission is 
thus a kind of rite of passage in which new entitlements are obtained. It turns the slave 
into a client with subservient rather than freeborn status (Lofkrantz 2008: 1).  
Reasons for the legal (self-) manumission of slaves are described in the hadith, the 
sayings and doings of the Prophet and in Islamic legal books (Arabic: Fiqh). Those for 
masters to liberate a slave range from rewarding a loyal slave to demonstrating resent-
ment over a wrongdoing by a freeborn. Manumission, for example, may be implement-
ed in relation to specific conditions (Addoun 1998, 2005), as a result of a testamentary 
demand by a master or as a post-mortem inheritance.413 In addition, manumission can 
be contracted as a reward for merit on the initiative of the master, as a way of ensuring 
legal alliances (with a slave concubine) or on the slave’s personal initiative (self-
manumission). For slaves, claiming proof of descent from a slave mother’s union with a 
freeman can be a reason to request a manumission certificate (Document II, Image 5).414 
A French archival document from 1894 describes the procedure followed for issuing 
a manumission document according to Islamic procedures:415  
The freeing of a captive is sealed with an act (French: Certificate de liberté) that is given to the person 
by the cadi (Islamic scholar/scribe) in the presence of the masters of the slave and 7 witnesses taken 
amidst the eldest of the village. After that the freeing is announced in loud voice by an Islamic scholar 
at the time of the evening prayer. 
Current procedures of manumission (FF: Rimɗineede)416 in the Haayre diverge 
slightly from this colonial observation. On the day of liberation, the slave (descendant), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410  Sehou (2009: 18-19) makes the same comparison for manumissions of FulBe slave descendants in 
northern Cameroon.  
411  A specific advantage of manumission is that it legally entitles one to take on one’s master’s first and 
family name. See Schmitz (2009: 96) and Baier (1980: 83) quoted by Hall (2009: 13). On surnames 
and renaming by slave descendants, see Pelckmans (2011b forthcoming). 
412  The manumission certificate shown by one of the slave descendants in Dalla turned out, after transla-
tion, to be literally a description of a gift of land by his master.  
413  This footnote gives the Arabic names and the exact references to these various forms of manumission: 
Testamentary or post-mortem manumission (Arabic: Tadbir) (Addoun 2005: 9); homologation 
(Arabic: Iktifa) (Ibid.: 7), ransoming (Fida), conditional manumission (Arabic: Itq li’agal) (Ibid.: 9-
10, (Addoun, 1998: 11), simple manumission (Ibid.: 17) (Arabic: Kaffara), manumission of a slave 
woman (Arabic: Umm walad) and self-manumission (Arabic: Mukataba). 
414  Both Addoun (2005) and Sehou (2009) mention different forms, reasons and terminology for the 
various forms of (self-)manumission in Arabic and Fulfulde. 
415  ANM, FA: 1E-156/August 1894/Pression traite esclavage Haute Senegal Niger. 
416  In local Fulfulde dialect, the liberation procedure is called Rimɗineede (informal): ‘To be made 
noble/free’. Some use the verb joppude meaning ‘to let go, to drop’. An informant describes how a 
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his (former) master and witnesses gather417 and an Islamic scholar, preferably the imam, 
writes out a contract, a ‘paper of confidence’ (FF: Wassigatu; Arabic: Almouktaba). 
Various books stipulate the precise formulations that are used on the manumission 
document.418 In the Haayre region, convention has it that the (reason for) liberation (FF: 
Asahaada), the name of the person to be liberated (FF: Dimɗinaaɗo), the date (day, 
month, year) and the names of the witnesses (at least four freeborn persons) are all 
mentioned. 
To illustrate (self-)manumission as practised in the Haayre in more detail, the Islamic 
manumission documents419 issued to two slave descendants, who I will call Diougal 
Issiaka and Bilaali Allayidi, are included as images to this text. 
 
See Image 2-3-4 in appendix 
Image 2: Manumission document I- Musa Issiaka 
Image 3: Manumission document II- Diougal Allayidi 
Image 4: Censored translation of both manumission documents 
 
They were written in the 1990s by the imams of Dalla and Booni. (The Imam of 
Dalla as well as the manumitted slave descendant Bilaali central to document II (Image 
5) have since passed away.) These documents (see Image 2 & 3) are examples of self-
manumission and are written in Fulfulde but using the Arabic alphabet (FF: Ajami). 
Islamic Fulɓe scholars thus ‘certify’ the liberation of a slave according to Islamic Law 
and each document mentions 7 witnesses. Diougal self-manumitted and so the price he 
paid is mentioned in Document I (Image 2). Bilaali, on the other hand, was manumitted 
by his master and no price is mentioned in his manumission document.  
The self-manumission document (Image 2) of Diougal Issiaka specifies that he paid 
two calves and FCFA 3600.420 Diougal explained how he discussed the price, which 
typically consisted of animals and money, with his former master.421 In general, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
master lets go of his slave through manumission, saying kanko joppan (he drops it), but here meaning 
that ‘he (the master) lets go of him (the slave). 
417  The place of gathering is ideally the mosque but can also be the imam or chief’s compound.  
418  Addoun (2005) refers to several standard Arab formulations that can be used for contracts: Shurut, 
khutut or watha’iq.  
419  I obtained these documents by consulting two imams in Fulfulde villages near Douentza. Diougal 
Issiaka and Bilal Allayidi’s family were willing to show me their manumission documents. I have 
changed their names to guarantee their privacy. 
420  Manumission Document I spells out that 3600 units of something were given. The unmentioned unit 
is most likely Francs, which in Fulfulde has to be multiplied by 5 = FCFA 18,000, which is the 
equivalent of about €27. 
421  Prices are high and comparable to the amount paid for women in marriage. Other examples of prices 
for liberation in the Haayre region in the 1990s are: 1 bull + FCFA 10,000; 3 goats + FCFA 10,000 + 
5 cotton strips; 1 bull + FCFA 30,000. The money is for the cola nuts that are distributed among the 
witnesses at the liberation. 
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price that has been paid by the slave descendant to manumit himself remains a secret if 
possible. In general, however, the amounts paid are quite high, with some informants 
indicating that a minimum of FCFA 150,000 (€229 in 2006) is standard. Belco, an in-
tellectual of slave descent,422 describes these payments as ‘moral bribery’ by a dominant 
elite who are ‘abusing religious arguments’.423  
Document II (Image 3) is a copied contract of manumission by a master, who manu-
mitted the person’s family in the 1960s and describes the renewal424 of Bilaali 
Allayidi’s former manumission document. Although the document does not clearly 
mention it, Bilaali was manumitted by his master as a reward for his and his parents’ 
loyalty. The document mentions: ‘For the sake of Allah and his Prophet to the parents 
of Bilaali’. A co-villager claims that Bilaali’s master was exceptionally courageous to 
free Bilaali although it was Bilaali who in fact requested the corresponding 
manumission document. He needed it to be allowed to marry an already manumitted 
woman called Dikel.425 Since manumitted slave descendants became a separate 
endogamous group, Bilaali was only allowed to marry Dikel if he could manumit 
himself. He had to make sure that legally he enjoyed the same status as Dikel otherwise 
their marriage would be unacceptable. So at his request, Bilaali received ‘proof’ of the 
fact that his parents had been manumitted by their master as a result of their loyal 
behaviour sometime in the 1960s.  
Copying documents is common and there are usually two copies: one is kept by the 
imam, the other by the manumitted person/family. The fact that the document was 
important to Bilaali was obvious from the way in which he had recopied it from time to 
time to ensure it remained legible. The document shown in Image 3 is a copy that was 
issued in 1992. It is not a copy of the 1960 original but of another copy (issued in 1984), 
since this document was in poor condition.426 In the last decade of his life,427 Bilaali’s 
seniority made him chief of the slave descendants (FF: Amiiru maccuɓe) in his home 
village. During Tabaski he was the only one of the slave descendants of the ruling elite 
to have his own sacrificial animal slaughtered.  
The manumission documents of Bilaali and Diougal show how a small number of 
slave descendants continue to look for redemption in formal Islamic legislation. It is 
only a minority of slave descendants in the Haayre region who are concerned with 
manumission today.428 To estimate the frequency of self-manumissions today is quite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422  Belco Tambura, of slave descent from Mopti, living in Bamako, interviews 2007. 
423  Cameroonian scholars Saibou (2005; 869 and 873: Footnote 30), Sehou (2009; 2010) and Mahamat 
(2009) share this position by describing how the payments for liberation asked by freeborn Fulɓe in 
northern Cameroon are swindlers (French: Escrocs). 
424  Renewal of a document is called homologation and is described in Islamic legislation as Iktifa. See 
Addoun (2005: 7). 
425  Dikel is the daughter of a manumitted slave woman who had been married to her noble pastoralist 
master. Due to her mother’s manumission, Dikel also enjoys manumitted status. 
426  By issuing liberty certificates, the French colonial administration may have encouraged the perceived 
importance of paper manumission documents. Informants believe that if the paper goes missing, one 
becomes owned (FF: Jeyaaɗo) again. 
427  Bilal went blind and died in 2007. 
428  Meillassoux (1991: 12) counted 53 manumitted versus 1,040 slaves born in captivity in Gumbu. 
While manumission was relatively scarce, ransoming took place on a much bigger scale (Lofkrantz 
2008; Lovejoy 2009).  
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complex, not least because informants are aware of their illegal nature vis-à-vis State 
Law. Both scholars and informants agree that manumissions were more frequent during 
colonial occupation429 and I have not come across any other study on manumission and 
how it is practised in the region today. Even a recently issued research report by Anti-
slavery International (Keita, 2011 forthcoming) does not mention the existence of this 
practice in the region. I did, however, encounter references to the practice today in 
northern Cameroon by Cameroonian scholars Sehou (2009), Saibou (2005) and Maha-
mat (2009). Through self-manumission, slave descendants are trying to gain social pro-
motion within the socio-cultural boundaries of their community (see Pelckmans 2011a 
forthcoming). 
Although orally contracted (self-)manumissions continue to take place, the use of 
Islamic and French manumission documents has become rare. If my main informants 
are to be believed, paradoxically, oral manumission agreements430 increased in Booni 
rather than in Dalla. This is strange because Dalla is renowned for its strong emphasis 
on Islamic practice and Booni was one of the first villages in the region to be incor-
porated in post-colonial nation-state politics and is considered to be more ‘advanced’.  
Many rich slave descendants (both male and female) in Booni have self-manumitted 
to be legally allowed to marry other manumitted slave descendants and/or freeborn. 
However these manumissions are effectuated orally because most imams do not feel 
comfortable issuing certificates, which are illegal under State Law. Oral manumissions 
are obviously more difficult to prove and sometimes a document was deemed necessary 
to prove the higher legal status. The liberated person keeps the manumission document, 
which can be requested at the time of marriage (to another liberated slave descendant) 
or in the case of conflict over land or inheritance. 
Cutting the rope from round one’s neck  
In my home village, those who butcher meat at the market are ennobled 
slave descendants; they no longer have a rope 
around their neck.431 They have become like their masters.  
(Beidary Tambura, interview, Bamako, 2006)	  
Beidary is a slave descendant from the Kau family in Dalla and the butchers he des-
cribes are slave descendants who have self-manumitted. Several informants compared 
manumission to the cutting of the rope from one’s neck and the Fulɓe often use the 
image of a rope around one’s neck to discuss legacies of slavery. The rope that used to 
keep slaves from running away became a metaphor for the stereostyled patron-client 
relationship between former slaves and their masters. To cut the rope from one’s neck 
thus symbolizes a break in this relation. This section focuses on the motivation behind 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429  Most informants agree that manumissions were frequent during French colonial occupation (FF: 
Laamu tuubaakooBe) and declined after independence. 
430  Such oral agreements have a long tradition of establishing legal contracts in customary tradition (FF: 
Al’ aada). Pageard (1987: 142) indicated how Arabic and French written documents and traditional 
oral agreements challenged each other but all of them had to be agreed in the presence of the highest 
possible number of witnesses.  
431  In Fulfulde: A taƴƴi (cut) ɓoggol (rope) e daande ma (neck): You cut the rope from your neck.  
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(self-)manumission and why those who do so believe it to be a liberating and ennobling 
strategy.432  
A first and often-mentioned motivation for liberating was access to full membership 
of the religious community. Especially older informants believe that only manumitted 
slaves can become ‘true’ Muslims.433 Manumission for some is geared towards legal 
entitlements to practise and access the five pillars of Islam. Such is for example the case 
for Allay, one of the latecomers in the Kau family in Wuro Maccuɓe, who was the chief 
of slaves (see Chapter 4). 
Allay always dreamed of going on pilgrimage to Mecca434 and when he proposed 
manumitting himself, both the imam and his former Dicko master refused, saying that, 
in the eyes of God, it was more worthwhile for Allay to remain in the position of loyal 
slave than to self-manumit. The benediction of the master is crucial and manumitting 
independently of one’s master is impossible. Instead they advised Allay to give the 
money (his manumission price) to his former Dicko master who around that time was 
leaving for Mecca. Allay was told that God would reward him for this demonstration of 
loyalty to his former master. Years later, in 2005, Allay still expressed his desire to be 
manumitted, not so he could go on the Hajj (as he was too old by then) but to be able to 
travel on horseback instead of on foot in his afterlife. He died in 2008 without being 
manumitted.  
Diougal was luckier as his self-manumission was accepted by his master. For both 
Diougal Issiaka and Allay, the main motivation for liberating themselves was to gain 
full access to the Muslim community without any legal restrictions on access to the five 
pillars of Islam. Allay indicated that he no longer wanted to follow two masters (Allah 
and his former Dicko master) but to be more autonomous and to devote himself entirely 
to Allah in order to be accepted as a full member of the community of Muslim believers 
(Arabic: Umma; FF: Alsilaamaaku). Diougal Issiaka, the liberated slave descendant 
central to document I, is currently the muezzin at the village mosque and takes pride in 
actively demonstrating his piety. Self-manumission was a precondition for him to be 
able to do so. For women, manumission allows them more room to express their piety, 
for example, by wearing a veil. Women of slave descent who wear a veil and display 
piety are insulted and ridiculed by freeborn women, while those who have manumitted 
do not suffer in this way as they are legally part of the community of Muslim believers.  
Besides piety, there are those who manumit for practical considerations related to 
inheritance. According to Islamic Law, there are free versus non-freeborn rights and 
duties. Some slave descendants self-manumit to become a partner who is legally con-
sidered entitled to inherit. In 2007 the chief of Dalla described how, just three days 
earlier, he had allowed a woman of slave descent (who he referred to by the ana-
chronism female slave: kordo) called Lobooru to self-manumit to facilitate inheritance 
procedures. Since her husband’s first wife had been manumitted, not manumitting 
would have resulted in her losing her entitlement to her husband’s possessions. Another 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432  In French, many informants used the word anoblissement. 
433  De Bruijn & van Dijk (1994: 99, 103). 
434  The desire to make the pilgrimage after being liberated used to be widespread among slave descend-
ants in the Sahel (Klein 1998: 246-247).  
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practical consideration, which might have been important in the past, was the right of 
manumitted slaves to own slaves themselves (McDougall 2007: 172). 
Other motivations for manumission are related to economic status (wealth). Manu-
mission by rich slave descendants seems to be primarily geared to underlining wealth 
vis-à-vis less wealthy slave descendants. Some of the rich emigrants who have manu-
mitted however expressed the fact that they no longer wanted to feel any obligations 
towards their former masters’ families. Burra Moodi, the imam in Booni who issued 
Document I (Image 2), said that most of the self-manumission requests he receives are 
from rich slave descendants because since they have become wealthier than their former 
masters’ families, they no longer benefit from their historical bond. They are no longer 
dependent on the social security that the hierarchical relation used to guarantee and 
want to remove the legal bond with their former freeborn masters by freeing them-
selves.  
Self-manumission thus helps to emphasize one’s social promotion and independence 
vis-à-vis those slave descendants who remained clients and less wealthy. Self-manu-
mission allows them to climb in status and such social promotion crystallizes in the 
establishment of their own endogamous group. Manumitted slaves are only allowed to 
marry other manumitted slaves and his wish to marry another manumitted woman was 
the main motivation behind Bilal’s manumission. The social promotion of manumitted 
slave descendants also results in their increased respectability. Liberated men indicate 
how their voice becomes heard and their participation in freeborn associations is res-
pected. Manumitted slave-descending women claim their liberation allows them to 
partake in saving groups organized by freeborn women.  
A specific motivation in the Haayre region for manumission, which is not related to 
any of the legal Islamic prescriptions,435 is the manumission of women who have prob-
lems giving birth. Local folk beliefs have it that a child will be more willing to be born 
if it knows it will be born free.436 This shows how customary practices intermingle with 
Islamic legislative arrangements. Fanta’s mother was manumitted by her master who 
pitied her because her first three babies had died. After she had been manumitted (she 
had already turned 30), her fourth child survived. Three more cases of such children of 
manumitted mothers in Dalla437 were mentioned by both Musa Gaalil,438 himself the 
son of liberated parents, and my research assistant Amadu.439 Manumission can thus be 
undertaken to become more fertile and to please the spirit world. 
A final motivation for slave descendants to engage in self-manumissions is to rid 
themselves of certain visible aspects of slave status. They are visibly stigmatized on a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435  Personal communication with two researchers who specialize in ransoming (Lofkrantz 2008) and 
manumission (Addoun 1998; 2005). Both confirmed never having encountered (references to) this 
practice either.  
436  Riesman (1992: 110) described the importance of manumission for children to be born alive as 
practised among FulBe in northern Burkina Faso.  
437  Examples given are Hawa (Wuro Burram, 1994), Takkel Tambura (child = Djadji Afel) and Weloore 
Toufado Tambura. They all took the name of their master after liberation. Takkel Tambura became 
Takkel Dicko and Welloore Toufado Tambura became Welloore Toufado Diallo. 
438  Moussa Gaalil, born in 1977, is a slave descendant living in Wuro Burram in Dalla. Interview, Dalla, 
May 2007. 
439  Research assistant Amadu Amiiru Dicko, interview, Mopti, 2007.  
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daily basis and do not enjoy full citizenship, remaining recognizable through their 
family names.440 A specific advantage of manumission is that it legally entitles them to 
take on one’s master’s first and family name.441 This is how Allayidi Tambura of the 
Kau family became Ali Allayidi Diallo and Welloore Tufado Tambura was renamed 
Welloore Tufado Dicko. In this sense, manumission comes close to a renewed social 
birth or a rite of passage (van Gennep 1960). Camara (1995: 23) even compares manu-
mission to a form of ‘patriarchal adoption’.  
Apart from these changes, both freeborn and slave descendants realize that manu-
mission does not eradicate the stigma of slave status. Informants indicated that those 
who liberate themselves continue to be insulted and addressed in the language of 
slavery.442 In this case, the advantage of manumission is real only for one’s children 
who are truly free of obligations vis-à-vis their parents’ former master. 
Finally, it should be stressed that the majority of slave descendants do not want to 
engage in (self-)manumission. The younger generation refers to personal choice more 
than wealth for explaining why certain people liberate themselves and others do not. In 
general, it is the rich slave descendants who are more likely to obtain their liberty than 
poor ones, especially if their master is himself poor. Economic emancipation is an 
important prerequisite for self-manumission and some former masters ask exorbitant 
prices that have to be paid over a long period of time (Saibou 2005).  
The plurality of reality: Evaluating (self-)manumissions 
Even liberation is no dimension of liberty but is,  
on the contrary, a dimension of slavery. 
(Botte 2000a: 12)443 
Liberating someone is confirmation of his imprisonment, not in a literal but in a 
psychological sense. One could see servility (the cultural field of hierarchy) and the 
quest for liberation as both sides of the same coin (Saibou 2005: 868). In addition to 
such moral and philosophical evaluations, actors in Fulɓe society in Central Mali have 
attributed various meanings to (self-)manumissions. Talaata’s case demonstrated how 
some religious scholars adhere to Islamic Law, while others stick to State Law. How-
ever for magistrates but also slave descendants themselves, the practice of liberation is 
measured in contradictory ways. 
Slave descendants’ opinions on manumission are multiple and differences in opinion 
depend on the legal frame of reference one adheres to. There are those who consider 
themselves free according to Islamic Law and those who consider themselves free 
according to State Law. Those who feel free according to State Law describe those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440  For more on naming, see Pelckmans (2011b forthcoming). Hurault (1994: 99-100: Footnote 11, 106) 
indicates that only upon manumission could the master change a slave’s (sur)name. 
441  Most slave descendants use the surname Tambura in Dalla. See Schmitz (2009: 96) and Baier (1980: 
83) quoted by Hall (2009: 13).  
442  Hall (2009: 19) also describes how Anjay, a slave who had been liberated in the nineteenth century 
and who enjoyed considerable wealth, continued to be addressed in the language and titles reserved 
for slaves. 
443  In French: ‘Même l’affranchissement n’est pas une dimension de liberté, mais au contraire une 
dimension de l’esclavage’. 
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resorting to manumission as still being caught up in ‘mental slavery’. As one informant 
put it: ‘Slavery may be finished, but mental slavery still exists’. 
Hama Adja, who is of slave descent and from Kikara, indicates how ‘status is more 
powerful than money in the village’.444 This reflects the views of the majority of slave 
descendants in the Haayre region. He believes that manumission makes no sense be-
cause:  
... wealth is not the only thing, people know your descent and respect you for that, not for your 
money. Even if Riimaayɓe (slave descendants) have a lot of money, they will not glorify themselves 
like Rimɓe (freeborn) do. They might change their dress, but this doesn’t mean that they obtain more 
power. You know, Amadou Hampâté Bâ was right when he said: ‘No matter how long a piece of 
wood stays in a stream, it will never become an alligator’.445 
It is mostly youth and migrants who look down upon those who manumit themselves 
back home, reproaching them for being ‘stuck in the Middle Ages’ and naïve. Naïve 
because those manumitting believe that the only way to really be free is in the eyes of 
God, while according to these youngsters, one should first free oneself in one’s own 
mind. Rich slave descendants who self-manumit after resettlement in their home 
community are critiqued for their motives. Fanta explains:446  
We insult those rich slave descending Riimaayɓe who self-manumit by reminding them of how they 
never will become ‘really’ noble or freeborn. We gossip about them only ‘pretending’ to have become 
freeborn. I would never liberate myself, I am proud of whom I am. If you free yourself, you are 
neither this nor that kind of person. 
Her assertion underlines the fact that there is honour in knowing yourself and in 
accepting your social position, which I call the loyalty style (see Chapter 4). They stress 
the importance of not underestimating oneself and liking who you are (FF: Yiidude ko o 
woni) and knowing oneself (FF: Anndude hoore makko). According to them, those who 
manumit pretend to be superior to who they actually are. To be superior is expressed by 
the Fulfulde concept of manngu, which is used to denote someone who feels better than 
others and is a moralizing notion used to incite people to be more humble.  
Those who believe in manumission reproach those who do not for adhering to the 
secular constitution. In the eyes of this small group of demonstrably pious slave des-
cendants, God does not approve of the prayers, pilgrimages and other religious obli-
gations of those who have not manumitted. Some, like Allay, are even more orthodox 
and do not believe in self-manumission. For them, the (former) master should take the 
initiative to manumit, otherwise it is not valid. Often these are older, widowed, slave-
descending women like Kumba447 who has benefitted from her relationship with her 
former master because she is regularly offered paid jobs. Kumba is very critical of self-
manumission:  
According to my religion, if you don’t obey your master (FF: kalfaaδo), you go to hell. This is why 
people are scared to change their identity. Only if your master blesses or damns you, you are sure that 
God does so too. It is only if your master frees you that God agrees. This is the religious path, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444  In Fulfulde: Ley wuro, sii  ɓuri semmbe mbuudu.  
445  In French: ‘Quelque soit la durée d’un tronc d’arbre dans un marigot, ca ne serait jamais un caïman’. 
Amadou Hampâté Bâ (1979) is a renowned Malian writer with a Fulɓe background.  
446  Fanta Tambura, born about 1950 in Joona, interview, Bamako, 2007. 
447  Kumba is one of Souleymane’s paternal aunts and both belong to the Kau family.  
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some are too blinded by money, which makes them ignore their religion. They do things the other way 
around: They pay their masters. 
Kumba does not agree with those who self-manumit. Although the rope is not there 
in practice, it is clearly inscribed in her mind and morality. She represents a commonly 
held view that manumissions are not worthwhile and do not count without the consent 
of the master. If not, the anger of God will be upon the slave (Saibou 2005: 868). 
Hardly any young slave descendant today dreams of manumission so that they can 
go on pilgrimage in the way Allay and Diougal Issiaka did. Most of them identify with 
different interpretations of Islam that allow them to conduct the Hajj without resorting 
to manumission first. For this generation, it seems that mobility is the main precondition 
for emancipation from ‘mental slavery’.448 Paradoxically, those slave descendants who 
obtained enfranchisement in the fullest sense of the word449 are impossible to trace as 
they cannot be named, traced through documents or even referred to as such. Anony-
mity is the only way to obscure any reference to one’s former status and past.  
Many never return to their hometowns but settle elsewhere in cities and other 
countries, which makes getting rid of their social stigma easier. It allows them to bypass 
the social control of their village community and marry freeborn women in other ethnic 
(status) groups, and some have changed ethnic affiliation through marriage and/or name 
changes (Rossi 2009a: 4; Pelckmans 2011b forthcoming/ Chapter 8 on ‘moving out’ of 
slave status). 
Conclusions: Legal pluralism (en-)countering social stigma 
Even in the formal sphere, such as legislation, the status of slave descendants is ambi-
guous and open to various interpretations. Islam is of central importance for belonging 
and identification for all members in Fulɓe society in the Haayre. Religious piety has 
become a shared ideology that has fed into the cultural field of hierarchy.  
Different legal systems exist and allow leeway in the interpretation and implementa-
tion of Islamic jurisprudence. A recurring argument in this chapter has been that legal 
pluralism generates paradoxes for all the parties involved and that the difference be-
tween freeborn and non-freeborn is untenable when considering the variety in the two 
legal arrangements and statuses.  
The section on legal pluralism pointed out how Malians are likely to be judged 
according to different normative systems, the national constitution that criminalizes 
slave status, and Customary Islamic Law that upholds it. The religious liberation pro-
cedure was the only one that could give legitimacy to someone’s liberty in the cultural 
context of one’s community. By emphasizing legalization, the French colonial appa-
ratus overlooked the much more important aspect of legitimacy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448  Other strategies involving mobility that became available to (Fulɓe) slave descendants in the Sahel as 
in the Haayre region are French education (Jezequel 2003; N’Gaide 1999), Islamic schooling (Berndt 
2008; Schmitz 2009), decentralization politics (de Bruijn & Pelckmans 2005; Leservoisier 2005b; 
Hahonou 2009), development aid (Giuffrida 2005; Mauxion 2008) and emigration (Manchuelle 1997; 
Boyer 2005; Rossi 2009b). 
449  Enfranchisement is defined by Meillassoux (1991: 120) as the process by which the slave acquires all 
the prerogatives and honour of the freeborn. 
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Various factors, such as socio-cultural beliefs, wealth, knowledge, access, distance 
and social networks are practical factors that explain why some aspects of a slave past 
that were considered non-existent and illegal under national State Law for decades now 
live on today. This was demonstrated here with reference to manumission documents 
that continue to be issued in the Haayre region. Slave descendants who want to change 
their position have the option of resorting to manumission before Divine Law. Those 
who liberate themselves outside the religious realm, and even those who do so on their 
own initiative, risk the wrath of God. Islamic jurisprudence describes several legal 
procedures for slave descendants to liberate themselves. These do not result in liberty 
but in the liberation of people who are supposedly free citizens according to their 
national constitution.  
Under Customary Islamic Malikite Law, slave descendants can be freed from certain 
aspects of their condition but cannot become free in the way the freeborn are. For 
informants themselves, the causalities of what leads to what seem sometimes to be 
blurred: Explanations contradict each other and underscore the importance of contextual 
details such as timeframe, discourse and generational perspectives.  
In general, it is the religious elites who have access to the powerful ideological tools 
of Islamic knowledge and legislation that legitimizes and reproduces the cultural field 
of hierarchy. Over time, some slave descendants have turned this ideological tool to 
their own advantage. By manumitting or educating themselves, some have managed to 
achieve social recognition based on their religious piety. However, slave descendants 
have usually specialized in other forms of social recognition through (secret) knowledge 
(FF: Anndal) related to herbs and plants as bonngobi healers, tattooing or music 
making. Legal pluralism remained most beneficial to the religious and political elite 
who are able to use it to their advantage.  
Manumission documents issued by Islamic scholars formalize the new status of a 
slave (descendant) as a freed slave. Despite their legally acknowledged freedom 
according to national legislation, a minority of older slave descendants continue to 
liberate themselves to gain full recognition in close-knit religious communities. Manu-
mission for them is a culturally accepted strategy of inclusion and social promotion 
from within. Others view manumission as being instrumental to gaining access to 
fertility, property, inheritance, renaming, land, social authority and recognition, manu-
mitted marriage partners and the Hajj.  
To be freed does not equate being free. The promise of upward social mobility by 
liberation is only partial and a freed status does not equal free status. Manumission is all 
but helpful in obscuring the stigma of the rope and instead reframes slave stigma by 
optimizing the relative inclusion of slave descendants in the freeborn community. Those 
who engage in manumission are freed but they are not free and are still likely to be 
stigmatized as ‘children of the rope’. Manumission does not result in full 
enfranchisement. In local interpretations of Islamic legislation, systematic suppression 
of the stigma of slavery and dependency does not exist. In short, the liberation 
procedure appears to confirm the impossibility of complete freedom and independence.   
  Why is manumission for some slave descendants considered a culturally 
recognized strategy for obtaining social promotion within their home community? This 
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chapter has underlined how, legally, wealth can enable one to buy freedom but not 
nobility. Self-manumission does not result in gain in an economic or material realm but 
leads to social recognition in a cultural context where religious identification is central. 
Besides obtaining religious inclusion and cultural prestige, self-manumissions are about 
renegotiating social distances from within the cultural field of hierarchy.  
Finally the reasons why the majority of slave descendants do not engage in self-
manumission were considered. They have other strategies for obtaining social recogni-
tion and, unlike those who liberated themselves, they were able to rid themselves of 
stigma not by challenging existing religious boundaries but by bypassing and ignoring 
them. For some, especially the younger generation, mobility has enabled them to dis-
tance themselves from the cultural field of hierarchy. They have made money from 
engaging in seasonal or long-term (international) migration and this wealth automa-
tically makes them less dependant on interaction with the freeborn elite and a stig-
matized identity in their home community (cf. Boyer 2005). They obtain their social 
promotion from outside the cultural field of hierarchy. Others, especially the older 
generation, have specialized in niches such as healing, dancing and music-making. 
These groups are not interested in (self-) manumission because they have accessed a 
much broader array of alternatives for social promotion and have bypassed rather than 
renegotiated patron-client relations based on a slave past. They have other strategies for 
obtaining social recognition and, unlike those who liberated themselves, they have been 
able to rid themselves of stigma, not by challenging existing social boundaries but by 
distancing themselves from them or by challenging them. These renegotiations and the 
social promotion obtained from outside the logic of the cultural field of hierarchy will 





‘Having a road’ to mobility:  
Options to master one’s own mobility 
‘Moving is as commonplace as eating, those who move are no more remarkable and 
commonplace than those who eat’ (Rain 1999: 4). But however normal eating may be, it 
may be organized differently and can have different ingredients, ways of preparation, 
and it depends on environmental and economic resources available to different groups 
of people. What you eat demonstrates who you are, and mobility is no more natural or 
less cultural than cooking. Moving is a cultural process and when describing the 
movement of different social groups in Niger, Rossi (2009b: 182) points out that: ‘How 
one moves is an indicator of who one is’.  
That mobility is embedded in hierarchical power relations in the Sahel was already 
acknowledged by scholars who worked on migration in the 1970s. Tardits (1973) 
described how elites in the pre-colonial Grassfields region in Cameroon often had better 
and easier access to mobility than commoners who stayed in one place to work the land 
and, if necessary, changed their master rather than their place of residence. Later studies 
continued this line of reasoning. Manchuelle (1997: 186) described how Soninke elites 
in the west of Mali were often the first to enter new niches and careers that required 
movement and mobility.450 Only later on did their clients and slaves follow. Rossi 
(2009b: 183) demonstrated how in Niger too, clients and commoners had intersecting 
patterns of movement whereby clients engaged in ‘subordinate movement’ vis-à-vis 
elite groups. 
Mobility is thus part of the cultural field of hierarchy. This is an interesting insight 
related to the central question of this thesis, namely, how hierarchies travel and whether 
movement by slave descendants is dominated by the same power relations and stigma-
tizations they are subject to at ‘home’. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450  Manchuelle (1997: 186) describes how Soninke youngsters used to migrate from rural to rural areas 
on an individual basis and later moved to urban centres such as Dakar and Kayes where they engaged 
in wage labour, mostly in harbours (Saint Louis) and on railway-building projects. These connections 
eventually opened up opportunities for moving to France. 
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Since mobility is central to understanding the livelihoods and trajectories of groups 
of people in Africa (de Bruijn et al., 2001b) and in the Haayre region more specifically 
(de Bruijn & van Dijk 2001b & 2003a; de Bruijn et al., 2001a), it is vital to address it 
when analyzing social change. The introduction focussed on the Fulfulde concept of 
‘having a road’ (FF: Heɓude laawol) with the road as a metaphor for having access, 
being given opportunities or experiencing possibility and agency. Put simply ‘having a 
road’ underscores both the metaphoric road to (social) promotion and the literal road or 
having access to spatial movement. It underlines how advancement in life can 
correspond with mobility to other places: The road is a possible way out of existing 
constraint.  
This chapter analyzes who has access to mobility. What are the power relations that 
(used to) define the mobility of different status groups of Fulɓe? I demonstrate that the 
spatial and social mobility of former domestic slaves often remained ‘tied’ to that of 
their former Dicko masters in the municipalities of Joona, Booni and Dalla (Map 3).  
In the first section, I address the historical interrelations between power and mobility 
with a focus on the post-independence period. Then I move on to describe hosting to 
fully understand the linkages between status and movement. This is an institution that 
explains not only how status groups move but also towards whom people move. This 
will allow us to understand the conditionality of people’s mobility. 
The subsequent sections provide more concrete case material on the mobility of the 
freeborn, royal branches of the Dicko family in Dalla, Joona and Booni, and the 
mobility of their slave descendants. Although many Dicko family members in their 
home village remained relatively immobile, the descendants of semi-freeborn members 
of the Dicko families in each kingdom (Musa from Dalla, Hamadoun from Joona and 
Mustaphe from Booni) have been extremely mobile. Their independent itineraries 
(‘roads’) were possible thanks to education and politics. After addressing the roads of 
the Dicko family, a next section will zoom in on the itineraries travelled by the Kau 
family, the former royal slave descendants of the Dicko family in Dalla whose 
independent roads are mainly based on labour migration. After that, I describe how the 
spatial insertion of both groups of migrants in Bamako, i.e. their access to housing and 
hosting, reproduces the power relations between them. After a more general description 
of mobility and migration in Fulbe society, this chapter thus mainly focuses on the 
mobility of first-generation immigrants in the Kau-Dicko network who have settled in 
Bamako.451  
Contextualizing mobility:  
Histories of control over mobility in a stratified Fulɓe network  
This section analyzes the history of control over mobility by the freeborn families in the 
Haayre over their (former) slaves. An important aspect of the power of the ruling elites 
was that they had the monopoly on moral, bureaucratic and physical access to mobility 
for a long time. However new and controlling institutions, elites and political players, 
such as colonial and national governments, began to take over part of that control. Apart 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451  Chapter 7 focuses on second-generation Kau and Dicko immigrants in Bamako.  
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from permission and/or access to institutions regulating mobility, there were changes in 
the ways in which one could obtain resources to pay for transport, food and housing.452 
In the Central Malian Sahel in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Fulɓe wealth 
consisted of people and cattle rather than fixed assets or land. Cattle and people were 
obtained through raids, which necessarily demanded a mobile lifestyle. Wealth in 
people meant the wealth to delegate degrading tasks and this increased social status. 
The power of the Dicko family was established thanks to their control of the mobilities 
of several client groups, for example slaves who cultivated their fields and prepared 
food.  
Each status group had access to specific forms of mobility in pre-colonial Mali. The 
nomadic groups moved around with their cattle (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 111-166, 
223-330) and, for them, mobility was the norm rather than the exception (de Bruijn et 
al. 2001a). Before the arrival of the French, the freeborn Dicko family specialized in 
immobility rather than mobility. They were only mobile in order to engage in raids or 
tax collection on their territories, looking down on trade and physical labour such as 
cultivation and construction and outsourcing these forms of mobile labour to clients and 
other dependants. They ‘mastered’ the mobility of their clients.  
A concrete example is that of the Hajj. According to Islam, a slave’s pilgrimage is 
only valid on two conditions. The first condition is the manumission of the former slave 
and the second one is the official permission of the master. The freeborn Dicko family 
could officially control their slaves’ pilgrimages, which meant that mobility was thus 
embedded in power relations. In terms of mobility, specializing in the patriarchal style 
means controlling one’s own and other people’s mobility. To varying degrees, the 
ruling freeborn Dicko elites controlled the mobility of other social status groups, such as 
the pastoralist Jalluɓe who herded their cows, the Jaawamɓe who traded their slaves 
and cattle, and the slaves who provided them with labour. After forced movement 
following capture by Fulɓe warlords, slaves initially underwent a form of forced 
‘immobilization’ in their new host society. Forced immobility or ‘involuntary 
immobility’ (Carling 2002) means a lack of roads to access social, economic or political 
capitals. 
Due to newly emerging powerful movements, such as El Hajj Omar Tall’s Fuutanke 
Empire (Klein 1998: 49-52) and international governance under French colonial 
occupation (Klein 1999), the Dicko families in the Haayre region lost some of their 
power to master the movement of their slaves and clients. Most freeborn reacted con-
servatively to the introduction of schooling, national policies and the secular rule of law 
by the French. 
The relative peace resulting from under French colonial occupation was important  
so that people of all status groups could travel more safely. In certain urban areas of 
Mali, for example in Bamako and its surroundings, French colonial interventions 
directly loosened the control of the elites over their clients’ mobility. 
This was less so in Central Mali as the region was relatively unimportant and under-
equipped and was only governed by a few colonial officers. It was mostly the less 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452  The amount of money needed for transport has rapidly decreased over the last few decades and the 
remittances of those on the move have generated the chance for co-villagers to leave too. 
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powerful elites, such as Jaawamɓe traders and impoverished Jalluɓe herdsmen, who 
lost considerable power over their domestic slaves from colonial occupation onwards. 
Their slave descendants decided to detach themselves from their masters, ‘voting with 
their feet’ for more freedom and moving out of the orbit of their masters’ power. Some 
moved only a short distance, while others left the country or tried their luck in the 
capital, Bamako.  
In contrast, the control of the ruling elites over their domestic slaves was criticized 
but accepted by the colonizers. The French prohibited the accumulation of new slaves 
and curbed the mobility of the elites453 but, due to indirect rule, felt obliged to accept 
domestic slavery in this economically ‘under-developed’ region. This explains why the 
oldest generation of domestic slaves in Dalla recall their emancipation as slaves at the 
royal court only starting in the 1950s and not from colonial abolition in 1905 onwards. 
Colonial governments did however offer their subjects new roads or options for 
movement. The harshness of French forced labour (Cooper 1996; Fall) combined with 
several plagues and droughts led to the migration of the inhabitants of the French 
colonial Sudan to the British colonies.454 Demands for taxes also encouraged labour 
migration.455 The French colonial government created large-scale plantations with single 
crops, such as the ‘Peanut Basin’456 in Senegal and rice in the ‘Office du Niger’ in 
Mali.457 The demand for labour was high on these plantations and offered immigrants 
the chance to earn the money they needed to pay their taxes back home. Labour 
migration could range from permanent to seasonal. 
Since labour has always been a slave’s main capital, labour migration was an im-
portant alternative road for slaves if they wanted to leave hierarchical master-slave 
relationships behind.458 Manchuelle (1997: 129) argues that about 75% of the migrants 
to West African cities from the 1930s onwards were slaves.  
Another road to (social) mobility created by the colonial government was education. 
Some of the freeborn elite families were initially wary of sending their own children to 
the French colonial schools and sent their slaves’ children instead. However they came 
to realize that these slave children had gained a ‘double advantage’ (Cf. Mauxion 2008) 
by becoming part of the national administration as a result of having had a good edu-
cation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453  The colonial regime reduced existing flexibilities and pluralities of movement due to border policies 
(de Bruijn 2007: 118). The freedom of freeborn to conduct the Hajj was for example curbed because 
of increased border controls between the French and British colonies. 
454  Dougnon (2007) describes how Dogon farmers from Douentza province (Map 2, see introductory 
chapter) migrated to the Gold Coast (now Ghana). 
455  Manchuelle (1997: 4-8) gives an overview of the literature on labour migration in West Africa. 
456  See Moitt (1989) on the slavery and emancipation in the Senegal’s peanut basin.  
457  This project was initiated by the French colonizers in 1939 and taken over by the socialist Malian 
state. For more detailed information on L’Office du Niger, see Dougnon (2007: 75-83).  
458  Mobility resulting from droughts and labour migration has been analyzed by various academics as an 
important incentive for the (further) emancipation of former slave groups in different regions. See for 
example, Georg-Deutsch (2003: 186; 2006) for East Africa; Klein (1998) for West Africa; Ruf (2000) 
for Mauritania; Manchuelle (1997) and Pollet & Winter (1971; 1978) for West Mali; and de Bruijn & 
van Dijk (1995a) for Central Mali. 
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‘Having a road’ from independence onwards 
After independence from France, the national Malian government mastered the mobility 
of the Dicko family. The life history of Hamadoun Dicko is taken here as a starting 
point to explain post-colonial developments in the national government’s mobility poli-
cies.  
 
Hamadoun459 Dicko: Royal intellectual at Mali’s independence 
As a freeborn prince from the royal Dicko family in the former Fulɓe kingdom of 
Joona, Hamadoun had the privilege of being involved early in a new niche for social 
mobility created by the colonial state through education in French. In the years 
preceding Malian independence, Hamadoun Dicko, who was born in 1924 as the oldest 
son of the ten children of the chief of the Fulɓe Kingdom of Joona, had become an 
important national politician. His career started off with a French education at the Lycée 
de Terrasson de Fougères à Bamako460 (L’Echo du Mali 2006: 18). After teaching in 
Bafoulabe (Kolokani),461 he was asked by PSP, one of the first political parties, to be 
Député du Sudan. In 1951 at the age of 27, he moved to France where he had several 
positions as secretary and deputy minister of different departments, reflecting his 
personal preference for education and research.462 Hamadoun Dicko's move to France to 
pursue his educational and political career was not an isolated case. Although 
Hamadoun and his fellow students only stayed in France temporarily, many Malian 
labourers, soldiers and colonial assistants stayed permanently. 
Back in Mali, conflicts over positions of power and political agendas were hotting 
up. The socialist regime of Moodibo Keita and the ruling USRDA463 party were serious 
about ending slave status, not least because many of the administrators knew the 
legacies of slavery personally, being of slave descent themselves.464 Hamadoun’s PSP 
party was conservative on these issues as it was made up of many prominent traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459  Although in other personal names I opt for using the Fulfulde spelling which would be “Hamadun”, in 
this case I opt for using the French spelling, because Hamadoun Dicko is a public figure after whom 
several buildings are named in French spelling. Same goes for his son, who is called Umar in 
Fulfulde, but Oumar in French spelling. Since he was an important national politician I also stick to 
French spelling for his name.  
460  Another source (archives M162 (23.11.57) referred to by anonymous author in: L’Echo du Mali 
(2006: 16) suggests he attended the Ecole Normale de William Ponty in Dakar, but this has not been 
confirmed by his family members. 
461  Kolokani is the hometown of Fily Drabo Cissoko, where Hamadoun and Fily Drabo met.  
462  He was secretary of the national assembly and became Deputy Minister (French: Sous-sécretaire 
d’état) of Industry and Commerce. In 1956 he became Deputy Minister in charge of the Advisory 
Board of Scientific Research and Technical Progress (French: Sous-sécretaire d’état à la présidence 
du conseil). From 1957 onwards, he was State Secretary of French Overseas Territories (French: 
Sécretaire d’état à la France d’Outre-Mer) and in 1958 he was State Secretary of National Education 
(archives M162 (23.11.57)/archives Paul Dehème, 9.XII.19 (D.B.-A.N.) referred to by anonymous 
author in: L’Echo du Mali (2006: 16).  
463  US-RDA = Union Soudanaise - Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple. Part of the URDA became 
ADEMA (Alliance pour la Démocratie du Mali).  
464  Since many slaves were sent to French schools by their masters. A concrete example of their attempts 
to end slave status is their downplaying of the legacy of Islamic laws that forbid slaves to inherit from 
their kin, as slave property supposedly belonged to their masters (Berndt 2008: 290-291). See Lecocq 
(2005) for an overview of Malian politics at independence in the context of legacies of slavery. 
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elites who were generally not keen to let their clients go. Mawludu Dicko, one of 
Hamadoun’s paternal cousins, remembers how the PSP was considered as ‘the party of 
the slave traders and collaborators of the colonial regime’ between 1946 and 1958. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 8, it was the party of some Dickos and their slave descendants 
from Dalla (see also de Bruijn & Pelckmans, 2005). 
By taking part in demonstrations against the new Malian currency,465 Hamadoun and 
other PSP party leaders were accused of acting against the national government’s 
interests (Le Monde, 21 July 1962). They were seen as a threat because of their loyalty 
to France around the time of independence. After being condemned to death by the 
popular court in Bamako (Le Monde, 24 July 1962), the PSP leaders were sent to work 
camps in Kidal, which is where Hamadoun Dicko was killed by the governing USRDA 
party in 1964.466 
The injustice done to Hamadoun Dicko and his family by Moodibo Keita’s regime is 
still vivid in the memories of the Dicko family.467 The first Malian Republic severely 
restricted the mobility of the Dickos. Hamadoun Dicko's brother-in-law Musa Dicko (an 
educated semi-freeborn) was, for example, sent out by the USRDA government to teach 
in villages in Mali’s remotest regions.468 These forced short-term transfers were the fate 
that many Dickos faced in their position as teaching functionaries (French: Cadres) in 
this period.469  
 
A first and second Malian Republic 
While the French improved security and thus the mobility of their subjects, socialist 
President Moodibo Keita (1960-1968) actively curbed certain forms of mobility by 
reintroducing laisser-passers, these travel documents were much more difficult to 
obtain than the former French colonial ID cards (Gary-Tounkara 2003). Moodibo 
wanted to prevent any further rural exodus and incited Malian emigrants to return to the 
land. The Segou-based Office du Niger 470 attracted a lot of rice cultivators on the banks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465  The USRDA and PSP disagreed over the introduction of a Malian Franc in 1962. The USRDA wanted 
an independent Malian currency (Franc Malien) but the PSP pleaded for gradual independence by 
remaining within West African monetary union (FCFA) (Diallo 2005; Diallo et al., 2005).  
466  Various sources: Interviews with Dicko family members (Mawludu, Bamako 2005; Musa Dicko, 
2001-2007; Samba Dicko 2005-2008). Anonymous author in ‘L’écho du Mali’ 2006 (20): 18-19; 
Malian newspaper L’Essor, special issue Mali 2000 (1999: 23) with a picture of Hamadoun Dicko. 
467  A first step towards reconciliation was a meeting in December 2005 organized by the French 
Embassy. Hamadoun Dicko’s son, Oumar, obtained a medal of honour but was frustrated because the 
former RDA (current URD) refused full acknowledgement of murder, suggesting instead that their 
political opponents died accidentally.   
468  Musa Dicko described his life history in a letter to de Bruijn & van Dijk in the 1990s.  
469  Mawludu from Joona (Bamako 2005) was forced to move in five years’ time from Bankas to Mopti 
(two months) to Sevare, to Djenne and finally to Djah when the coup took place in 1968. After the 
coup, he was transferred to Bamako where he has stayed ever since. Also Usmane from Joona 
(currently living with Hamadoun Dicko’s son Oumar in Bamako, described on following page) was 
transferred to work in a different place each six months. Ibrahim Dicko, a direct family member of 
Hamadoun Dicko, was killed by the RDA opposition party on his return to Mali because he fought on 
the side of the French, which the RDA still considered ‘the enemy’, in the Algerian war.  
470  This project was initiated by French colonizers in 1939 and taken over by the socialist Malian state. 
For more information on L’Office du Niger, see Dougnon (2007: 75-83).  
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of the River Niger. Access to French education was soon discouraged by the socialist 
regime, which was much more oriented towards Russia, China and Libya.471  
Hamadoun’s son Oumar remembers how he never felt safe during the First Malian 
Republic and only started to relax after the coup by Musa Traore in 1968. Traore then 
prosecuted prominent USRDA members who could no longer upset the Dickos. In 
short, the first years of independence were turbulent for the Dicko family; they lost 
significant control over thei clients, not only due to their absence but also due to their 
own powerlessness vis-à-vis the Malian government.  
Dictator Traore’s repressive regime (1968-1991) impeded mobility outside Mali and 
favoured movement towards the capital city (Brand 2001: 39-40) as it needed urban 
labourers for its industrialization projects. The small-scale, cross-border trade between 
Central Mali and Burkina Faso decreased, while migration to urban centres increased. 
Economic decline coincided with major droughts during much of the 1970s and 
1980s472 and for many inhabitants of the Haayre, these were the symbolic straw that 
broke the camel’s back. Poor villagers moved to small cities, such as Bandiagara and 
Douentza. Dikoore, a slave-descending women from Dalla,473 for example, went to 
Douentza to get food from the international NGOs there and, in 1985, barely managing 
to survive, decided to travel on with her two-year-old twins to Mopti to beg. Giving 
alms to twins in Mali is considered to bring good luck but when one of the twin girls 
died of malnutrition, Dikoore had to return to her village empty-handed. 
The droughts and Moussa Traore’s regime accelerated urbanization on a national 
scale.474 The droughts brought new NGO money and administrative functions to towns 
like Douentza475 that attracted the destitute (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a). The majority 
of those who settled in the cities were slave descendants of impoverished noble families 
who could no longer sustain themselves as a result of the droughts. In Dalla and Joona, 
those freeborn, for example the ruling Dicko families, who managed to lean on their 
slaves remained relatively immobile, even in times of droughts.476 
Several status groups in Fulɓe society opted to settle in urban centres: Pastoralists, 
traders, praise singers, slave-descending cultivators and weavers. Many weaving slave 
descendants from Joona settled in Bamako where their products were valued by other 
ethnic groups and colonial officers. Other slave descendants from Booni, Dalla and 
Joona moved to Segou where they worked, for example, as painters or cultivators in the 
Office du Niger. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471  All three countries made bursaries available to Malian students. Many Malians in their forties and 
fifties today enjoyed an education in Libya, Russia or China. 
472  The severe droughts of the 1970s (1972-1973) and 1980s (1984-1986) led to a profound crisis in 
many Sahelian countries and in the already arid Haayre region. 
473  Dikoore Tambura, married to Seydu (one of the Kau descendants), interview with interpreter Umu 
Sangare, Dalla, 2001-2002. 
474  Zondag (2005: 170-172) describes the dynamics behind the growth of rural towns in Mali. 
475  Today, people from the surrounding areas are settling in Douentza, not only for economic reasons but 
also due to the presence of schools, healthcare facilities and employment possibilities (Zondag 2005: 
174-176). 
476  The exceptions were however those Dicko’s who pursued their educational careers, obtained degrees 
and became teachers or politicians.  
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The colonial period and independence allowed much more leeway for slave 
descendants to conduct the Hajj both with or without their masters’ consent. The imam 
of Dalla describes how the first slaves who left for Mecca were slaves from the estates 
who had become relatively rich and manumitted themselves from their impoverished 
pastoralist Fulɓe masters in the 1980s.477 So although some groups of slave descendants 
‘had a road’ to Mecca, tellingly none of the Kau descendants to date has ever conducted 
the Hajj.  
Increased mobilities after independence 
Pastoralist mobility with cattle in the Fulfulde dialect of Central Malian is called 
Eggude (to move and resettle).478 For (labour) migration in a much broader sense and as 
related to youngsters going on adventure, three notions are central: Yuultoyde (FF) 
which means leaving for somewhere else or emigrating,479 ferrude (FF) which is leaving 
in search for a better life, and the third notion is fagoaade (FF) which puts more 
emphasis on leaving in search of money and good luck. The most all-encompassing 
notion that is used and seems to apply to any category of moving people is dawde (FF), 
which was translated as ‘travelling’ by my informants.  
Mobility in the Sahel has often been explained as historical adaptation to the climate 
and the environment but the plurality of forms of mobility in this region can no longer 
be denied (de Bruijn 2007: 110-111). Reasons for migrating, often to towns like Dou-
entza and cities like Bamako, are not only drought, poverty and disdain for heavy ma-
nual labour in the fields but also work, education, curiosity, religion, trade, governance 
and youth culture. 
Most informants indicate that the 1980s, and especially the 1990s, saw a rapid 
increase in emigrants in the Haayre region. Some mention the 1991 military coup that 
finally brought Traore’s dictatorial regime to an end as an important incentive for new 
forms of migration. Following the elections, Alpha Oumar Konare became president 
and agreed to decentralize politics. By the end of the 1990s, this had generated new 
hopes, reinvigorated the participation of young intellectuals in their country’s future and 
opened Mali up to new international opportunities.480 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477  He mentions El Hajj Bucary Padjo from the village of Torbani who left on foot in 1936, just like El 
Hajj Arsuke from the village of Bara-Aoussi who went in 1938. See also chapter 5 for more info on 
slave descendants from dalla who conducted the hajj. 
478  According to Ciavolella (2008), most studies on pastoralist Fulɓe focus on the classification of 
mobility in terms of the distances that Fulɓe undertake. Stenning (1959: 142) in his study on Wodaaɓe 
Fulɓe of Niger notes how transhumance (‘regular seasonal movements’) are translated as Kodol. 
Migratory drift, defined as ‘the gradual displacement of transhumance orbits’ is rendered in Fulfulde 
as eggol (Egga: To wonder). Migration defined as the ‘assumption of new transhumance orbits by a 
sudden and often lengthy movement is translated as perol (fera: To flee). However, the focus here is 
on sedentarized Fulɓe and attention to detailed vocabularies of movement is not required.  
479  I discussed these notions with Amadu Amiiru Dicko by email in November 2008. In his French 
translations, the notions are translated as follows: Dawde = voyager; eggude = déménager; juultoyde 
= aller en exode, émigrer; faggaade = aller chercher fortune; ferude = aller en exile. 
480  De Bruijn (2007: 118-119) also mentions various reasons why both rural-rural and rural-urban migra-
tion of Fulɓe in the Malian Sahel region increased. 
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The majority of Fulɓe labour migrants from the Haayre region living in Bamako are 
slave-descending Riimaayɓe who formerly belonged to (impoverished) freeborn 
Jaawamɓe traders or pastoralist Jalluɓe families. The main incentive for the migration 
of slave descendants is labour. Keleere’s story below indicates how as slave 
descendants of Jaawamɓe traders, his family accumulated enough wealth to move 
independently of their master. Keleere is also a typical example of how a temporal 
seasonal labour immigrant in Bamako can become a more permanent resident in the 
city. 
According to Keleere, historically, it was his master’s social group, that of the 
trading Jaawamɓe, who were always mobile. They were a specialized group who visited 
new destinations to barter goods over long distances. Today, trade has become an 
accepted activity for various status groups, even for freeborn noblemen who used to 
look down on trade and traders. Keleere started moving to Bamako for seasonal labour 
in 1992 and since 1999 has been living there permanently with his wife, her brother and 
his own brother. He pays employers back home to cultivate his land and in Bamako he 
has become an important host for co-villagers from Dalla. 
Keleere was born in 1964 as the son of a well-to-do family of former slaves who 
used to belong to traders (FF: Maccuɓe Jaawamɓe). He stresses that he never worked in 
the service of someone else and his family became independent quite early on, earning 
money from the Burkina-Mali cross-border trade. As a youngster, Keleere used to sell 
sugar, tea and cigarettes walking from hamlet to hamlet and managed to save enough to 
go to Burkina Faso where he continued with petty trade and made good money. Dictator 
Mousa Traore’s regime however controlled border trade much more closely and many 
traders lost all their goods to corrupt customs officials. This is when Keleere decided to 
make seasonal labour trips to Bamako. Today he pasteurizes the fresh milk of Ja-
waamɓe traders from Nioro du Sahel and sells it by riding from compound to compound 
on his bicycle. 
Apart from political changes, the 1990s heralded the unprecedented emergence of 
several new technologies in the Haayre region, many of which have in some way 
democratized access to mobility.481 The tarred road between Bamako and Gao was 
completed in 1986 and faster, easier and cheaper travel came within the reach of 
many.482 Bard Baa Digi describes how when the road was still untarred, it took three 
days to get from Douentza to Dalla (35 km), especially during the rainy season (Ange-
nent et al. 1998).  
An informant of slave descent483 explains the increase in labour migrants over the 
past decades as a need for cash: ‘In Dalla life is difficult (FF: Ana tiidi) since cultiva-
tion is not lucrative enough these days (FF: Demal wanaa nafal hannde) and one needs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481  Connection to the cell-phone network in the Haayre region from 2004 onwards has minimized the 
distance between ‘home’ and ‘away’. Television and cameras contribute to local imaginaries of ‘else-
where’ and generate the desire to ‘see with one’s own eyes’. 
482  Alu Paate Tambura (interview, Segou, 2007) said: ‘Before people migrated less, they were afraid of 
being killed. There was no road to Douentza before 1945 and thus it was ... dangerous to undertake a 
trip elsewhere.’ With the tarred road from Bamako to Gao finished (during Traore’s rule), people 
started travelling more. 
483  Amadu Hama Dauda, interview, Bamako, 2005. 
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money to pay for food and invest in animals. Youngsters feel forced to leave their 
villages to work in the cities.’ The consumer goods that migrants bring back encourage 
others to leave. 
Slave-descending youngsters are increasingly engaging in seasonal migration to the 
bigger cities, especially Bamako. They migrate in the dry season but come back in May 
to assist with cultivating their family’s lands and in October or November, when the 
harvest is in, they leave again for the urban areas.  
The labour migrants today are younger than before and sometimes children as young 
as ten are leaving. A decade ago, the minimum age was about fifteen. They have 
various reasons for leaving (de Bruijn & van Dijk 2000b: 41-62) but most consider the 
sense of adventure (partir en aventure) as most central to the (seasonal) migration of 
male youngsters. Their migration is a metaphor for initiation into the world and one 
which entails accessing new sources of knowledge such as languages, consumer goods 
and ideas.484 The worldly orientation of Haayre’s youth today is well illustrated by the 
way youngsters from Dalla have rebaptized their home village ‘Dallas’.485 The setting 
up of an association of emigrants from Dalla in Bamako in 1998 testified to the 
increased number settling there. 
The majority of the international migrants from the Haayre region today go to 
Malabo, the capital of Equatorial Guinea.486 Any youngster in Dalla knows the exact 
costs and various hosts on the road to Equatorial Guinea by heart. Malians from the 
Kayes region also moved to France before and after independence (Daum 1998; 
Manchuelle 1997), and two-thirds of the West African migrants who went ‘all the way 
to France’ (FF: Faa Leydi Franci) are from the Senegal River region (Fiévet 1999: 
22).487  
Very few emigrants from the Haayre region went to France.488 One of the reasons for 
this is that there are no existing networks for them to rely on when moving abroad489 
and where people go is defined by their social networks, the experience of co-villagers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
484  Male Riimaayɓe seasonal labourers interviewed in Bamako explained how they learn a lot about the 
real world as they face the hardships of coping with a different language, the difficulties of establish-
ing new contacts and finding a job, the dangers of being robbed or misled by others and the problem 
of not having anywhere to sleep but the streets. 
485  Also, during their campaign in the municipal elections in April-May 2009, some Dicko youngsters in 
Dalla compared their efforts and dedication to politics with Obama’s. They described themselves as 
‘young Obamas’, who give hope for a better future for the citizens of ‘Dallas’. Phone conversations 
from Netherlands with Demba Dicko, Bamako, 2009 and Amadu Amiiru Dicko, Douentza, 2009. 
486  Dougnon (2007) explains how Congo and Angola that were popular destinations throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s have declined in importance because of civil wars and an oversaturation of immigrants in 
Angola’s lucrative diamond mines. Equatorial Guinea started to attract a lot of migrants in the mid 
1990s because of its newly discovered oil and gas fields. See:  
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/7221.htm, accessed March 2009. 
487  This is according to Tribalat in his study De l’immigration à l’assimilation quoted by Fiévet (1999: 
17-18) on the official numbers of African immigrants in France. Population censuses indicate a strong 
increase per decade from 9,000 in 1964 to over 43,000 in 1974 and 178,000 in 1980-1984.  
488  As will be demonstrated, those who did are mainly freeborn Dickos. Hamadoun Dicko and Musa 
Dicko both have daughters who have settled more permanently in France. 
489  As opposed to Soninke and ethnic groups in West Mali who had a much longer history of travel to the 
French colonial motherland (Manchuelle 1997). 
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and family and the information available. Hosting is central in defining people’s 
destinations and possibilities for migration. 
The njaatigiya principle: Moving towards hosts 
Hosting is an important aspect of mobility and is a central institution for ethnic groups 
in the West African context who share the same terminology. Njaatigi literally means 
‘to host’490 and is someone who makes a visitor’s stay possible. The word as it is used 
in Fulfulde is borrowed from the Bambara language (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1997: 255) 
and its linguistic hybridity indicates in itself the interethnic aspect of most host-guest 
relations. Fulɓe pastoralists in the Haayre region, for example, tend to have hosts among 
Dogon, Riimaayɓe, Songhay and Hummbeeɓe in the plains of Seeno down south (Map 
3).  
One of the main reasons why hosts preferably need to be from another social group 
is the ideology of shame (FF: Yaage) (de Bruijn 2000: 20, 24).491 To avoid activities 
that might lead to feelings of shame (eating, sleeping, defecating), it is important to 
have a fixed host from an ethnic group where shame is not an issue or is less 
pronounced. Another source of shame can be poverty, which is why poor people prefer 
to be hosted by another social group towards whom shame will be less strongly felt 
rather than their own close kin (brother or sisters). 
There are elaborate networks of njaatigi-hood in the Haayre region. In every major 
village that a person regularly visits, he needs a njaatigi to be able to stay. This is a 
relationship between male heads of families that last over several generations and are 
passed on from father to son (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995a: 161; de Bruijn 1998: 24). 
Being married is an important criterion to becoming a host. Hosts contribute to feelings 
of belonging, which are based on social relations rather than on fixed entities, such as 
land (de Bruijn 2007: 125). Most people will have a host in every village they visit 
regularly. In order to be able to study at the school in Booni in the 1970’s, several 
members of the Dicko family in Dalla were, for example, hosted by a family of praise 
singers from Booni. 
The host-guest relationship has material and social advantages (de Bruijn & van Dijk 
1997: 255). First it is an institutionalization of the complementary, reciprocal cultivator-
pastoralist exchange of products whereby the cows and milk of Fulɓe pastoralists are 
exchanged for millet and other agricultural products. The cultivator-pastoralist couple 
can span interethnic relations (Dogon hosting Fulɓe)492 or intra-ethnic relations, with 
cultivating slave populations hosting freeborn masters.493 Often people eat and stay with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
490  A host is someone who receives a traveller in a place far from home. Feeding and housing the travel-
ler are the obligations of the host.  
491  For a more general description of shame relations as interpreted by the various ethnic groups in the 
sub-region, see Breedveld & de Bruijn  (1996). Shame is strongest within one’s own social group and 
is then referred to as ndewru (FF). 
492  Since Dogon cultivators were the first to move to Equatorial Guinea, most Fulɓe who came later are 
hosted by Dogon. This is thus a typical interethnic njaatigi network. 
493  During tax collections, it is typically the Dicko elite who are hosted by ‘their’ slaves who host them in 
the most superb conditions, spoiling their former masters with lavish meals and a lot of milk in the 
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their njaatigi when visiting a market or when on business in another town and some-
times poor people will look for work with their wealthier host. The material advantages 
of staying with a host are, however, less pronounced or even non-existent in cities. 
There the njaatigi relationship is much less an exchange or economic relationship (de 
Bruijn & van Dijk, 1995a: 161) but is instead social and secures the identity and status 
of the visitor. Thanks to one’s njaatigi relationship, a person is not a complete outsider 
or stranger. 
When travelling, having a njaatigi host reduces the risks of downward social 
mobility related to strangerhood. The host takes care of his visitor’s respectability and 
social needs, and maintaining respectability avoids shame in the new environment. 
Since shame relations exist between same-status group members, one is preferably 
hosted by a different social status group to avoid shame. For example, slave descendants 
and/or pastoralists host religious and political elites, and vice versa. The less shame 
there is between host and guest, the more freedom there is for the guest involved.494 
Only if one has parental relations is being hosted by kin of the same social status 
group possible. For example, if a slave descendant who lives in the hamlet of Aoussi 
(see Map 5) goes to the market in Dalla, he will not be hosted by his sister because after 
she got married she will have settled with her husband’s family (virilocal) who are 
people towards whom he might have feelings of shame. Instead he will prefer to go to 
his former masters (FF: Weeheeɓe) or his male kin members.  
The people central to one’s network of potential hosts are, in principle, hereditary 
and established njaatigi relations need to be respected. Even if your best friend lives in 
Douentza or New York and you travel to visit him, it would be considered a grave insult 
if you slept at this friend’s house rather than at your family’s traditional host’s home. 
One does not have to have dinner with one’s njaatigi host but not spending the night 
there would be an offence.  
The historical host-visitor relationships between specific families can be stretched to 
the cities and other places. Most households in Bamako host relatives and neighbours 
from their home region, often youngsters who are studying or working (Brandt 2001: 
42). Most migrants who leave for Bamako opt for hosts among close family members 
(brothers and sisters) for lack of existing inter- or intra-ethnic njaatigi relations.  
In summary, people do not move randomly and hardly ever settle on their own 
without pre-existing social ties in their new place of residence. They move within a 
network of hosts to reduce vulnerability and any risk of downward social mobility.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
hope of their loyalty being rewarded with lower official community tax payments and bureaucratic 
assistance in times of need.  
494  The son of the chief of Dalla, Amadu Amiiru, was hosted by a trading family in Booni. In this family, 
Amadu had many fewer rules to observe than his host’s own children. Since he is from a higher social 
group and from Dalla, which is higher in rank than the village of Booni, people had to respect him and 




Roads to mobility for the Kau and Dicko families  
This section considers the historical appreciation of mobility and immobility, and the 
new mobility created by regime change and its effect on the Dicko and Kau families in 
Dalla. Colonial governance provided citizens with alternative ‘roads’ for mobility by 
building actual roads and increasing security. Colonial officers also introduced educa-
tion and labour migration, which prompted more mobility. As the descriptions of each 
family network illustrate, the Dicko family specialized in educational mobility, while 
the Kau family focused on labour migration.  
 
Itineraries travelled by the Dicko family 
The fact that hierarchy is ‘expressed in relative control over one’s own and other 
people’s mobility’ (Rossi 2009: 182) is evident in the history of the Dicko family who 
ruled over the rural communities of the Haayre region. Their settlement required control 
over the mobility and labour of others and during French colonial occupation, the Dicko 
elites stayed largely in one area, controlling the movement of their clients and domestic 
slaves.  
Those among the freeborn political elite (FF: Weeheeɓe) who did become mobile 
were the semi-noble sons of slave concubines (see Chapter 3) who were sent to French 
schools.495 The most conservative rulers in the Haayre region thus sent their slave 
children instead of their own noble sons to school (Angenent et al. 1998: 100). In Dalla, 
King Yerowal decided to send a Dogon called Sambo Ongoiba from one of his slave 
estates plus two of his semi-freeborn children, Musa and Nassuru, which he had with a 
slave concubine, to school. Booni’s king also opted to send the semi-freeborn children 
he had with slave concubines to the French schools. One of the semi-freeborn children 
he sent to school was Mustaphe Dicko. Joona’s king was much more positively inclined 
towards the French colonial rulers and trusted his own freeborn children to French 
schools. Two of these children are Hamadoun Dicko and Mawludu Dicko. Thanks to 
the French education of their semi-freeborn children, the royal Dicko family managed to 
maintain their precious stability and political power. Education was for these semi-
freeborn Dicko family members a way to claim a more central position in the royal 
Dicko family. Over time it even allowed these intellectuals to control the mobility of 
their own clients. 
The remainder of this section focuses on the itineraries of the mobile members and 
their children.496 In retrospect, the major source of power for the semi-freeborn Dicko 
family members was the fact that they had taken roads out of the village into education 
as it was through education that they managed to accumulate wealth in and control over 
people (see Chapter 8). French education turned out to have a double advantage as it 
reinforced the power of the Dicko family over their dependents, politics and land. 497 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495  The example of Hamadoun Dicko from Joona shows that there were exceptions to this rule. The King 
of Joona did not see the French colonizers as an enemy.  
496  These early intellectuals are a product of the colonial administration and remain exceptions among the 
freeborn in their village of origin. A lot of freeborn villagers have never been to school and will never 
obtain a primary-school certificate.  
497  Mauxion (2008: 158) describes the same advantages for the educated Songhay elites near Gao. 
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The fact that it was mainly the political Fulɓe elites (the Dicko family) who mono-
polized access to schooling in the Haayre region is reflected in the board of DEENTAL, 
the students’ association of Douentza, where seven of the fourteen members were from 
the Dicko family in 2007. In short, the majority of the descendants of the semi-freeborn 
sons of the Dicko kings of Joona, Dalla and Booni continue to specialise in French 
education.  
All the educated Dickos who went to school in colonial times have become impor-
tant politicians. Semi-freeborn Mustaphe Dicko from Booni first moved to Burkina 
Faso as Mali’s ambassador and later became a Member of Parliament for the Douentza 
region for much of the 1980s and 1990s. He founded a secondary school in Douentza 
and primary schools in the smaller villages in the Haayre were built in the late 1980s.498 
Possibilities for schooling arrived quite late in Dalla, which explains why most of its 
inhabitants are still illiterate today. Even the mayor nominated in 2009 is almost illi-
terate. 
Sambo Ongoiba became a deputy MP for the Douentza region from 1978 to 1988. 
Nassuru died young but Musa Dicko had a very successful career as a teacher and later 
as the director of several schools, ending his career as the (elected) mayor of Dalla. He 
broke away from his father’s traditional political party (ADEMA), much to the regret 
and anger of his father, King Yerowal. This caused much gossip but Musa was always 
active in the PSP, inspired from the outset by the successful career of his brother-in-law 
Hamadoun Dicko. In 2002, Musa became mayor of Dalla by managing to get the 
support of the majority of the Kau slave descendants who, out of loyalty as maternal 
family members, voted for the party. Although at independence the PSP was considered 
to be the political party of the conservative elite who wanted to keep their slaves, semi-
freeborn Musa Dicko in Dalla turned this image upside down and democratized access 
to the party for many of his slave-descending family members.  
The Dicko family gained prestige in President Amadou Toumani Toure’s regime 
(2002-now). In Joona, the son of Prince Hamadoun Dicko, called Oumar Dicko, 
continued his father’s PSP political tradition and became a minister in Amadou 
Toumani Toure’s government from 2002-2007. During the 2007 campaigns, President 
Amadou Toumani Toure visited Dalla to express his condolences to the deceased imam 
in person. Madame Dicko, Musa’s eldest daughter became the MP for the Douentza 
region in 2007. A year later, in 2008, the president visited Dalla to pay tribute to 
Madame Dicko’s deceased father and Dalla’s mayor, Musa Dicko.  
So far only the mobility and education of male Dickos have been discussed, partly 
because studies that trace the history of migration are often male biased. Contemporary 
studies increasingly show that women have always migrated just as much as men.499 
Thanks to their privileged position, noble Dicko women have been able to outsource 
their mobility and work to others.500 Today they see the importance of their lack of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498  As indicated in Chapter 2, a primary school was established in Booni in the 1950s, while the first 
school in Dalla was only built in 1986 and even later in Joona.  
499  For examples of the historical mobility of women in West Mali, see Rodet (2009). The recent trend 
has been for an increased ‘feminization of migration’ (Castles & Miller 2009: 12). 
500  This is still reflected in the restricted movement of noble Weeheeɓe women who ideally should not be 
seen in public locations, such as markets. 
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mobility as being based on Islamic prescriptions and insist that they would never allow 
their daughters to move out of the village, work in the service of others or live by 
themselves. Only in the context of marriage are noble women allowed to move. The 
strong discourse on female nobility discourages female migration in the Dicko network. 
The French notion of partir en aventure is never used to describe female migration.  
Here again, the exceptions are the children of (semi-freeborn) Dickos who moved. 
The daughters of the educated Dicko families of Musa (Dalla), Hamadoun (Joona) and 
Mustaphe (Booni) all now live in cities. Musa Dicko’s children settled in Bamako and 
Segou, and one of his daughters, called Kadji Musa Dicko has been living and working 
in France for about fifteen years. If he were still alive, Hamadoun Dicko could have met 
up with his own daughter, Kadji Hamadoun Dicko, in Paris who has also been living 
with her husband Mamadu Dicko and their three children in a Parisian suburb for over 
thirty years now. Most of these freeborn women, such as Madame Dicko moved out of 
their hometowns in pursuit of their higher education.  
In conclusion, this particular branch of semi-freeborn Dicko family became mobile 
thanks to their early involvement in French colonial education. The noble Dicko family 
members who have remained in Dalla looked down on French education for a long time 
and, paradoxically, the fact that they sent the semi-freeborn children in their midst to 
French schools in the end turned out to lead to the inverse of what the freeborn Dicko 
family members would have envisaged. Instead of excluding the semi-freeborn from 
positions of power back home by sending them off to study with the French, the effect 
has been precisely the opposite.  
The semi-freeborn Dickos have become mayors, chiefs and MPs in their home 
villages and regions. Musa and Mustaphe have benefitted from their education and their 
double descent enlarged their social network on the paternal side of the family through 
their royal father and on their maternal side of slave descendants.501  
The descendants of Hamadoun (and Mawludu) Dicko in Joona have all completed a 
French education. In Dalla, all twelve sons and daughters of Musa Dicko graduated 
from university and are living in cities around the world. The children of this avant-
garde elite have gained a monopoly on educational mobility and this put them in an 




Itineraries travelled by the slave-descending Kau family  
Colonialism diminished the control of the Dicko family over the (mobility of) their 
domestic slaves (Kau family). The Kau family and other former domestic slaves closely 
related to their powerful masters generally remained immobile. Former estate slaves 
(FF: Riimaayɓe Haayre) always enjoyed more freedom of movement because they lived 
in independent settlements at some distance from their masters and cultivation is only 
possible for four months of the year, which leaves them time for other (seasonal) 
occupations. These slaves, who belonged to impoverished pastoralists and tradesmen, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
501  Historian Valsecchi (2009) raised this ‘double advantage’ argument for semi-freeborn children in 
Ghanaian chieftaincies.  
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engaged in (forced) labour migration and others became soldiers in the French army 
(French: Tirailleurs). 
The (im-)mobility of these former domestic slaves (FF: Maccuɓe Weeheebe) of the 
royal court was controlled by the ruling Dicko elite. Ancestor Kau never left Dalla and 
always worked in the service of the royal Dicko family. This is no longer the case for 
his descendants who frequently migrate and move with much more freedom today. 
Various reconfigurations in the power of the masters to control and thus ‘master’ the 
mobility of their clients have taken place over the past century.  
Within the category of former domestic slaves, the Kau family acquired the freedom 
to move later than other domestic slave groups. As privileged domestic slaves of the 
king, they lived in relative isolation and under the close control of their masters. They 
started migrating independently only late on and some still move in subordinate ways as 
stereo partners. 
For slave-descending groups in the Haayre region however, their own control over 
their mobility and labour increased significantly. More and more youngsters from the 
Kau family engage in independent labour migration to Bamako but in general the Kau 
family have engaged more in dependent than independent mobility. 
A minority of Kau slave descendants belonging to the semi-freeborn educated Dicko 
of Dalla left for Segu and Bamako during the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s. After 
some years of seasonal emigration, some of them stayed there permanently. One of the 
Kau family members became a painter for the colonial buildings in Segu and Amadu, 
who arrived in Bamako in 1984, started as a weaver.502 His elder brothers Beidary Kau 
and Hamadu Kau have been living in Bamako since the 1970s.  
Beidary Kau started off as a seasonal labour migrant thanks to his elder brother 
Hamadu who could host him in Bamako in the 1970s. Beidary’s decision to marry a 
slave descendant who formerly belonged to a trader’s family was looked down upon by 
his fellow royal slave descendants. Although he never explicitly said so, this was 
probably an additional reason for him and his wife to permanently settle elsewhere. 
When he arrived in Bamako, he was first hosted by his elder brother Hamadu and he 
now lives in the compound of a rich migrant who is living abroad. Beidary has nine 
children, works as a guard at the migrant’s compound and engages in small-scale culti-
vation. 
The main reason for migration among the Kau family is labour. This form of 
mobility has been much more common for them than for their noble Dicko counterparts. 
They have more experience and no moral impediments in different sectors and engage 
in jobs related to the skills they developed at home. Slave-descendants of Joona who 
settled in Bamako in the 1980s have continued weaving503 and those from Dalla 
typically work as construction workers or as petty traders in the informal sector selling 
cigarettes, cloth, ice-cream, powdered milk, cassettes and medicines (see photo 9).504 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502  Later he engaged in woodcarving and heavy physical labour in the construction sector and today 
distributes bread for a bakery on his motorcycle.  
503  The majority of these Joona weavers set themselves up in front of the Moodibo Keita football stadium 
in Bamako.  
504  Chapter 7 describes how most of them obtain jobs via earlier migrants and/or their hosts, which ex-
plains why many of them work for the same patrons and do the same things. 
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However their destinations tend to be restricted to the African continent as they lack the 
right political and administrative contacts to travel to Europe or the US. In France I only 
met one slave-descendant (FF-Diimaajo) from Booni, while there were several Dicko’s 
living there. 
Conclusions: To be or not to be … elsewhere505 
The ability to move reflects social status and this in turn offers different ways to move. 
This chapter has demonstrated how the emic idea of ‘having roads’ is often an illusion 
and how the ways in which people move, the places they are hosted and the places they 
are able to settle are defined to a large extent by the cultural field of hierarchy. The 
roads along which people move are embedded in hierarchical power structures. 
The first section described how, depending on historical conjuncture, the power of 
the Dicko family over the mobility of their clients was reinforced or released. Succes-
sive forms of government curbed or reinforced the control of the Dickos over the move-
ments of their slaves. Several ‘roads’ opened up in the post-independence period to both 
groups and, in the 1960s, the Dicko family lost control over the mobility of their clients 
because their own movement was now controlled by the national government, which 
favoured different political parties.  
By the 1990s, they regained control over others as a result of their entry into well-
paid jobs and power in national politics. The Malian government under President 
Amadou Toumani Toure was however much more favourably inclined towards the 
Dicko family and, thanks to their education, it was the semi-freeborn Dicko family 
members in Dalla who restored the political power of the royal Dicko family.   
Although the control of the Dickos over the movement of their clients in an absolute 
sense has diminished, new forms of ‘making people move’ (dependent mobility) have 
appeared. Hamadoun’s and Musa’s educational and political careers opened up impor-
tant hosting networks through which they gave access to roads of social mobility to both 
their noble descendants as well as their slave-descending clients. In short, the Dickos 
reinforced their patriarchal style by strategic hosting, by arranging ritual and domestic 
assistance and the (temporary or permanent) transfer of stereo partners of slave descent. 
The Dicko family have tended to migrate to pursue higher education abroad. Slave 
descendants, however, have engaged in labour migration. The Kau family engaged both 
in dependent and independent mobility. Those who engaged in dependent mobility 
often worked for their masters’ families, even abroad. Furthermore the temporalities of 
their mobility are different. While most youngsters of the educated Dicko family 
members live in permanent settlement in cities, Kau youngsters engage in temporary 
seasonal labour migration.  
In short, education has led to significant internal power shifts within the Dicko 
family but not between the Dicko and Kau families. Describing the mobility of people 
in this interconnected stratified network has shown how mobility among both families 
has been organized top down (Manchuelle 1997: 186) or as a subordinate movement 
(Rossi 2009: 183). Freeborn status groups moved first and lower status groups followed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
505  Joolare is the verb expressing in Fulfulde ‘to be elsewhere, to be abroad’.  
206 
 
later. The Dickos were often the first to access certain areas (Bamako/education) after 
which their clients followed. This indeed corresponds to the ‘downward social spread of 
migration’ (Manchuelle 1997: 144).  
It is ironic that Musa Dicko’s children are doing everything to reproduce the cultural 
field of hierarchy. Samba has chosen for the safe option of existing hierarchical 
relations. The semi-freeborn Dickos are also engaged in stereostyling as an institutiona-
lized form of perpetuating the cultural field of hierarchy.  
The central question in this chapter was the extent to which people of slave descent 
‘have a road’ and manage to master their own mobility. Although this underlines how 
people believe in the link between mobility and opportunity, this chapter has demon-
strated that the structural context of the cultural field of hierarchy nevertheless restrains 
both. The roads of the Kau and Dicko family are gendered and structurally embedded in 




Placing the cultural field of  
hierarchy in urban Bamako  
As in the rural context described in Chapter 2, hierarchical social relations in the  urban 
context are also expressed in spatial arrangements. This chapter discusses the organiza-
tion of migrants in Bamako and focuses on the occupation of space by the Kau and 
Dicko families and the way Bamako is emerging as an immigrant town. The housing 
and spatial organization of Haayre immigrants in Bamako will then be considered with 
special reference to the living conditions of two persons in the Dicko-Kau network: 
Madame Dicko, a descendant of Musa Yerowal Dicko, and Hama Dauda, a descendant 
of Dauda Kau (see figures 1 & 2).  
I Bismila! Welcome to Bamako city 
Bamako, like many other cities, has been characterized by mobility and migration, 
which has clearly had an impact on its social organization. With over one million in-
habitants, Bamako is home to one out of ten Malians.506  
The remarkable increase of the amount of traffic in Bamako City is perhaps the best 
illustration of the city’s rapid expansion. During my first stay in 2001 there were hardly 
any motorcycles or traffic jams but in 2007, I found myself among thousands of other 
Jakarta motorcycle users all focusing on surviving the complete chaos of the crowded 
roads full of every possible kind of traffic on wheels: Whole families on motorcycles, 
packed cars, overloaded trucks, bicycles transporting 10,000 eggs or balancing bundles 
of straw, jammed busses with people hanging on the outside, wheelchairs and impatient 
taxi drivers wanting to deliver their clients as soon as possible to earn back the money 
they owe their patrons. Everyone invents their own rule of thumb, traffic courtesy and 
police control are hard to find and I personally witnessed more traffic accidents in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
506  For more detailed demographic figures of population growth and urbanization in Mali, see Ballo et al. 
(2003: 8, 14) and for Bamako in particular (Ibid.: 25-29) and Brand (2001: 41). 
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twelve months in Bamako than in almost thirty years in Europe.507 Although the 
increase in traffic does not say anything about the influx of people, it demonstrates the 
scale of urbanization Bamako is undergoing. 
The meaning of the word ‘Bamako’ is either ‘river of caimans’508 or ‘river of 
Bemba’, although the ‘caiman’ interpretation is more common (Ballo et al. 2003: 16, 
Footnote 12). Towards the end of the seventeenth century, a Bamana clan, the Niare, 
settled on the left bank of the River Niger in what later was to become Bamako. The 
European explorer Mungo Park described it as a wealthy town involved in trade 
between the north (salt and cattle) and the south (gold, ivory, slaves and kola nuts) and 
later on also in European goods imported up the river. Apart from the Bamana Niare 
peasants, Bamako was also inhabited by Moorish traders (Drave & Touati) and Bozo 
fishermen (Meillassoux 1986: 4-9; Brand 2001: 36). These groups had their 
corresponding wards and today most are still named after them: Niarela, Dravela, 
Tourela (present-day Bagadadji) and Bozola.  
French colonizers were attracted by Bamako’s strategic position connecting the 
Senegal River Basin (a French stronghold) and the West African interior. They set up a 
military fort in 1883 and a railway was built to connect Bamako with the River Senegal 
and Saint Louis (Meillassoux 1986: 6-7). In 1908 the government of the French 
Sudan509 was transferred from Kayes to Bamako. Administrative functions and 
buildings were installed next to the presidential palace on Bamako’s northern plateau 
called Koulouba (see * on Map 7) and Bamako was officially recognized as a town in 
1918 (Ballo et al. 2003: 20). However, it was only after the First World War that 
increased investment was made, such as extending the railway from Bamako to Dakar. 
Income in Bamako was mostly related to trade and wage labour.  
From 1945 onwards, Governor Louveau invested in Bamako’s infrastructure and 
created the wards of Medina-Coura, Quinzambougou, N’tomicorobougou, Hamdallaye, 
Missira, the three Badialans and Niomirambougou, north of the River Niger.510 The 
period after the Second World War witnessed increased investment in services for the 
African population including education and health, and not only economic infrastruc-
ture. Bamako’s population increased rapidly at this time.511 Plots were no longer 
allocated on the basis of ethnicity, and expansion on the right bank of the river started 
after the construction of the first bridge in 1957 (see Map 7).512 In that same year, Islam 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507  Almost every family in Bamako has a family member that has had a serious traffic accident resulting 
in death or serious injury. Since the death rate was becoming so high, helmets and an official 
registration system for motorcycles and drivers licences was finally introduced in 2007. Nevertheless 
from 2007 to 2009 traffic jams increased significantly and the number of vehicles doubled (again). 
There are now plans to have minibuses (sotramas) on a separated ring road and to introduce trams 
(van Vliet 2009).  
508  A caiman is a kind of alligator.  
509  Present-day Mali was part of the French Sudan during French colonial occupation. 
510  See: http://mairiebamako.africa-web.org/histoire.htm. Accessed February 2009. See Map 7, wards No. 
2, 15, 16, 33, 15, 27, 28, 29, 30. 
511  From 1945 to 1951, numbers rose from 37,000 to 85,000 inhabitants, which included 600 Lebanese 
traders and 5000 French colonizers. The local immigrants were mostly from Mande (over 50% versus 
4.2% Fulɓe from central east Mali and 3.1% Soninke from northwest Mali (Meillassoux 1986: 12). 




was acknowledged as the main religion of Bamako with the construction of an 
impressive mosque in the heart of the city (Meillassoux 1986: 13).  
Bamako is quite a green city, with big trees planted after 1945 by colonial officers 
still giving shade along the roads. From above, the greener areas indicate the limits of 
the former colonial wards,513 which are still best provided for in terms of electricity, 
sewers and other important services.514 At independence in 1960, Bamako became the 
official capital and new wards were created to cope with the massive increase in 
population. According to Ouedraogo et al. (1995: 16), this increase was due to the 
disintegration of the Sudanese Federation, which led to the return of many Malian civil 
servants, workers and soldiers who had been stationed in Senegal. These often older 
return migrants settled mainly in the ward of Lafia-bougou (Village of Rest) to the west 
of the existing ward of Hamdallaye (Brand 2001: 39). A second reason for the increase 
in immigrants in Bamako was optimism. Mali’s independence brought with it the belief 
of a better life in the city. The new wards created in this period included Korofina, 
Djicoroni-Para, Badalabougou, Quartier Mali, Quinzambougou and the so-called Zone 
industrielle (Map 7).  
	  
@see MAP 7 in appendix  
Map 7: Subdivision of the capital city of Bamako in wards  
After independence, Bamako boomed and the area of parcelled land doubled or even 
tripled with every decade as concentric movements around the older wards north of the 
River Niger,515 expanding in all directions and only halted by natural boundaries.516 
Often the furthest wards were less well developed (with notable exceptions) and 
‘spontaneous wards’517 only appeared at a certain distance off the main road axes, 
marginalizing these wards and making them difficult to access, and thus more 
dangerous. 
From the 1980s onwards, population growth declined due to structural adjustment 
programmes in rural areas but in the 1990s a second bridge was constructed by, and 
named after, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. It improved connections with the southern 
parts of the city dramatically but it was only with the arrival of Alpha Oumar Konare’s 
first democratically elected government in 1991 that urban planning was back on the 
agenda. This resulted in better access to water, electricity and public services for the 
majority of inhabitants, which had been badly neglected in the previous decades 
(Ouédraogo et al. 1995: 19). The bridge enabled southward expansion and these days 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
513  Ballo et al. (2003) describe how the Koulikouro road is only lined with trees to a certain point, which 
corresponds with the limits of former colonial occupation. 
514  Such crucial services include hospitals, high schools, ministries, embassies and a commercial hub. 
515  The colonial inner city wards in existence before 1940 were Bozola, Bagadadji, Niarela and Medina-
Koura. 
516  The Manding Hills prevented expansion of Bamako city to the north and channelled its expansion to 
the east and west instead. 
517  Brand (2001: 40) mentions Bankoni, Fadjiguila, Balibougou, Missabougou and Nyamakoro as exam-
ples of early impromptu wards (French: Quartiers spontanés) in the mid 1970s.  
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the areas north and south of the river seem to be equal in size. Nevertheless, the core of 
the commercial and political activity remained north of the river. The big Suguba 
market today connects the post office with the house of the artisans and the big mosque, 
which is of origin the main bustling downtown area.518  
Over the last ten years, Bamako has seen profound changes with prestigious im-
provements prior to hosting international visitors at the 2002 Coupe d’Afrique (CAN), 
the 23rd France-Afrique top in December 2005, the first African edition of the World 
Social Forum (WSF) in January 2006 and the 24th regional FAO conference for Africa 
in February 2006. And by the end of 2010 all the ministries will have moved to one big 
complex near the Place de la Paix. In addition, the Chinese began constructing a third 
bridge over the River Niger in 2008 (Van Vliet 2011 forthcoming). Bamako has become 
a city that never sleeps and even when I got a flat tyre in some sleepy neighbourhood at 
4 am, I found help and the tools to change it in less than 10 minutes. There are always 
people around. Who are they? And where and how do they live? 
 
Where Kau and Dicko immigrants settle 
Bamako’s expansion has mostly been based on in-migration and more than two-thirds 
of its current inhabitants were born elsewhere. Manchuelle (1997: 129) argues that 
three-quarters of the migrants to West African cities from the 1930s onwards were 
slaves. Two-thirds of the seasonal labourers and two-thirds of the permanent settlers in 
Bamako originate from the nearby regions of Segou, Koutiala and Kayes. Only about 
17% of the immigrants in Bamako are from the arid north (of which Douentza Province 
and the Haayre region are a part). Another 10% are international migrants from other 
African countries.519 Men and women have arrived in equal numbers,520 and the Dicko 
and Kau families were part of these flows. Musa Dicko’s twelve children all studied in 
Bamako and the majority have since settled there as well. Some Kau family members, 
like Beidary, Hama and Amadu, have also settled there permanently since the 1980s and 
1990s.  
Where one settles in the urban context is an important indicator of one’s relative 
wealth and status. Most of Bamako’s wards are very heterogeneous, both ethnically as 
well as in terms of income level. Bamako today consists of six municipalities (French: 
Communes), which are then subdivided into 62 wards (French: Quartiers) and sub-
wards (French: Sous-quartiers), the boundaries of which tend to be rather vague (Ballo 
et al., 2003: 127). Each municipality has its own town hall where identity cards are 
issued, births and deaths are registered and civil marriages celebrated. How easy it is to 
reach where one lives is often directly linked to class and status and is thus an important 
criterion for distinction in an urban context. Whether or not a neighbourhood is easily 
accessible by local transport, such as taxis and the Sotrama bus system, is an indicator 
of a neighbourhood’s status. The majority of the educated Dicko elite from the Haayre 
region who are in Bamako live in officially recognized wards near tarred roads (see 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
518  Initiatives to create new market spaces, for example by constructing a completely new market in Kala-
ban Koura, failed. 
519  Sanogo (1994: 15) in Brand (2001: 43). 
520  Findley (1990: 4) in Brand (2001: 43). 
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Dicko wards indicated on Map 7, supra).521 The majority of the Kau immigrants, by 
contrast, live in small rooms in slum-like and less-accessible neighbourhoods522 with 
bad sanitation and untarred roads with no gutters. One of Musa Dicko’s sons, Samba 
Musa Dicko, lived in Kalaban Coura (Map 7 supra, ward No. 49) 700 m off the main 
road.523 In contrast, Beidary, one of the Kau slave descendants, lives in an untarred part 
of Kalaban Koro, 5 km off the same main road that does not even feature on Map 7 
because it is a new slum area.524 The hierarchy between the Kau and Dicko families is 
therefore visible in their housing and proximity to the city. 
Access to transport is a way of distinguishing richer and poorer citizens. Paradoxi-
cally, those in poorer neighbourhoods and settlements pay more (both in money and in 
time) to be mobile in the urban context. Beidary, who lives in Kalabonkoro (ward 52 on 
Map 7), a slum 5 km off the main road, either pays an expensive taxi fare to get 
somewhere or he has to cycle for at least an hour in order to get access to public 
transport. Samba Dicko, on the other hand, only needs to walk 700 m to the main road 
where he can choose to stop a bus or taxi. How one moves about is an important ‘style’ 
of distinction too. Most Kau descendants walk, take local transport or use a bike, all of 
which are means of transport used by the poor underclass. The better-educated Dickos 
in Bamako all use their own motorcycles or cars and over longer distances will take air-
conditioned cars or even fly. Madame and her Dicko siblings regularly fly from 
Bamako to Mopti.  
The type of housing a person lives in is another way of distinguishing between the 
immigrants of the Haayre region. I visited many Haayre migrant families of both noble 
and slave descent in Bamako525 and there were undeniable differences in living 
standards between the two groups.526 The majority of the elite families live in much 
more expensive and spacious detached houses, while both temporary and permanent 
labour migrants continue to live in small rooms or in the unfinished houses of 
transnational emigrants.  
 
Housing of the Dickos  
Most residential homes in Bamako consist of a compound with several rooms opening 
onto a central compound, with an area (an open room or corridor) for cooking and open-
air bathrooms with toilets. Some of these compounds have an untarred communal space, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
521  In 2007 there were some children of Musa Dicko from Dalla which I frequented regularly. I weekly 
had at least one lunch at Samba Dicko’s rented villa in Kalaban Coura (Map 7, ward No.49), I passed 
at least every three days at Nassuru Musa Dicko’s house in Hamdallaye (Map 7, ward No. 33) until he 
moved to his own house in Baco Djikoroni (Map 7, ward No. 35), I only visited Busi twice in Bul-
kaasumbougou because it is rather out of the way (Map 7, ward 1) and since I lived next to Madame 
Dicko in Lafiabougou (Map 7, ward No. 34) I participated in her household on a dialy basis. 
522  Keleere Tambura in Falladie (Map 7, ward No. 43), Beidary and Amadu Dauda in Kalaban Koro 
(Map 7, ward No. 52) and Belco Tambura in the hamlet of Ghana near Senou airport south of Bamako 
(not on Map 7). 
523  He moved to his own house in a new ward called ATT-bougou in 2008 (not on Map 7). 
524  Comparable to descriptions of nouveau riches in Jakarta, Indonesia who have clear preferences for 
certain neighborhoods. See van Leeuwen (2005: 59). 
525  And also, but less intensively and over shorter periods of time, in Kayes (3 weeks), Mopti (several 
separate weeks and shorter visits) and Segou (2 x 2 weeks and shorter visits). 
526  However the invisibility of some successful Riimaayɓe families may present a distorted image here. 
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others have mud walls with corrugated-iron roofs, while still others are made of brick. 
Most compounds have access to their own well and some have running water.527 How 
the rooms are used is organized according to gender and varies considerably in relation 
to the number of inhabitants, income levels and the space available. Bertrand (1999: 
136) distinguishes three important factors that influence the choice for settlement: 
Demographic (there is a limit to the number of people who can live in each compound), 
economic (salary and the housing market) and social (social class and preferences of the 
compound head). Most compounds are inhabited by multi-generational families whose 
composition shifts constantly, not least because of the constant arrival and departure of 
visitors from the rural areas. Since many houses become overpopulated, young 
unmarried men are asked to look for a room (French: Chambre)528 in a nearby 
compound, either on their own or with friends. 
The rich reside in bigger houses, often with fewer communal structures, for example 
with private bathrooms with running water. These houses are usually well hidden from 
the street and enclosed by walls and gates. In addition to the open-air compound, a big 
living room displays wealth by way of pictures of trips to Mecca and lavish wedding 
ceremonies. Plastic flowers, tapestries, a fan or air-conditioning and a big television set 
(which is usually turned on) are also part of the interior design. Most villas are built of 
brick, while the compounds can be either brick or mud. Most of Musa Dicko’s children 
live in such houses in Bamako. Musa’s eldest daughter’s house is a typical example.  
Madame Dicko (figure 2), born around 1965, moved every two to three years when 
she was growing up because of her father’s job as a teacher. Once she was enrolled in a 
secondary school in Bamako, she was lucky to have her maternal uncle Mawludu, a 
Dicko of the royal family of Joona, to host her. Mawludu studied in France and has 
worked for the Ministry of Education in Bamako ever since. Madame married, had three 
children, got divorced and started working in an important state company, which en-
abled her to host brothers and sisters who came to Bamako to pursue their studies. Just 
like her mother, Madame Dicko is a beautiful woman and is always dressed in the latest 
outfits from the Sublime Couture tailor. She likes to be called ‘Madame Dicko’. Since 
2007 Madame has been an MP, some say thanks to her close ties with President 
Amadou Toumani Toure. Apart from her Rotary Club membership, she has also been 
actively engaged with Taabital Pulaaku, an international organization that promotes 
Fulɓe culture.529  
The fact that she is a wealthy woman is clear from the house and the way she lives. 
Madame’s house is on the edge of Hamdallaye and Lafiabougou (ward No. 33-34, on 
Map 7). The house is situated on the corner of a dead-end street near the Manding Hills, 
the rocky plateau that forms the natural boundary of Bamako City and which remind her 
of the typical rocky Haayre landscape of Douentza. Hamdallaye used to be one of the 
older ethnic neighbourhoods where Fulɓe settled. Hamdallaye is also a village near 
Djenne (see Map 3, Introduction), which was of historical importance in reconciling 
two different Fulɓe clans. Until 2010 Madame rented a big house for FCFA 100,000 per 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
527  In that case, the water is often shared with neighbours who fill up their drums for a small fee. 
528  For a description of rooms in other cities: See Timera (1996) and Manchuelle (1997: 123). 
529  See: http://www.tabitalpulaaku-international.org/. Accessed August 2009. 
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month and as it is too big for her and her visitors, she used to rent out three rooms: one 
to a photographer, one to a tailor and one to a small shop owner.530 After going through 
the garage, the open-air part of the compound is a communal space where dinner is pre-
pared and served and where the young students, visitors and domestic workers watch 
television in the evening. 
Madame’s living room is more private and only used for important visitors. During 
the hot season, the women living with Madame usually have lunch with her in this part 
of the house, which has a fan and so is cooler. Madame has decorated it with pictures of 
her eldest daughter’s wedding, the Hajj her parents made and some self-portraits, one of 
which shows Madame with her hair plaited according to Fulɓe tradition and em-
broidered with a lot of gold. The picture was taken during a big Taalibal Pulaaku 
conference in Bamako in 2002 and shows the pride she takes in her ethnic status as a 
real Pullo.  
Madame Dicko has all the luxuries of modern life – telephones, televisions, air-
conditioning in her bedroom, fridges and a kettle – and her furniture reflects that of one 
of Bamako’s well-to-do inhabitants: Local handmade furniture decorated with a lot of 
white lace, velvet couches with tiger prints and small side tables with plastic flowers in 
Asian vases standing beside porcelain statues. The curtains (decorated with flower 
prints) and the carpet on the floor need to be cleaned every once in a while by her 
domestic staff to get the red Bamako dust out. In the corridor behind the living room 
there are several bedrooms.  
Madame is an important host (FF: njaatigi) who provides accommodation for co-
villagers and (female) family members. Since she is the oldest daughter of Musa Dicko 
and married young she was also an important host for all her younger brothers and 
sisters for more than a decade. During the 1980s she was one of the very few permanent 
residents of Dalla to be living in Bamako. Now that her brothers and sister have gradu-
ated and married, they too host students. 
She is wealthy enough to have staff to assist her: A driver and domestic workers who 
do all the household chores. A picture of President Amadou Toumani Toure seems to 
‘survey’ the domestic workers from his gold frame high up on the wall in the corridor as 
they sleep under the staircase. 
Madame used to live two blocks away in Hamdallaye where she rented a corner of a 
square compound with four rooms. When she moved to her current place in 1995, her 
old house was taken over by her recently married brother Nassuru (an MP), his wife, 
their domestic worker and between five and seven youngsters (brothers, cousins). In 
2007 he moved to his self-built detached house in Baco-Djicoroni (Map 7, ward No. 
35). The youngsters Demba and Papa Dicko who used to be hosted in Madame’s 
compound started renting the place together although they continue to eat at Madame’s 
place. 
Like Madame Dicko, the majority of her family members all live in big houses in 
good neighbourhoods, as do the Dickos of Joona. Oumar’s compound is one of the 
largest and most luxurious compounds I ever visited in Bamako (apart from the Dutch 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
530  Just before this thesis goes to the presses (December 2010), Madame moved to her own house, which 
she had constructed nearby in Hamdallaye (Map 7, ward No. 33). 
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Embassy and some other expatriates’ homes). The house, situated in the old colonial 
ward of Quinzambougou, was bought by his father and politician Hamadoun Dicko531 
in the 1950s and his son Oumar Hamadoun has lived there since his father’s death. 
Oumar Hamadoun lives with his mother, his wife and their three children and whenever 
I visited the compound, Oumar was never around: He travelled a lot in his position as 
Minister of Malians Abroad. However just as at Madame’s place, there were always a 
lot of people around: Students, maids, seasonal labourers, temporary visitors and family 
members.  
 
Housing of the Kau family  
For the Kau family too, their status as stigmatized slave descendants seems to have been 
translated into the houses and neighbourhoods they inhabit. Unlike the Dickos though, 
they can only pay for renting a single room on shared compounds, or they guard and/or 
squat in houses which are still under construction who are abroad.  
Those Kau family members who have settled permanently in Bamako live in the 
slum areas of Bamako. Amadu Hama and Keleere live in the overpopulated Falladie 
(Map 7, supra, ward No. 43), while Beidary and Amadu live in the slums of Kalaban 
Koro (which is not even marked on Map 7) in a single room with their wives and 
children. This is the story of Amadu Hama, a descendant of Kau from Dalla. Amadu 
Hama was born around 1970 and left Dalla for the first time in 1984 during the drought 
to earn money (FF: Tewtude mbuudu). Over the years he decided to stay in Bamako, 
engaging in various jobs such as weaving and wood carving. 
First Amadu Hama was hosted by Beidary, a paternal uncle (Kau family) who was 
already living in Bamako. Amadu Hama married a manumitted woman of slave descent 
called Oumou Aafe and since 2005 she has lived with him in Bamako where they rent a 
room (FCFA 15,000) of 20 m2 in a compound in the ward of Falladie (Map 7, ward No. 
43). They share the bathroom and well with two other families. Their four children all 
live with Amadu’s parents in Wuro Maccudo in Dalla. When they are old enough, 
Amadu wants them to go to school in Bamako. At present though he visits his native 
village each year for Tabaski and his wife only goes for a month every two years. For 
four years Amadu has delivered bread for a local bakery where he earns an average 
salary and, according to him, manages to live quite well. Nevertheless, the contrast 
between his 20 m2 room and Madame’s spacious compound is big.  
Other members of the Kau family who have moved to Bamako permanently either 
squat or guard compounds and construction sites. Such is the case for Beidary Dauda 
and Belco Musa Tambura, a slave descendant from Nokara. Belco Musa guards the 
cows and the chicken farm of a rich Bambara trader who is working in Europe. Belco 
and his wife live on this isolated farm outside Bamako city in a hamlet near a small 
airport slum called Ghana. Belco, his wife and their two children hope to earn enough 
money to be able to return home in some years and to have their own cows and 
chickens. By that time, the farm will probably be part of the urban agglomeration of 
Bamako, which is constantly expanding.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531  See his life history in Chapter 5. 
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How you move affects who you become 
There are interdependencies and interactions between the Kau and Dicko networks in 
Bamako in terms of movement from the Haayre to Bamako and back. This is considered 
here by looking at how hosting works in Bamako and the way in which most Dickos in 
Bamako recruit assistants from their home village, who thus engage in a form of 
dependent mobility.  
Most Dickos in Bamako have managed to restore their positions of political power 
through the double advantage of education, which allowed them to accumulate wealth 
in people. Most of them have recruited various, usually female, assistants in their home 
village to assist them on ritual occasions as domestic labourers. As will be described in 
the last section, the Kau family is willing and keen to engage in the loyalty style with 
these wealthy patrons in Bamako. But first let us look at the networks of those who 
have settled more or less permanently in Bamako and host others. 
 
To be hosted  
Hosting is related to housing, and access to the city (and to other faraway destinations) 
depends on access to hosts. They are the gatekeepers and, to a greater or lesser extent, 
define where people end up and how they live. Having a host (FF: njaatigi) enables 
people to move to a specific destination without being a complete outsider or stranger 
there (as explained in more detail in Chapter 6). Since there are no pre-existing njaatigi 
relations in Bamako, most people end up with their relatives, which means that status 
differences are maintained. In Bamako most slave-descending Riimaayɓe youngsters 
are hosted by fellow Riimaayɓe immigrants, while the majority of Dicko youngsters are 
hosted by Dicko family members or rent their own rooms.  
 
Dickos as hosts 
In his maternal slave-descending family, only Musa’s own children, those of his 
deceased brother Nassuru and a few slave-descending youngsters he has hosted have 
obtained a degree. Musa Dicko tried to educate his maternal slave descending family 
members and attempted to change some of the rigid status boundaries between his 
maternal and paternal family. His eldest daughter, Madame Dicko, is less charmed by 
her maternal family and presents herself today as 100% noble. She has refused to host 
some of the students of slave descent proposed by her father. 
However, it was Musa Dicko who hosted Suleymane’s eldest daughter Aafi when 
she had to attend secondary school in Douentza. To ‘pay’ for her stay, Aafi does 
domestic work in the Dicko compound. Similarly Alu, also a Kau descendant, owes his 
educational career to Aba Kadji, one of Musa Dicko’s children (see Figure 2) in Segou. 
Although Alu sleeps at the house of fellow Riimaayɓe who are permanent labour 
migrants in Segou, he gets the money he needs for books and transport from his former 
master, Aba Kadji Dicko. In return, he does small clientelistic jobs, such as making tea, 
cleaning, butchering for the sacrificial feast and driving to arrange things for his host or 
his wife.  
Aafi and Alu are lucky because most parents of slave descent who support their 
children in higher education lack hosts who are able and willing to feed an extra student 
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mouth. Finding a (reliable) host in Douentza for secondary school is problematic for 
many: If they don’t find a host this means the end of their education and any chance of a 
good career. Many slave-descending Riimaayɓe clients who want to proceed with their 
studies in other cities depend on the generosity of wealthy hosts. The ‘roads’ of the Kau 
family into higher education today are dependent on the loyalty style vis-à-vis the Dicko 
family. 
If being accepted by a richer family does not work out, youngsters try to be hosted 
by other (mostly Riimaayɓe) co-villagers who are often less well off. In all, most Dicko 
families in Bamako host on average between three and seven students and/or migrants 




The young seasonal labour migrants are mostly hosted by other slave-descending labour 
migrants who have settled permanently in Bamako but as few slave-descending 
Riimaayɓe did so, those (like Keleere) who did, tend to receive between 10 and 25 
youngsters in the dry season. And even though they are poorly hosted, most of them 
know where to go for temporary shelter. 
The slave-descending Kau families I visited in Bamako hardly ever refuse the 
demands of young seasonal labour migrants wanting to be hosted. Especially Amadu 
Hama and Keleere end up hosting numerous youngsters because they live in Falladie, 
the ward where a lot of petty trade can be done near the long-distance bus stations. 
Beidary and Amadu Kau, who live in Bamako Koro, hosted no one at all but this can be 
explained by the fact that both live in places that are so difficult to reach that if 
youngsters went there they would have to walk two or three hours a day to get to their 
jobs. And Beidary squats a house where he cannot afford to invite others.  
Amadu Hama and Keleere532 host the majority of the seasonal labour migrants in 
Bamako who sleep in the open air in the public space of the shared compounds of their 
hosts. They are exposed to the elements and get wet in the rainy season. When I visited 
him in 2005, Amadu Hama was hosting four students (one girl who had obtained her 
DEF and was preparing his lunch) and ten seasonal migrants. In 2007 he hosted seven 
seasonal migrants from Dalla533 plus one student, Saajo Tambura. Most seasonal 
migrants of slave descent from Booni end up with an Islamic scholar host but also in 
rather basic conditions. 
The more successful and experienced among the migrants that have worked in 
Bamako for several years get tired of being poorly housed. They try to be independent 
and look for collective shelter and share a room with up to ten others. Such is the case 
for Litri and his friends534 who I met at the bus station in the Falladie ward in 2005.535 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
532  Keleere is a slave descendant who used to belong to Jaawamɓe traders. 
533  Examples of the seasonal migrants he was hosting in 2007 were: Usmane Waygallo nick named 
‘Beja’ (Jawaanδo); Djuballu Dicko (Beeweejo); Saidu Tambura (Maccuδo); Usmane Tambura (Mac-
cuδo Jalluɓe); Baa Yero Waygallo (Maccuδo Jaawamɓe), nick named ‘big head’ (ko-iri). 
534  Hama Alu, Bucary Hamadun Tambura (Diimaajo Jawaanδo), Hamadun Nu Dicko (beeweejo), Umaru 
Hamedi Dikko (Beeweejo), Yero Burra Dikko (Beeweejo); Amadu Umar Waygallo (Jawaanδo). 
Sekuba is the guard.  
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They had decided to rent a room in the unfinished house of a rich emigrant in Falladie 
(Map 7 (supra) ward No. 43). They were renting this room permanently even over the 
summer months when most of them would go home to cultivate.536 They do not have 
domestic workers to clean or cook for them so they buy cheap food on the streets.537 
Since neither water nor electricity are available in the compound, they regularly fill a 
big container with water from the tap further down the street.  
The unluckiest (Riimaayɓe) youngsters lack a host altogether and try to protect 
themselves by joining other street kids who spend the night near big public spaces such 
as the post office, the border control post or bus stations. Those who have the energy 
and money visit better-off families they know from time to time in the hope of getting 
some food from them. 
There is a relationship between the spatial insertion of certain social status groups in 
Bamako and their options for hosting people through the njaatigi system. In fact, 
hosting has proven to be an institution through which the Dickos in Bamako have 
managed to reinforce their patriarchal style.  
 
Dependent mobility  
This section addresses three main ways in which the movement of the Kau family to 
Bamako has depended on their former Dicko masters. Domestic workers and ritual as-
sistants in the Dicko families who have settled in urban areas are often of slave descent 
and female Kau descendants’ mobility in particular has remained ‘dependent’ on Dicko 
family invitations. Being hosted by Dicko family members in Bamako in 2005, 2006 
and 2007 myself, I observed many members of the Kau family from Dalla who either 
temporarily or permanently lived with the Dicko family to render service. Some did so 
as domestic workers, while others were temporary assistants during the crucial life-
cycle stages (birth, marriage, death) of freeborn Dicko women who lived in Bamako. 538 
Chapter 4 discussed how freeborn Fulɓe in the Haayre region either at birth, circum-
cision or marriage are given a stereo partner (see link-up in Chapter 4). When moving to 
the city as a result of marriage, some freeborn Fulɓe bring along their unmarried stereo 
partners as domestic assistants. Three examples of male stereo partners from different 
generations are presented here before moving on to descriptions of female stereo 
partners who operate as domestic workers.  
The first example is that of my host Suleymane who accompanied his stereo partner 
Samba Dicko, an educated son of Musa Dicko for much of his childhood. Samba left 
Mali to study in Niamey at the end of the 1970s . Suleymane joined him there for some 
time in loyalty style. Samba studied and Suleymane made his tea and food. As he could 
not find a rewarding job, Suleymane continued to move and engage in all kinds of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535  My interpreter and I arranged a day to have a focus-group discussion with them for which they all 
took a day off. They only take half a day off on the traditional market day in their home village 
(Tuesday) to meet up with each other and exchange news from the village (FF: Kabaaru wuro). 
536  The rent of the period of absence is added to the monthly rent when they do reside there. This is the 
way they guarantee their place year after year. 
537  They always try to buy from the same person to ensure optimal service, hygiene and low costs. 
538  Chapter 8 gives the example of such a temporary assistant, Kumbel Dauda Tambura, the mother of 
my host Suleymane.  
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labour within the West African sub-region (Burkina Faso, Benin and Togo). For some 
years he was a cultivator in Burkina with his wife and family and sometime in 1995, 
four years after the fall of Musa Traore’s regime, he and his wife decided to return to 
Dalla ‘to educate our children according to our own traditions’.  
Another example of stereo partners who moved together are Oumar and Hassan. 
Oumar Dicko is the son of politician Hamadoun Dicko (see chapter 1) and he has been 
living in Bamako since the 1960s. On his move to town, Oumar brought his stereo 
partner with him and ever since, Hassan539 and his wife Kumba,540 both descendants of 
slaves from Oumar’s home town of Joona, have assisted him. For two decades now they 
have lived in Oumar’s compound in Bamako, but since their house burned down they 
have settled on a shared compound with others a bit further down the street. Hassan 
currently works in the construction sector.  
One of their sons, typically called Bilal,541 is the personal link-up stereopartner (see 
Chapter 4) of Oumar’s son Usmane. Bilal and Usmane are inseparable. The boys share 
their teenage adventures together in an urban context as stereo partners, much like their 
parents did in their villages of origin (see Chapter 4). The two boys now aged 14 always 
hang out together. People comment that there is a part missing if one of them shows up 
alone. Kumba explains that although their friendship (FF: Giɗiraaɓe) is genuine, it is 
based on the fact that Usmane as a freeborn can ask Bilaali to do things for him (French: 
lui faire travailler) and Bilaali is not allowed to refuse. She thus emphasizes how their 
friendship is embedded in structural differences. These differences also translate in 
appearances and activities: Usmane Dicko is studying and wears smart clothes, while 
Bilal does domestic work in the service of Usmane’s family (like his parents) and has 
older less trendy clothers. Furthermore, mother Kumba explains that ‘if Usmane marries 
in the future, Bilal will be given as a kind of wedding present to him’.542  
Like his parents, son Bilal will probably have chances of a successful career by 
rendering service to Usmane Dicko for the rest of his life. This means his mobility in 
the future will continue to depend on and probably be subordinate to that of Usmane 
Dicko. In short, the stereo partnership between the Dicko and Kau family continues to 
be attributed a lot of importance. Ironically, the sons of the semi-freeborn, like Samba 
as the son of Musa Dicko, behave as patrons vis-à-vis their maternal family.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
539  Hassan is part of the group of slave descendants belonging to Oumar Dicko’s royal family. His wife 
Kumba describes her husband as ‘l’esclave directe de Oumar’, referring to their stereo partnership 
(link up).  
540  Kumba visits her home village Joona every year during the dry season (FF: Ndungu fuu). Kumba is no 
longer in touch with her personal master and defers to her husband’s master Oumar and her children 
do too. Last year she accompanied Oumar for the New Year’s festivities in Joona. I got to know her as 
one of the most energetic Riimaayɓe women.  
541  Bilal was the name of one of the most loyal slaves of the Prophet Mohammed. For more about names, 
see Pelckmans (2011b forthcoming). 
542  She refers to stereo partners who have been linked up (see Chapter 4).  
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Dependent mobility of domestic workers 
The majority of Dicko immigrant families in cities like Bamako recruit domestic work-
ers from among their co-villagers.543 Even families with relatively low incomes contract 
at least one domestic worker to assist with household chores in the overcrowded city 
compounds.544 This can be done either on the basis of regional (ethnic, familial) ties 
among ‘relatives’ or on a contract basis with strangers who are available on the urban 
market.545  
The Dicko family’s domestic workers are often from families with a slave back-
ground, which contributes to the employer’s social prestige in the eyes of the Fulɓe 
community in Bamako. On marriage, a freeborn woman from the Haayre region takes 
the stereopartner with whom she was linked up  with her when she moves to settle with 
her husband. Most freeborn women in Bamako thus ‘receive’ rather than ‘recruit’ their 
first domestic worker from their parents when they get married.  
Such was the case for Madame’s brother Nassuru and his freeborn wife Assi.546 
Nassuru had spent seven years studying in Bamako and by the time he got married in 
2003, he had a well-paid job in a travel agency. Assi moved to Bamako to live with him 
and her mother ‘gave’ her Maya (one of the slave-descending girls belonging to her 
family) to assist Assi with household chores. Maya is an orphan from a very poor slave 
family in Booni  
and moved to Bamako in a form of subordinate mobility.  
Often however, once stereo partners get married, they cannot be employed fulltime 
on their patron’s compound anymore. When Maya gets married, Nassuru and Assi can 
opt to recruit salaried domestic workers. Especially older Dickos, like Madame Dicko, 
continue to actively recruit among their slave descendants for urban assistants.547 As I 
will describe with examples of Madame’s domestic workers in the period 2005-2007, 
not all of the slave-descending domestic workers she recruited were made to move to 
Bamako. During my first stay in 2005, she only had one domestic worker, Adama, who 
was one of the slave-descending children belonging to her paternal family. Adama was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
543  For the case of Riimaayɓe domestic workers recruited by Weeheeɓe in Bamako, see Pelckmans 
(2011d forthcoming). 
544  It is surprising to find so few scientific contributions on domestic workers in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
existing studies tend to focus on (Abidjan) Ivory Coast: Jacquemin (2000) and Deshusses (2005). 
According to Deshusses (2005: 737), based on a survey in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1991, Ivory Coast 
is, after Senegal, the country in which most children under 15 years old are entrusted to other families. 
For the Malian context, studies focusing exclusively on domestic workers are rare, with the exception 
of Bouju's recent study (2007) and a report by Coumare et al., (1994) on ‘aides menagères, bonnes in 
Bamako’. Lastly, there is a Save the Children UK-UNICEF report by Delay (1999) on domestic girls 
in Sévaré and Mopti.  
545  The main difference between the two groups is the way in which they are remunerated: Market 
domestic workers are paid in cash, while co-villagers get payment in kind. Jacquemin (2000: 111) 
describes how in the Ivory Coast capital of Abidjan young nieces (French: Petites nieces) are remu-
nerated in kind, as opposed to young salaried domestic workers (French: Petites domestiques salaries) 
who get a fixed salary each month.  
546  Assi is a young woman from the religious elite (FF-Moodibaaɓe) in her husband’s neighbouring vil-
lage.  
547  See Chapter 7 on how the younger generation recruits unknown domestic workers on the urban mar-
ket in Bamako.  
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promised as a second wife to a man she did not want to marry and left for Bamako in 
the hope of making money and escaping parental pressure to marry. She was hosted by 
Amadu Hama, who asked Madame to recruit Adama as a domestic worker in 2001. 
Madame recalls how ‘I could not refuse because after all Adama is a niece.’ In this case 
it was Adama who had made the initial move and only on arrival engaged in the loyalty 
style vis-à-vis Madame within the cultural field of hierarchy.  
When Adama left her, 548 Madame says Sali’s father approached her and asked her to 
take on his daughter. She explains that it was impossible for her to refuse: ‘She is one of 
our slaves, I don’t know if you understand.’549 Madame points to the moral obligation 
she feels she has due to her patriarchal position in the cultural field of hierarchy vis-à-
vis her demanding clients. A close family member however rejects this view and 
explains how Madame herself asked this slave-descending Riimaayɓe family to give her 
a girl. This informant insists that ‘it was not Sali’s parents who offered to send their girl 
to assist her. Madame sent her sister to Dalla to find a domestic worker. Sali's father 
accepted since he sees it as an advantage that his daughter is recruited by a wealthy 
family member in Bamako. Domestic workers in Bamako get better paid than those 
working in Mopti or Douentza.’550   
From the various domestic workers that Madame had over the years, it is clear that 
access to mobility is not necessarily initiated at the request of the noble families. Both 
Maya as a stereo partner and Sali as domestic worker moved to Bamako at the request 
of the Dicko family. Domestic worker Adama left her home village by herself. For her, 
mobility was an exit option from the constraining demands of her family back home and 
she preferred Madame’s authority over that of her parents.  
 
Temporal dependent mobility through ritual assistance 
Not only for daily domestic assistance but also for more temporary tasks such as ritual 
assistance during marriages and baptisms, the Dicko family in Dalla invests significant 
sums of money in transport to have Kau descendants assist them. They continue to 
engage in stereo styles in their new destinations: The Dickos pay the bus tickets of their 
stereo partners and other slave descendants so that they can assist on important ritual 
occasions. The Dicko elite derive prestige from making their slave descendants move 
towards them: It underlines their wealth in people. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
548  The rainy season is a time when some domestic workers return home to assist their families in the 
fields. Most families prefer domestic workers who live with them but there are also girls who migrate 
to cities in groups, sleep together at night and spend the day working in families, see Bouju (2007: 31-
32). 
549  Literally in French: ‘C’est un de nos captifs, je ne sais pas si tu comprends.’ Interview in Bamako, 
November 2006. 
550  Salaries for domestic workers differ from region to region, are regulated by demand and vary accord-
ing to experience, the time of year, the employer, etc. According to several informants in 2007, the 
following salaries were average for domestic workers in different regions of Mali. Many mention 
Kidal as the place where domestic workers are best paid (FCFA 12,500) because there are a lot of 
civil servants living there who give their domestic workers weekends off. In Kayes, salaries were 
around FCFA 10,000 because domestic workers are difficult to come by; in Bamako average salaries 
range between FCFA 6000 and FCFA 7500; in Douentza a domestic worker is paid FCFA 3500 and 
in Djenne between FCFA 3000 and FCFA 5000. (1€ = about 656 FCFA in December 2010) 
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These temporary assistants are recruited at crucial life stages (birth, marriage, death) 
of freeborn Dicko women residing in Bamako. An example is the recruitment of 
Kumbel to assist a freeborn widow. As Papa Dicko died and left a pregnant, illiterate 
and Fulfulde-speaking wife living with his brother in Bamako, this freeborn wife 
needed an assistant. Musa Dicko decided that Kumbel Kau, a widow herself but much 
older and thus experienced in raising children would be the perfect candidate. Kumbel 
was given a bus ticket from Dalla to go to Bamako where she spent six months assisting 
the noble widowed and pregnant wife. Well in her fifties, Kumbel Kau was anxious 
during her stay in Bamako: She did not speak the lingua franca (Bambara) and never 
left the house of her hosts. She was extremely humble in her behaviour and her presence 
was almost ghostly.  
The major advantage of this ‘road’ to Bamako for Kumbel Kau was that she got 
rewards in the form of clothes and money when she returned to Dalla. For Kumbel and 
many other (ritual) assistants, being chosen to assist wealthy Dicko families in Bamako 
is seen as a privilege. Thanks to their loyalty style, they have managed to become 
mobile over distance by moving in a form of dependent mobility.  
Conclusions: Mastering mobilities as ‘memoryscapes’ of slavery 
This chapter described how the city of Bamako has grown historically and then moved 
on to how immigrants from the Haayre region have settled there. Although in the urban 
context of Bamako there are no clear-cut spatial neighbourhoods that discipline or 
testify to a slave past between Kau or Dicko in ways described for the rural context of 
the Haayre, there are other ways in which hierarchy and ‘distinction’ are maintained 
along status lines in the urban context. There are huge differences in comfort, the 
accessibility of a neighbourhood and its sanitation, which implicitly recreate the cultural 
field of hierarchy in the city context. 
The living conditions of Haayre migrants in Bamako differ significantly. The ma-
jority of educated Dicko family members live in detached houses where they can enjoy 
privacy. By contrast, seasonal and permanent labour migrants of the Kau family tend to 
inhabit the poorest neighbourhoods in small spaces (rooms or squats). The spatial 
organization of Bamako demonstrates how hierarchy is inscribed in the use of place. 
For this particular family network, differences in status back home converge with 
differences of education, income, housing, surroundings and wealth in people in the 
urban context. 
The network of the Kau family formerly in the service of the royal Dicko families in 
Dalla, as well as other families of royal slave descendants in Booni and Joona still 
mainly engage in forms of dependent mobility. Most of those Kau family members who 
engaged in mobility did so as dependents of the Dicko family. Their access to mobility 
for higher education is dependent on wealthy and/or intellectual hosts. Most slave des-
cendants lack such hosts and are thus disadvantaged in terms of educational trajectories.  
Their mobility depends on hosting, domestic and ritual assistance and access to long-
distance destinations, and is to a greater or lesser extent regulated by the Dicko family. 
Even if they engage in independent mobility, there are other areas where they remain 
dependent on (their former) patrons. It is no longer one’s ability to move but certain 
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aspects of mobility (form, length and profitability of movements) that remain linked to 
social status. 
 
The emic idea of ‘having a road’ is thus an illusion in that both Kau and Dicko have 
fewer agency in their movements than the expression might suggest. People cannot go 
anywhere they would want to and, in the end, their movement is (re-)embedded in the 
structural conditions of the cultural field of hierarchy. They do not ‘master’ their roads 
because these roads are defined by pre-existing institutions such as schools, njaatigi 
relations, knowledge and established spatial networks.  
This brings us to a final conclusion linking mobility and slavery. The way in which 
slave descendants have moved is a form of ‘embodied memory of slavery’. Slave 
descendants’ mobility represents a ‘memoryscape’ of slavery (Argenti & Röschenthaler 
2006: 40). The way in which domestic workers are recruited recalls cultural memories 
of domestic slavery transposed through space and place as part of a ‘memoryscape’ of 
West African slavery. The past is shaped according to existing power relations in the 
present and these power relations define people’s possibilities to reflect on and/or 





Travelling cultural fields of  
hierarchy in urban interactions  
Street life in Bamako today testifies to the high level of unemployment among West 
African youngsters. This has become a social problem facing even those who graduated 
with good grades. Young people gather with their so-called grins (French)551 or groups 
of friends to drink tea, exchange phone numbers and airtime while gossiping about girls 
and dreaming of marriage and the homes they will have in the future when they start 
earning. This chapter describes the activities of the different groups of migrants 
described in earlier chapters. The focus is on the different options available to slave 
descendants (for example those of the Kau family) on a gliding scale ranging from those 
who make use of their social status as slave descendants, to those who ignore or 
explicitly deny it in the urban context of Bamako. Also, attention is paid to how the 
cultural field of hierarchy travels with migrants to urban contexts and influences ritual 
interactions there.   
 
A donkey among princes? 
The grin of the youngsters hosted by Madame is made up of freeborn Dicko youngsters 
and Hama Adja, a slave descendant (FF-Diimaajo Haayre) who works as a seasonal 
labourer working in construction. Hama Adja and the other youngsters spend endless 
nights sitting outside the compound on the street talking at weekends and late at night 
during the hot season, exchanging stories and jokes. Hama Adja is much older than the 
students and is mostly out at work but when he was there, I was amazed by the position 
he was given in the grin. He was the ideal scapegoat, or in the words of the youngsters 
themselves ‘he is the compound’s donkey (FF: Araanu galle)’. No one would ever 
hesitate about insulting or making fun of Hama Adja and he, in turn, never showed 
offence and joined in the jokes about his weight, his nose, his stupidity and so on. At 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




first I interpreted the teasing as a joking relationship (FF: denndiraaku) but since 
virtually everyone laughed with him, classificatory cousin or not, this was no expla-
nation. The simple fact that he is of slave descent explained everything. 
Hama Adja would do everything without complaining and was always the first to 
offer his chair to visitors. He was always asked to do whatever was necessary and never 
appeared to refuse anything that was asked of him. Female visitors commissioned him 
to go buy an ice cream, milk or breakfast and the students (in their twenties and thirties) 
asked Hama (who was in his forties) for massages, to pass on a message to a girl and so 
on. Madame asked him to do all the heavy physical jobs in the household, such as 
carrying the cooking coals and the bags of rice, feeding the goats at the back of the 
compound and butchering an animal on festive occasions. Hama Adja was the only one 
I ever saw dancing as the other freeborn youngsters felt too shy to do so and insisted 
that the rules of conduct for noble freeborn (FF: ndimaaku) did not permit them to 
dance. 
Hama Adja was the one who did not have a cell phone, did not speak a word of 
French and was never given a proper chair. Even though he was the oldest, worked the 
hardest and got up earliest, he was given the worse spot on the floor in the boys’ 
overcrowded bedroom.  
Memories of slavery are embodied in the figure of Hama Adja in several ways: 
Firstly by the activities he was expected to undertake; secondly by the stereotypical 
jokes and insults he was the subject to. Thirdly Hama Adja literally ‘embodies’ his mar-
ginal status in subtle introvert bodily acts of deference and at the same time extrovert 
explosions of energy in his dancing and unhindered expression of joy. Finally, Hama 
Adja also embodies his status in the cultural field of hierarchy by the places he occupies 
or is not allowed to occupy (see example of taking a seat). 
Despite his age and move to an urban area, these descriptions of Hama Adja’s 
interactions with the Dicko family illustrate how the cultural field of hierarchy, even in 
Bamako, operates in an uncontested sphere of hegemony rather than in contestable 
ideology. Hama Adja’s former slave status is constantly confirmed in subtle expecta-
tions by the Dicko family. He himself has no problem with his self-imposed loyalty 
style and considers himself lucky to be hosted by one of the most influential members 
of the Dicko family.  
This chapter outlines the cultural field of hierarchy in the Kau-Dicko network and 
the ways in which it has been ‘transferred’ to the urban context of Bamako. To what 
extent did the mobility of slave descendants, like Hama Adja, help to turn hegemonous 
aspects of the cultural field of hierarchy into contested ideology? Hama Adja’s case is a 
clear demonstration of how also in other places like cities, the cultural field of hierarchy 
is ‘transferred’: I will demonstrate how some aspects of it travel with the main actors in 
the Kau-Dicko network to other places.  
Urban contexts however offer variations in relations. There are also slave descend-
ants whose mobility elsewhere allowed them to move up and specialize in the 
patriarchal style themselves. Existing hegemony are likely to clash in contexts where 
other ideologies of how social relations should be designed are accessible and present. 
New places challenge the cultural field of hierarchy, eventually transforming it. When 
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people move, their styles and expectations are explored in new contexts. New en-
vironments are likely to test their original roles and behaviour and every migration 
process involves a major reorientation of social perspectives and categories over time. 
‘Cosmopolitanism, in other words, does not necessarily imply an absence of belonging 
but the possibility of belonging to more than one ethnic and cultural localism simul-
taneously’ (Werbner 1999: 34). And according to Geschiere et al. (2006: 1):552 
One can argue that the separation of ideas from the places and circumstances that have generated them 
may have created a fissure between reality and discourse: As people attempt to comprehend reality 
with ideas, which have been generated without any heed to local particularities, they may confuse 
discourse with reality and gradually replace the reality with discourse ... the priorities of ‘here’ may be 
determined by the dynamics of ‘there’, while the only connection between here and there remains an 
imagined one. 
In short, some migrant communities are more conservative than others, depending on 
their investment in reproducing the cultural field of hierarchy in which they were 
socialized back home. Some groups of migrants in new (urban, transnational) contexts 
have maintained or reinvigorated the cultural field of hierarchy. Sy (2000) mentions an 
example of a mixed-status marriage between a freeborn woman and a man of slave 
descent among Malian Soninke migrants who had been living in Paris for decades and 
who were violently sanctioned in both the migrant and in the home community.  
Other recent studies have focused on how emigration for (Fulɓe) slave descendants 
can be an emancipatory process or, at least, is likely to influence social transformations. 
Saibou (2005: 869-870) in his study of the legacies of slavery among Fulɓe in northern 
Cameroon, for example, indicates how young Riimaayɓe benefit from emigration and 
their act of moving away from constraining or stigmatizing hierarchies at home allows 
them to start reflecting on them. Their movement is likely to result in a contestation of 
the cultural field of hierarchy upon their return. Boyer (2005) demonstrated how Nige-
rian Tuareg migrants of slave descent increasingly expressed a sense of emancipation 
from their masters after they had lived elsewhere. Thus, by moving into urban contexts 
and distancing themselves from their rural homes, slave-descending Riimaayɓe obtain 
more freedom and feel freer regarding not only their rural villages as places but also the 
hierarchical ideas inscribed in the landscapes of these villages. Taking a distance in 
space does not automatically lead to an increased ability to disconnect socially. Some-
times the opposite is true. Besides change, conservatism can also be a characteristic 
feature of migrant communities.  
The following sections describe five different, sometimes intersecting, ways of en-
gaging with the cultural field of hierarchy resulting from mobility in an urban context: 
Moving on, moving back in, moving up, moving against and moving out of the cultural 
field of hierarchy. The focus is on how the cultural field of hierarchy ‘travels’ and is 
even transferred to Bamako. It analyzes interactions of ‘move on’ ritual occasions and 
greeting and how migrants ‘move on or back into’ stereostyling in the urban context. 
Mobility is considered for some as an interesting strategy to move against, to move up 
or even to move out of the existing cultural field of hierarchy. The main argument of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
552  Geschiere, Rath & Meyer (2006) requested papers for a conference on mobilities in honour of Abram 
de Swaan at the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, 25-26 January 2007. See:  
http://www.h-net.org/announce/show.cgi?ID=149202. Accessed June 2009. 
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chapter is that people in the specific Kau-Dicko network in general ‘move on with’ or 
‘move back into’ the cultural field of hierarchy rather than leaving it behind (by moving 
up or out).  
‘Moving on’: Travelling hierarchies and villagization in an urban 
context 
The anonymity and distances of urban territories restrain social control and close inter-
action. This section considers some of the times when villagers of various status groups 
meet in the urban context. In Bamako, the stigma of slave status is maintained through 
social boundaries between the different groups in Fulɓe society and when moving out of 
the village, slave descendants continue to ‘move on’ in the cultural field of hierarchy in 
Bamako.  
Whether they move on or not depends on how big the communities of the home 
region or village are, and the extent to which the moral community is regulated and 
controlled in the new urban contexts. Those who live in urban centres with fellow 
villagers nearby (or compatriots, as in Abidjan or Paris for example) may feel and also 
practically be locked into their translocal village and its social network.  
In addition to multiple opportunities for relating because of its scale, the city po-
tentially (re)qualifies ways (forms) of relating when away (from the home village). 
Especially compared to the closeness of the rural village, there are not many occasions 
in which the cultural field of hierarchies is explicitly evoked among Haayre migrants in 
Bamako. There are specific times and places when stereo styles are played out and 
reinforce the existing cultural field of hierarchy. Greetings and ritual events are im-
portant moments when people are expected to know their place.  
 
Greeting in urban stereo style 
Chapter 2 described how greeting practices are an important way of demonstrating 
respect and of underlining stereo styles according to the cultural field of hierarchy. In 
Bamako, daily greetings have become impossible for the villagers of Dalla. Neverthe-
less, it is important to show one’s involvement with others, and Kau family members in 
particular are expected to invest time and money in greeting Dicko family members. 
However, most Kau descendants live in faraway places and may spend more than two 
hours getting to one of the central neighbourhoods where they can visit a Dicko. 
Interacting with each other on an urban scale is hard work and demands significant 
investment. Greeting is part and parcel of demonstrating and engaging in the loyalty 
style. Every week Beidary visits Samba Musa Dicko and Nassuru Vieux Dicko who live 
nearby. 
Amadu Kau, Beidary’s eldest brother (see Figure 1), has been reproached for not 
investing enough in the loyalty style in the urban context. Since Amadu was raised by 
the Dicko family and studied with most of Musa Dicko’s children, he became a close 
family member but has been excluded from the family for not visiting and constantly 
demonstrating his loyalty. Some say the height of his arrogance is the fact that he no 
longer accepts being called Tambura (a slave surname) and only wants to be addressed 
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as Dicko (a freeborn surname) (Pelckmans 2011 forthcoming). Today he is never 
present at Dicko family events or ritual occasions. 
In contrast, his younger cousin, Amadu Hama, gets on well with the members of the 
Dicko family in Bamako. He confidently considers himself part of the Dicko family, 
saying: ‘We (Kau descendants) are one family with the Dickos!’ He maintains close ties 
with the Dicko family and freeborn Dicko youngsters visit him regularly. Madame and 
her brothers ask for his assistance if things need to be arranged and engaged Amadu 
Hama in Madame’s political campaign.553 The interaction between freeborn Dicko 
youngsters and the Kau- Riimaayɓe living in Bamako is imbued with the quest for 
influence. Amadu, Papa and Moustique Dicko from Dalla and Saajo from Joona 
regularly visit the slave-descending Riimaayɓe from their home village. They maintain 
that keeping relations intact and showing interest will win them votes.  
Elder Dicko family members also try to involve the labour immigrants of Dalla in 
their political campaigns. In December 2006, Oumar organized a big meeting for all 
Dalla inhabitants who are part of the village association of Dalla to inform them about 
the PSP’s ideas, progress and campaign.  
 
Ritual events as ‘villagization’ 
Devish (1996) in his article on charismatic healing churches in Kinshasa describes how 
the lack of authority in the city context is filled by churches that remobilize and re-
inforce interpersonal links with the village. This process, which he calls ‘villagization’, 
fills the desire for moral integrity and sharing but I argue that in the Kau-Dicko network 
it is especially ritual occasions that allow for villagization.  
Ritual occasions generate interaction between villagers from different groups. There 
is however a clear unidirectionality in the reciprocity between groups. Kau family mem-
bers and other slave-descending Riimaayɓe assist with ritual occasions in the Dicko 
family, but not vice versa. Ritual events in the Kau family are never attended by the 
Dicko elite in Bamako. Just as on ritual occasions in the village the noblemen send 
money or presents but do not participate in person in slave-descending Riimaayɓe 
rituals. It would be unthinkable for them to ever undertake physical labour for the Kau 
family.  
The ritual occasions that bring together Haayre villagers are thus organized by the 
Dicko family, who even pay for the transport of the slave-descending Riimaayɓe who, 
in turn, assist with labour.554 I will describe the 2005 baptism (FF: lamuru) and naming 
ceremony (FF: Inde) of a newborn Dicko baby called Ina, as a concrete example of 
ritual events recreating the cultural field of hierarchy in Bamako. Ina is the firstborn 
daughter of Assi Cisse and Nassuru Dicko.555 Mother Assi Cisse is a member of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
553  In the parliamentary elections in June 2007 and the municipal elections in April 2009. Personal 
communication, Amadu Amiiru Dicko, April 2009. 
554  In contrast, praise singers often invite themselves in the hope of getting money by singing the praise 
of elite members. Many persons of noble descent complain about the aggressive actions of praise 
singers during their ritual events in Bamako and claim that they try to avoid them as much as possible 
as they are too expensive. 
555  I attended five baptisms among the Dicko family members in 2005-2006. Since I have known Assi 
best (she lived near to my host), I describe her baptism here.  
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religious elite of Booni, while Nassuru Dicko is a member of the royal family of Dalla. 
Nassuru is the son of Musa Dicko and a younger brother of Madame Dicko.  
Ina’s baptism was celebrated in the compound of Nassuru’s elder brother Samba 
Dicko because contrary to Nassuru’s compound, Samba’s compound at the time was 
bigger and therefore more suitable to host the many visitors. In order to assist, some 
villagers invited themselves by buying a bus ticket on credit from the bus driver in the 
hope that their host in Bamako would reimburse their costs. For Ina’s baptism, her 
mother and her husband’s mother paid for their stereo partners to take the bus from 
Dalla/Booni/Douentza to Bamako to attend the event and young father Nassuru and his 
brother Samba paid for the transport back. A one-way ticket Douentza-Bamako costs 
about FCFA 10,000. So the freeborn Dicko family in Bamako will try not to invite too 
many villagers because of the expense. I heard the Dickos complain about their many 
clients who need food, compensation, drinks and so on. This is however a double-edged 
sword: It enhances their prestige and the ‘village context’ is recreated if a lot of vil-
lagers are present. It allows them to excel in the patriarchal style and corresponding 
prestige. It is thus a discourse in which the elite ‘victimizes’ itself for ending up in the 
position of the patronizing style, which they are ‘forced back into’ by their clients.  
In addition to villagers travelling more than 800 km, Samba also invited the slave-
descending Riimaayɓe youngsters he regularly sees in Bamako556 and asked them to 
invite other villagers and the Kau family. For many of the younger labour migrants of 
slave descent, such ritual celebrations are an occasion to eat well and catch up with 
fellow villagers so the majority of youngsters in Bamako would not hesitate to attend. 
Baptisms (FF: lamuru) in Bamako are organized in much the same way as in the 
rural context. It is mainly the quality and amount of food, the presents and the visitors 
that have changed due to increased wealth and social networks. A bull is slaughtered for 
a first-born baby like Ina but, unlike in the village, the meat is served to the visitors with 
potatoes, and lemonade is also offered. For Ina’s baptism in Bamako, Samba and 
Nassuru Dicko were helped with the butchering by slave descendants living in Bamako 
(called Hama Alu and Amadu Hama) and not by their stereo partners who live in Dalla. 
Although Samba often paid for his stereo partner Suleymane to come over, he did not 
always manage to do so. Moreover, he disposed of an extra stereo partner in Bamako, 
with the name of Belco Tambura. Belco is a poor man of freeborn descent from the 
village of Nokara, who sells the milk of his animals on a weekly basis to Samba in 
Bamako. My interpreter Musa Dicko once called Belco a ‘Dogon’ and another time 
referred to him as a ‘former slave of the Islamic scholars from the village of Nokara’ 
(FF: Maccuδo Moodibaaɓe Nokara). Belco considers Samba Dicko as a friend and 
patron: 
I am poor so on every ritual occasion I go to Samba, I do my job and afterwards he gives me meat and 
money, which I will divide with my family. I got to know Samba because I was the driver of Dikoore 
Hamadoun (a daughter of Hamadoun Dicko living in Bamako) at that time. Although before we never 
met in person, my parents have been hosted by Samba’s family for some time. Here in Bamako I work 
in the service of a Bambara migrant. With regard to my home region, it is Samba who lives nearby 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
556  Samba explains that his choice is not focused on inviting those Riimaayɓe officially belonging to his 
family but to all slave descendants belonging to whatever social group. 
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and buys the fresh milk of my cows. So we are now ‘friends’ (FF: Giɗiraaɓe), I even named my last 
son after Samba.557 
Belco thus became a newly acquired stereo partner for Samba, replacing Suleymane 
if necessary. Despite the fact that Suleymane is Samba's ascribed stereo partner, Samba 
did not invite him to come from Dalla to Bamako for the baptism of his brother as it 
was deemed too expensive for Samba to pay transportation costs.558 Since Suleymane is 
living in Dalla, he is often not available for Samba who lives in Bamako, so Samba 
turns to other clients such as Belco. Here it is clear that distance influences the cultural 
field of hierarchy in many ways. This time, it was Belco, Hama and Amadu who were 
given the heads, feet and intestines of the slaughtered bull as a reward for their 
assistance with butchering.  
The work of the various clients assisting the baptism is rewarded differently. The 
male youngsters (who butchered animals and arranged chairs) get food, parts of the 
meat and some money. Depending on what they did, they are likely to get paid between 
FCFA 500 and FCFA 1000. This is about half what they earn on average for a full day’s 
work, not including the extra food that they are given on ritual occasions. There is thus 
a monetization of the work they do, which is labelled ‘slave labour’ (FF: Golle Mac-
cuɓe) by the Dickos. The women are paid collectively as is described below. 
A final difference that clearly points to differences in wealth of the families cele-
brating a newborn in urban versus rural contexts, is the fact that cameramen and 
photographers are hired to make professional reports in Bamako. These include a 
section in which the close family members direct their speech in the form of wishes to 
the newborn baby. Among the visitors are not only co-villagers, family members and 
slave-descending assistants but also friends, colleagues and neighbours – often from 
other ethnic groups – who do not spend the whole day there but drop in to greet people 
and profess their affection. 
Ina’s baptism starts early in the morning with a male gathering when father Nassuru, 
his brothers Samba and Aba Kadji (see genealogy Dicko family, Figure 2, Chapter 2) 
and other male friends and cousins meet with an Islamic scholar. Nassuru chose the 
name Ina as it renders homage to his father’s first wife ‘Ina Wuro’ (literally: Mother of 
the village). After Nassuru pronounced the name (FF: Inde) of his child, a bull is 
slaughtered and the men sit together discussing life while listening to a Ŋeenyo singer 
praising the history and genealogy of the newborn’s respective paternal and maternal 
lineages. Nassuru and his friends spend all day outside the compound proper, sitting on 
rented chairs on the unpaved street in front of the house.  
Even while sitting and talking or playing cards, a keen observer might notice subtle 
differences among the social categories by paying attention not only to their outward 
appearance (dress, vehicles) and styles of behaviour (who does the dirty work) but also 
to the use of space. Among age mates who are sitting together drinking their tea, it is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557  Naming one’s child after someone is done in the hope that the child will be taken extra care of by his 
homonym. See also Pelckmans (2011b forthcoming). 
558  On important ritual occasions in Samba's family in Bamako, such as Samba’s children’s baptisms and 
Samba’s marriage, Suleymane will be given a ticket by Samba. When Suleymane is there, he will 
perform typical Riimaayɓe tasks for his stereo partner. 
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slave-descending Diimaajo who will give up his chair if a freeborn person arrives. It is 
the young male slave-descending youngsters who will remain standing. In general 
however, status differences in the interaction between the male slave descendants and 
their freeborn counterparts are less marked than among women.  
In the afternoon, it is the women who meet up during the joonde when they sit with 
the beautifully adorned mother and her baby and give them presents. The mother and 
important female members of the family are seated together and all the other women 
join in and add their gifts, which are piled up in a central spot in the middle of the space 
where they are seated.559 The important female members of the family are the ones who 
decide who gives what and whether the amounts are according to the cumulative 
reciprocal logic. 
The display of wealth is an important aspect of the joonde. Firstly the assisting 
women are all dressed in expensive clothes, exclusive and sophisticated hairdos and 
jewellery. As in their home village, most of the slave-descending women do not wear 
expensive cloth (French: Bazin) but use the much cheaper wax cloths. They are not 
embroidered with gold and their hairstyles are not as sophisticated as those of the elite 
women. These slave-descending Riimaayɓe women help on such occasions by offering 
assistance (taking out a crying baby of a noble woman, arranging gifts and cooking). 
Displays of wealth are done through gift giving. All the women sit together to witness 
the presents given which, in addition to traditional presents such as cloth, silver 
bracelets, soap and money, include plastic baby baths, teats and feeding bottles from the 
urban residents. Unlike in the rural context where many women are illiterate, the gifts of 
the urban joonde are noted down (Image 5).560   
 
Image 5 (see appendix): Baptism- Detail of gifts as registered during a 2003 baptism in 
Dicko family (personal archives of Thiomo Dicko) 
People with different backgrounds have different roles to fulfil on such ritual 
occasions. Assisting clients demonstratively engage in the loyalty style and are not 
supposed to give presents like other visitors. They are thus excluded from establishing 
long-lasting ties of gifts that are established between freeborn Dicko women. Back 
home, slave-descending women would never give gifts to the Dicko family as they only 
do so among themselves. At the end of the day, the pile of presents and money bear 
witness to the mother’s solid network of wealth in people. 
Ideally the gifts are for the mother and her baby although some are redistributed 
among clients for services rendered such as to the praise singers, who might have made 
the mother cry with their compliments about her family ancestors, and to the slave-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
559  The verb ‘to sit’ in Fulfulde is Joodaade; hence this part of the ritual event is called joonde. 
560  This inventory of who gives what to the mother of the newborn baby is important since the young 
mother when visiting the baptism of one of her visitors in the future will have to give the same 
amount plus 25% extra, which inevitably leads to more expensive gifts. 
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descending Riimaayɓe through their labour such as cooking and carrying things.561 
Seydou explains that:  
They (slave descendants) want their social status group to be cited (as a way of thanking them) when 
there is a distribution during a ritual occasion. Our efforts (of the Dicko family) towards our Maccuɓe 
are a bit superficial but we will always give some extra to those who actually worked and they earn 
good money like this. 
Slave descendants in general do not contribute to these ritual occasions but, on the 
contrary, will be paid money or given cloth for their assistance. In general, it is not only 
the father and mother who pay the assisting Riimaayɓe, it is also several members of the 
Dicko family who give their money to compensate for the services rendered. This is 
again a clear example of how stereo styles are perpetuated in the urban context. 
When comparing the redistribution of the money in the personal administrative notes 
of Ina’s mother Assi Cisse (Nassuru Dicko’s wife who was born in Booni) and that of 
Dioro’s mother Thiomo Dicko (Samba Dicko’s wife who was born in Joona), it is in-
teresting to note how different status groups are discerned in different village contexts.  
 
 
Table 2 Redistribution of gifts in personal administrative notes by young mothers Assi and 
Thiomo 
                            Ritual Occasion: 
 
Baptism Ina, first-born of 
Assi Cisse (2005) 
Baptism Dioro, third-born of Thiomo 
Dicko (2004) 
                          Village of origin: Booni Joona 
Assisting social status groups: Rewards: Rewards: 
- Slave descendants 33,000 12,000 
- Arts & crafts groups 6000 6000 
- Traders 3000 not mentioned 
- Woodworkers  not mentioned 1500 
 
 
Table 3 Subdivision of slave descendants as noted in the personal administration of 
baptisms of child Ina (mother Assi) and child Dioro (mother Thiomo).	  	  
            Personal administrative notes of: Assi Cisse (Booni) Thiomo Dicko (Joona) 
Subdivision of slave descendants: Female cooks Female cooks 
 Men Male butchers 
 Cousins Slaves 
 Riimaayɓe  
 
 
When looking at this table, one can see that there are differences in the way social 
status groups are valued differently for Dicko families with different village contexts. 
The differentiation of social groups can be accounted for because both women are from 
different native villages: Thiomo is the daughter of the political elite (FF: Weeheeɓe) 
from Joona, and in Booni Assi is the daughter of the religious elite (FF: Moodibaaɓe). 
Their respective home villages have a different status group composition. In Joona there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561  Male slave-descending Riimaayɓe slaughtered the bull or sheep and distributed the usual cola nuts. 
The female slave-descending Riimaayɓe provided the cooking and other coordination, such as the 
stapling, counting and carrying the presents during the ceremony. 
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is a group of traders who receives money, while in Joona there are no traders but 
woodworkers to be rewarded. Each of the above mentioned social status groups (FF: Sy) 
has a representative who receives the money in name of the group and will later on 
redistribute it.562 The table below indicates how also the group of slave descendants is in 
turn subdivided in various categories at both baptisms. The perception of subdivisions 
in the group of slave descendants differs quite significantly when comparing what has 
been noted down in the personal administrative notes of both women.  
In Thiomo’s administration, there are slave descendants in three groups: Those who 
worked (female cooks versus male butchers) and the more general category of other 
slave descendants that did not work but were present (slaves). According to Assi, the 
social status group of the slaves was divided differently, making a difference between 
female cooks, men, cousins and Riimaayɓe. The amount of money given to each of the 
status groups and their subdivisions differ because the total amounts to be divided were 
different from the outset. It is not the aim here to discuss the earnings of each group and 
the individuals that benefitted.563 Rather in these written accounts of freeborn mothers 
Assi and Thiomo, slave descendants obtained more money than the caste groups of 
weavers, woodworkers, dancers, praise singers and smiths. 
The different appreciations of the different status groups come to the fore in Table 2. 
and the slave-descending Riimaayɓe are put into the loyalty style position, while the 
Dickos through their ostentatious gift giving confirm their patriarchal style. Villagi-
zation is a process of sociality, and interaction thus creates recognizable parallels be-
tween the urban and rural socio-spatial organization.564 These moments of villagization 
confirm the transfer or rather the ‘travelling’ of hierarchies. 
 
Occupying place during the Joonde 
Chapter 2 demonstrated how the landscape is organized and shapes people’s inter-
actions. In the urban context of Bamako, (the use of) place reflects the cultural field of 
hierarchy. This section gives an overview of the women's joonde,565 where one can read 
a certain hierarchy of importance from the spatial occupations of those involved. At 
ritual events, such as the baptism of Ina (mother Assi), places are allocated to specific 
social groups and these are maintained in a disciplined manner throughout the event. 
Image 6 (see appendix): Spatial organisation during a baptism in a Dicko family in 
Bamako 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562  During the baptism of Assi Cisse and that of Mariam Dicko in Bamako (2005-2006) I observed many 
quarrels - among praise singing Ŋeeyɓe about the division of money among themselves and in relation 
to status groups. 
563  It is impossible to know what the net amounts of money and gifts received per person are. During all 
the baptisms I went to in Bamako, the praise-singers were given extras by individual visitors as a 
reward for singing praise to their hosts.   
564  I take up the main argument of Chapter 2 on mapping again: the cultural field of hierarchy is em-
bedded in the places where people live and interact.  
565  Men are only allowed if they are clients with a legitimate activity among the women, for example 
Ŋeeyɓe praise singers. 
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The drawing (Image 6) of Ina’s baptism in Bamako shows how the places of the 
female visitors at the joonde are arranged hierarchically. In the most central spot of the 
living room on a central couch was Assi with baby Ina on her lap. Next to her were her 
closest friends on the couch. Important elderly women in her and/or her husband’s 
family are seated on the couch next to this one. Both couches define the central spots in 
the living room of the house. All visiting female family members and friends surround 
mother Assi, baby In and the pile of presents (see * in drawing on Image 6). On the 
edge of the circle (Couch 3), slave-descending women are far from the actual gift 
giving, both physically and in reciprocal practice. Having worked all day, the slave-
descending women have changed their outfits and assist from afar. One of them, Kumba 
Tambura566 moved into the circle of seated freeborn women to arrange the presents, put 
them in baskets and finally carry them away. 
The slave-descending women are seated at the back and, in terms of dress, never 
show off the way the elite women do, underlining how slave-descending women will 
never be centre stage but are constantly reminded of their ‘lower ranking’ that forces 
them into the loyalty style.  
Moving back into stereo-styles in Bamako  
While for some stereostyling is a permanent way of moving on in the cultural field of 
hierarchy in the urban context, for others it is a (temporary) way to ‘move back in’. This 
section discusses how most slave descendants sooner or later move back into the 
cultural field of hierarchy, for example in times of crisis, such as unemployment, illness 
of a family member or problems with the police. Secondly, it demonstrates how the 
Dicko family does not necessarily rely on those who ‘move back into’ loyalty style with 
their former patrons. Instead, other slave descendants or people marginalized from their 
home region are also willing to engage in stereostyling with them and thus ‘move in’ 
but not ‘back in’ to that particular stereo relation.  
Those who moved to the city enjoy different degrees of socio-economic emancipa-
tion. It was argued in Chapter 6 that the ways in which people move and access mobility 
are gender specific. Women are less encouraged (or even discouraged) to move than 
men. This section demonstrates that gender also defines access to different niches in the 
job market and options to engage in stereo styles in the urban context. Female migrants 
from the Haayre region depend on existing social networks to obtain work more than 
men. Their dependence on networks is a vicious circle: The fact that they engage in 
domestic work for patrons who speak the same language makes them less likely to learn 
Bambara, Bamako’s lingua franca, than their male counterparts. Women therefore tend 
to remain more dependent on existing social networks and generally stereostyle more 
than their male counterparts.   
Overall, young male Riimaayɓe labour migrants in Bamako benefit more from the 
emancipatory effects of their mobility and individual incomes than their female coun-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
566  Personal observations of the baptism of Assi Cisse in Bamako in 2006. The slave-descending woman 




terparts. For example, Hassan, Kumba’s husband, works for himself in the construction 
sector and although he is the stereo partner of Oumar Dicko, his daily activities are 
quite independent of those of his stereo partner. This can be explained by the fact that 
from the outset most female migrants move on demand either with their husbands or 
patrons. They not only engage in so-called dependent movement567 but also have to 




The organization of ritual assistance  
Female assistance in Bamako and domestic labour in the city context echoes the rural 
divisions of labour and social status. About 90% of the noble Weeheeɓe families from 
the Haayre region in Bamako have a maid of slave descent.568 This contrasts sharply 
with the lack of domestic workers among slave-descending Riimaayɓe families from the 
same village living in Bamako.569 However, there are some exceptions. Belco, who is of 
slave descent but was one of the first students in his home village to graduate, has been 
living and working in Bamako for decades. He takes pride in mentioning that his maid 
is of noble Fulɓe descent and his case shows how social status can be reversed through 
wealth. 
Chapters 4 and 6 demonstrated that the elite’s control over their female clients’ work 
and mobility remained much stronger than that over their male clients. However, even 
those female slave descendants who did not migrate to the city at the request of a patron 
often end up working for families from their home region, because they are often the 
first ones to offer them a job. To illustrate this, I will describe the female slave des-
cendants that assisted Assi when she gave birth to her first child.  
When living in cities, noble women no longer return to their parents or family of 
origin to give birth as is the case in rural areas. Kin members who live in town generally 
host them. Assi, for example, stayed in Bamako to give birth because the healthcare 
facilities in her home village are not considered good enough. In contrast to such 
arrangements among elite women, most slave-descending women in Bamako did return 
to their home village to give birth. Amadu Hama’s wife, for example, gave birth to each 
of her children in Dalla. As explained in Chapter 4, slave-descending women only have 
a friend or sister to assist for about a week when their first child is born.  
Freeborn women receive help for at least forty days from one or even two slave-
descending women who make their food, help them with breastfeeding and generally 
take care of the baby. The choice of an older woman of slave descent is common as they 
have experience bringing up children. Moreover, some slave-descending Riimaayɓe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
567  See Chapter 6. This ‘dependent mobility’ has also been called ‘subordinate movement’ by Rossi 
(2009b: 183). 
568  According to my observations, the large majority of noblemen in the villages of Dalla, Booni and 
Joona who live in Bamako have maids of slave descent. Camara (1995: 15), describing slave-des-
cending maids among the Torooɓe (Fulɓe religious nobility) in Kaedi (Mauritania), indicates how this 
is a general trend. 
569  I conducted a quantitative survey among the Riimaayɓe families with historical links as slaves to the 
royal Weeheeɓe nobility in the Fulɓe village of Dalla (Central Mali). 
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women are believed to have special skills in handling children.570 In Bamako, freeborn 
Dicko families look for older women among their slave descendants, either among those 
already living in Bamako or they recruit them from the home village and pay for their 
transport to Bamako.  
Freeborn mother Assi was assisted by two women for forty days. The first girl was 
her stereo partner and the same time her domestic worker Maya, and the second was 
Aminata, an older woman in her fifties and of slave descent from Booni. Aminata had 
already been working as a trader at the market in Bamako when she was asked to assist 
Assi who was having difficulties breastfeeding even though this exceeded the 
obligatory forty-day period described in the Koran. Maya continued to do the general 
household shores.  
Since Assi lived near my compound in Lafiabougou, I regularly visited her and the 
newborn and tried to talk to Aminata, who explained that she is married and trades in 
cloth on the big market of Bamako. Because she was asked to assist Assi, she tem-
porarily stopped her trading and although she was unhappy about this, she asked me 
rhetorically what else she could have done. She would have earned much more from her 
trading activities but could not ignore the ties of reciprocation with her co-villagers.  
The assistance that was given to freeborn Assi in Bamako demonstrates that although 
some stereo partners are more permanent, others are only engaged temporally. Aminata 
was reminded of her reciprocal plight and loyalty style by her former patrons. This is 
why she moved back into the cultural field of hierarchy by engaging in stereostyling. In 
contrast, others, such as Kumbel who assisted widowed Kumba Dicko, are happy to be 
able to temporarily opt for the loyalty style vis-à-vis their former patrons (see Chapter 
6) because they depend on the rewards.  
Baptism, marriage ceremonies and widowed female elite women in the city context 
are assisted by female slave descendants. Not only slave-descending women but also 
men assist the freeborn Dicko family in Bamako ‘just like we do in the village’. Ritual 
events demand simple and short-term assistance from men. The main difference is that 
in general men only ‘move back into’ stereostyling relationships for very short periods 
of time.  
Time and geographical distance from one’s stereo partner are important elements in 
stereo styles within the urban Kau-Dicko network. When talking about the future of 
their status as married persons, freeborn Aai Musa Dicko explained that she knew her 
personal stereo partner in Booni. Nevertheless since she was only 18 in 2007 and living 
in Bamako, she will only request help from her stereo partner for personal ritual events 
such as her wedding. Contrary to those of slave descent who grow up with their stereo 
partner, Aai does not have very close ties with her stereo partner because she moved 
away and the binding ties became less binding.   
In contrast, Bilal, the son of slave descending Kumba and her husband who assist 
Oumar Dicko in Bamako, is very close to his stereo partner Usmane, who is about the 
same age as one of Oumar’s children. Both boys developed a strong stereo partnership 
in Bamako.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570  See Chapter 5. 
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Reward through generous reciprocity 
Although noble Fulɓe families living in urban areas could easily afford a salaried maid, 
the majority recruit one among slave descendants who are considered to belong to their 
family. When this maid returns home to get married, her employer is supposed to pay 
for her trousseau. However the most obvious advantage, apart from social prestige and 
social cohesion,571 is that the payment of a trousseau is lower (FCFA 150,000 max) than 
a monthly salary over several years (FCFA 90,000/year). 
In addition to the domestic labour of ‘niece’ Maya, employer Assi and her husband 
Nassuru also pay for a salaried maid from the San region who works for the three 
families they share a compound with.572 Unlike this maid, who is paid FCFA 6,500/ 
month), Maya’s reward will be at her marriage in the form of a trousseau. Whether the 
decoration of her house or furniture, jewellery and her dress will be paid for depends on 
the number of years she has worked and on the goodwill and respect of her employers. 
Maya has an interest in working hard because if she does not succeed in Bamako, she 
will ruin the status of her future marriage partner. Maya’s dependence on receiving a 
trousseau is even higher than that of other slave-descending girls in her situation be-
cause she is an orphan and has no one who will give her additional gifts when she 
marries. Maya’s future seems to be assured for the moment but she is likely to continue 
to rely on her former employer once married and settled in her home village. Her 
employers’ family will probably be her future host (FF: njaatigi) in Bamako for her and 
her family members.  
Maya no longer lives in poverty in her home village and is hosted in relative luxury 
in Bamako. Whether this will eventually result in social mobility remains to be seen and 
much depends on the way she is married off by her employers. Only time will tell how 
things turn out and as Maya says herself ‘it is in Gods hands, God willing I will be fine’. 
Having one’s trousseau paid for is considered a good reward and is not necessarily 
any less well perceived than monetary reward, i.e. a salary. Madame Dicko and one of 
her nieces who organized a smart wedding to remunerate her maid of slave descent are 
seen as good employers by many. Although Madame’s domestic staff work hard, she 
takes good care of them and does not abuse them physically. Nevertheless, like so many 
domestic workers, the girls wore dirty old clothes and if their flip-flops broke, they 
spent weeks walking around barefoot. Madame allowed her domestic workers Umu and 
Adama to go out dancing with the other domestic workers in the neighbourhood573 and 
even helped the girls to recycle hair extensions that her daughters had used and lent 
them clothes and make-up. Madame pays her domestic workers in goods rather than in 
money and non-monetary gifts are often considered advantageous for the giver because 
they have extra value on top of their monetary cost: They ‘remind’ the receiver of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
571  Most maids in the Dicko family are recruited among the slave-descending Riimaayɓe to ensure ‘social 
cohesion’, as one of my research assistants has it (Personal conversation, 4 March 2009).  
572  During my regular visits in 2006, people gossiped about this salaried maid because she was pregnant 
and had to be replaced. For more about the commonalities of pregnancies and sexual abuse of maids 
in Djenne, see Bouju (2007). The commonality of sexual intercourse with one’s maid (FF: Kordo) in 
Fulɓe society is mentioned by N’Gaide (2003: 715-716).  
573  Late at night the young maids meet up to have fun at their own music and dance evenings, known as 
balani in Bambara language.  
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gift. Madame can claim to have married the girl off and this reinforces her patriarchal 
style. A monetary reward would evaporate more quickly and provide no extras in the 
relationship between giver and receiver.  
According to informants in the Kau family however, the majority of the girls from 
Dalla who worked as domestic workers for the Dicko family have been exploited and 
some have never been paid. Freeborn Dicko families stress their benevolence and 
generosity but admit that some freeborn who ‘still have a village mentality sometimes 
exploit their maid (who they don’t hesitate to call their slave)’. The example mentioned 
by most Kau family members is Nafoore, the daughter of Macca, who had worked in 
the service of a freeborn Dicko family in Bamako but had never been paid for years of 
hard work (see Chapter 3). Nafoore had worked for her mother's master’s family in 
Bamako for seven years and one day suddenly returned home empty-handed. Her 
employer reproached her for flirting too much but to avoid the shame of sending her 
home immediately, her employer first sent her on to her brother in Bamako but he 
feared Nafoore would become pregnant so sent her home against her will. Employers 
feel responsible for protecting their girls’ virginity but he used the excuse that she was 
disobedient to dismiss her. This was not acceptable as a reason for not paying her for 
seven years of work and resulted in a mayor conflict between her parents and her 
employer. Nafoore’s father Macca (see Chapter 4) is the stereo partner of the village 
chief, who was a close relative of Nafoore’s employer, but even in this privileged 
position, the girl’s return only increased the stigma and shame on his family's honour 
and not on the freeborn family who had exploited her.574  
Last year Nafoore found herself a marriage partner and since then pressure on her 
former employer has been mounting to pay for her trousseau. It remains to be seen 
whether her parents have enough influence or authority to convince her former noble 
employer to do so. The timing and choice of marriage partner have become dependant 
on the employer’s permission and appraisal and Nafoore will have to wait for the 
conflict to be settled before receiving her trousseau. Even if the employer agrees to the 
girl’s marriage, there are no minimum requirements for this kind of payment and the 
cultural field of hierarchy reproduces matrimonial control by freeborn elites over their 
former slaves. In addition to their mobility being dependent, the salary of most Kau 
domestic workers is dependent on the generosity of the Dicko family. 
 
Generational perceptions: Slave-descending nieces or salaried domestic workers 
Whether noble Fulɓe opt for recruiting a related maid of slave descent or a salaried 
maid depends not on their wealth per se but on the character and age of the employer 
and his/her connections with the home community. Madame preferred domestic work-
ers of slave descent because of the social prestige it brings, but the younger generation 
in their thirties are increasingly switching to salaried domestic workers. The majority 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
574  I was living in Dalla when Nafoore returned home. Her mother was ridiculed for having such a dis-
obedient daughter and fell ill. As indicated in a former chapter she was also socially sanctioned: At 
Tabaski, she was given an insulting small piece of meat by her neighbouring Riimaayɓe. This made 
her lose her temper and, while crying loudly, she threw it away in front of me and my interpreter. 
Crying is not something people in Central Mali do easily and underlined the mother’s severe emo-
tional stress.  
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start off with a slave-descending maid who is ‘given’ to them as part of their trousseau 
but later recruit a salaried maid. The shift is seen to avoid trouble and social control by 
the maid’s families. The case of Madame’s younger brother Samba demonstrates why 
he switched to salaried domestic workers.  
Samba and his brother Papa married in Douentza on the same day in 2003 and settled 
together in a rented house in Bamako. Both wives brought their own ‘given’ maid of 
slave descent575 from their respective home villages. Samba explains that, after two 
years, one of these domestic workers went home to get married, although others in the 
family claim that the girl was extremely wilful and Samba wanted to avoid conflict with 
her family. In the end, he decided to marry her off as soon as possible as this would be 
an acceptable reason for sending her home.  
By 2006 Samba and his wife were living on their own576 and recruited another 
Riimaayɓe girl, this time from the slave descendants of Samba’s patriliny. Samba 
explains how this girl was impossible to teach.577 He was irritated with having to 
employ Riimaayɓe domestic workers, claiming that ‘anything is better than these girls 
who are disobedient and talk too much about us in the village’. A young niece hosted by 
Samba and his wife felt that there was nothing wrong with the girls but that ‘when 
something goes wrong and they no longer like their maid, they invent stories and say 
they do not work well’. Nevertheless by 2007 Samba had opted to employ a salaried 
maid and, to date, is happy with the Christian girl from San who he pays FCFA 6000 a 
month. Biba, a young Dogon woman from the Haayre region who squats in an 
unfinished house just opposite Samba’s house, does the family’s laundry.578  
Samba’s case demonstrates how the younger generations have different ideas about 
employing domestic workers. Interviews with several unmarried Fulɓe youngsters in 
Bamako highlighted how some increasingly value their urban social networks over their 
rural ones. Samba’s younger brother Seydu explained that since he had never lived in 
his home village or invested time and effort in relations with slave descendants there, he 
did not count on their assistance when he gets married in Bamako either. His current 
girlfriend is bamakoise and he expects to get married in the city without any help from 
his parents’ slave descendants and to pay people in Bamako if he needs help. Two years 
later Seydu married a girl from Mopti in Douentza and the Kau family were responsible 
for several arrangements. Although Seydu, who speaks better Bambara than Fulfulde 
(his mother tongue) predicted he would become a real bamakois, he now lives in 
Douentza. His wedding and way of life seem not to be all that different from that of his 
older brothers, whose traditional lifestyle he used to criticize.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575  Aai Musa Dicko, interview in French, Bamako, 2007. She uses the French word captive to talk about 
slave descendants today. 
576  Papa Musa Dicko died in a motorcycle accident in 2005 and his wife was sent back to Dalla in 2006. 
Her oldest boy remained in Bamako with Samba who is paying for his education.  
577  Maid Aai married but stayed in Bamako, occasionally washing clothes for Samba’s sister Madame 
Dicko. 
578  Biba and her husband are poor urban dwellers who have deferred to Samba's family ever since Samba 
paid for Biba’s hospitalization when she was ill. Their aspirations for securing a lasting bond with 
Samba became more pronounced when Biba named her child after him. 
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Some of his unmarried second-generation urban Dicko peers who had similar 
trajectories with moving from one Malian town to another to pursue their studies 
indicate how, even when living in Bamako, they consciously maintain their relations 
with the Kau family by visiting seasonal and permanent labour migrants from Dalla 
regularly. Also, they spend as much time as possible in their home village each vacation 
and are active in village associations. They identify with their home village because 
they hope to one day become politicians (the mayor or chief). They aspire to marry a 
girl from their home village and expect to have girls of slave descent as domestic 
workers. 
Being employed by a freeborn family can be advantageous for young girls with a 
precarious position back home although the reward they receive for their work is not 
always guaranteed. Having slave descendants ‘moving back into’ the cultural field of 
hierarchy as domestic workers contributes to the Dicko’s prestige. They also have more 
authority over these girls as they decide her income, her marriage, her contact with her 
family and, as the section below will show, her behaviour and identity.  
 
Imposing authority and maintaining social boundaries by recalling slave origins  
A taxi drops me at the compound of Fanta’s family, who are first-generation Dicko 
emigrants from Central Mali who have moved to Bamako. During lunch, Anta, a young 
girl of about five, shyly approaches those of us having lunch, carrying a small stool. 
Before she can put it on the floor and sit down, my host insults her: ‘Anta, what do you 
think you are doing? Have you forgotten to bring us water?’ The girl, naked apart from 
an old, colourless man’s shirt runs off to bring us water. As she hands it over to her 
boss, she whispers that she is hungry. Her remark meets with mockery: ‘Are you out of 
your mind?579 Can’t you see we haven’t even finished eating yet? Go and take this food 
to the Koranic students first!’  
Little Anta takes the food to the entrance of the compound where the young students 
are shouting their typical begging phrases: ‘Allaah garibu!’ While crossing the com-
pound, Anta’s employer Fanta shouts after her: ‘Walk quickly, they don’t have all day! 
Keep the plate horizontal, you fool!’ She makes a disapproving sound to indicate her 
dissatisfaction: ‘We really have to train her like a dog, she doesn’t know a thing. She is 
so stupid that she is going to forget her own name one day!’ While Anta’s mother 
brings around the water and soap and assists each of us by pouring water to wash our 
hands after dinner, with a one-year-old baby on her back, my hosts continue making fun 
of the girl: ‘She isn’t coming back very quickly, she probably fell in love with one of 
the student beggars! Does she actually think they will even bother to take a proper look 
at her? She’s so ugly!’  
While I was happy to have arrived and had felt welcomed by Fanta’s family, the 
incident made me feel very sorry for the girl and provoked some questions. Should I 
interpret these remarks as normal West African jokes? Were these really discriminatory 
remarks? When I inquire about Anta’s mother and the relationship between her and 
Fanta’s mother (Where is she from? How long has she been working in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579  In Fulfulde she says: ‘A anndaa hoore ma jaati’, which literally means ‘you are really losing your 
head’. This expression has been explained in more detail in the introduction of this thesis.   
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compound?), Fanta explains that they are just poor fellow villagers that asked then for 
work and constantly give birth to children. Upon her second pregnancy Fanta’s family 
considered sending Anta’s mother away, but ‘since these people don’t have anything 
and her mother’s mother also worked as a slave for my father’s father, king Yerowal, 
we decided they could stay’. She sighs and says it is not easy to be of royal descent 
because they have so many obligation vis-à-vis former slave groups: noblesse oblige.  
Anta’s case demonstrates how besides economic advantages, recruiting slave-
descending girls from the home region offers noble Fulɓe other advantages too. Firstly, 
most of these girls are young and inexperienced, and therefore cheap and malleable. 
And for the illiterate, non-Bambara-speaking female freeborn Dicko employers580 in 
Bamako, domestic workers who speak Fulfulde have a twofold advantage: The em-
ployer can communicate with them easily inside the compound and outside the com-
pound the maids are not likely to engage with others as they do not speak much, if any, 
Bambara. Some employers mentioned a preference for employing slave-descending co-
villagers as domestic workers because they show more respect and would never even 
think of seducing their husbands.  
There is an awkward ambiguity in the relationship between domestic workers and 
their employers that can be overcome by setting clear-cut social boundaries. The 
ambiguity of domestic workers being allowed in the most intimate spaces of their 
employer’s house and family life probably explains the need to ‘separate’ them by 
constantly referring to how different they are. All over the world, domestic workers are 
considered different because of the specific rules and roles that only apply to them, such 
as eating after or at a distance from their employer, waking up early to arrange 
everything and so on. Such measures are thus not specific to the case here of a shared 
history of stereostyling and slavery between freeborn Dicko employers and their slave-
descending domestic workers. 
However, the moral authority of the Dicko family is higher and more constraining 
for domestic workers of slave descent from the Haayre region than for unrelated 
domestic workers. Firstly, slave-descending domestic workers often have a close, pre-
established relationship with their freeborn Fulɓe hosts due to their common back-
ground and social networks. Secondly, even the parents of these domestic workers in 
freeborn Fulɓe families engaged in loyalty-style relations based on the shared historical 
legacies of slavery. The parents of domestic workers of slave descent cannot criticize or 
challenge Dicko decisions and if they do, they are likely to lose access to land, their 
mosque, politics and administrative protection.  
Thirdly, the considerable distance between these slave-descending domestic workers 
and their families (Douentza is more than 800 km from Bamako) and the fact that 
permission is needed to visit them makes them dependent on their employers’ good-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
580  Many of Madame Dicko’s younger brothers have married a noble wife in their home village 
according to customary alliance preferences and have settled in Bamako with their illiterate wives. 
Some wives try hard to adapt to the city by learning Bambara and the local way of life but assistance 
from and the possibility to communicate in their mother tongue with co-villagers is important to them.  
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will.581 It is the physical distance of domestic workers from their own families that is 
felt to increase their vulnerability582 and their precarious position is aggravated by the 
fact that they are socially isolated and lack skills in Bambara. Their isolation from 
emancipative interaction with peers forces them to socialize within their host family and 
makes them feel more cut off that other domestic workers.  
These reasons ensure the continuation or moving on of the cultural field of hierarchy 
between the social groups. Under the guise of generosity and a win-win situation for 
both parents and employer, noblemen are likely to veil the fact that they recruit girls 
from lower social categories because they have more moral authority over them. The 
following section considers how young domestic workers of slave descent are more 
likely to embody and internalize their stigmatised status.  
There are several reasons why the relationship between Freeborn Fulɓe employers 
and their slave-descending domestic workers is more morally loaded than that between 
the same employer and an unknown maid who has been hired in Bamako. Freeborn 
Fulɓe necessarily have more authority in relation to ‘their’ slave-descending domestic 
workers than other employers. The additional authority of the Dicko family resides in 
the reproduction of a stereostyled relationship through subtle and cultural details of 
language, behaviour and interaction that can only be read by cultural insiders.583  
Dicko employers engage in continuous but subtle forms of symbolic violence to-
wards their slave-descending domestic workers in their use of language (the way they 
talk to and about their domestic workers), moral projections (what the employers deem 
appropriate behaviour for a maid) and jokes (stigmatizing their domestic workers’ 
behaviour by connecting it to their social status).  
When it comes to language, the language of kinship allows employers to cover up 
status differences to outsiders who do not comply with the cultural field of hierarchy. 
Such metaphorical use of the kinship idiom is common in Africa, where kinship ex-
presses hierarchy rather than sentiment in non-kinship relations (Kopytoff & Miers 
1977: 25). Furthermore, most studies on domestic workers indicate how kinship terms 
are strategically used both by employers (Anderson 2000: 124; Jones 2004) and em-
ployees (Parreñas 2001: 180) and uphold a kind of ‘illusion of affection’ (Anderson 
2000: 124). This intimacy becomes a form of authority (Parreñas 2001: 153) and work 
becomes part of so-called family duties that are considered as a more or less natural 
‘labour of love’ (Parreñas 2001: 179-180). Nevertheless, such metaphorical use of kin 
terms should not obscure the fact that employees and the broader cultural field of 
hierarchy in society are powerful social boundaries in this relationship (Rollins 1985: 
92, 151). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
581  Even if permission is granted, their lack of cash makes it impossible for them to leave. From my 
interviews, it appeared that the maids of Fulɓe noblemen in Bamako were allowed to visit their home 
village in Central Mali only every two or three years.  
582  The greater the distance, the less social control parents will exert over the employer. Deshusses (2005) 
makes this case for maids in Ivory Coast who are employed by family in France and who end up in 
social isolation. Camara (1995: 14) describes how maids in Kaedi, Mauritania whose parents live in 
the same village as their employers are less likely to be exploited.  
583  Both Camara (1995) and N’Gaide (2003: 716-717) wrote on domestic workers, being cultural insiders 
in Mauritanian Fulɓe (Haalpulaar) society. 
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The Dickos consciously choose certain words over others, depending on the context 
and audience. Although freeborn women in the village context do not hesitate to refer to 
their personal female assistants of slave descent as ‘our slaves’ (FF: Hoorɓe amin),584 
this term is less used in Bamako. Employers tend to, for example, present their domestic 
workers as related cousins to outsiders but use the term of golloowo kordo with insiders. 
The Fulfulde term golloowo is neutral and frequently used and is derived from the verb 
golluude, which means ‘to work’. It is a gender-neutral term and does not explicitly 
refer to slave status or the slave past in the way kordo does. Those intellectual members 
of the Dicko family who are aware of the ideologies of others, refer to their domestic 
worker with the word golloowo rather than with the term kordo. Nevertheless, to their 
own peers or within their own community, they might add that maid X is not only a 
worker (FF: Golloowo) but also a ‘slave’ (FF: Golloowo kordo). They take pride in 
specifying the origin of their maid and the specific reference to slave status in this 
context underlines one’s wealth in people and highlights the employer’s prestige within 
his/her group. 
When it comes to behaviour, the employer’s expectations of their slave-descending 
domestic workers are different from those of their own children. It is deemed normal, or 
even typical, that slave-descending domestic workers may say shameful things, are 
overtly impolite, voracious and rude. And some employers may even abuse their maid 
by instructing her to insult a guest who is no longer welcome in the house. This is a 
more general role that used to be delegated to slaves before: Slaves did all things that 
noble freeborn were unable to do because of their status that requires honour (FF: 
ndimaaku). Insults are constantly used to remind the girls of their lowly origins: When 
eating they are insulted for being greedy, if they talk they are told they are being as loud 
and talkative as slaves, if they do something stupid they are compared to a donkey or a 
fool (FF: kangaaδo).585  
In terms of behaviour, girls of slave descent are not expected to pray and if an 
employer remarks that the girl does not pray five times a day,586 she will ignore the fact 
as ‘these people don’t need to pray anyhow’.587 The only area in which the maid is 
expected to excel is in manual labour. Intelligence is not encouraged and taking ini-
tiatives is definitely discouraged. One day Adama was anticipating Madame’s call for 
water and soap to wash her hands after dinner and brought it to the table. Madame got 
angry with her because she had not asked for it. The girls quickly learn that only silent 
obedience will not be reproached.  
The girls are not encouraged, in fact they are often even actively discouraged, to take 
an interest in making themselves beautiful and competing with their peers, although 
beauty is central in the lives of their better-off freeborn peers. In general domestic 
workers are given their employers’ old dresses and used hair extensions. Freeborn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584  Plural hoorɓe; singular koorδo meaning slave woman.   
585  As N’Gaide (2003: 722) underlines, the fool (FF: Kangaaδo) is the one who defies society’s norms 
and is therefore considered foolish.  
586  Although a maid is employed by a compound or nuclear family, it is the female head of the household 
who trains her and gives orders. With regard to domestic affairs, the woman is considered the ‘em-
ployer’ rather than her husband (who is however likely to pay the maid’s salary or trousseau). 
587  Aai Musa Dicko, interview with interpreter Amadu Amiiru Dicko, Sevare, 2007. 
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family members, even children, learn to constantly remind the maid of her inferior 
position. When I showed some youngsters living with Madame a picture of Umu and 
Adama (domestic workers) who had dressed up to go out, the only comment they had 
were cynical jokes about their ‘vanity’.  
Through reminders, the Dicko family ensures that their domestic workers do not 
value and certainly do not overestimate themselves. I observed how maid Sali on a lazy 
Sunday afternoon asked Madame’s sister Hadiata to plait her hair with (already used) 
extensions. Hadiata agreed to do so but hastily plaited the most basic model. When she 
was finished, she laughed about the ugliness of the plait and the Fulɓe youngsters 
hanging around joined in, agreeing that it was more than sufficient for a maid.  
The jokes made about domestic workers are not only related to their status as minors 
(reproaching their irresponsibility),588 but also to their stereotypical social status (com-
paring them to donkeys, as stubborn hard workers). When maid Aai reminded me that I 
had promised to buy new flip-flops on the day her old ones broke, there was general 
laughter among the other youngsters about how it was ‘typical for a Diimaajo to beg 
(French: Quemander) like that’. When Madame announced that all the youngsters living 
with her had to go and get vaccinated by her sister Hadiata who works as a nurse, she 
did not send the domestic workers. When I ask her why they were not getting the 
vaccination, she replied that they were but slaves (FF: ɓe hoorɓe tan). Camara (1995: 
10-11), writing about domestic workers in freeborn Fulɓe families in Mauritania, also 
commented on attributed roles and domestic workers’ ways of behaving being 
invariably reduced to the stereotypical ‘native brutality of slaves’.  
Coercion in this hierarchical context is not necessarily related to physical but rather 
socio-cultural (symbolic) violence. Religious threats are common to keep the slave-
descending maid in her place. She is threatened with not going to paradise but to hell if 
she is not obedient. As the Dicko family is closely related to the religious elite families 
(FF: Moodibaaɓe), their curses are considered powerful.  
Such non-physical, but nevertheless stigmatizing, interactions help separate the em-
ployer morally and physically from the slave-descending maid. The domestic workers 
of slave descent underline the social position and prestige of their Fulɓe employers in an 
urban context. Distinction is difficult and expensive in Bamako and to be noticed is an 
art. Being able to employ a domestic worker from one’s home village helps to confirm 
the patriarchal style and nobility of the employer. Within the Dicko family, assistance is 
mostly not recruited on the anonymous labour market of Bamako but instead through 
existing stereo styles where hierarchical relations are constantly reinvented.  
This ‘reinvention’ of stereo was demonstrated by Belco’s description of how he 
came to defer to Samba. Although Samba has his personal assistant Suleymane, based 
on legacies of slavery, Belco replaces Suleymane when he is not around. Due to in-
creased distances, other people thus get the chance to defer and develop a clientelistic 
relationship. Nevertheless, ethnic background and a person’s home region seem to 
remain important elements in all these relations in order to have access to the Dicko’s 
network. Madame’s drivers, for example, were for a long time exclusively of Fulɓe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588  Anta, was reproached for not taking responsibility. 
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origin,589 her domestic workers are mostly Riimaayɓe or Dogon girls from Douentza 
Province and the students and seasonal labourers she hosts are without exception co-
villagers.  
‘Moving up’: Social promotion in the urban context  
Cities are specific places that offer a multiplicity of options and access to alternative 
social relations and hierarchies. People from all the major ethnic groups are to be found 
in Malian towns, each with a history of assigning some of its members to a slave 
category. Although hierarchical distinctions between freeborn nobles and slaves have 
remained important for situating people socially, their actual achieved status often no 
longer corresponds with their ascribed status. Among other ethnic groups such as 
Bambara urban areas such as in Bamako, the cultural field of hierarchy is often less 
pronounced compared to in Fulɓe society. The more fluid definitions of social status in 
urban contexts are likely to influence the cultural field of hierarchy of Fulɓe migrants.  
The economic diversification that has accompanied the steady growth of Malian 
towns has created new options for people of slave descent, many of whom have left 
their former masters. In the new urban environment, slave descendants encounter more 
fluidity and flexibility in social positions. Most of them however have continued to 
engage in occupations stereotypically assigned to slaves and their descendants, such as 
brick making, butchering, domestic work and catering.  
The majority of the slave-descending Kau family members who have settled perma-
nently in Bamako are engaged in physical labour ranging from delivering bread by 
motorbike (Amadu Hama) to selling fresh milk (Keleere), working in the security sector 
guarding empty houses, cattle farming (Belco, Beidary) and construction labour (Hama 
Adja). Young seasonal labour migrants arrange a loan from their host when they arrive 
in the city and while some start up as petty traders, for example selling clothes, others 
engage in selling ice cream or cleaning. 
In contrast to the activities of slave descendants in Bamako, the majority of Dickos 
in Bamako are, with varying degrees of success, engaged as public servants (French: 
Cadres) and are working for travel agencies (Aissata Dicko, Nassuru Dicko), NGOs 
(Samba Dicko), national companies such as SODAGAZ and EDM (Ali Dicko, Demba 
Dicko), politics (Madame Dicko, Musa Dicko, Oumar Dicko, Mustaphe Dicko) and 
educational institutions (Mawludu Dicko, Nuhun Mbaabi Dicko, Amadu Dicko). Most 
owe their jobs to the good networks and political positions of their predecessors. The 
fact that 90% of the Dicko family members have a maid, while none of the Kau family 
members I visited do, underlines the differences in wealth between the two families in 
Bamako.  
Nevertheless, the arrival of slave descendants in the cities has created new oppor-
tunities for them to work and to earn money. For example, Daandiire (the wife of 
Beidary Kau), turned her skills and experience with catering for large groups on ritual 
occasions in her master’s family into an asset in Bamako where she now caters for big 
parties for urban families. Not only did Daandiire manage to get paid for her labour 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
589  Only since 2007 has she been driven by a Bambara boy. 
245 
 
skills, but at the same time the city of Bamako made new social networks available to 
her and Daandiire now socializes mostly with the members of her women’s saving 
group (French: Tontine). Beidary himself goes on the road to greet some of the Dicko 
family members on a weekly basis, but he has also developed a daily social network 
with his neighbours. In these new social networks, Beidary and Daandiire are no longer 
stigmatized on the basis of their descent. 
 
Dicko youngsters: Later labour migration 
Most Dicko youngsters have either stayed in Dalla or continued their education. How-
ever freeborn Dicko children are increasingly trying to engage in wage labour as well, 
especially now that other emigrants who have made money elsewhere are threatening 
their monopoly on power as a result of their achieved wealth.590  
Noble Dicko youngsters willing to engage in labour migration are limited to finding 
a job that corresponds to their status and have fewer opportunities. They fear engaging 
in jobs that are associated with slave status and are expected to avoid manual labour,591 
especially if it is for someone else because this does not correspond to the rules of 
nobility (FF: ndimaaku).592 Most freeborn prefer to engage in petty trade (cf. Soares 
2005: 65) selling items like cigarettes, pencils and CDs, unlike their slave-descending 
counterparts who trade in much heavier items (second-hand clothes) or do physical 
labour, like pushing heavy loaded carts or construction labour. 
In general the Dicko family youngsters engages less in physical labour migration 
than youngsters with slave descending status. Due to the difficulty of upholding their 
status, most freeborn Dicko youngsters from Dalla, Joona and Booni who engage in 
labour migration move not to Bamako but further away for example to Equatorial 
Guinea or France. Engaging in degrading jobs below their status is less shameful when 
one is at a safe distance from the social control of relatives. Guro Dicko is an example 
of a noble Dicko labour migrant who managed to get to France by selling his cattle and 
thanks to the help of a successful family member. Thanks to his connections in admi-
nistration, he obtained the papers required to go to Europe and is now living and 
working in Clichy-sous-Bois.593 His job is rather degrading to him, but at least no one in 
his family knows about it and it allows him to earn quite some money. 
Guro’s case shows how wealth, the first prerequisite for intercontinental travel, is 
within the reach of noble youngsters who can always sell their family cattle. Secondly, 
thanks to the Dicko family’s long-standing networks in national administration and 
politics, access to visas and other government administrative requirements is guaran-
teed. Selling family cattle and having contacts in the embassies are generally not an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
590  Some migrants challenge the ascribed dominant position of the Dicko elite back home by buying land 
from impoverished freeborn.  
591  Several authors point to this disdain of freeborn Fulɓe to work in the service of others or to engage in 
hard physical labour (Grayzel 1990: 45q). De Bruijn & van Dijk (1995a: 306) describe this reluctance 
and/or unwillingness among pastoralist Fulɓe youngsters. Similarly, but in a different context, Brettell 
(2003: 63) describes how many forms of manual labour (in the service of others) among Portuguese 
migrants in the 1970s were deemed dirty work by wealthier students who preferred to earn no money 
than to engage in such jobs.  
592  See also Breedveld & de Bruijn (1996). 
593  Renowned for the riots that broke out there in November and December 2005. 
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option for the slave-descending Kau family who lack the necessary contacts, position 
and wealth. This explains why they specialized in seasonal migration to towns nearby. 
Being a labour migrant has another disadvantage for freeborn Dicko youngsters who 
want to uphold their honourability in terms of hosts and living conditions. Although 
many freeborn Dicko youngsters have family members living in cities, when it comes to 
hosting, they privilege students over labour migrants. Freeborn labour migrants who 
want to avoid being hosted in poor circumstances by co-villagers of slave descent there-
fore need to rent their own room. Although this is rather costly, several of them do so to 
maintain their independence and feelings of nobility. Some Dicko youngsters from the 
village of Joona installed themselves in Bamako’s ward Banankabougou (Map 7 
(supra), ward No. 44), where they cofhabit with their slave descending stereo partners. 
Hama Alu for example has a social status as Maccuδo Weeheeɓe (FF) and cohabits with 
his stereo partner Hamadun Nu Dicko, who belongs to the freeborn elite and is 
Beeweejo (FF). Likewise, Bucary Hamadun Tambura who has a social status as 
Maccuδo Jawaanδo (FF) cohabits with his stereo partner Amadu Umar Waygallo, who 
belongs to a family of freeborn traders and classifies himself as Jawaanδo (FF).  
‘Moving against’:  
Slave descendants against their position in the cultural field of hierarchy 
It is through interaction with different social and ethnic groups in new places that 
migrants are likely to become conscious of their position and identity. Daum (1998: 72) 
gives the example of two Malian migrants from different regions and ethnic groups but 
with a similar surname who meet in Paris. Sharing a room, they soon find out that the 
same surname signals slave status for the one and noble status for the other in their 
respective regions. Their meeting in France makes them realize that not everything is in 
a name and they wonder: ‘Why am I considered of slave descent, while my neighbour 
with the same name can claim to be a noblemen? What is the legitimacy of such 
ascribed social status here in Paris?’ In short, both men become much more conscious 
of the existing cultural field of hierarchy thanks to the literal distance from their home 
country. 
When discussing the ways in which slave descendants try to opt out of Fulɓe society, 
informants mention the manipulation of surnames as an important strategy. By changing 
their surname, slave descendants hope to become less stigmatized and recognizable as 
being of slave descent. This is an important strategy in climbing the social ladder. 
Seydu, a member of the Fulɓe Taabital Pulaaku, pointed out this strategy as a ‘prob-
lem’ for Fulɓe society today, describing how there are decreasing numbers of people 
who identify themselves as Fulɓe. Many slave descendants are opting out of Fulɓe so-
ciety by using the surnames of other ethnic groups, thereby changing their ethnic 
affiliation. Seydu has tried to deal with this problem by radio broadcasts on discrimi-
nation in Fulɓe society, seeing discrimination and stigmatization as the root cause 
behind slave descendants’ tendency to change their names. 
When I inquired about how name changes work, he advised me to check the national 
administrative files: It is indeed possible in Mali to change one’s surname. Neverthe-
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less, the civil servants at the Ministry of Territorial Administration and the tribunal 
court in Bamako informed me that official registrations of name change are rare because 
migrants do not need official institutions to change their names. Instead, their mobility 
and wealth can guarantee the secrecy needed for a successful change of surname. If 
changing one’s surname (and ethnic affiliation) is not about obtaining access to legal 
administrative claims, what does a surname mean? Why would slave descendants 
bother to change their surnames? How are surnames related to memories of slavery? 
What kind of procedures are there for changing one’s surname? These questions are 
addressed in a forthcoming publication (Pelckmans 2011b).  
The case in the epilogue to Chapter 9 describes how an emigrant in Bamako moves 
against the cultural field of hierarchy practised by people in his hometown and illu-
strates how, although he as an individual turned himself against and contests the hege-
monic aspects of the cultural field of hierarchy, his kin back home do not participate in 
the same ideological framework and finally prevented him from implementing his ideas.  
‘Moving out’: Opting out through exit mobility  
Cities are relatively neutral in their potential for disconnection and anonymity. In 
keeping with the more fluid social positions of the new urban environment, some have 
tried to evade their slave origins and status altogether or have passed as members of 
other ethnic groups whose language they speak. Although they are often the subject of 
gossip as co-villagers know their slave origins, they uphold their pretence of belonging 
to another ethnic group. Some manage to do this more successfully than others. The real 
key to social promotion and moving out of the cultural field of hierarchy seems to be 
avoiding all contact with family and friends.  
Abdulaye is an example of someone who passes himself off as a ‘non-slave’ (Rossi 
2009a: 19). He is a descendant of the former domestic slaves of the royal family in 
Booni but as the king sent Abdulaye to a French school, he benefitted from higher 
education and became the director of a communications business in Douentza. People 
claim that it is thanks to his wealth and because he lives in town that Abdulaye managed 
to marry a freeborn woman from his home village. The couple have established a good 
social network and live well but their families have, to date, refused to visit them and 
say they will never accept any children they may have.  
Another example of a man who tried to gain recognition for his social promotion is 
Hamadun Dauda. This royal slave descendant from the Kau family was adopted by 
Musa Dicko as a child, which meant that Hamadun Dauda studied and moved with 
Musa Dicko’s family until he had finished studying. Hamadun Dauda takes pride in his 
career and has managed to build his own house, even though it is situated in a distant 
neighbourhood in Bamako (Kalaban Koro, see Map 7,supra). The Dicko family accuses 
him of being vain and reproaches him for not demonstrating his gratitude towards them 
for the chances he has been given. 
Hamadun Dauda, however, claims he no longer visits the Dickos because they do not 
accept his new social position. He considers himself a free person, which is reflected in 
his use of the noble patronym Dicko instead of the slave patronym Tambura when he 
248 
 
introduces himself.594 The Dicko family continues to call him Tambura and exclude him 
from their network because he does not respect his place in society. As Hamadun Dauda 
passes himself off as a non-slave and this is not accepted in his village community, he 
prefers to live in town and does not plan to ever return to Dalla. His network consists of 
colleagues, his brother Beidary who lives nearby and his immediate neighbours. 
Hamadun Dauda’s story demonstrates how, even when mobile, it is impossible – or at 
least difficult – to shake off one’s past social status.  
Similar situations can occur for women of slave descent who try to pass themselves 
off as non-slaves. Mariam Nassuru Dicko (Madame’s daughter’s cousin)595 describes 
how she attended a baptism in Mopti and was upset when the young mother who had 
just given birth insisted on her freeborn status, ‘although she was only a slave’ (FF: 
kanko woni koorδo tan). It was the baptism of a child of a very rich woman with the 
patronym Tambura, a typical patronym for slave descendants.596 Mariam was indignant 
about this woman’s behaviour and publicly alluded to her lowly patronym of Tambura. 
The young mother responded that Tambura was also a common patronym for noble 
Fulɓe. Mariam explained why this angered her so much that she retorted: ‘You can have 
your money, but you will never be noble!597 No matter how much money it is 
impossible for someone with the patronym Tambura to be noble!’ When the young 
mother still did not give in, Mariam felt so offended that she left the party. The young 
mother might have succeeded in obtaining a higher status thanks to her wealth but had, 
in this case, met resistance from traditional nobility, like Mariam.   
These cases demonstrate how it is possible to move up in the hierarchy and become a 
patriarch oneself but the stigma of one’s slave origins remains. Those who are 
determined to move out completely are more or less obliged to leave behind all their 
social relations and their wealth in people. When asking for cases of successful and 
wealthy descendants of slaves who pass themselves off as non-slaves, most informants 
agree that there are many executives (French: Cadres) who are working in national 
politics, the civil service, universities or NGOs. However, when asked for concrete 
examples, names or even phone numbers of the persons they are referring to, informants 
show unease. Since successful individuals of low-status origin who have done well for 
themselves in the national administration prefer to conceal their roots and want to be 
appreciated for their achievements. Research assistant Amadu Dicko comments:  
Their parents have been treated as inferior people, like slaves [FF-Maccuɓe]. These days these 
executives [FR: cadres] who descend from slaves have worked hard to obtain what they have. They 
will no longer accept someone calling them Diimaajo [connoting slave status]. They will change their 
name and their birth certificates and only compete with the children of important families. Some who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594  Pelckmans (2011b forthcoming) describes how the choice for certain patronyms reflects attempts to 
‘pass as non slaves’ (Rossi 2009a: 19) by slave-descending Riimaayɓe.  
595  Mariam Nassuru is the daughter of the brother of Musa Dicko, who had a French colonial education 
but died young. Interview without interpreter, Sevare, February 2007. 
596  In Pelckmans (2011b forthcoming) I describe the links between patronyms and social positioning. The 
patronym Tambura is in the Maasina and Haayre region known as the patronym of the former noble 
slave soldiers (FF: Maccuɓe arδooɓe). These Maccuɓe were highest in rank and value. 
597  In French: ‘Tu n’as qu’a garder ton argent, mais tu ne seras jamais noble’. 
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have become rich will not even visit their parents anymore because they are ashamed of presenting 
their parents to their friends. It depends on the personal conscience of each and everyone.598  
Nevertheless, if a successful Diimaajo meets a freeborn Pullo whose parents used to 
own his parents, the Diimaajo will (have to) respect him, even if the Pullo is poor. He 
can try to avoid doing what is asked of him by delegating the task to a small kid for 
example, but he will avoid open opposition.  
If one wants not to be reminded of one’s slave status, the only way is to make a clean 
break with all existing relations and start from scratch somewhere else. Historical 
studies (Klein 1989; Georg-Deutsch 2006) have pointed out how migrants of slave 
descent tend not to return to their villages and have severed all ties with any family who 
stayed behind. Some disappear because they consciously chose to, others because they 
lacked the funds to return, still others probably died. Life histories in the Haayre are 
replete with mothers599 who went looking for their sons as far away as Ivory Coast or 
Nigeria. Keleere’s mother, for example, found his brother Hama Tile in Abidjan, while 
other families have never succeeded in finding their loved ones. Those who completely 
disappear become ‘lost; not only for their relatives but also administratively’ (de Bruijn 
& van Dijk 2001b: 270-272). 
Although it is impossible to write their story or to quantify their numbers,600 these 
‘lost ones’ do merit a mention because oral traditions and interviews suggest their 
numbers are quite high. It should be stressed that these are slave descendants who have 
completely ‘moved out’ of the cultural field of hierarchy and migrated without ever 
returning or keeping in touch and who may have obtained a better status position 
elsewhere. Despite their invisibility, it is likely that some have made it and successfully 
opted out of existing hierarchies forever. Moving out of hierarchies and making a new 
start is probably the highest degree of social promotion one could reach.  
Methodologically, these stories necessarily remain invisible and hidden: Their story 
of social promotion is untraceable to all – this researcher, their family members and co-
villagers. The only source of information is village gossip (French: Radio trottoir), 
which comes up with stories of successful public figures with unclear, and therefore 
probably slave, origins. Mali’s President Amadou Toumani Toure’s ‘impure’ roots are 
discussed in the Malian public sphere and his political opponents have even published 
on it (Le Sphinx 2007: 1-2).  
In my reconstruction of the genealogy of the Kau family (Figure 1), nobody men-
tioned people who had disappeared forever, which confirms how, for these former royal 
slaves at least, the loyalty style remains the most rewarding strategy. Those Kau mem-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
598  In French: ‘Leurs parents ont été traite comme des sous-hommes, des Maccuɓe. Actuellement les 
cadres Riimaayɓe ils ont bosse jusqu’a ce qu’ils ont tout. Ils ne vont pas accepter ça, qu’on les appelle 
de diimaajo. Ils vont changer leurs noms et ils vont changer les actes de naissance, et ils se comparent 
uniquement aux enfants des grandes familles. Certains même, s’ils trouvent des moyens, ils ne vont 
plus voir leurs propre parents, ils ont même honte de montrer leurs propre parents à leurs camarades. 
Ca dépend de la conscience de tout un chacun.’ 
599  Keleere’s mother, Fatumata Koira Tambura (nicknamed Pico), was born 1921 and applied for a 
passport in Douentza on 9 September 1958 to travel to Ivory Coast to look for her son who migrated 
there but had never been heard of again. Luckily she finally found him working as a guard and took 
him home.  
600  An attempt to trace some of the ‘lost’ Fulɓe herdsmen was made by de Bruijn & van Dijk (2000b). 
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bers who did migrate have stayed in touch with their family and former masters’ family 
to ensure some degree of social security on their return. Taking the risk of opting out 
and remaining excluded forever was a step too far for most of them. They had been 
socialized with the idea that it is from loyalty that one benefits most. Since their former 
masters have remained powerful and wealthy in most cases, this is indeed often the 
most rewarding trajectory.  
Conclusion: Options to move in, out, on, up or against slave 
status? 
This chapter has explored the extent to which migrants who settled in urban contexts 
obtained new options to engage in alternative social relations and ideologies. The first 
two sections demonstrated how the cultural field of hierarchy ‘travels’ with the migrant 
to the urban context and is actively reproduced there (moving on and back in), while the 
last three sections (moving out, up and against) described the alternatives and changing 
attitudes of slave descendants vis-à-vis the cultural field of hierarchy.  
The description of ‘moving on’ with the existing cultural field of hierarchy consider-
ed how anonymity and distanced urban contexts generally offer proximity between the 
Kau and Dicko families and this is recreated through access to already existing social 
networks of assistance. In a process of ‘villagization’ (Devish 1996), these hierarchical 
encounters between the Kau and Dicko families are the main events reproducing social 
control and stereo styles among Fulɓe migrants. A baptism is, for example, a typical 
ritual event organized by noble elites where social boundaries display the cultural field 
of hierarchy. The Dicko elite interacts with the Kau family according to historical social 
roles, which are often explained as belonging to ‘that what we found with our ancestors’ 
(FF: Tawaangal).  
The second section described the ways some have moved out but then moved back 
into the cultural field of hierarchy. Both male and female slave descendants in the Kau 
family still assist the Dickos. Elite women take their stereo partners of slave descend as 
domestic workers with them after marriage and freeborn Dicko men demand assistance 
from those slave-descending Kau men already resident in the city. This section on 
stereostyling demonstrated that it is not necessarily slave descendants (of the Kau 
family) who stereostyle with the Dicko family. Some stereo partners have been replaced 
by other clients who ‘move into’ this vacant position in the cultural field of hierarchy. A 
concrete example was Belco who assisted Samba during a baptism (see Chapter 8) in 
Bamako instead of Samba’s ‘original’ personal stereo partner Suleymane Dauda. Most 
Dicko family members continue to engage in a firm patriarchal style, always managing 
to find other marginalized people from the Haayre region to defer to them in loyalty 
style in the urban context of Bamako. 
In the third section, the rural-urban mobility of domestic workers freed from the 
stigma of slave status and given access to better status positions was analyzed. Although 
domestic workers may be well taken care of, at a more symbolic level, they were 
constantly reminded of their inferiority and slave status and girls are only talked to in 
the form of commands. Insults are related to stereotypes associated with slaves and only 
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silent obedience was not reproached. The interaction between domestic workers and 
their employer remains imbued with status ideology and related (embodied) behaviour. 
The maid of slave descent is today certainly not wearing shackles but in the socio-
cultural realm she is nevertheless constrained by discourse and practices that link her to 
her slave past.  
Through their work, these girls are reaffirming and reactivating collective memories 
of their historical link of subordination with the now urbanizing semi-freeborn Dicko 
elite. And they are resorting to the loyalty style based on memories of belonging as 
slaves to local masters themselves. By engaging explicitly in the loyalty style, they 
manage to assure an income for themselves. The way the Dicko family ‘masters’ the 
mobility of their stereo partners, domestic workers and ritual assistants reflects the way 
their ancestors controlled the mobility of their domestic slaves. The difference is that 
most slave descendants see it as a privilege today to be invited to go to the city. Within 
their structural context, it is advantageous relatively speaking to engage in the loyalty 
style and most of them claim that they benefit rather than suffer from this relationship.  
Slave descendants other than Kau family members have achieved social promotion 
in areas such as education, religious piety, trade and commerce. Some people of slave 
descent actively engage in moving against the cultural field of hierarchy by organizing 
radio broadcasts and distributing cassettes on which they preach for change and against 
various forms of discrimination in Fulɓe society.  
The only way to significantly change social status is by ‘moving out’. By becoming 
completely detached from existing social relations, the Kau family could succeed in 
having ‘a road’, which is what I called ‘exit mobility’. This is a form of radical social 
mobility for slave descendants, and completely detaches them from a hierarchically 
mastered past. I discussed the paradox that those slave descendants who succeeded in 
life necessarily became invisible and this poses a methodological challenge that is 
almost insurmountable. Those who have successfully changed social status continuous-
ly invest in invisibility vis-à-vis their own network.  
Mobility allows slave descendants to move away from existing hierarchical relations, 
which are likely to change. However, I demonstrated how in the urban hub of Bamako, 
the close ties and density of the social network central to my analysis ensured a re-
production of the cultural field of hierarchy. For migrants in Bamako it is difficult, or 
almost impossible, to disconnect from the cultural field of hierarchy because it is so 
omnipresent and unquestioned in all realms of social life, even in the city context of 
Bamako. Through engaging in what I call exit mobility, some have managed to carve 






Having weight versus belonging 
Bamako, 10 March 2006 
Today my host Madame Dicko comes home with a television set, a DVD player and 20 
DVDs (typically Asian martial art and action movies) to send to Dalla. She enthu-
siastically indicates how Bucary, who works for Bittar, one of the bus companies that 
travels between Bamako and Douentza, will take everything to Dalla for her next 
Thursday. Madame decided it was important for her co-villagers to be connected 
(French: Branchée) and informed about the wider world. She is convinced this will 
make people in Dalla more ‘worldwise’.  
Obviously, the fact that there will soon be a television set in Dalla is very exciting. 
And, as is often the case with exciting things, disagreement soon arises. Madame 
decided that the television set should be put in her father’s house in the royal court. In 
Dalla, several youngsters protested and wanted to have it in a much more neutral space 
of the village, for example the townshall. They argued that with the television in the 
royal court, a lot of youngsters will be reluctant to go and watch it, for example their 
friends from Wuro Burram who are supposed to show reserve (FF- yaage) when they 
visit the royal court and might not even dare to come and watch there. This short 
description of the television set shows how migrants like Madame even when they are 
not present have an impact on what happens back home.  
Increasingly, migration and mobility studies are including ‘return’ as an integral part 
of any analysis to understand people’s mobility projects (Brettell 2003: 47-100). This is 
why this chapter moves back to the Haayre region and focuses on what has happened to 
returned migrants in Douentza, Dalla and Booni. It is an exploration of the comings and 
goings on the Bamako-Douentza road as it has been travelled so far by the informants in 
the network described in the previous chapters. This is the last chapter and brings the 
story full circle, ending where the book started, i.e. in Central Mali. This chapter des-
cribes the changes and continuities in relations back home and with home after mo-
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bility. This chapter thus describes what happens to hierarchical relations if they travel 
back home upon return of a migrant.   
Those who have settled in urban contexts, like Madame Dicko, continue to influence 
and interact with their home village, but at a distance. In the first section of this chapter, 
I describe the ways these interactions (varying from remittances, to visits and the 
recruitment of labour) have contributed to the social position of the Dicko and Kau 
families respectively. For the Kau family as the former royal slaves of the political elite, 
their main way to social promotion would be by obtaining access to politics. The 
itineraries of Suleymane and Musa Dicko will be followed throughout this chapter. 
In the next section, the focus is on the home context of Dalla, Douentza and Booni. 
The trajectories back home and/or the situation of some of the informants once they 
have settled back home are described. The social promotion of returnees remains rela-
tive to that of their former masters and therefore the Kau family have continued to 
parallel but not to outdo the economic and social status of the Dickos.  
In the epilogue, which comes after the conclusions because it serves at the same time 
as an introduction to the final conclusions of the thesis, I describe an attempt by Saajo* 
Tambura to change the vision of his family members back home. He tried to bring home 
social remittances based on his transformed worldview but, as will be demonstrated, did 
not manage to convince his family members.  
Roads between the urban and the rural 
Migrants still use their sending community as the reference group  
against which they gauge their status. 
(Levitt 2001: 11) 
The road described in the introduction to this thesis is travelled to and fro, for longer 
and shorter periods. Roads go in several directions and temporalities. Various scholars 
have pointed out that return is an integral part of mobility (Brettell 2003: 47-100) and 
returning is part of the process of reinsertion of both people and their ideas back home. 
The assumption that migrants necessarily transfer their loyalty and community 
membership over time from one place (country) to another has been abandoned in 
transnationalism studies. Instead, there is a focus on the fact that migrants keep a foot in 
both worlds: They do not automatically trade in their membership and network of one 
community for another but capitalize on both, depending on their situation. They use 
political, religious and civic arenas to forge social relations and livelihoods, and to 
exercise their rights across borders (Levitt 1998: 3). Migrants remain attached to their 
homeland through intense contacts and social bonds (Brettell 2003: 75-100). Marriage 
arrangements, remittances and religious affiliations keep many migrants well linked to 
their places of origin (Patel & Rutten 2003). Velayutham & Wise (2008: 115) use the 
term ‘moral communities’ to indicate how translocal villagers are influenced by or in 
their words even the ‘product of a sense of responsibility for others’ back home.  
Few Africanist studies on post-slavery societies describe how ideological struggle to 
reconfigure cultural fields of hierarchy is initiated by migrants.601 In a study on Malian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
601 Exceptional examples are: Leservoisier 2005, Boyer 2005, Daum 1995. 
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associations, Daum (1998: 109-111, 167-178) described how Malian Soninke migrants 
of slave descent in Paris manage to obtain higher positions in village associations, 
thereby influencing or even turning upside down existing status and generational hierar-
chies in their home region. Boyer (2005) described how the actual distance in space 
allows slave-descending Iklan in Niger to observe their own position and identity from 
a distance. Being away allows them to temporarily disconnect from their identity as 
clients vis-à-vis the freeborn in their home community. Leservoisier (2005b: 1011-1012, 
2009: 146-149) demonstrates how revolutionary the first attempts to claim political 
participation by Fulɓe slave descendants in a rural Mauritanian village were, attributing 
these changes to the democratic ideas that the emigrants obtained in France.  
Often slave descendants who moved out obtained the necessary economic resources 
needed to ‘buy’ their social promotion (land, manumission, higher status wives). In 
Dalla, slave-descendant migrants formerly belonging to Jaawamɓe elites have so far 
proved to be the wealthiest. Many have become wealthier than their masters who lost 
power over their domestic slaves decades ago.602 Their mobility has also provided them 
with relative social promotion. In contrast, social promotion for the Kau family has 
remained to a large extent related to the social promotion of their master. In most cases, 
the social promotion of slave descendants has only proved to be a temporary escape 
from slave status. On return, the majority are put back ‘in their place’.603 The case of 
Maman Abidjan (see Chapter 2) demonstrates how, for individuals belonging to stigma-
tized social status groups, wealth can change their situation but not their social position. 
In other words, while wealth has helped many former slave groups to mitigate, it has 
not erased their marginalized social status (cf. Soares 2005: 66).  
Migrants who return home have a wider view of the world and are likely to engage in 
relations with new, wealthier patrons. They can afford to do so because their knowledge 
of language, professional skills and economic status make them more attractive as 
clients for certain patriarchs. Secondly, the fact that they moved away and encountered 
new ideas in cultural fields of hierarchy has made it possible for some of them to 
convert certain hegemonic aspects of that field into a contestable ideology. Some of the 
slave-descending migrants have become aware of existing axioms and unspoken rules. 
This, in turn, is likely to allow them to contest the hegemony more actively. They can 
do so, for example, by refusing to engage in the loyalty style vis-à-vis former patrons 
and/or by specializing in patriarchal style themselves.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
602  This can be partly explained by their early emancipation from their trading Jaawamɓe masters, as 
opposed to the Kau family who remained domestic slaves well into the 1950s. Today those slave 
descendants who sell meat at the market or clothes and kitchen utensils are often former slave-des-
cending clients of Jaawamɓe traders who have made good money. Some have used their wealth to 
acquire land, others to manumit themselves. For more on the manumission by slave descendants 
today, see Pelckmans (2011a forthcoming) and Chapter 5. 
603  See also Boyer (2005) who makes a similar point about Iklan in Niger who temporarily distance 
themselves from their ascribed slave status through migration. 
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Remittances and social remittances in the Dicko – Kau network  
That Madame is sending a TV as a kind of collective remittance for the village is not 
uncommon. The association in Bamako of villagers from Dalla sometimes contributes 
football outfits for the local team there, and most emigrants regularly send money to 
important families (of the mayor, the chief and the imam) and their own network. Musa 
Dicko’s children in Bamako collect money annually and send it to all the old men in the 
royal compound to share.  
Madame’s willingness to connect with her home village through a television set at 
the same time establishes her image as the village benefactress and allows her to 
demonstrate a patriarchal style vis-à-vis her home community. Obviously some emi-
grants have more of an interest in belonging to and engaging with (the moral economy 
of) their home village than others. For those who try to pass as non-slaves elsewhere or 
have engaged in exit migration, contact with family or friends back home is avoided. At 
the other end of the spectrum are those who have most interest in investing in contact 
with their home village: Those with political ambitions or positions (Amadu and 
Madame Dicko for example), those whose children are hosted by family members 
(Amadu Hama), those who have fields to cultivate (Hama Adja), and youngsters who 
are looking for a wife (Demba and Papa Dicko).  
The majority of the youngsters in the Haayre region, and in Dalla more particularly, 
start off as seasonal labour migrants. Compared with the possibilities in South-North 
migration, the ‘development potential’ (Schapendonck & Smith 2008: 128) of South-
South migration is often limited.604 Most young people migrate on a temporary basis to 
earn extra income for their expensive marriages or to overcome a crisis. Although the 
Kau and the Dicko families send home substantial remittances, the relative impact of 
these differ and diverge significantly. As Schapendonck & Smith (2008: 128) remark: 
‘First of all, remittances are channelled within migrant’s private spheres which includes 
only relatives and people in the “inner circle” of their social network.’ This inner 
network in the case of the Dicko family has remained restricted to the descendants of 
Musa Dicko and has not included slave-descendants of the Kau family. The social 
promotion of one member of the family did not, therefore, necessarily lead to the social 
promotion of his kin. Remittances only serve a core, indeed an inner circle, of one 
specific branch of the Dicko family, thus excluding the Kau branch of the network. 
In the Haayre region, those former slave groups who acquired wealth – often thanks 
to emigration and through the remittances of family members – have appropriated 
things formerly inaccessible to them. They mark their economic emancipation in the 
same way as their masters, namely by investing in cattle or land, by conducting the Hajj 
and so on (this is a general feature of slave descendants in FulBe society, see Botte et al. 
1999: 18). Saibou (2005: 869-871) mentions how, also in northern Cameroon it is 
especially slave-descending Riimaayɓe who benefit from migration since they are hard-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
604  As outlined in Chapter 6, the youngsters who manage to gather the money to move on generally 
engage in interregional migration to Ivory Coast, Ghana, Burkina, Senegal and Equatorial Guinea. 




working and manage to earn money, which makes them less dependant on the local 
elites in their home region. 
Lastly, as I will demonstrate with cases from each family, the social promotion that 
individuals are likely to achieve thanks to remittances often run parallel to that of their 
stereo partners. In other words, as long as both Dicko and Kau family members both 
gain more wealth and social promotion as a result of their mobility, their social 
promotion vis-à-vis each other will remain the same. To illustrate the point of ‘relative’ 
social promotion of migrants who might be getting wealthier but do not necessarily 
have more room for reconfiguring their relations, I describe the trajectories of Suley-
mane, my host (see Chapter 2) and that of Musa Dicko, the first elected mayor of Dalla, 
who died in 2007.  
 
Remittances and status of the Dicko family: The social promotion of Musa Dicko 
‘... many descendants of families that pretend to belong to nobility, try to reactualise 
their former positions in order to get themselves to (the summon of) power and above 
all to impede others from the ambition to insert themselves in the local, regional and 
national political tissue.’ (N’Gaide, 2003: 718)605 
This quote suggest that those slave descendants who did make it to obtain upward social 
mobility, will do everything to impede their fellow slave descendants to do the same. 
This is indeed the case for Dalla, where it has been the semi-freeborn Dicko elite who 
have managed to claim the main political positions in the decentralized municipality of 
Dalla’s ‘democracy’. Other social groups are not supposed to even think of presenting a 
candidate for the position of mayor and the Dickos do everything to ensure their 
monopoly on power. The son of the chief explains how, since decentralization in 1999, 
the order that has been respected in Dalla is that the first and second positions are for 
the nobility (Dickos of the Weeheeɓe group). Third position is for Jaawamɓe traders, 
then two administrators from Douentza and only after that (i.e. from seventh position 
onwards) is there a possibility for slave descendants to stand. The religious scholars 
(FF: Moodibaaɓe) are neutral and are not involved in politics. In March 2009, the 
municipal positions were indeed divided in the above-mentioned manner, with the first 
four being occupied only by freeborn.606  
In the last years of his life, Musa Dicko enjoyed the fruits of his (educated) 
children’s well-paid jobs. While he was still alive (he died in the January 2008), he only 
needed to phone his children in Bamako to ask for any money he needed. And when 
there was a wedding or a circumcision in the Dicko family, he could count on the input 
of Bamako migrants who sent money that enabled him and his family members in Dalla 
to excel in the patriarchal style to the fullest.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
605  Author’s translation of: “Beaucoup de descendants des familles prétendues nobles, tentes de réactuali-
ser leurs anciennes postions pour se hisser au sommet du pouvoir et surtout contester aux autres l’am-
bition de vouloir s’insérer dans le tissu politique local, régional et national. (…). 
606  These are: (1) Mayor = temporarily replaced by (3) because Musa Dicko died in January 2008; (2) 
First deputy = Samba Bundu Dicko (freeborn Moodibo, Wuro Burram); (3) Second deputy = Amadu 
Buraima Dicko (freeborn Beeweejo, Wuro Galbal); (4) Third deputy = Allah Amedu Bocum (freeborn 
Jawaanδo loyal to Wuro Galbal) and (5) and (6) administrative staff members who live in Douentza 
and who visit Dalla weekly on market days. 
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Musa’s children send remittances and pay for the trips to Mecca of their elders 
because such forms of contact with the home village reinforce the family’s powerful 
position in politics. This is why Madame and her brothers and sister send about FCFA 
250,000 every year to be divided between the eldest members of the ruling Dicko 
family and the imam’s family. In this way they hope to maintain the imam’s bene-
dictions and favour. It is by demonstrating how they continue to engage with their home 
village as specialists in the patriarchal style, that they maintain social and political 
relations between the village and the city. These villages are in many ways the main 
place in which political legitimacy is inscribed (Gugler 2002; Ferguson 1999). Through 
her remittances Madame Dicko engages perfectly in the globalized world as a cos-
mopolitan citizen preoccupied with democratization while at the same time recreating 
belonging and feeding her position of power in a localized community (Geschiere & 
Nyamnjoh 2000; Ferguson 1999; Comaroff & Comaroff 2001).  
Not only did Musa Dicko promote socially in politics, he also managed to remove 
the stigma of his slave ancestors socially. In short, the trajectory of semi-freeborn Musa 
Dicko is a success story. From a stigmatized semi-freeborn child of the king, he became 
an educated, wealthy patriarch. Although he started off as a ‘legal minor’ with a serious 
disability, he managed to get the fullest form of recognition from his former freeborn 
masters. Mayor Musa Dicko died in the middle of his term in office, in January 2008, so 
was replaced by his deputy, a freeborn Beeweejo from the same family and royal 
compound (FF: Wuro galbal). His own and his children’s inclusion in the royal group 
of the Dicko family was officially confirmed with the burial of Musa Dicko’s body 
within the royal compound, next to the body of his father, King Yerowal. In the past, 
only kings were buried in the royal Dicko family’s compound. As Kopytoff & Miers 
(1977: 30) described, becoming a remembered ancestor is a strongly desired form of 
self-fulfilment, especially for descendants of slaves.607  
Since the death of Musa Dicko left a sudden political void, the municipal elections in 
April 2009 generated heated discussion over who was to stand as a candidate for mayor 
among the Dicko family. In the end, Burra Seydu, the son of Musa’s deceased brother 
Seydu (†2000, see Figure 2) was announced as a candidate. At the elections, his party 
won six of the eleven seats. Burra Seydu is currently the mayor of Dalla. He was Musa 
Dicko’s personal driver for many years. But what is most surprising is that Burra was 
elected mayor at the age of only 32 and that he not finished any degree in education. 
Madame Dicko had become a prominent member of Malian politics due to her 
election as Member of Parliament in 2007. Typically, Madame was assisted by her 
stereo partner Amadu Hama Kau608 during the parliamentary election campaigns of 
2007. None of Muusa Dicko’s children wanted to be elected as a mayor, because they 
wished to continue living in Bamako where they all have good jobs. In order to keep 
power close to themselves, the family decided to propose a youngster who had been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
607  In other post-slavery societies too, the establishment of tombs in honour of one’s ancestors is des-
cribed as the crowning glory on careers of emancipation. For Benin, see Ologoudou (2008) and for 
Madagascar, see Evers (2002). 
608  Amadu Hama is a young slave descendant of the Kau family who has been living in Bamako for more 
than a decade. He has never been to school but he is an entrepreneur and always joins Madame on her 
visits to Dalla to assist her.   
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living in Douentza with Musa Dicko as a candidate for the position of mayor on the list 
of the political party of PSP in 2009. They opted for Burra Dicko in the hope that their 
father’s lineage would maintain political power. Because he is close family and 
manipulable, Burra, who is from the same paternal lineage as Musa Dicko was 
prioritized over an older, better-educated candidate from a more distant Dicko lineage. 
Finally, the municipal elections in May 2009 brought victory to Burra, the PSP 
candidate proposed by Madame Dicko. This guaranteed Musa Dicko’s heritage and 
reinforced the prominence of the PSP party in Dalla. The billboard indicating that Dalla 
is a PSP municipality (See Photo 10), which had been installed by her father Musa 
Dicko, is likely to testify to this loyalty for many years to come. 
 
Remittances and the status of the Kau family: The social promotion of Suleymane 
Chapter 6 described how various Kau family members also live in Bamako and make 
money there but their jobs are less well paid and their remittances tend to be much 
lower. Most slave-descending return migrants try to use their remittances and relative 
emancipation acquired elsewhere to renegotiate their position and possibilities back 
home. However, let me illustrate the fact that remittances often only contribute to 
‘relative’ reconfigurations of the cultural field of hierarchy for the Kau family by 
analyzing the case of Suleymane.  
Suleymane’s first migration consisted of moving with his stereo partner, Samba to 
Niger (see Chapter 6). When Samba finished studying, he decided to return home and 
married. Suleymane however continued travelling and moved to work in agriculture in 
Burkina Faso. His wife joined him there for some years and although they did well, they 
decided to return home in the mid-1990s. Their main reason for returning to Dalla was 
to have their children educated at home so that they would know their roots. On his 
return, Suleymane invested his earnings in a camera and made some (extra) money as 
the village photographer. He also invested in a motorcycle and animals. Visiting his 
compound, one notices that it is much cleaner than average and the chickens, goats, 
bicycle and even motorcycle show his relative wealth. Suleymane and his wife obtained 
new visions on how to deal with certain issues in life. This comes to the fore in the way 
their attitude to education contrasts sharply with that of their family members and 
neighbours. Suleymane’s children are all vaccinated against all possible diseases, they 
all go to school, even the girls and Suleymane’s wife Hadiata washes the children with 
soap on a daily basis, even in wintertime. All this says something about their different 
attitude towards hygiene and education.  
Besides material investments, Suleymane tried to reconnect socially upon his return 
home. Since his stereo partner Samba Dicko lives in Bamako and only occasionally 
pays for Suleymane’s transport to assist him in Bamako, Suleymane started to defer to 
Samba’s father Musa instead. The fact that he speaks some French and is hard-working 
made Suleymane an interesting assistant for Mayor Musa Dicko and he was entrusted 
with the practical organization of the 2002 and 2006 municipal elections. Suleymane 
campaigned on the mayor’s behalf in the small hamlets around Dalla and was paid for 
distributing voting cards. One of the ways in which he expressed his gratitude and 
deference to Musa was by naming his son after him. In short, it was thanks to his 
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relative wealth and the knowledge he had acquired by emigrating that Suleymane was 
able to access a paid job. 
Relatively speaking, Suleymane’s economic promotion as a result of his mobility 
was no higher or more beneficial than that of his peers in the Dicko family. So although 
Suleymane may have obtained more wealth, most of his Dicko peers, like his stereo 
partner Samba (and Samba’s siblings) accumulated more wealth and owned real estate 
in Bamako and drove cars. Suleymane rides a motorcycle and his mud-brick house is 
built on land belonging to the Dicko family. This demonstrates the relative economic 
impact of wealth: Although it allowed slave descendants like Suleymane to reconfigure 
their position, these reconfigurations often do not result in a reversal of styles. Suley-
mane continues to engage in the loyalty style vis-à-vis his former patrons and stereo 
partners who migrated too and became even more wealthy than he did.  
Suleymane’s progressive ideas have often caused him trouble: He is a proud man 
who knows what he wants and from time to time tries to engage in the patriarchal style, 
which is not appreciated by his former masters or by his kin. His Dicko stereo-partners 
have an interest in maintaining their privileged positions and therefore Suleymane’s 
attempts to patronise are not accepted by the Dicko elite who for example forced him to 
assist them and forbade him to butcher his own animal (FF: layyaare) on the first day of 
Tabaski (as described in Chapter 4). In so doing they actively reminded Suleymane of 
his obligation to work in the service of his former patrons. Suleymane says that at least 
he managed to minimise the obligations of his children towards the freeborn elite fami-
lies in Dalla. Since he married the daughter of a manumitted mother, his children will be 
completely free of expectations of loyalty vis-à-vis his former masters (as explained in 
Chapter 3). Suleymane has certainly obtained better living conditions and more political 
influence, but in the end he did not manage to change his stigmatized social status nor 
style.  
Over the last ten years, I have witnessed how Suleymane has increasingly started to 
give in to the expectations of his older family members and co-villagers. He has become 
more modest, realizing that the loyalty style could yield more results than sticking to his 
deviant principles and attempts to become a patron himself. On the one hand, he has 
experienced pressure from the Dicko family who reproached him for not sticking to the 
loyalty style, while on the other hand he has also experienced constant pressure from his 
own family and peers. Two examples illustrate this: First, the fact that he agreed, under 
pressure, to let his daughter get married before she finished school, and secondly, the 
fact that he did not dare to put himself forward as a candidate at the municipal elections.  
As described in Chapter 6, Suleymane, who always took pride in having his children 
educated, agreed to let his daughter being married before finishing the most basic 
educational degree. In 2010 he had married her off to her cousin just a few months 
before she would have got her diploma. This was explained by the fact that ,for a long 
time, Suleymane’s family members had not approved of his efforts to have Aafi 
studying and they reproached him for investing in the education of a girl who was 
destined to get married, have children and work in the household. Educating her would 
only make her proud and risk her ‘losing her head’. Aafi had been promised to the son 
of Suleymane’s eldest brother Hama and for years Hama had been insisting that the 
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marriage take place. In his eyes, the girl was getting too old to marry. In April 2010, 
Suleymane gave in to the pressure of his elder brother and in May 2010 Aafi was being 
married out to Hama’s son. Once married, Aafi was not allowed to finish her degree. 
A second way in which Suleymane could not get his envisaged access to social pro-
motion was through municipal politics in Dalla. With the implementation of decentrali-
zation policy from the 1990s onwards, the theoretical possibility of former slaves and 
other lower-status groups developing a political career came closer. It became a poten-
tial new niche for slave descendants to get rid of their so-called ‘clientelistic 
citizenship’, which, as Hahonou (2009: 16) points out, is not peculiar to Africa but a 
common feature of any society where economic redistribution is organized along 
clientelistic lines. In Douentza province, several municipal districts were newly created 




@see map 8 in appendix 
Map 8: The subdivision of Douentza province in rural municipalities (election districts)  
  
The 2009 municipal elections created a schism in the Dicko family. Typically the 
stereo partners of important politicians in Dalla vote for the same parties and assist them 
in their campaigns.609 When it comes to politics the former royal Dicko family of Dalla 
is divided: on the one hand there is an elected mayor who is in favour of the PSP party 
and on the other hand there is the ‘traditional’ chief Haidu Dicko and his descendants 
who always have voted in favour of ADEMA. The Kau family mainly support Musa 
Dicko and his children who support the PSP. Since Suleymane is loyal to mayor Musa 
Dicko, he helped him with the distribution of voting cards and campaigned for PSP in 
2002 and 2007 in the hamlets on the Gandamia Plateau.610 Other slave descendants in 
Wuro Maccuɓe (Map 6, Chapter 2) are loyal to Chief Hamidu and his party ADEMA. 
The schisms and animosities within the Dicko family have spilt over into the 
descendants of slaves formerly belonging to them. The social status of the master thus 
continues to define social stratification and interrelations among former slave groups, 
recalling the way hierarchies among slaves used to mirror those of their freeborn 
masters.  
Suleymane considered running as a candidate in the municipal elections of 2009. He 
knows many people thanks to his election campaigning in the hamlets and realized that 
slave descendants constitute the majority of potential voters as they make up between 
30% and 50% of the municipality. Secondly, in terms of literacy he is just as qualified 
as the then-candidate and now mayor, Burra Seydu. Thirdly, since he used to campaign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
609  Likewise Macca (see Chapter 4) as stereo partner of the traditional Chief Hamidu is sent out from 
time to time to the surrounding Riimaayɓe villages to get animals or other ‘gifts’ from his ‘citizens’. 
610  As Musa’s assistant, Suleymane used to spend the two months in the run-up to each municipal 
election (2002; 2009) in the surrounding Haayre villages in the municipality of Dalla. Whenever 
Musa Dicko went to Bamako for his regular medical visits as a diabetic, Suleymane joined him, even 
answering Musa’s mobile phone.  
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for Musa Dicko, he knows how to run an election campaign and has developed an 
extensive network. In short, he was potentially a strong candidate. 
When I visited him in February 2007, Suleymane claimed to be too scared about 
damaging his position with the Dicko family to put himself forward as a candidate. He 
feared (FF: Huulaade) the power and witchcraft (FF: Sukunja) of the Dicko family who 
are close to the Islamic scholars and the imam’s family and also the jealousy (FF: 
Haasidaaku) of his own family members. In the end, he decided to remain loyal to 
Musa’s children, Madame and his stereo partner Samba. Suleymane ended up opting for 
the loyalty style.  
Nevertheless, with the new municipal elections of 2009, Suleymane got a place on 
the list as an eligible candidate for the Kau family, thanks to his younger brother, 
Amadu Hama, who did a lot for the legislative campaign as Madame Dicko’s stereo 
partner. Furthermore it was as a result of his own efforts in cooperation with Madame’s 
brother Samba Musa Dicko, Suleymane’s stereo partner. Samba and Madame thus 
decided to reward these Kau family members for their loyalty with a place on the list. 
Expectations were high and many, especially Suleymane and Amadu Hama, had hoped 
to be allocated third place on the list, which is still a place of influence as opposed to 
seventh, eighth or ninth position, which are more symbolic.  
After the April 2009 elections however, the municipal council remained firmly in the 
hands of the Dicko families in Dalla. Suleymane and Amadu Hama did not get the place 
on the list they had hoped for in compensation for all their hard work. Suleymane ended 
up in the seventh place, which is traditionally a place reserved for former slaves living 
on the plateaus (FF: Riimaayɓe Haayre). This frustrated the Kau family who, as 
Maccuɓe Wuro, have always derived prestige from their close ties with the Dicko 
family. It was all the more frustrating because, in the end, the Kau family has the same 
ancestors and roots as the mayor and chief of the Dicko family that are now in power. 
For a while, Amadu Hama considered switching parties (from the PSP to ADEMA) to 
demonstrate his feelings of dissatisfaction but this would have meant an end to his being 
Madame’s stereo partner. To date, Amadu Hama has decided that this would not be 
worthwhile and continues to assist her out of loyalty.   
Once back home: Returnees from Bamako in their home villages 
In spite of economic dire straits, the village continues  
to be a point of reference for the diaspora.  
(Gaibazzi 2010: 34) 
Macro-economic factors, international policy measures and the ideology of modern 
capitalism all contribute to a dislike of people who are ‘out of place’ and adrift. Several 
international (mostly European) policy measures have been geared specifically at con-
trolling and managing the movement of African immigrants. This is done through 
development initiatives where potential emigrants are sent back to or kept in their coun-
tries of origin (Haas 2007). These and other measures (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2000) in 
combination with economic conjunctures (Ferguson 1999) are structural factors that 
have been introduced to influence the movement of people. In times of economic hard-
ship, policy makers in receiving contexts often encourage migrants to return home.  
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Increasingly migration studies are paying attention to return as an integral part of 
mobility (Brettell 2003: 47-100). ‘People are actively involved in their home society 
through economic remittances, the building of houses, and participation in the social 
and religious life of their native villages’ (Ibid.: 49). Return is not only an outcome of 
mobility but the imagination of how they will materialise their return constantly influ-
ences the way people leave. Ideas and practices of return are thus just as much part of 
the mobility project as ideas and practices surrounding people’s departure. It is on 
return that some migrants manage to convert their economic capital into social capital in 
cultural fields that are meaningful to them.  
Although this chapter focuses on migrants, it should be pointed out that the percent-
age of those who move and settle elsewhere is much smaller than the number of those 
who stay. Those who stay behind (the immobile) in Dalla and the surrounding Haayre 
are important agents too (Gaibazzi 2010; Jonsson 2009) and they are a majority.  
Back home in Dalla 
The city youngsters who return home to Dalla sometimes no longer feel at home and are 
surprised at the way certain things are organized. Dalla is known to be an extremely 
conservative place, which some link to its Islamic legacy, others to the low literacy rate 
among its inhabitants. For whatever reason, outsiders who move to Dalla have difficulty 
understanding why not only in politics but also in asserting authority more generally, 
slave descendants remain so subordinate. I illustrate this with three cases. One is about 
the schism between the older and younger generations in their negotiations over rewards 
for construction labour, and two cases illustrate how professional ‘outsiders’ in the 
village of Dalla (a nurse and NGO worker) complain about the submissiveness of 
Dalla’s slave descendants.  
 
The first case is linked to how in the Fulɓe economy of the Haayre region, some aspects 
of work have been monetarized, while others have remained in the sphere of reciprocal 
exchange. According to informant Allay, being paid for labour is something that was 
introduced by the French colonizers who used cash payments for building houses and/or 
making mud bricks. Slave descendants in Dalla, especially the Kau family, take pride in 
the fact that it was they who constructed all the houses, granaries and walls in the 
village.  
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, slaves constructed houses for the sedentary 
Fulɓe elite without demanding payment. The influx of ‘strangers’ (civil servants, 
doctors, teachers) who settled in Dalla and the wider region was a first trigger of mone-
tization. A second explanation is that Riimaayɓe emigration resulted in their increased 
knowledge of building practices. Migrants (often youngsters) have gained knowhow in 
other places, such as Djenne which is famous for its masons, and on their return their 
specialized knowledge of new and better building techniques were noticed. As they had 
got used to being paid in other areas and their skills were in demand, these youngsters 
demanded payment for their labour in their home villages as well.  
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The rewards for construction labour are increasingly negotiated, especially by the 
younger generation. These shifts are illustrated here with the case of Moodibal,611 an 
intellectual emigrant from the Dicko family in Dalla who is currently living in Bamako. 
Moodibal, a nobleman is in his fifties, is constructing a house in Dalla and described the 
changes in remuneration and the expectations of the patriarchal versus the loyalty style 
for patrons and clients in Dalla. ‘These days we no longer pay the taxes of our slaves, 
we do not clothe or feed them. If they work today, we need to pay them, even if it is 
only with a symbolic gift.’612 Paradoxically he equates ‘paying’ with a ‘symbolic gift’ 
and this at the heart of the matter. There is a complex system that combines money and 
a gift in the local Haayre economy. For the construction of his own house, Moodibal 
considered various options:  
As you have your captives613 next door, you will first try to get their help. I am not obliged to contract 
my own slave masons (French: Esclaves maçons) to construct my house. Only if I consider the 
traditions of my old man do I have to invite my own slaves to come and help me construct my house. 
Their chief (of the slave descendants) will gather them together and they decide among themselves 
who does what and when. They make bricks and in return you buy them cola nuts and food. They will 
construct the house as a group: Each family sends a representative. You reward them symbolically 
with cola nuts. That is the traditional scenario: You do not give them money for their work. 
Another scenario is that if you really want to build a beautiful house, you preferably look for those 
youngsters (or elders) who are renowned for their accurate work. In this case, you negotiate with them 
like with the big construction companies in Bamako; you discuss the price of labour, materials and so 
on. You even pay them just to get started. You do not ask the elders to construct your house if you 
really want quality. However the elders offer their labour voluntarily because traditionally	  we never 
asked them about or discussed money. They do not claim money (French: Quemander).   
In Moodibal’s view, Dicko family members today have two options: Either they 
contract their older former slaves and have cheap labour but probably a less well-built 
house, or they have an official agreement with other younger slave descendants who are 
more experienced in building houses but then they have to pay the market price for their 
labour. 
Building is a dry-season activity before work in the fields gets started. While living 
in Dalla, I observed how a freeborn Beeweejo from the royal family compound 
requested neighbour Seydu, a fifty-year-old man from the Kau family, to bring the 
bricks needed for the construction of his house. For the rest of that day, Seydu and his 
son Samba were busy bringing mud bricks to the construction site and for the rest of the 
week about five of Seydu’s family members helped with the construction. When I ask 
Seydu how they were compensated, he explained:  
Maybe you don’t always get money. Sometimes it is only cigarettes and cola nuts. But you always get 
some kind of compensation relative to the kind and amount of work you do. Asking to be paid or even 
negotiating the amount of money is impossible. We (in the Kau family) would be ashamed to do so. I 
always accept what my master (FF: kalfaaδo) decides to give me, out of respect for him. I do what 
they ask me and hope that I have built up enough credit with them to be well rewarded. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
611  Moodibal, Beeweejo, interview without interpreter, Bamako, April 2007. 
612  Author’s translation of French: ‘Actuellement on ne paie pas leurs impôts, on les habille pas, on ne les 
nourri pas. S’ils travaillent, il faut les payer, même si c’est symboliquement.‘Moodibal, Beeweejo, 
interview without interpreter, Bamako, April 2007. 
613  He used this term in French, which means ‘those captured’ (during wars and raids).  
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Older slave-descending Riimaayɓe insist that it is unthinkable for them to ask their 
former masters to pay them for work. Seydu explains this loyalty by pointing to the 
importance of ‘walking in the footsteps of his ancestors’ and feels it would be morally 
wrong to divert too much from their path. Seydu insisted that it would be unthinkable 
for him to ask his former masters to pay him for work. He explained this explicit 
demonstration of his loyalty by pointing to the importance of ‘walking in the footsteps 
of his ancestors’ and felt it would be morally wrong to divert too much from their path. 
At the same time, he indicated how his respect for his (former) masters makes him 
fearful of them.614 Not respecting the bonds with one’s former masters according to him 
always results in negative repercussions. 
In Seydu’s view, negotiating remuneration remained impossible (in 2002). There was 
no contract between himself and his former master’s family. Collaboration remains 
asymmetric in that open discussions, let alone contesting reward and thus indirectly the 
monetary value of his work, were unacceptable. Seydu and his relatives worked for a 
week but ended up frustrated with their remuneration and the youngsters involved 
(Kodo and Samba) had hoped to get more than just the food and cola nuts they 
consumed during the construction period. Monetarization and paid labour are not easily 
separated from other forms of contract related to the cultural field of hierarchy. These 
days it is only influential freeborn who have their family houses built by their most 
loyal and/or indebted Riimaayɓe such as Seydu. They do not pay them but do provide 
the necessary food, cola nuts and cigarettes consumed during working hours. Seydu said 
that they accept such agreements because the former masters provide Riimaayɓe with 
other services, such as intervening in court cases or conflicts with herdsmen at other 
times.  
Expectations of remuneration are perceived differently by the younger generation. 
While for the older generation the non-negotiable remuneration in kind is still used, 
market logic has entered work relations for youngsters between the ages of 15 and 35. 
Increasingly, they are openly asking to be paid for specific tasks, which is in part due to 
their experiences with contract labour elsewhere. Rather than becoming a more general 
feature of intergenerational social mobility of the Kau family, the monetization of 
construction work has only led to individual lifetime promotions for some youngsters 
but not for their co-family members.  
While for the older generation like Seydu the non-negotiable remuneration in kind 
remains, many of this generation’s children are opting for remuneration according to 
market logic. Obviously within the generations there are differences. Macca’s son 
Hamidu, for example, is a teacher and earns a salary. He would never do unpaid work 
and does not feel the need to engage in the loyalty style. His age-mate Samba, who did 
not finish his education or migrate, feels less secure and has no other options. He has 
thus internalized the loyalty style like his father, Seydu. Nevertheless, the fact that some 
youngsters explicitly negotiate payment for their labour is in part due to their increased 
experiences with contract labour in the urban areas.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
614  This fear sometimes came up during interviews when Maccuɓe lowered their voices when discussing 
sensitive information and were convinced that all that we were discussing could be heard by the free-
born Fulɓe elite.   
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The second and third case described below, will illustrate how slave descendants in 
professional positions, often internalise the stigma of slavery themselves. During my 
fieldwork in Dalla in 2001-2002, I tried several times to interview the male nurse called 
Usu, a slave descendant from Douentza. Although I had had close ties with both his 
brother who worked as a tailor and his uncle Burra Yero who was my research assistant 
Burra (see Chapter 2) in Douentza, Usu always had excuses for not being interviewed. 
He pretended to be too busy, which was often the case, because –as so many other 
administrators, he spend as few time as possible in Dalla, and as a consequence he 
always had a lot of patients waiting for him in Dalla. Nevertheless, my interpreter Umu 
sensed that the amount of attempts we made to get to talk to him and Usu refusing, 
clearly indicated he had an interest to avoid to be interviewed by us. 
Years later in 2007, when talking to Guiro, the male nurse of Bambara origin who 
had replaced Usu in Dalla,615 I realized why Usu felt uncomfortable discussing his posi-
tion in Dalla with me. According to Guiro, Usu had had many difficulties enforcing his 
authority vis-à-vis the big families of Dalla (FF: Weeheeɓe and Moodibaaɓe). Guiro 
indicated how, despite Usu’s professional qualifications and position, he always obeyed 
the wishes of these families regardless of whether their requests made sense to him 
professionally. When there were vaccination campaigns, Usu used to treat these im-
portant families first and during office hours, they were given priority treatment, 
irrespective of the time they arrived. For Guiro, this was unacceptable but he had had a 
lot of difficulty changing these discriminatory practices and described how he faced 
opposition when he introduced queuing.  
According to Guiro, who is a relative outsider in Dalla, Usu was a typical illustration 
of the impotence of slave descendants changing existing hierarchies. They are unable to 
impose their authority due to their acquired status vis-à-vis the ascribed status of the 
important families. Usu could not separate his administrative status as a nurse from his 
ascribed status as a descendant of slaves. Over time, Usu developed clientelistic ties 
with the Dicko family and became the stereo partner of the chief’s son, Nassuru. When 
visiting his brother Seydu Tambura in Douentza in 2007, I encountered both of them 
having tea. Usu introduced Nassuru as his best friend.  
The third case is about another relative outsider, an administrator in charge of 
implementing a national NGO project in 2007, was relieved to be able to discuss his 
frustrations about Dalla. His wife had gone back to the city and refused to live in Dalla 
as she could not stand the fact that they were excluded as strangers. He complained that 
outsiders are not welcome in Dalla but, more importantly, he was indignant about what 
he called ‘severe power abuse’ by the Dicko elite there.  
He describes how the cooking oil and cereals that had been given to Dalla by the 
World Bank616 were stored in the municipal compound. The guardian appointed to 
watch the building was typically a loyal slave-descending youngster who would never 
refuse anything to the mayor’s family as he realized how easily he could be replaced. 
When a Dicko from the royal family comes after dark to get some oil and grains for his 
own personal benefit, the boy keeps quiet and gives whatever is asked for. The young 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
615  Guiro replaced Usu in 2005 as these kinds of functions rotate.  
616  Through a world bank project on which Musa’s son Samba works. 
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boy who guards the oil realized that he is better off engaging in a remunerated loyalty 
style. 
These cases illustrate how slave descendants in Dalla who get paid for a professional 
position consider it better to be an ally than to assert authority and to contest the power 
of the Dicko and the imam’s family. This does not mean that they are passively put in 
place without their consent. Given the structural context they find themselves in, they 
have calculated that it is better or more rewarding (and not only in economic terms) to 
respect the cultural field of hierarchy.  
Back home in Douentza 
As opposed to Dalla village, decentralization politics did challenge the power claims of 
traditional elites in some ways in the town of Douentza (de Bruijn & Pelckmans 2005). 
The former elite has desperately tried to hold on to its traditional spheres of influence 
and one of the ways they have managed to do so is through various forms of social and 
economic sanctioning, for example through their monopoly on land, which they re-
inforced during the decentralization of land (French: lotissements) (de Langen 2004, 
2005). 
Place is also in Douentza symbolically loaded. Much as I described for Dalla in 
Chapter 2, most slave descendants of freeborn Fulɓe live side by side in the ‘fifth 
quarter’ of Douentza. The majority work on their masters' land and still give their 
masters' part of their harvest. Other slave descendants live dispersed across town: Some 
are linked to Fulɓe originating from Douentza town, while others are connected with 
Fulɓe in different villages and hamlets in Douentza Province. In some cases, these slave 
descendants have come to Douentza to escape the relations of subordination in the 
villages and to live in town in relative autonomy. Others have arrived in town to try 
their luck, and there are those who came as refugees after the droughts in the 1970s and 
1980s.  
Most slave descendants in Douentza are cultivators and may also be involved in the 
livestock trade, in cotton weaving, making mud bricks or in construction. Few slave 
descendants are big traders (Zondag 2005) nor do they play an important role in politics 
or in Islamic power structures. This does not mean that the slave descendants in town 
are poor. On the contrary, many slave descendants in town today are richer than their 
former masters because of the variety of activities they engage in. 
However their wealth has not necessarily removed the stigma of their slave status. 
Many wealthy slave descendants continue to butcher for their former masters at Ta-
baski, thereby engaging in the loyalty style, The case of Bura Yero Cisse demonstrates 
how, even in the urban environment of Douentza, slave status remained a constraint for 
Burra (de Bruijn & Pelckmans 2005). Initially, Burra stated that being of slave descent 
did not influence his life since he was from a family where slavery was something of 
the past. But after going through his life history, he realized himself that indeed, even 
today, he visits his mother's master and takes him presents. Secondly, his social net-
works consist mainly of close ties to other slave descendants’ families and/or his 
master’s family in Douentza and Dalla. 
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Although he did not put it that way himself, the fact that he lives where he does in 
Douentza, which is typically the ward inhabited by the chief’s former slaves, ties him in 
a spatially stigmatized place associated with a slave past. His activities are also stereo-
typically related to the history of slavery and in the course of his lifetime Burra has 
engaged in weaving, cultivation and construction work. Even as a research assistant,617 
he has the typical position of loyal intermediary. He fits into the cultural field of hier-
archy through his loyalty style as the ‘slave’ of the researcher in question (de Bruijn & 
Pelckmans 2005: 88-90).618 Burra thus came to realize that he did, indeed, still behave 
as he was expected to because of his position as a member of the former-slave group. 
He ended his life story by thinking out loud about his children's future: Would they 
escape their position? This is Burra’s life history till 2005. I will now describe what 
happened after that.  
In 2006 Burra was thrilled because his wife had given birth to their seventh child. In 
2007 he had had a road accident and was hospitalized in Mopti. A month later when I 
was in Douentza we planned to do some interviewing and although his shoulder was 
better, he had become weak and was constantly having fevers. He put his weakness 
down to the fact that the harvests had been ‘too good’ and this had involved a lot of 
extra work. As always, he joked about it: ‘I continue to think that I’m still a young 
man!’ Three months later when I was back in Europe, I got a phone call from Burra’s 
son informing me that his father Burra had died.  
Burra was not only responsible for his own family but also for the wife and children 
of his deceased brother. His eldest son of 12 now has to provide for both the families 
who depended on Burra’s food production through cultivation and the money he earned 
as a research assistant. Now that he has gone, his children stand virtually no chance of 
becoming wealthy. None of them is likely to finish their education and the burden of 
being part of a big family will weigh heavily on their shoulders for many years to come. 
They will engage in all the possible existing ties of support and it is likely that deferring 
to the former master of their mother or father will be part of their survival strategies.  
Burra’s life history demonstrates the instability and often temporary nature of up-
ward social promotion of slave descendants in town. For some time he had had a good 
income, which he also had to share with a large network of people who did not. There is 
no sustainable alternative for his family members to turn to now. The vulnerability of 
these families is high. The alternative option of reengaging in loyalty styles (moving 
back in) with former patrons is often considered the only viable exit option from 
poverty.  
Back home in Booni 
Returning ‘home’ is obviously not the same process for everyone. Besides different 
trajectories of return, the home context itself can differ significantly in its possibilities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
617  As explained in Chapter 2, Burra Yero Cisse was the main research assistant of de Bruijn & van Dijk 
(1995a) who subsequently put him in touch with their student researchers. 
618  Examples mentioned are the fact that he always did the tasks typically done by slaves, such as but-
chering goats when they were offered. Informants sometimes literally called him ‘slave’ (FF: Mac-
cuδo) but in a friendly way. 
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and niches for return migrants. As the municipality of Booni invested in education ear-
lier than most other areas, many more people received an education, and several inform-
ants saw this as an explanation as to why slave descendants in Booni are less loyal, less 
dependent and more assertive vis-à-vis their former masters. 
When a freeborn asks them to do something, they emphasize that they have no 
obligation whatsoever towards those who have never been the owners of their ancestors. 
(There are no stereo partners here.) They often literally do so by saying: ‘Neither my 
mother nor my father was in your possession. You never fed me or my family so you 
have no right to command me.’ Not only in practice but also in the more symbolic 
domain of language, slave descendants in Booni openly refuse to be called captif, 
maccuδo or anything else that refers to a slave past. In Booni it is considered a terrible 
insult if a freeborn calls someone of slave descendant a maccuδo to his face.  
This contrasts with the way the Kau family in Dalla, which enjoys high esteem vis-à-
vis other slave groups, accept insults and reproaches from freeborn Dickos stoically and 
without overt defence. An example of this acceptance is as follows. When I was about 
to leave Dalla on a Tuesday in 2007, the mayor Musa Dicko, offered me a ride in his 
personal Mercedes. I still had to fetch my suitcase and say goodbye to my hosts in 
Wuro Maccuɓe. My host Suleymane and I informed Musa that we would pick up my 
suitcase and say goodbye to people there. Musa Dicko however became angry and 
cynically insulted the people I was supposed to go and greet in what he refers to as: 
‘that ward of slave descendants that are not worthy of being greeted’. He thus directly 
insulted Suleymane’s family in his face and at the same time proposed for Suleymane to 
go and get my suitcase on his bicycle. I insisted on joining Suleymane to say goodbye 
to my hosts and neighbours but this made him incredibly nervous. I have never had such 
a quick set of goodbye. And I was shocked that Musa insulted Suleymane’s family so 
overtly in public. It was even more puzzling to read from Suleymane’s reaction that this 
was not a joke, it had been a real insult, which Suleymane only replied to by engaging 
in the loyalty style and trying even harder. As my research assistant remarked, such an 
insult would never be accepted by slave descendants in Booni.  
A visit to the family of domestic worker Maya in her home village of Booni made 
me realize that although she works hard as a maid, her life in Bamako is much better 
than it could ever have been at home. Chapter 7 described how maids of various ethnic 
backgrounds are hard-working in Bamako and live a life in which they make their own 
decisions. This is not necessarily seen as deprivation by the girls themselves. Many 
perceive this as the ideal opportunity to participate in city life and see something of the 
world,619 which is why so many young girls from various ethnic groups in Mali eagerly 
leave their families to explore city life, dreaming of buying nice clothes and other items 
they cannot purchase where they come from. In Booni Maya is an orphan and has a 
stigmatized position, in Bamako she is among the lucky few to have a generous and 
caring employer.620 Thanks to her job as a maid in a wealthy family, she found a good 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
619  See the documentary entitled Le monologue de la muette, translated as: The silent monologue by 
Charlie van Damme & Kady Sylla (2008). Jan Vrijman Fund. 
620  Maya is always well dressed, is hardly ever sick, gets money to plait her hair with extensions and is 
from time to time allowed to dance at wedding parties and watch television with the other youngsters 
if her day’s work is done. 
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marriage partner, who she would probably never had the chance to marry if she had 
stayed in her home village as an orphaned teenager living with a blind, poor grand-
father. Her work experience in Bamako has had a positive effect on her social status. 
For her, the dependent mobility as a stereo partner provided her with a road to oppor-
tunity.  
Even if several slave-descending families today explicitly refuse to engage in the 
loyalty style by sending their daughters to work as domestic workers for freeborn 
families in cities, others, like Maya’s grandparents, continue to do so for they do not see 
any alternative. Maya’s grandparents were responsible for a girl they could hardly feed 
and they were too old to make a living through cultivation. They thus depended on the 
goodwill of others. For these rural poor it is not necessarily a matter of deliberate choice 
to ‘give’ their daughters to wealthy freeborn families like the Dickos. Rather they 
depend on the favours of such wealthy families and are trapped by structural conditions. 
There will always be poor families – not necessarily of slave descent – who have no 
viable alternative and are prepared to ‘give’ their daughters to wealthy elite families, 
thus recalling legacies of slavery and engaging in corresponding loyalty styles. 
Conclusions: Back home: Return as deception? 
The antithesis of being (a) slave was not freedom or autonomy 
but rather belonging  
(Kopytoff & Miers 1977: 17) 
Migrants are believed to play a big role in processes of social transformation. They are 
expected to be the best-placed mediators between the village and the national admini-
stration, between the industrialized (urban) world and the village, and between village 
members and themselves. They create dynamics in social contexts (Daum 1998: 29). 
However, this chapter pointed out that not all migrants strive for change and trans-
formation. Most of those who become mobile continue to move on in the existing 
cultural fields of hierarchy available to them. The few migrants who contest their slave 
status, like Suleymane, often do not manage to permanently reconfigure their marginal-
ised status. Slave descendants thus experience some troubles in transforming their 
stigmatized slave status into respected citizenship. There is a strong belief by many 
groups in society, including most slave descendants themselves, that they lack authority 
and the skills to be in political office. There are various reasons for this, to a greater or 
lesser extent related to the internalization of the norms and values of the dominant cul-
tural field of hierarchy.621 
As slaves of the royal elite, politics is the field of social promotion that the most 
successful and mobile members of the Kau family aim at. The central argument in this 
chapter is that most attempts by the Kau family to reconfiguring the cultural field of 
hierarchy remained interlinked with that of their former masters. The social capital that 
the slave-descending Kau family gained through emigration has not led to fundamental 
reconfigurations in their hierarchical relations with the freeborn Dicko family. Mobility 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
621  See Chapter 3 on the lack of proper descent as a serious handicap for slave descendants because it 
stigmatizes them and impedes them from occupying prestigious jobs. 
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did not necessarily help the Kau family to radically emancipate from existing hierar-
chies. Instead, their mobility contributed to the active maintenance and reinforcement of 
their ascribed position in the existing political context of Dalla.  
The Dicko family too accumulated significant resources by emigrating and can rely 
on the existing hegemonic aspects of the cultural field of hierarchy back home, which is 
especially strong when it comes to claiming a privileged history (Chapter 1) and asso-
ciations of status with place (Chapter 2). The descendants of semi-freeborn members of 
the Dicko family managed to maintain their monopoly over politics and thus specialised 
in the patriarchal style. The Kau family, just like the Dicko family, has managed to 
reinforce their position as privileged clients of the Dicko family but at the same time 
this means they continue to specialise in the loyalty style.  
On returning home, emigrant Suleymane has used his mobility capital to reinforce 
his ascribed position as a loyal, reliable and worldly client. Suleymane invested in 
connections with the most prominent members of the Dicko family, who also invested 
in their position as wealthy patrons back home. A lot thus depends on the relative status 
of one’s master’s family. The example of the Kau-Dicko network shows how the fact 
that the Dicko family is wealthy and influential, makes it more difficult for people like 
Suleymane to challenge or reconfigure their interrelation. Suleymane was unable to 
specialize in the patriarchal style as both the social pressure of the Dickos and his own 
family members continues to impose loyalty on him. This is not the case for slave 
descendants who used to belong to Fulɓe pastoralists and/or traders who impoverished 
by now. If former masters became poor, their former slaves often experience much 
more freedom and some have managed to invert their relations and have specialized in 
the patriarchal style vis-à-vis their patrons. Conversations among these groups of slave 
descendants who did manage to reconfigure the cultural field of hierarchy often are 
about emphasising their generosity vis-à-vis their master families and this indicates how 
they take pride in their newly acquired patriarchal style.   
Social promotion through mobility is obtained not only by slave descendants but also 
by their former masters. The maintenance of the traditional position of the Dickos as the 
ruling elite would not have been feasible without their insertion in French education and 
their ensuing emigration. The semi-freeborn children of former mayor Musa Dicko 
(Madame and Samba Dicko for example) managed to overcome the stigma of slave 
status, and their wealth and intellectual careers have helped them to reinsert themselves 
into the heart of village politics and power relations. The social promotion of Musa 
Dicko’s paternal family stands in sharp contrast to that of his maternal Kau family 
members who have not been freed from the Rope through marriage to a freeborn 
woman (like Musa Dicko). Both Kau descendants, such as Suleymane, and Dicko 
descendants, such as Madame Dicko, have invested their capital in the reinforcement of 
their authority and status back home.  
The Dicko family, who have had an ascribed political mandate, still dominate the 
region’s politics, even though it is the semi-freeborn branches that have taken over. The 
semi-freeborn Dickos have recreated a monopoly on political positions back home. The 
Kau family choose to remain loyal to this successful branch of the Dicko family in 
order not to lose the advantages as stereo partners who engage in the loyalty style as 
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clients to the Dickos. For some their specializations in specific professions elsewhere 
have led to renegotiations over labour remuneration back home. Economically than, 
many slave descending families in Dalla today managed to better their positions. 
Socially however, it seems much more difficult to get rid of certain stigmatising 
ideologies. The case of Suleymane who finally allowed his daughter to marry before 
finishing her studies, already demonstrated that social remittances do not always have 
the desired effect. In the epilogue below, the case of Saajo* Tambura again underlines 
the difficulties that descendants of slaves face when they want to change the cultural 
field of hierarchy.  
Saajo* describes how he was fighting against what he himself calls the ‘mental 
slavery’ of his co-villagers but, in the end, did not succeed. Often it are slave des-
cendants who have themselves internalized the loyalty style and are afraid to distance 




Changing the tides? The case of Saajo* Tambura  
Migrants reinvest skills and resources gained through movement (roads) back into their 
home context. The concept of ‘social remittances’ (Levitt 1998, 2003) explicitly focuses 
on what is brought back, not in terms of goods but in terms of ideas by migrants who 
spend (part of) their lives elsewhere. Social remittances are the ideas transferred 
between migrants and their home communities and possibly transform the social status 
of migrants and their families, such as differentiating existing power relations.  
To illustrate why social remittances do not always have the desired impact and the 
fundamental dilemmas migrants’ face, let us consider the case of Saajo* Tambura. His 
story622 shows how Saajo*, an educated man with slave-descendant status, has tried to 
implement his newly acquired ideas on hierarchy in his kin network. Despite his own 
changing visions on aspects of hierarchy, he has been unsuccessful in negotiating 
change. Saajo* recounted this story in several interviews in Bamako in the spring of 
2007. Having studied at university in Canada and Bamako, Saajo* works as a journalist 
and is the editor of a newspaper in Bamako. He is part of the generation that took part in 
the student protests that led to the overthrow of dictator Moussa Traore in 1991. 
Although he was born in Central Mali, Saajo* has turned into a Bamakois (an inhabitant 
of Bamako) but continues to actively engage with his family back home by regular 
phone contact, visits and remittances. He also hosts visitors and fosters some co-vil-
lagers’ children in his compound in Bamako.  
When discussing his life history, Saajo* recalls how as a child he was one of the first 
children of his village to go to school. He was among the brightest students and, looking 
back, he says that the competition with the youngsters of noble descent in his classroom 
was an exciting and important thing for him. For him, it was the start of his process of 
emancipation.  
The first day I met him (through a mutual friend), he presented himself as Saajo* 
Tambura. Having explained about my research and knowing that the name Tambura 
often refers to slave descent in the Maacina region,623 I asked him whether he was of 
slave descent himself. At first, he refused this definition of his name and status, 
explaining that it was when he first matriculated in his home village Konza that a local 
Jawaanδo gave him the patronym Tambura, much to his own surprise. He nevertheless 
did not engage in a discussion about this ‘wrong attribution’ and ended up using this 
patronym ever since. Saajo* explains that his real patronym is Toure, as his mother was 
a noble Songhay woman from Timbouctou and his father was a Bozo from Djenne and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
622  Saajo* Tambura, Diimaajo, Konna, several interviews in French without an interpreter, Bamako, 
Spring 2007. As indicated in the language and orthography section, Saajo has an * because his name 
has been changed in order to guarantee his anonymity. 




surroundings. However, since both his parents settled as strangers, their status as 
outsiders categorized them as part of the group of slave descent.  
In practice, this meant that they were only allowed to marry within the status group 
of people of former slave descent. For a long time, Saajo*’s parents did not accept that 
their children had to marry other slave descendants in the village because they felt that, 
by doing so, this would acknowledge belonging to an inferior status group. One day 
however, Saajo*’s mother’s youngest brother decided to marry a Diimaajo woman (see 
Figure 3: Genealogy Saajo*).  
 
 
Figure 3 (see appendix): Schematic overview of Saajo Tambura’s case (genealogy) 
The whole family fiercely opposed this marriage because they risked forever being 
stigmatized as being of slave status. The brother however did not change his mind and 
Saajo*’s family had to give up trying to be part of a social status category that is not 
associated with slave status. Some years later, a brother of Saajo*’s mother married the 
sister of his younger brother’s wife of slave descent.  
As the marriage between the eldest brother (Seydu) and the Diimaajo woman never 
worked, Seydu decided to ask his Islamic scholar and teacher (FF: Moodibo) for advice. 
The scholar explained how the ‘problems’ were due to the fact that his wife had a slave 
status and was still enslaved by her master, a herdsmen. The moodibo explained that it 
would have been better if Seydu had freed his wife from her master before marrying 
her. This advice made Seydu decide to free his wife, even though they were already 
married. Saajo* never knew the exact amount of money that his uncle paid to free his 
wife from her master but he assures me it was a significant sum.  
Both the younger and older brother who married the two slave-descendant sisters had 
children by these wives. The oldest brother, Seydu, has a son and his youngest brother 
has a daughter. In Fulɓe society, marriage between the son and daughter of brothers 
(cousins) is a desirable combination, so Seydu and his brother decided that their 
children would marry.624  
When I discussed the matter with Saajo* in Bamako in 2007, he explained how both 
children were becoming to old to get married and this posed problems, such as the girl 
who was being discriminated against by her peers and faced insults from others in the 
village. So what went wrong? The troubles started about ten years ago. When the 
children reached marriageable age, Seydu tried to convince his youngest brother to free 
his wife, Rukiatu, who as a sister has the same Fulɓe master. The younger brother was 
not against it but had difficulty finding the huge amount of money needed (FCFA 
400,000). The amount was high because the Pullo master of both sisters was not willing 
to let go of a second slave (FF: koorδo). The master felt under pressure from the rest of 
his family, who did not appreciate the first liberation (of Mariam). So they warned him 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
624  For a more elaborate description of this form of pre-arranged marriage between cross cousins (FF: 
Cabbugal), see de Bruijn & van Dijk (1995a: 370). 
274 
 
not to liberate more of their slave-descending descendants since this would harm their 
prestige.  
When Saajo*’s uncle Demba died in 2007, it was decided that Saajo* (who had the 
money) would financially support widowed Rukiatu and her daughter Y. Mother 
Rukiatu was willing to pay whatever it took for her to free herself so that her daughter Y 
could marry her cousin. Saajo* adds that his maternal uncles and aunts caused most 
trouble and incited Rukiatu to use her money to manumit herself. The maternal family 
feared going against the wisdom of the imam and the decision of their deceased elder 
brother. It is because they decided that it was necessary that Rukiatu freed herself from 
her former master, just like her older sister Mariam had done before, that the trouble-
shooting started.  
Saajo*, in his position as financial back-up for Rukiatu and her daughter felt he 
needed to intervene. As an intellectual emancipated from the ‘conservative’ perceptions 
of his kin back home, claimed to be explicitly against the idea of paying money for a 
liberation. For him all of his family members are free in the face of Secular Law. He 
argued that someone who, in 2007, still feels obliged to pay for his/her freedom is 
continuing the practice of slavery instead of being liberated from it. Nevertheless, 
Saajo* was also concerned about the marriage taking place as soon as possible, as it was 
his deceased brother’s wish and both cousins had reached marriageable age.625 Saajo*’s 
maternal uncle Seydu, (aged 70+) is of an age that lends him a lot of authority over 
Saajo*, who was only 45. Seydu insisted on freeing Rukiatu and refused to marry his 
son to Rukiatu’s daughter until she was freed. In his line of reasoning, such a marriage 
would affect his son’s status and, more importantly, that of their children because the 
children would remain attached to Rukiatu’s Pullo master.  
Saajo* is thus caught up in a considerable dilemma. Disrespecting his uncle Seydu 
by marrying both children without freeing Rukiatu seemed impossible. If he proceeded 
along this route, he risked not only his uncle’s anger but that of many more people in 
his village as well. Saajo* decided that the best option was to put pressure on the Fulɓe 
master of the widowed mother and force him to free her without payment. This would 
be the perfect solution: The astronomical sum of money due (FCFA 400,000 / €610) 
would be annulled and his uncle would also be satisfied. In December 2006, to put 
pressure on the Fulɓe master, Saajo* contacted the local reeve (French: Prefet) – who is 
of slave descent himself – and also called him from Bamako from time to time. Saajo* 
asked him to pressurize the Pullo master into freeing the woman for nothing. In May 
2007 I joined Saajo* to visit this reeve (whose patronym is Tambura as well). Much to 
Saajo*’s disappointment, the reeve told us he had not managed to talk to the Pullo 
master. Although they did not discuss the failure to contact him explicitly, Saajo* 
concluded that the reeve was clearly embarrassed and doubted his authority over a noble 
freeman (Pullo), being a Tambura of slave descent himself. 
The legal framework which this reeve supposedly represented did not seem to give 
him enough weight to validate his position and exert his authority as a professional 
representative (French: Cadre) of the Malian state and Constitutional Law. In May that 
year I joined Saajo* (and his best friend) when he had decided to settle the case by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625  The girl was at the centre of village gossip and was the only one in her age group not to be married. 
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visiting his kin in his home village Konza. As soon as our arrival in the village was 
announced, Rukiatu’s freeborn Pullo master rushed into the bush. The Pullo master’s 
sudden disappearance was not a coincidence and demonstrated his fear of being taken to 
court by Saajo*. The visit allowed us to discuss with the reeve and the judge the 
difficulties they face with people who want to liberate themselves. When we visited 
him, Saajo* again asked the reeve and later on a local judge to threaten the Pullo master 
with a case in the court of Mopti where Saajo* would accuse him of slavery practices. 
They indicated how difficult it is to fight against ‘invisible’ and ‘mental slavery’. 
Since things did not seem to change after his threats, the next step Saajo* took was 
inviting both the boy and the girl to his house in Bamako (the girl had lived there as a 
domestic worker since her father’s death) and paid and arranged for their religious 
wedding that took place in Bamako in February 2008. He stressed that this religious 
marriage was only possible because it was not held in the village. However, a religious 
wedding is only a commitment, similar to an expression of intent to marry. The ‘real’ 
marriage ceremony will only be valid if held in the village itself (and therefore with the 
consent of everybody present) and the freeing of mother Rukiatu remained a huge 
obstacle for his uncle and other family members there.  
Saajo* tried to convince the future groom that he was in the best position to change 
his father’s mind, by insisting that liberation was not necessary for him. However the 
boy did not have the courage to stand up to his parents and the girl was angry with 
Saajo* and begged him to take all of their possessions and give them to her mother’s 
master in order to free her and enable her to marry. 
Saajo* and his uncle Seydu disagreed profoundly on how to proceed: The uncle had 
been trying to save up the money for years but had not yet saved enough and Saajo* 
who is relatively wealthy refused to help his uncle with the payment. He was severely 
criticized for this as he is a relatively rich Bamakois and is the only family member who 
could pay such an amount of money to liberate the women in question.  
Finally the case came to an end with Saajo*’s withdrawal from anything to do with 
the Pullo master. The girl’s family did pay the master and there was a ceremony in-
volving the exchange of cola nuts, which Saajo* refused to attend. The girl’s mother 
paid two heifers and one bull (total value, depending on season and age about FCFA 
125,000-160,000 each, which came close to the master’s original FCFA 400,000). 
Saajo* did not want to have anything to do with it. After the manumission, Saajo*’s 
cousins X & Y both got finally married in May 2008, about ten years after the 
discussions on this case started. Saajo* had been obliged to accept that he could not 
change the minds of his co-villagers on social hierarchies. He had tried hard but had to 
admit he had lost. This case illustrates how hierarchies travel to many places and that 
despite the fact that some people successfully manage to move out like Saajo* himself, 
others – like Saajo*’s family members, move (back) into the cultural field of hierarchy, 
time and again.  
The case of Saajo* illustrates what can happen when a migrant who has moved out 
of the cultural field of hierarchy tries to negotiate change back home. He wanted to 
avoid his family’s wealth being invested in buying someone’s freedom but, at the same 
time, his case makes it painstakingly clear how he fails to implement his new world-
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view. The legal framework and his reliance on state administrators are not enough in his 
pursuit of ‘justice’. Reflecting on his position, Saajo* indicates that his voice was not 
being heard by his family members. Not only Saajo* but all the parties involved faced 
dilemmas. Saajo*’s uncle did not see the advantage of taking on a worldview inherent 
in Secular Law. The dilemma for the former Pullo master was the pressure from his 
family who did not want him to liberate yet another of their former slaves (Rukiatu), 
because in their view that would make them loose influence as patrons over their 
clients. The major dilemma of the future bride was her need to marry as soon as pos-
sible to avoid stigmatization by her peers. On the other hand, she was hosted by her 
uncle Saajo* whose opinion she had to respect. The future groom wanted to respect his 
father’s (Demba) last wish before he died but also needed to respect his older uncle 
Saajo*, who hosted him so generously. The fact that the family gathering did not result 
in a solution made the complexity of the case and the dilemmas of the people involved 
even more irreconcilable.  
Similar dilemmas as in Saajo*’s case are central to the lives of most informants in 
the Kau-Dicko network. They are constantly navigating between their manifold loyal-
ties that are triggered by specific moments in time and place. Dealing with these di-
lemmas is an inherently human and relational process of checks and balances, where 
both successes and failure contribute to change. Ultimately, the case demonstrates how 






A relational approach to mobility in and out of slave status626 
Although the official stance vis-à-vis slavery in the Malian public sphere is that 
slavery is something of the past, I have demonstrated how categorical slavery con-
tinues to be present in many people’s lives. The history of indigenous slavery in 
Central Mali is so close in time that it cannot be considered as a belated trauma.627 
Rather, in the Sahelian context, the slave past manifests itself as a cultural field of 
hierarchy that is an intricate reality of the present, not a legacy of a past long gone.  
This study focused on reconfigurations of the cultural field of hierarchy in relation 
to mobility, space and claims to the slave past. Where possible I indicated how this 
specific cultural field of hierarchy interacts with others, such as gender, age and 
economics. An informants aptly points to the importance of recognising other cultural 
fields of hierarchy when he said: ‘We should be weary of ascribing all perceived 
differences solely to status and hierarchy. After all we are all first and foremost 
enslaved by money (FF: Yimɓe fuu maccuɓe mbuudu).’ 
The originality of this study is that it takes a ‘mobile approach’ to the dilemma’s of 
slave status for one specific hierarchical network of people in Central Mali. Although 
new niches of occupation and identification as a result of mobility have been 
addressed by scholars working on slave descendants in the Sahel and Fulɓe society, 
the focus on mobility per se as an agentive strategy of social promotion has not been 
given the central attention it merits. The main contribution of this study to post-
slavery studies is therefore a methodological one: The angle of mobility to approach 
changes and continuities in the cultural field of hierarchy. 
This ‘mobile approach’ demonstrated how mobility and spatial distance do not 
necessarily result in an unilinear emancipation from the stigma of slave status, be-
cause hierarchies often travel with people to the different places they go to. Most 
slavery studies indicate how the mobility of the masters is linked to that of the slaves 
and vice versa. I argued that not only mobility but also social mobility remains linked 
between both families. The short answer to the question what has changed in relations 
between the Kau and the Dicko families since the formal abolition of slavery, is that 
social change took multiple directions but most often hierarchy travelled along with 
the moving people in the network I described.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
626  As indicated in the introduction to this thesis, my use of the term slave status refers to categorical 
slave status, defined by Rossi (2009: 5) as ‘stigmatisation on the grounds of inherited or putative 
slave status’, unless otherwise indicated.  
627  Argenti 2007 concludes that certain legacies of the slave trade in the Cameroonian Grassfields are 
belated trauma’s of the slave past.  
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Secondly the focus and contribution of this study is that it takes a ‘relational 
approach’ to status in post-slavery societies in the Sahel. Most studies on post-slavery 
in the colonial period were influenced by views and interviews with influential 
(noble) freeborn members of society: The view from above. In the neo-Marxist 
studies of the 1970s and 1980s, there was a radical emphasis on the view from below: 
That of slaves and their descendants. Although I have tended to focus mostly on the 
identity and changes negotiated by slave descendants, I have demonstrated that 
changes in their social status can only be analysed when keeping both freeborn and 
slave descending groups in the picture.  
The innovative point of the chosen family networks is that it describes the mobile 
trajectories of one and the same family, part of which obtained freeborn status and 
part of which maintained slave status. Some post-slavery studies emphasized how 
freeborn families over time have become disadvantaged because they stick to immo-
bility, which in the past used to be a privileged position. This was not the case for the 
described Dicko family, precisely because they started of as semi-freeborn which had 
been excluded from this privileged position. Their mobility brought them various 
options for social promotion and resulted in their successful claims to freeborn status 
in the cultural field of hierarchy back home. 
The fact that both the freeborn Dicko family as well as the slave descending Kau 
family moved, explains why mobility generated less options for social promotion for 
the Kau family. As the final Chapter 9 on return indicated, the political promotion of 
the former Kau slave group, remains overshadowed by the political promotion by that 
of the Dicko family. 
In the introduction I have criticized the common assumption in modernization 
thinking that links mobility with downward social mobility vis-à-vis the host society, 
but with upward social mobility in the home society (Brettell 2003: 65-72). I agree 
with existing critiques that argue against such teleological expectations of mobility628 
and applied it to the emancipation trajectories of slave descendants in post slavery 
societies. Mobility does not necessarily lead to social promotion of slave descendants 
who don’t move in an unilineair process from A to B(-etter). 
My argument is that it is precisely because of the modern assumptions that link 
mobility to teleological change that less obvious and subtle continuities as well as 
changes of the cultural field of hierarchy are dismissed in mobile contexts. Often 
domination becomes stronger when it can be implemented unnoticeably in implicit 
ways. This form of implicit power is what the Comaroffs (1991) called hegemony. 
Modern assumptions about the link between status and mobility often blind us for the 
power of hegemony in the cultural field of hierarchy.  
A teleological description of mobility as social promotion does not explain why 
and how the cultural field of hierarchy is reproduced in the Kau-Dicko network. 
Various members within the described family network had very different roads into 
social promotion. For one part of this family, the Kau family, the cultural field of 
hierarchy ‘travelled’ with them. For another part of this family, who became Dickos, 
mobility brought such extreme social promotion that it seems today as if it is not a 
form of social promotion but rather an ascribed freeborn social status that they always 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
628  As formulated by for example Ferguson (1999: 38-48) and Levitt & Glick-Schiller (2004). 
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had. Both the relational and mobile approach served as antidotes to such teleological 
thinking and allow for more nuance when describing the different trajectories in the 
cultural field of hierarchy in Sahelian post-slavery societies. 
‘Shortcuts’ as silent social change in the cultural field of 
hierarchy  
The introduction proposed analyzing social change through a model of power 
introduced by Comaroff & Comaroff (1991). Social changes are changes in the triadic 
power relations between a cultural field, ideology and hegemony. An existing cultural 
field can be actively contested (ideology) or it can work as a naturalized, uncontested 
form of power (hegemony). Change is the move from an unrecognized form of power 
(hegemony) to a recognized and thus contestable form of power (ideology). The cul-
tural field of hierarchy changes when hegemony is recognised and thus becomes an 
ideology.  
This model allows us to understand changes in the anachronic and stereotyped 
stigmatisation of people of slave descent in the Sahel. It explains why so few slave 
descendants actively engage in moving ‘against’ the stigma of slave status, like 
Saajo* (see Epilogue) did. The case of Saajo* highlighted how those who move 
against aspects of the cultural field of hierarchy often meet fierce opposition and/or 
incomprehension from those who do not benefit from or share the same worldview.  
This paucity of protest can be explained by the fact that most individuals benefit 
from social promotion if it can be done in silence. So it is not necessarily so that the 
process whereby hegemony comes to be perceived as a challengeable ideology is loud 
and clear. Rather, such struggles to move from hegemony to ideology do take place 
but as silent as possible. The Comaroffs (1991: 27) explain how: 
... once something leaves the domain of the hegemonic, it frequently becomes a major site of 
ideological struggle. Even when there is no well-formed opposing ideology, no clearly articulated 
collective consciousness among subordinate populations, such struggles may still occur. But they 
are liable to be heard in the genre of negation-refusal, reversals, the smashing of idols and icons- 
and not in the narrative voice of political argument. 
So social change can take place as an ideological process that takes place rather 
silently, not in explicit ways. This struggle is thus not visible in the usual fields of 
protest such as narrative voice of political argument. When applying this to the Dicko 
family, we see that their move from hegemony to ideology was incredibly silent. 
Starting of as a slave family, marriage alliances have helped them to bypass their 
slave status. Instead of challenging the stigma related to slave status, they specialized 
in the ‘patriarchal style’ themselves.629 They successfully bypassed their stigmatized 
slave status in a non-confrontational (silent) way and they crossed rather than con-
tested the existing social boundaries of the cultural field of hierarchy. They did not 
challenge the stigma related to the slave status of their maternal kin. Rather they 
encompassed their maternal kin as clients with slave status, thus perpetuating the 
existing cultural field of hierarchy. The Dicko family did not empower thanks to 
protest to obtain social change. Rather they obtained the possibilities to go from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




hegemony to ideology and back. They reversed their own move from hegemony to 
ideology, and instrumentalised their changes in social status to reinstaure existing 
hegemony. 
The power model proposed by the Comaroffs lacks room for reversed struggles 
and changes. It does not account for active moves from ideology back into hegemony. 
So besides attention for ‘silent ways’ in which the move from hegemony to ideology 
takes place, I argue for more attention to ‘reverse ways’ in which social change 
ideologies are actively re-muted and delegated to the sphere of hegemony. Such 
reversals are also forms of social change and are often actively sought for to be able to 
benefit and/or instrumentalise a new status in the existing cultural field of hierarchy.  
To refine the triadic relationship between the cultural field of hierarchy, ideology 
and hegemony, the silent and reversible process of change (from hegemony to ide-
ology and back) needs a concept in its own right to give this process more visibility in 
analyses of post-slavery societies. To this end I propose the concept of the ‘shortcut’ 
as those forms of social change whereby social boundaries are crossed rather than 
defied and actively reproduced rather than displaced. Shortcuts are not only the silent 
reconfigurations of hegemony into ideology, but also give way to the reverse process: 
Silent reconfigurations of ideology back into hegemony. Shortcuts are characterised 
by an active interest in oblivion and forgetting, rather than in noisy claims to change. 
So the shortcut refers to ‘less evident evidence’ of social change that takes place in 
silence, through refusals, passiveness and reversals rather than actively voiced con-
testations, legal claims or political proclamation. The concept of shortcut refers to the 
silent, subtle and, at first sight, passive contestation of categorical slave status.  
My central question was how mobility does or does not contribute to such social 
changes. The answer is that most shortcuts in post-slavery societies have become 
available to people thanks to mobility. It is thanks to their mobility, that the Dicko 
branch of the described network got access to education and created a shortcut to 
assert control over the resources needed to reproduce the cultural field of hierarchy in 
a hegemonic way. In the first chapter I demonstrated how they managed to become 
part of the heroic Dicko history as one such central resource, Chapters 2 and 7 
described how place and ritual processes are resources that have been appropriated by 
this branch of the Dicko family. Chapters 4 and 8 described how the Dickos’ spe-
cialisation in the patriarchal style mutes their own history in the loyalty style. In 
Chapter 5 the Dickos manipulation of legal procedures to recreate social boundaries 
were central. Chapter 6 demonstrated how mobility is a central resource they control 
in order to reclaim hegemony and finally Chapters 1 and 9 analysed how decentrali-
sation politics are an area to reinforce their hegemonic power position.  
Travelling hierarchies: Did Roads reconfigure Heads and 
Ropes? 
The introduction to this thesis proposed three concepts as metaphors and at the same 
time analytical tools for addressing changes in cultural fields of hierarchy in the 
proposed social network of people. The central question in this thesis was how the 
Roads (mobility as social change) have reconfigured the Ropes (change in relations 
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and representations) and the Heads (identity and stylistic changes) in a well-defined 
Central Malian social network. 
The notion of the ‘Road’ points to the chosen methodological zooming in on the 
role of mobility and movement as roads to change. This notion in my view en-
courages us to see status in the cultural field of hierarchy as a continuum: An itinerary 
that can be moved in, on, against or out of in a temporary way. The road can be 
travelled both back and forth and there are several shortcuts that are available to some 
but not to all. Social changes in categorical slavery are not about unidirectional, one-
way itineraries that eventually lead to adopting a freeborn status, or not. That there are 
many more shades of grey on this continuum was shown in the discussion (Chapter 5) 
on the legal category of ‘freed slave status’, which comes between slave status and 
free status.  
When saying that ‘hierarchies travel’, this does not sound as a process of social 
change whereby hegemony turns into ideology. However, examples of ways in which 
hegemony has been silently turned into ideology are those instances where slave 
descendants actively instrumentalize their loyalty style (like Suleymane of the Kau 
family) and thus move on, or move out or even move against the expected styles to the 
opposite end of the spectrum. The Dicko family moved out of the loyalty style to 
specialise in the patriarchal style (like Madame of the Dicko family).  
The notion of the ‘Rope’ stands for multiple (imagined) relations to the slave past. 
To fully underscore the relational aspect, this study focused on one specific network 
of people in which interactions between two status groups occur on a daily basis. 
Because these groups share such intense, sustained daily interactions, relations 
between other former slave groups and their freeborn masters necessarily travelled on 
different roads than the described relations in the Kau-Dicko network.  
A central conclusion of this study is that a relational analysis of social promotion 
allows to fully apprehend the multiplicity of roads possibly travelled by slave des-
cendants, without loosing out of sight how their mobility changes (or not) existing 
hierarchical relations back home. Social promotion of former domestic slave groups 
can only be understood in relation to that of their masters. Chapter 9 described how 
both the Dicko and the Kau families accumulated different forms of wealth and 
knowledge during their travels. The two families enjoyed considerable economic 
promotion vis-à-vis some of their immobile family members. If the analysis had not 
been based on a relational approach, the conclusion would have been that people part 
of this moving network, did indeed obtain better conditions (more wealth) and thus 
presumably a higher social status. The relational approach demonstrated that this 
would deny the way in which hierarchies travel and that the rope is still there.  
Finally, the notion of the ‘Head’ symbolizes expectations based on performed 
identities that are linked to a past of enslavement. I did not analyze (social) status as 
either ascribed (by society) or achieved (by the individual) but opted for a 
performative perspective, status takes ‘two to tango’: It is relational and active and 
results both from achievement and (self-)ascription. An example is the way in which 
the semi-freeborn branch of the Dicko family managed to move from servile to free-
born status in only two generations. To do this, their claims to freeborn status had to 
be actively self-ascribed by themselves, but also recognised as a (legitimate) achieve-
ment by others.  
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The slave descending Kau family’s social promotion through mobility did not 
allow them to move up in the cultural field of hierarchy, rather stereo styles were 
reinforced. The Dickos obtained access to mobility through education, they became 
wealthy, settled in large houses in Bamako and continued their social promotion in 
national administration and/or politics. They engaged in patriarchal style vis-à-vis 
their maternal kin, who are of slave descent. Their maternal kinmembers -the Kau 
family- also moved to other destinations, but often only to engage temporarily mainly 
in physical labour, while living in the slums of Bamako and stereo styling in loyalty to 
their Dicko kinsmen. Upon their return home, most of the Kau family members con-
tinued to work as cultivators, while most of their former Dicko kinsmen did not re-
turn, but maintained their patriarchal position on distance from Bamako which was 
possible thanks to their wealth and remittances. 
Since status is performative, I argued for using the notion of ‘stereo styles’. This 
notion helped me to analyse changes of status as changes in the performance of 
relations of interdependence between different status groups. Chapter 4 demonstrated 
how people (depending on time, place and circumstances) can move on from loyal to 
patriarchal styles, but also vice versa. The reference to mobility in the title to this 
thesis (‘moving in and out of’) highlights the temporality of these values, styles and 
identities. People adopt a certain style at specific times and in certain spaces. And 
throughout the analysis I have stated that the adoption of a style is tied to one’s 
embeddedness in social relations which in turn structure people’s access to 
institutions such as politics, national administration, schools, courts, monetary 
economy and so on.  
In the remainder of these conclusions I recapitulate how the different chapters ad-
dressed roads travelled and shortcuts taken by the Kau-Dicko network in the process 
of reconfiguring ideology and hegemony in the cultural field of hierarchy.  
Of ties that bind:  
Power as hegemony through invisible ropes and ancestral heads 
The stigma of slavery has remained hegemonic when it comes to how it is embedded 
in (access to) history and place. Populations used to float (Chapter 1) and at different 
moment in time some have managed to contest their masters’ interpretations of 
history. Nevertheless, the dominant version of history as a heroic conquest by the 
Dicko family in the Haayre region gained firm ground from the beginning of the 
twentieth century onwards. Becoming part of the freeborn Dicko family meant shar-
ing this heroic version of history. Slave descending groups have difficulties to master 
their past due to their own internalization of shame about it. Here again there are 
internal differences among slave groups: slave descending Riimaayɓe Haayre did start 
to reformulate their history to their own advantage, while the Maccuɓe Wuro of the 
Kau family hardly did so.  
The semi-freeborn Dicko family central to this thesis obtained a shortcut to be-
come part of the ruling Dicko elite’s history as a result of marriage alliances (Chapter 
3). They did not obtain their new position by actively contesting the hegemony of the 
freeborn Dicko’s. Rather their access to (French) education in the middle of the twen-
tieth century gave them the chance to take a ‘shortcut’ and bypass the hegemony of 
freeborn families. The niche to education allowed them to move out of the cultural 
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field of hierarchy. Their mobility established a shortcut which offered them new roads 
(opportunities). Today, this branch of the Dicko family clearly has an interest in 
forgetting and silencing their (slave) past and managed to claim the freeborn history 
as theirs. However, their inclusion in freeborn history did not start out as a conscious 
and active ideological struggle, rather it was what became possible thanks to various 
circumstances throughout time.  
A second hegemonic aspect of the cultural field of hierarchy is the muted and 
uncontested way in which the ritual organization of interactions and the spatial orga-
nization of both urban and rural areas tie inhabitants with a symbolic rope to certain 
social positions. Central to Chapters 2 and 7 is an analysis of how the places where 
people live tie them to stigmatized positions, irrespective of the actual lived experi-
ences, competences and roads. Maman Abidjan was a migrant who moved back home 
after forty years and discovered that she was bodily manoeuvred into a place (a 
former royal slave ward) and position (slave descending status) she did no longer 
identify with. The fact that slave descending groups continue to be bound to certain 
marginalized geographical spaces sustains the argument that place is certainly an 
axiomatic – indeed hegemonic – aspect of power in the cultural field of hierarchy.  
An implicit argument which I want to make more explicit here is that precisely 
because the discussed branch of the Dicko family in Dalla took shortcuts, the repro-
duction of the social boundaries they managed to cross is even more important for 
them than for their freeborn counterparts. Together with other reasons of political and 
economic insertion in the nation state, this explains the stronger need for maintenance 
of the cultural field of hierarchy by the ruling elite in Dalla when compared to Joona 
(where only freeborn ruled), or in Booni (which was founded by semi-freeborn slave 
descendants). 
Saajo*’s case revealed how state administrators (such as the reeve) themselves 
internalized the stigma of slave status. Chapter 5 demonstrated how legal pluralism 
multiplied ideas on how to understand freedom and demonstrated how there is no 
single frame of reference. This makes interpretations over what is and what is not to 
be considered as social promotion and moving on from hegemony to ideology rather 
complex.  
To conclude, spatial organization of the landscape and written claims to historical 
representation and legal status are important resources to reproduce the stigma of 
slave status in hegemonic ways. Although these resources seemingly remained uncon-
tested by slave descendants in an active sense, the Dicko family bypassed them in 
silence and through reversal with the shortcuts available to them. 
Of ropes untied: Power as ideologies on the road  
The cultural field of hierarchy in the Kau-Dicko network is certainly not made up of 
uncontested hegemonic aspects of power alone. Several chapters pointed to the differ-
ent possibilities for slave descendants to actively or passively contest the cultural field 
of hierarchy. Often it are migrants who went studying that defied existing marriage 
rules by engaging in exogamous marriages. I explained how endogamous marriage 
(Chapter 3) as control over wealth in people turned from hegemony in ideology for 
those migrants who defied social boundaries and obtained wealth thanks to moblity.   
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Although they have not actively defied the legal confines of Islamic endogamous 
marriage rules (Chapter 3) the legal institution of slave concubine marriage in the Kau 
family created a shortcut that in the end led them so successfully to an appropriation 
of freeborn status. The semi-freeborn children that came out of these marriages 
managed to revert to the patriarchal style and were renamed Dicko. Their Kau uncles 
and aunts reinforced their family members’ new Dicko status as freeborn by engaging 
in the loyalty style with them (Chapter 4).  
Those who managed to move on to the patriarachal style (example of the Dickos) 
were replaced by new groups of marginalized people deferring in loyalty.630 Migrants 
who settled as strangers were given slave wives because their ‘outsiderness’ meant 
that, just like slaves, they had to be inserted into society by assigning them slave 
status. Slave categories and those of their descendants were thus constantly filled in 
by different actors. There have always been poor and marginalized people who filled 
positions that require the loyalty style in the lower echelons of society.  
Chapter 9 demonstrated how to be successful in ‘passing as a non slave’ (Rossi 
2009), it has been not only crucial to adopt a new identity but also to never return to 
one’s home society. The road out of stigmatization is thus a road of no return, which 
is not taken by many slave descendants. Most of them do not move away to rid 
themselves of existing hierarchies and styles in their home societies. Rather the 
majority hopes to achieve promotion within existing hierarchies, because as the case 
of Maman Abidjan demonstrated, even if one makes a fortune and self-ascribes a new 
identity after living abroad for forty years, it is almost impossible to uphold a self-
ascribed status on returning home. Also the case of Suleymane in Chapter 9 demon-
strated how most migrants upon return are put under pressure to accept the existing 
status quo and they are discouraged when challenging existing hierarchies.  
In short, the most radical and successful shortcut is what I proposed calling ‘exit 
mobility’. This is the process whereby mobile actors moved out of their home soci-
eties to never return. Often these are the actors who potentially managed to do away 
with ascribed social status, but again those groups do not defy the status quo either as 
they wish to remain invisible. Not returning is their way of ensuring and protecting a 
newly achieved social status position elsewhere. Exit mobility is crucial to consider in 
any analysis of social change in cultural fields of hierarchy, because it is part of the 
full range of possible roads travelled by slave descendants. However interviewing 
those who have engaged in exit mobility is an empirical and methodological hurdle. 
Those who manage to upgrade their status by bypassing relations in their home soci-
ety are an empirical blind spot. The only thing I managed to ascertain by discussing 
genealogies is that none of the Kau family members have disappeared mysteriously. 
So far ‘exit mobility’ has not been a road available for them to travel.  
Exit mobility and other preconditions for ‘having a road’  
While what belongs to hegemony in the cultural field of hierarchy becomes contested 
as an ideology by people like Saajo* and Maman Abidjan, other slave descendants 
like the Dickos, could use shortcuts to recreate hegemony. The emic idea of ‘having a 
road’ is an illusion. Both the Kau and Dicko family members have less agency in their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630  I referred to this group as ‘floating populations’ in Chapter 1. 
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movements and style options than modernity thinking expected. Not only do the Kau 
family feel forced into deference and a loyalty style, the semi-freeborn Dickos were 
equally forced into specializing in the patriarchal style if they wanted to acquire a 
respectable position in the royal family. Historically, both families’ movements were 
(re-) embedded in structural conditions of the cultural field of hierarchy. People do 
not determine access to and the direction of their road, rather their options for 
travelling roads and taking ‘shortcuts’ are embedded in pre-existing institutions (such 
as schools, politics, laws) and established spatial networks (njaatigi hosts and stereo 
partners).  
This brings us to a final conclusion linking mobility and slavery. The way domes-
tic workers are recruited recalls cultural memories of domestic slavery transposed 
through space and place as part of a ‘memoryscape’ of slavery in the Sahel (Argenti 
& Röschenthaler 2006: 40). The ways in which certain members of the Kau family 
continue to move in loyalty style can be seen as a form of the ‘embodied memory of 
slavery.’ The past speaks through existing power relations that are inherent in mo-
bility at present. The cultural field of hierarchy travels with the mobile people in the 
network described. 
Categorical slavery is a situated relationship that can range from an active to 
passive and conscious to more unconscious maintenance of hierarchy. Individuals, 
like Saajo*, who actively contest stigmatization and reification of former slave status, 
have not managed to effectuate change in society at large. Saajo*’s family members 
do not see stigmatization as an obstacle to their livelihoods and organize their lives 
around it. So not everyone sees the stigma of slave status as an ideology, which one 
can actively identify with and/or deny at specific moments in time, in specific places 
and vis-à-vis specific others. Various more structural circumstances (conjuncture, 
education, place, economy) account for whether some identify with (slave) status, 
while others hardly ever do. One and the same person can instrumentalize his/her 
(slave) status while others silence it. The person who instrumentalizes his slave status, 
may at other times decide to move out of his/her (slave) status and leave the corres-
ponding style and identity behind.  
Dilemma, ambiguity, paradox and plurality of movements back and forth on the 
road to social promotion characterise the Heads of the Kau-Dicko network. The Rope 
is not strangling any one in the cases described but this doesn’t mean that it is not 
there. Few are visibly untying the ropes to their slave past because to cut all the ties of 
belonging through exit mobility is an option too uncertain. Instead, the directions of 
the Roads travelled in the cultural field of hierarchy are winding: People move in, on, 
against or out of the stigma of slave status either in imagination, discourse or actual 
practice. Social change takes place in silence, is reversible and time- and space- 
bound. Nevertheless cultural fields of hierarchy in many ways travel along with the 








Note: I did not use the correct annotation of Arabic words with the various accents and 
instead chose to spell them out in roman scripture.  
 
fida:   ransom. ransoming 
fiqh:   Islamic legal textbooks 
haratin:  slave descendants among the Moor 
hadith:   sayings of the prophet (used as guidelines for Islamic legal 
textbooks) 
hajj:    the pilgrimage to Mecca 
iktifa:   Renewal of a contractual document in Islamic legislation (homologation) 
mawla:  master slave relationship that became a client relationship (for example 
through Murgu) 
murgu:  legal arrangement of clientship. For slaves this ‘policy of assimilation’ 
could serve as an emancipatory arrangement as it allowed slaves to work 
on their own account in exchange for a payment. 
mukataba:  verses in the Koran summing up the possible reasons for self-
manumission (most reasons are  related to why masters should manumit 
slaves. 
surat:   a praying verse 
sharia:   Islamic law 
shurut   (also Khutut, watha’iq): standard Arab formulations used for contracts. 
sunni:  the five pillars of Islamic duties (profession of faith, ritual prayers, 
paying alms, fasting during Ramadan, conducting a pilgrimage to Mecca 
umma:   Muslim believers 
umm walad:  manumission of a slave concubine (in order to marry her) 




Note: in fulfulde language, the first letters of some words change in the 
plural. In those cases, I added both singular and plural forms in the list 
below. Due to a communication error when sending this book to the 
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presses, not all words in the text are spelled correctly. The spelling of 
words as indicated in this list, is the correct one.  
 
 
ajami:    Fulfulde written in Arab orthography 
al’aada:   customary (legal) traditions, as opposed to Juulde: Islamic (legal) 
traditions 
alsilaamaaku:   Islam 
alsilaame’en:   (knowledge of) the Muslim community 
alkaali:   Kadi, religious scholar who is in charge of justice 
amiiru:   mayor, leader, ruler (borrowed from Arab emir) 
amiiru Maccuɓe:  the leader of the slaves 
anndal:   knowledge, often connotation of ‘secret’ knowledge 
araanu:   donkey 
ardo/ardooɓe:   warlords or bandleaders 
asahaada:   the reason for liberation (written on the manumission document) 
baaba/ baabiraaɓe:  father 
banndiraaɗo/ banndiraaɓe: siblings, parallel cousins 
ɓaleejo/ ɓaleeɓe:  Those populations that are considered black by Fulɓe, who 
consider themselves to be white. This term either refers to their 
own descendants of slaves, or to other non- Fulɓe populations 
that are considered less worthy (often ethnic groups like Dogon, 
Bozo, Bambara) 
banngal:   wedding ceremony 
barke:    divine blessings, prodigious holey power, divine force, blessings 
[from Arab albarka] 
bellaajo/ bellaaɓe:  former Tuareg slaves 
beweejo/ weheeɓe:  lit. vulture, former warlords, nowadays political elite  
bitiki:    derived from French word for shop (boutique). 
ɓii, ɓiɗɗo/ ɓiɓɓe:  children  
ɓoggol:   rope 
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Related expression: ‘Mi haɓɓataa e ɓii ɓoggol’: I refuse to discuss with a child 
of the rope. 
Related expression: ‘A taƴƴi (cut) ɓoggol e daande (neck) ma’: You cut the rope 
from your neck.  
bonngobi:   healers, knowledgeable about plants and herbs, often associated 
with black magic 
cabbugal:   betrothal, form of pre-arranged marriage (majoritarily between 
cross cousins) 
caworɗi:   engagement and marriage ceremony of independent former slave 
families (riimayɓe) 
Dallanke:   inhabitants of the village of Dalla 
dammbaare:   name of a year round water spring on Dalla’s territory 
dawde:   to travel 
debere/ debeeje:  villages and/or land owned or appropriated by descendants of 
slaves. Since slaves and their descendants often specialized in 
agriculture, the term is often referring to cultivator districts, 
villages or hamlets (Saare in Maacina dialect and Ruunde in 
Fuuta Djallon dialect) 
demal:   cultivation, agricultural labour 
denndiraaku:   joking relationships between cross-cousins 
dimo/ rimɓe:   he who has (self-) ascribed freeborn ancestry/ community of the 
freeborn 
janngal:   (French colonial) tax for slaves 
jakka:    (French colonial) tax of the freeborn [from Arabic “zakat”] 
dimɗinaaɗo/ dimɗinaaɓe: freed slave 
dimo/rimɓe:   freeborn persons (as opposed to those whose ancestors have been 
enslaved) 
rimɗinde:   adopt (a slave), make noble, to free (liberate/ manumission) 
direre:    traditional slave songs (often sung during work or harvest 
ceremonies) 
disaare:   a length of printed cotton cloth [in French called pagne] 
duɗal:    Koranic school 
eggude:   to move in search for pastures (transhumance) 
egga-hoɗaaɓe:   semi-nomadic Fulɓe cattle herders  
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esiraaɗo/esiraaɓe:  affines 
faggaade:  (to move in order to) look for profit (money, material gains), to 
put aside for later, to    save, to get rich 
fanɗinkinaade:   to make something/someone smaller 
ferude:   to leave on exile 
fijo: Game, feast amusement and celebrations with a dance party and 
music, for example on the occasion of marriage. [derived from 
the verb fijude]: playing the flute, which is traditionally done by 
Fulɓe herdsmen, but also Riimayɓe.  
Fulɓe:    self-designation of an ethnic group. Also called Fulani in English 
and Peuls in French. 
kurtungal:   actual wedding  
futte:    matrimonial compensation, dowry 
Fuutankooɓe:  Fulɓe group who historically are said to have conquered parts of 
Malian territory led   by El Hajj Omar Tall, who came from the 
West (Senegal)  
gaaribu/ gaaribaaɓe:  Koranic students 
galbal:  lit. “wall surrounding compound”, term used to indicate the royal  
compound in    Dalla village, see Map 6 
galle:    compound (sedentary) 
gargasaajo/gargasaaɓe: leather workers  
golle:    work 
goggo/goggiraaɓe:  paternal aunts 
golloowo:   worker, person who works 
Gourma:   territory north of Douentza, southern bank of the river Niger 
guluro:   old slave songs 
giɗiraaɗo / giɗiraaɓe:  friends 
kaaɗo/haaɓe:   all non- Fulɓe, often with a rather negative connotation 
haasidaare:   jealousy, wrath, grudgery 
haasidaaku:   jealousy 
Haayre:  rock, stone, by extension designates the region of rocky plateaus 
North & East of     Douentza (Map 8) 
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henndu:  wind (often hot and sandy dessert winds), sometimes connotation 
of illness caused by    spirits 
heeferɓe:    people who do not pray (sg. keefeero) 
hoore:     head 
Related expression: Anndude hoore ma, lit. translated this is ‘to know your 
head’, but in practice used as the reflexive form of the verb ‘to know’ and thus 
means to know oneself. 
In the negative: maani aɗa anndaa hoore: not knowing oneself.  
honnde Fulɓe:    nomadic Fulɓe camps (sg. kogge) 
horɓe:    female slaves (sg. korɗo) 
huɗude:   to curse 
huɗeede:   to be cursed 
huɗaaɗo:   a cursed person 
hulaade:   to be scared 
Hummbeeɓe:   subsection of the ethnic group of the Dogon  
hurto:    dowry or mothers gifts to the household  
hururuy:   bad mouths, tongue, gossip 
innde:    name, by extension also: naming ceremony 
Related expression: bonude innde makko: to make his name dirty, to spoil 
someone’s reputation 
jannginoowo:   teacher 
Jallo/ Jalluɓe:   semi-nomadic Fulɓe cattle herders 
Jaawannɗo / Jaawamɓe: traders, advisors 
jawdi:    wealth, all cattle owned by a family  
jeyaaɗo/ jeyaaɓe:  ‘those we own’, masters who speak about slaves that belong to 
them, also hosts    speaking of guests that they feel responsible 
for 
joolaare:   to be somewhere else, to be abroad.  
joonde:  place, seat, from jooɗaade; to sit. Points to the part of the baptism 
ceremony whereby    the women sit together with the new mother 
and her child.  
juulde:    lit. to pray, also Islamic rules of orthodoxy  
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juultoyde:   to go on exodus, to emigrate 
kabaaru:   news 
kalfooɗo:   the master 
kanngaaɗo:    a fool, someone crazy 
kau /kauiraaɓe:  paternal uncle [also: kaw, kaaw/ kaawiraaɓe) 
kiitaanngal:   lit. “not a big year’ to refer to the droughts of the 1912-1913 
Kommongalluujo/Kommongalluuɓe: social category of soldiers who used to work in 
service of Fulɓe      warlords. Claims to have never been 
enslaved 
koorɗo/ hoorɓe:  female slave  
koreeji:  family, but also in a larger sense: dependants, people one has 
responsibility and    authority over. This can be family members, 
children, slaves. Only adults can have Koreeji. 
Kurtungu:  celebration of the union between husband and wife [also 
kurtungal] 
layyaaji/layyaari:  he-goat or sheep to be slaughters at juulde layya 
laamiiɗo/ laamiiɓe:  those who hold political power (comparable to kings)  
laamu:   political power, ability to command, e.g. laamu tuubaakooɓe: 
French colonial regime 
lamuru [also lamru]:  ceremony for newborn babies, coinciding with the name giving, 
baptism  
laawol:   road 
Related expression: heɓude laawol: to have a road (opportunities) 
lenyol:    clan, lineage 
leydi:  lit. land, ground, territory, often also used as pars-pro-toto. For 
example leydi  Faransi   means the country of France.  
luumo:    market 
Maabo/Maabuuɓe:  wood workers, part of endogamous social category of clients in 
Fulɓe society (see    Ŋeeyɓe) 
Maccuɗo/ Maccuɓe:  slaves. Mostly used to refer to all slaves, sometimes to point to 
male slaves (in    opposition to female slaves called hoorɓe) 
Maccuɓe Wuro:  lit. ‘slaves of the village’, pointing to those slaves who were 
individually owned and lived in with their masters. In general 
they assisted their masters on a daily basis, for example taking 
care of the household  




Maraaɗo /Maraaɓe:  lit. ‘the ones who are attached’ 
mbuudu:   money  
 Related expression: tewtude mbuudu: To find money. 
Related expression: Ley wuro, sii ɓuri semmbe mbuudu: in the village, one’s 
social status matters more than money. 
miisiide:   mosque 
Moodibo/Moodibaaɓe: Islamic learned men/ social category of Islamic clergy in Fulbe 
society 
muntari:   virginity 
nafaaji:  among slave descendants refers to ‘wedding ceremony’ although 
in form it resembles  the freeborn’s ‘engagement’ (see Safannde) 
nanngaaɗo/ nanngaaɓe: lit. ‘the ones who have been taken (captured)’, i.e. captive 
slaves 
nayiraade:   to take pride in something 
ndimaaku:   community of those people who stick to noble behaviour 
ndimu:    mixture of customary and Islamic rules to behave like 
noble (honourable behaviour) 
ndunngu:   dry season 
njaatigi/ njaatigaaɓe:  host (someone who receives a traveler in a place far from home) 
ŋeenyo/ŋeeyɓe:  lit. ‘those who transform’. Social category of endogamous arts- 
and craftsmen who offer their services as leather, iron, wood or 
jewelry workers and/or praise singers, who offer their services 
to other social status groups (such as Maabuuɓe, gargasaaɓe) 
Pulaaku:  emic notion for Fulɓe behaviour, but in the Haayre also used to 
all those who identify    as Fulɓe people 
Pullo:    Singular form of Fulɓe 
Riimaayɓe: [sg. Diimaajo]: freed slaves, referring to those groups who 
formerly were slaves to    local Fulɓe rulers [from Arabic dimma] 
Riimayɓe Haayre:   ‘former slaves of the rocks’, pointing to those slaves who were 
collectively owned by local rulers, but often did not live in with 
their masters. They worked the land and had to give part of their 
harvest to their masters (in contrast to Maccuɓe Wuro) 
rimɓe (sg. dimo):  those who have (self-) ascribed freeborn ancestry/ community of 
the freeborn 
rimɗineede:   lit. to be made noble/free/ procedure of manumission 
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safannde:  freeborn engagement and more specifically referring to the gifts 
paid for the   engagement by (the family of) the groom 
semteende:    feelings of shame  
siiri:    secrets 
suudu/cuuɗi:   house 
sukunya/sukunyaaɓe:  witch (-craft) 
soodtaaɓe:   slaves who have been bought, trade slaves 
Sonhaykooɓe:  people from the ethnic group called Songhay in English 
sii:    social status group 
taalibaaɓe:   students of an Islamic scholar 
taarnaajo/ taarnaaɓe:  a slave concubine who is legally married to a freeborn person. 
Sometimes also referred to as Taarnugol, from the verbal root ‘to 
transform’. The transformation is that of female slave to freed 
woman.  
talkuru/ talki:   charms, often consisting of Islamic secret texts (see Anndal) 
written on a paper that is    wrapped in leather and attached on the 
body 
tawaangal:    lit. ‘that what we have found’, traditions 
taariki:   history, often referring to family histories written in ajami and 
kept privately by big    families [from Arabic Tarikh] 
teddungal:    respect, respectability 
tubaaku:    white person 
tuubal/ tuube:    drums in possession of those in power (see laamiiɓe), 
symbol of power. 
wassigatu:   verses in the Koran describing possible reasons for slaves to self-
manumit [see      mukataba in Arabic] 
wuro/gure:  Fulɓe village, central settlement around which several nomadic 
camps and slave      villages installed themselves. In Fuuta 
Djallon dialect called miisiide.  
wuro:  also used to point to a smaller unit within a Fulɓe settlement: 
ward (see  discussion in    Chapter two- sometimes the word 
daande is used in this context) 
Weeheeɓe:   [sg. Beweejo]: lit. vultures, referring to former warrior groups 
among the Fulɓe.  
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yaage:  explicit respect and avoidance of shame by public withdrawal 
from interacting  with   someone (speaking, eating) in a superior 
or rival position within the same ethnic group and social 
category.  
yiiyaaɗo/ yiiyaaɓe:   to see ‘those we see’, [from the verb yiide]: euphemism for 
masters to talk about slaves that belong to them and whom they 
see as theirs 
yolbere:   ‘the big hunger’, famine, used to refer to the droughts of the 
1970’s and 1980’s 
yimɓe:    people (undefined) 
 Related expression: yimɓe fuu potti: all people are equal 
yiɗude:   to like, to love 
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SAMENVATTING IN HET NEDERLANDS 
 




Reizende hiërarchieën: bewegingen in en uit slavenstatus in een Centraal Malinees 
Fulɓe netwerk 
 
In de Malinese publieke opinie is slavernij iets dat tot het verleden behoort. Wettelijk 
is dat ook zo. Desondanks ondervinden afstammelingen van slaven gevolgen van het 
verleden van hun voorouders. Volgens een recente studie (Keita 2010) worden 
minimaal 2 miljoen van de in meer dan 12 miljoen Malinezen op basis van hun 
slavenafkomst gediscrimineerd. Het slavernijverleden roept in landen als Mali 
ambiguïteit op en is voor velen een taboe onderwerp. Om deze ambiguïteit niet te 
laten voor wat ze is, documenteert deze studie de blijvende, bijna tastbare 
aanwezigheid van de erfenis van het interne Afrikaanse slavernijverleden voor vele 
mensen in de Malinese Sahel.  
 
Anders dan voor Afro-Amerikaanse slavenafstammelingen, is de juridische 
afschaffing van historische slavernij bij de etnische groep van de Fulɓe in Centraal 
Mali zo recent dat er nog weinig tijd is geweest voor slavenafstammelingen om hun 
verleden te bekijken, analyseren en interpreteren. Het slavernijverleden blijft 
intrinsiek aanwezig in het heden, en kan nog niet gezien worden als een abstract 
overblijfsel van een ver verleden. Dat wil echter niet zeggen dat er niets veranderd is. 
Centraal in deze studie staan de vele ‘wegen’ die door Malinese afstammelingen van 
voormalige slaven bewandelen in hun zoektocht naar een nieuwe verhouding tot hun 
voormalige meesters. Door deze wegen (sociale carrières) van slavenafstammelingen 
te onderzoeken, hoop ik een bijdrage te leveren aan debatten over ‘moderniteit’ van 
post-slavernij samenlevingen in West Afrika. Ondanks bovengenoemde relevantie van 
discriminatie op basis van slavenafkomst voor vele mensen, zijn er relatief weinig 
studies naar de huidige impact van interne slavernij systemen op samenlevingen in 
West-Afrika. Nog zeldzamer zijn studies die sociale verandering in de verhoudingen 
tussen afstammelingen van zowel meesters als slaven in het heden onderzochten in de 
context van migratie. Het unieke van deze studie is de benadering van sociale 
verandering in hiërarchisch georganiseerde samenlevingen van de Sahel, door de lens 
van mobiliteit en relationele netwerken.  
 Dit boek is het resultaat van interviews en observaties in hiërarchisch 
georganiseerde sociale netwerken van de Fulɓe van Centraal Mali. op verschillende 
rurale en urbane locaties in Mali (tussen 2001-2002/ 2005-2006 en 2007) en in Parijs, 
Frankrijk. Ik besloot de erfenis van het slavernijverleden in een mobiele context te 
bestuderen naar aanleiding van een observatie tijdens mijn 2001-2002 master 
onderzoek in de Douentza regio van Centraal Mali. De meerderheid van jonge 
slavenafstammelingen waren afwezig in het dorp waar ik toen verbleef. Zij bleken op 
‘avontuur’ (emigratie) te zijn in steden als Mopti, Bamako en Segou in Mali, Abidjan 
en Bouake in Ivoorkust, Kumasi in Ghana, Dakar in Senegal, Malabo in Equatoriaal 
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Guinea, enzovoorts. In tegenstelling tot jongeren die van slaven afstammen, bleven de 
jonge afstammelingen van vrije families wel in het dorp te wonen. Diegenen onder 
hen die toch wegtrokken, deden dat niet om te werken maar om elders te kunnen 
studeren. Dit riep een aantal vragen op: Hebben de van slaven afstammende jongeren 
extra redenen om weg te trekken en zo ja, welke? Hoe te verklaren dat de ene groep 
migreerde om te gaan werken en de andere voornamelijk om te gaan studeren? 
 
Alvorens deze en andere vragen te beantwoorden, is het belangrijk te begrijpen welke 
soort slavernij centraal staat in dit proefschrift. Rossi (2009a: 5) beschreef 4 manieren 
waarop slavernij in West-Afrika zich tot op heden manifesteert: (i) Historische 
Slavernij: het terugkeren van historische vormen van slavernij; (ii) Categorische 
slavernij: stigmatisering op grond van overgeërfde  of veronderstelde slavenstatus; 
(iii) Metaforische slavernij (ook bekend als ‘moderne slavernij’): vormen van 
exploitatie gelijkend op historische vormen van slavernij en (iv) Extroverte slavernij: 
exogene discoursen die nieuwe velden van actie en gedachtegoed omtrent de notie 
van slavernij stimuleren. In dit model kan enkel de eerste categorie als slavernij 
bestempeld worden. Alle andere categorieën zijn fenomenen die op verschillende 
manieren gerelateerd zijn aan slavernij, maar geen slavernij an sich zijn. In dit 
proefschrift focus ik op vormen van Categorische en Metaforische slavernij, ondanks 
het feit dat ik zeer uitzonderlijk hier en daar nog individuele gevallen van Historische 
slavernij ben tegengekomen. Dit zijn echter de uitzonderingen die de regel bevestigen.   
 
De focus in deze studie is een etnische groep, die zichzelf Fulɓe noemt. Fulɓe zijn van 
oorsprong nomadische veehouders die verspreid leven over grote gebieden in West en 
Oost Afrika en met name in Sahelgebieden. Sommige groepen islamiseerden en vanaf 
de achttiende eeuw ontstonden er grote Fulɓe rijken.631 De Fulɓe groep centraal in 
deze studie veranderde van nomadische pastoralisten in krijgsheren. De 
ongecontroleerde zones tussen deze rijken dienden als ‘slavenreservoirs’. Mobiele 
Fulɓe krijgsheren namen mensen gevangen om de grote stukken land die zij 
inpalmden te bewerken. Krijgsgevangenen werden tot slaaf gemaakt en soms 
verhandeld op slavenmarkten (zowel voor intern als trans-Atlantisch gebruik). Ook 
groepen die de veroverde stukken land bewoonden, werden tot slaaf gemaakt door de 
islamitische krijgsheren onder het mom van hun ongelovigheid. Slavernij was een 
belangrijke institutie die de oorlogseconomie en economische ontwikkeling van deze 
prekoloniale Sahelrijken versterkte. De mobiele krijgsheren konden leven van een 
landbouweconomie gebaseerd op slavenarbeid en vestigden zich op vaste plaatsen. 
Hoewel  ieder van die rijken onder andere omstandigheden ontstond, kenden ze 
een vergelijkbare hiërarchische sociale organisatie. Slaven werden op verschillende 
manieren uitgebuit en waren gespecialiseerd in verschillende vormen van fysieke 
arbeid. In deze samenleving had iedere groep een aparte sociale status: er waren de 
handelaren in slaven en vee, het monopolie op geweld was in handen van de politieke 
elite (krijgsheren) en islamitische geleerden versterkten het morele gezag van de 
vrijen over slaven. Deze sociale indeling van de samenleving was gebaseerd op een 
legaal systeem van afhankelijkheid gelinkt aan stereotypische basisactiviteiten die 
samengingen met verschillen in rechten en plichten, de uitwisseling van bescherming, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
631 De eerste Fulɓe rijken waren die van Futa Djallon (huidig Guinee) en Futa Toro (huidig Senegal) in 
de Westelijke Sahel. Later onstonden Fulɓe rijken richting het zuidoosten: het Sokoto Rijk (huidig 
Nigeria) en Adamawa Rijk (huidig Kameroen en Tsjaad). Zie Map 1 bij ‘Notes on transliteration’. 
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producten, handel en religieuze diensten. Slaven en vrijen hadden verschillende 
rechten: vrije Fulɓe controleerden de beweging en activiteiten van slaven, die minder 
rechten genoten dan hun meesters. In de Islamitische wetgeving hebben vrijen 
exclusieve rechten op verwantschap: slaven konden aanvankelijk geen eigen families 
stichten. Op basis van deze legale verschillen in rechten konden de vrijen 
slavengedrag controleren. Ook ideologisch waren slaven belangrijk om het nobele 
gedrag van vrijen te onderstrepen. Slaven werden geacht zich niet nobel te gedragen: 
ze hoefden niet te bidden, konden uitgebreid dansen en muziek maken en volgens de 
stereotypische ideologieën werden slaven beschouwd als sterk en grof en de vrijen als 
verfijnd en intelligent.  
 Zoals in vele West-Afrikaanse samenlevingen, concretiseerde ook daar de 
slavernij zich in een breed spectrum aan relaties die niet alleen verschilden door de 
juridische status van individuele slaven, maar ook door de sociale afstand tussen 
slaven en meesters. Slavengroepen waren divers zowel wat betreft de positie die ze 
kregen toebedeeld door hun meesters, alsook wat betreft hun verschillende afkomst 
(etnische, linguïstische en religieuze achtergronden). Vaak waren slavenactiviteiten 
afhankelijk van de positie van hun meesters, die dus bepaalden of mannelijke slaven 
wevers, boeren, bedelaars, beenhouwers, handelaars, soldaten, muzikanten of 
dagarbeiders werden. Ook vrouwelijke slaven konden voor verschillende activiteiten 
worden ingezet en functioneerden als concubines, schoonmaaksters, vroedvrouwen, 
marktventsters, huishoudsters, kruidenkenners, kindergenezeressen. Er waren dus vele 
soorten slaven en sommigen hadden niets met elkaar gemeen, ondanks hun gedeelde 
naam en status als ‘slaaf’.  
 Dat Historische slavernij dus ontzettend divers was in de praktijk, blijkt ook uit 
de diverse namen voor soorten slaven in lokale talen zoals het fulfulde van de Fulɓe 
(zie hoofdstuk 1 en glossary). Uit archiefstukken van eind 19e, begin 20e eeuw blijkt 
hoe moeilijk het was voor de Franse koloniale overheid om de diversiteit van slavernij 
in al zijn vormen af te schaffen onder de homogene juridische noemer van ‘Slavernij’. 
De eerste stap in het afschaffen van slavernij, was een totaalverbod op handel in 
slaven in de Franse koloniën vanaf 1889. Pas in 1905 werden alle vormen van 
slavernij illegaal verklaard.632 Het was echter de facto onmogelijk om slavernij af te 
schaffen vermits bij etnische groepen als de Fulɓe  30% tot wel 50% van de economie 
op slavenarbeid gebaseerd was. Na de onafhankelijkheid van 1960 probeerde de 
Malinese overheid nogmaals de ideologie van slavernij te verwerpen. Hoewel de 
slavernij wettelijk werd afgeschaft, bleef ze in de geesten en sociale relaties van de 
volgende generaties verderleven. Slavernij in deze samenlevingen was immers niet 
alleen een juridisch en economisch, maar ook ideologisch systeem met  diepe wortels 
in allerlei sociaal-culturele praktijken.  
In Centraal Mali kregen de meeste slaven pas na de Tweede Wereldoorlog de kans 
om zich onafhankelijker van hun meesters op te stellen. Deze kansen versterkten in de 
periode na de onafhankelijkheid van Mali in 1960, omdat hun meesters toen 
ontzettend veel vee en rijkdom verloren omwille van ingrijpende droogtes. 
Desondanks bleef slavernij een belangrijk idioom voor het uitdrukken en het 
reproduceren van ongelijkheid. Tot op heden is de samenleving sterk hiërarchisch 
georganiseerd en de status van mensen met slavenafkomst blijft ondergeschikt aan die 
van die van mensen met een vrije afkomst. Stigmatisering op basis van overgeërfde of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
632 Het eerste officiële verdrag (het Verdrag van Brussel) dateert van 1889, maar de rigoureuze 
implementatie daarvan in de koloniën kwam pas in 1905.  
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veronderstelde slavenstatus in bovengenoemde Categorische slavernij blijft 
voortbestaan, ondanks de bijna complete afschaffing van Historische slavernij.  
 
De centrale vragen in dit proefschrift zijn of, hoe en waarom hiërarchische 
verhoudingen gebaseerd op het slavernijverleden zo’n centrale rol blijven spelen in de 
Fulɓe samenleving. Deelvragen zijn: Hoe gaan zowel voormalige slaven als meesters 
om met het stigma van slavernij? En op welke manier helpt mobiliteit om afstand te 
nemen van bestaande hiërarchische verhoudingen? Om deze vragen te beantwoorden 
beschrijft het eerste deel van de inleiding de thema’s aan de hand van drie lokale 
woorden in de fulfulde taal: de Weg, het Koord en het Hoofd. Deze woorden of 
uitdrukkingen kwamen regelmatig terug tijdens gesprekken met 
slavenafstammelingen over de trajecten die ze sinds de afschaffing van de slavernij in 
Mali hebben afgelegd. De Weg staat voor het hebben van opties, letterlijk ‘een Weg 
hebben’(heɓude Laawol), het Hoofd staat voor zelfkennis, letterlijk ‘het eigen Hoofd 
kennen’ (anndude Hoore). Het Koord (ɓoggol) staat voor het verbonden zijn in 
hiërarchische relaties op basis van het slavernijverleden. Het zich gebonden voelen 
aan een Koord bestaat nog steeds, maar dan nu in meer symbolische zin. Dit 
proefschrift analyseert de verschillende strategieën (het bereizen van Wegen) van 
slavenafstammelingen. Daarin speelt de relatie tussen voormalige slaven en hun 
voormalige meesters (het Koord) een belangrijke rol. Ten derde besteed ik aandacht 
aan de manier waarop individuen met hun identiteit (het Hoofd) en het stigma van 
slavernij omgaan.  
 In het tweede deel van de inleiding, link ik deze concepten aan bestaande 
debatten over mobiliteit, erfenis van slavernij en moderniteit. De theoretische 
achtergrond van twee analytische termen die als een rode draad doorheen het 
proefschrift lopen, komen hier aan bod: ‘cultureel veld van hiërarchie’ en ‘stijlen’ om 
sociale verandering te analyseren. Comaroff & Comaroff (1991) beschrijven hoe 
sociale verandering in hiërarchische machtsverhoudingen zich beweegt tussen drie 
polen: het culturele veld, ideologie en hegemonie. Een cultureel veld is een onderdeel 
of thema in een samenleving dat geanalyseerd wordt. Omdat ik niet op alle culturele 
velden focus, maar met name op die velden die berusten op het slavernijverleden, 
koos ik ervoor deze ‘het culturele veld van hiërarchie’ te noemen. In mijn conclusies 
zal ik het model van de Comaroff’s weer opnemen om de sociale verandering in het 
‘culturele veld van hiërarchie’ in de Fulɓe samenleving te analyseren. De term ‘stijl’ 
ontleen ik aan Ferguson (1999). Ik koos voor dit begrip omdat het toestaat  sociale 
status noch als ascribed (toegeschreven door de samenleving) noch als achieved 
(bereikt op individueel niveau) te beschrijven. Het stijlbegrip benadrukt een 
performatieve benadering, waarin status net als dansen iets is wat je enkel met zijn 
tweeën kan doen (‘it takes two to tango’). Hoe dit precies in zijn werk gaat, analyseer 
ik in meer detail in hoofdstuk 4. 
 
 
Het proefschrift bestaat uit 2 delen. Het eerste deel omschrijft verschillende aspecten 
van het zogenaamde ‘culturele veld van hiërarchie’ in de thuisbasis van de migranten 
die centraal staan in het tweede deel. Ieder hoofdstuk beschrijft een andere manier 




In hoofdstuk 1 beschrijf ik hoe het stigma van slavenafkomst de toegang tot 
geloofwaardige claims op een heroïsch verleden bemoeilijkt. Geschiedenis wordt 
bekeken als een politiek instrument om hedendaagse machtsverhoudingen en sociale 
statusposities te legitimeren; iedere status groep heeft verschillende interpretaties van 
het verleden in het heden. Uit de analyse blijkt dat geschiedenis moeilijker te 
officialiseren valt voor slavenafstammelingen in vergelijking met vrijgeborenen 
omdat (i) vrijgeboren statusgroepen geschreven documenten over hun geschiedenis 
bezitten; (ii) vrijgeboren statusgroepen belang hebben bij het verzwijgen van de 
geschiedenis van hun slaven om hun eigen positie veilig te stellen en omdat (iii) de 
positie van vrijgeboren statusgroepen vaak werd versterkt door koloniale regimes (en 
koloniale archieven). Ondanks deze hindernissen slagen sommige slavengroepen in 
het creëren van hun eigen, persoonlijke geschiedenissen.  
 
In hoofdstuk 2 blijkt dat zowel de plaats waar mensen wonen als de activiteiten en 
verwachtingen tijdens rituele plechtigheden door dit stigma worden bepaald. Concreet 
analyseer ik de relatie tussen ruimte en hiërarchie in de koninkrijken van Joona, Dalla 
en Booni. Vervolgens vergelijk ik de geografische met de sociale indeling van het 
dorp Dalla. Daarna komen de belangrijkste methodologische aspecten van deze studie 
aan bod. Net als mijn informanten, begaf ik mij als onderzoeker van rurale over 
urbane naar transnationale omgevingen. Daarbij volgde ik het doen en laten van 
individuen binnen één enkel familienetwerk van voormalige meesters (de politieke 
elite of Dicko familie) en hun voormalige huisslaven (de Kau familie). Deze 
relationele methode maakte het mogelijk de strategieën van verschillende individuen, 
zowel van slavenafkomst als van vrijen, om hiërarchieën passief te behouden, actief te 
reproduceren of actief te vermijden, in relatie tot elkaar te beschrijven. Ook een 
rijkere slaaf blijft wonen in de wijken voorbehouden aan slaven. En ook in zijn gedrag 
en ‘stijl’ van sociale interacties blijft die verhouding zichtbaar. De manier waarop 
mensen elkaar groeten is daarvan een mooi voorbeeld.  
In hoofdstuk 3 zien we hoe het stigma leidt tot een verbod voor slavenafstammelingen 
op  huwelijk met vrijen. Verder analyseert dit hoofdstuk de genealogieën van zowel 
de Kau als Dicko familie meer in detail en hieruit blijkt –net als in hoofdstuk 1- hoe 
niets is hoe het aan de oppervlakte lijkt. De Dicko familie blijkt oorspronkelijk ook 
van slavenafkomst, maar claimt vrijgeboren te zijn. De Dicko’s en Kau’s werden 
familie omwille van speciale huwelijken tussen slavenconcubines en een Dicko 
koning. Beide families bleven echter tot verschillende sociale statusgroepen behoren, 
wat ook zeer sterk blijkt uit de verschillen in rituele stijlen van hun 
huwelijksceremonies. Vroeger konden slaven enkel onder het goedkeurend oog en 
zelfs op initiatief van hun meester trouwen. Vandaag de dag blijft het zo dat 
slavenafstammelingen zelden trouwen met afstammelingen van vrijgeborenen. Na de 
historische huwelijken die de Dicko en Kau families hebben verbonden, zijn er nooit 
nieuwe huwelijksrelaties tussen deze groepen geweest. Anderen, vaak economisch 
zeer welvarende slavenafstammelingen, zijn er wel in geslaagd deze sociale grens te 
overschrijden en trouw(d)en met vrouwen van vrijgeboren afkomst. Dit hoofdstuk 
focust dus op familierelaties en toont hoe categorische slavenstatus gereproduceerd 
kan worden dankzij ideologische restricties op inter-statutaire huwelijksrelaties 
(endogamie). Slechts enkele slavenfamilies slaagden erin te integreren in vrijgeboren 
families, de meerderheid blijft daarvan echter uitgesloten. 
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Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft rituele interacties en werkrelaties. Daaruit blijkt dat vele 
afstammelingen van slaven in de Kau familie de stereotypes en het stigma van 
slavernij internaliseerden. De  verwachtingen ten opzichte van hun positie blijven 
zichtbaar in hun lichaamstaal in de  zogenaamde ‘loyale stijl’. Bovendien ‘verdragen’ 
ze ook de patriarchale stijl van hun meesters. Beide stijlen vullen elkaar 
noodzakelijkerwijs aan; een patriarch moet een cliënt aan zich kunnen binden. Deze 
noodzakelijke interactie heb ik ‘stereo-stijlen’ genoemd. Net als stereo klanken, 
komen de loyale en patriarchale stijl pas echt tot hun recht als ze van twee kanten 
komen en dus door twee partijen toegepast worden in relatie tot elkaar. De ene stijl 
kan niet zonder de andere en het specialiseren in stereo-stijlen is de ultiemste vorm 
van behoren tot de Fulɓe samenleving. De patriarchale en loyale stijlen zijn de twee 
extreme ‘stijlen’ in de beide uitersten van het ‘culturele veld van hiërarchie’, 
waarbinnen actoren zich kunnen bewegen. Tot slot beschrijft hoofdstuk 4 de sociale 
sancties tegenover degenen die de stijl die van hen verwacht wordt op basis van hun 
status niet respecteren. Dit toont aan hoe er toch weinig ‘vrije’ keuze is in het kiezen 
voor een bepaalde stijl. 
 
De semi-legale reproductie van het culturele veld van hiërarchie blijkt met name 
mogelijk omwille van het grote belang dat gehecht wordt aan religie in hoofdstuk 5. 
Daarnaast toon ik aan hoe legaal pluralisme tot ambiguïteit in de interpretatie van het 
belang of zelfs bestaan van slavenstatus leidt. Legaal pluralisme is het naast elkaar 
bestaan van islamitische wetgeving met seculiere overheids- en internationale 
wetgeving. Sommige imams willen schriftelijk bewijs van het feit dat een bepaalde 
slavenafstammeling zich vrijkocht alvorens te beslissen over huwelijks- of 
erfenisregelingen. Dit toont aan hoe slavenstatus een legale categorie blijft in de 
dagelijkse praktijk van rechtspraak door een aantal geestelijken in verschillende 
dorpen van de beschreven regio. Oorspronkelijk was vrijkopen een legale vorm van 
sociale promotie in islamitische rechtspraak. Mensen werden daardoor wel ‘bevrijd’, 
maar niet ‘vrij’, want ze konden nog steeds niet dezelfde rechten genieten als 
vrijgeborenen. Islamitische rechtspraak overstemt dus op sommige plaatsen de (inter-) 
nationale wetgeving. Dit werd bevestigd op een bijeenkomst van magistraten in 
Bamako in maart 2011. Zij bespraken hoe ondanks de lange lijst aan zowel binnen- 
als buitenlandse juridische verdragen, er vaak in het nadeel van mensen met 
slaafstatus en in het voordeel van vrijgeborenen besluiten genomen worden. Sterker 
nog, vaak worden zaken van slavenafstammelingen geseponeerd omdat zij onder druk 
van machtige patriarchen hun klacht weer introkken.  
 
Deel II van de etnografische hoofdstukken herneemt dezelfde thema’s van Deel I 
maar dan op verplaatsing bij migranten van het centrale Kau-Dicko familienetwerk. 
Naar analogie met hoofdstuk 1, beschrijft hoofdstuk 6 dus wederom hoe geschiedenis 
een rol speelt, dit keer in de context van mobiliteit en migratie. De manieren waarop 
men beweegt, kunnen sociale status weerspiegelen. In dit hoofdstuk komen zowel 
afhankelijke als onafhankelijke vormen van mobiliteit en de manier waarop deze 
gerelateerd zijn aan sociale status aan bod. De letterlijke (geografische) ‘Wegen’ van 
koninklijke elite families als de Dicko’s en slavenafstammelingen als de Kau’s staan 
centraal, met een focus op hoofdstad Bamako. Het logeren van gasten is een 
belangrijk relationeel principe en uit de analyse blijkt dat het de positie van mensen in 
het culturele veld van hiërarchie versterkt. Slaafafstammelingen en elite families 
ontvangen meestal hun eigen familieleden. Daardoor versterken beide groepen min of 




In hoofdstuk 7 blijkt dat de plaats waar de leden van de Kau en Dicko familie 
wonen wederom het culturele veld van hiërarchie versterkt. De sociale status van een 
persoon in dat veld blijkt ook in Bamako evenredig met de plaats waar men woont. 
Rituele interacties zijn doorspekt met een bevestiging van de sociale orde: gedurende 
doopfeesten neemt iedere groep zijn typische sociale statuspositie in, zowel qua 
activiteiten als in de ruimte. Verder blijkt het inzetten van huishoudsters 
(dienstmeiden) gerelateerd aan sociale status en afkomst. De Dicko familie rekruteert 
huishoudsters met name onder voormalige slavengroepen. Het culturele veld van 
hiërarchie ‘reist’ als het ware mee met de migranten uit het beschreven 
familienetwerk. Dit is waarnaar de titel ‘travelling hierarchies’ van dit proefschrift 
verwijst. De stijlen en samenwerking tussen stereo-partners die in hoofdstuk 4 
besproken werden, worden vaak in Bamako verder gezet.  
 
De verschillende Wegen naar sociale promotie in de urbane context van Bamako 
voor zowel de Kau als de Dicko migranten staan centraal in hoofdstuk 8. Er is een 
scala aan mogelijkheden en opties om met het bestaande culturele veld van hiërarchie 
in de stad om te gaan. In eerste instantie zijn er degene die al in hoofdstuk 7 
beschreven werden: dienstmeiden kunnen migreren naar de stad omdat ze door hun 
voormalige meester-families gerekruteerd worden. Zij buigen dus ‘mee’ met hun 
sociale status, terwijl migrantenvrouwen van slavenafkomst die al in Bamako 
woonden, vaak enkel tijdelijk “terug in” hun slavenstatus bewegen door te 
stereostijlen, bijvoorbeeld tijdens rituele plechtigheden. Andere migranten met 
slavenafkomst bewegen echter expliciet “uit” hun slavenstatus. Deze groep grijpt de 
geografische afstand aan om sociale afstand te nemen van hun status in de 
thuissamenleving. Het offer dat daarvoor gebracht moet worden is echter dat ze alle 
sociale banden verbreken en weinig of nooit terugkeren. Deze strategie van sociale 
mobiliteit heb ik ‘exit mobiliteit’ genoemd. Het is een erg riskante en onzekere 
strategie, die misschien wel tijdelijk maar niet noodzakelijk blijvend tot sociale 
mobiliteit kan leiden. Er is in dit geval namelijk geen sociaal vangnet in tijden van 
crisis.  
Exit mobiliteit is een erg ‘onzichtbare’ vorm van emancipatie. De individuen die 
zich onttrekken aan hun eigen samenleving, worden ook methodologisch 
‘onzichtbaar’ voor studies en onderzoekers. Bovendien zijn er ethische dilemma’s aan 
de orde als de onderzoeker hen wel kan traceren. Hen zichtbaar maken, zou hun 
strategie en trots ondergraven. Een laatste strategie bestaat uit actieve vormen van 
protest tegen het bestaande culturele veld van hiërarchie en stigmatisering van 
slavenstatus. Er zijn echter weinig informanten die op een expliciete manier ‘tegen’ 
hiërarchie en slavenstatus in bewegen.633 Uit dit hoofdstuk concludeer ik dat er een 
brede variëteit bestaat aan strategieën van migranten met slavenafkomst om met 
afstand om te gaan: sommigen bewegen ‘mee’, anderen bewegen tijdelijk ‘terug in’, 
‘uit’ of expliciet ‘tegen’ slavenstatus.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
633 In West-Afrika zijn diegenen die dat wel doen vaak intellectuelen die relaties onderhouden met 
mensenrechtenactivisten. Een voorbeeld is de sinds 2006 opgerichte organisatie TEMEDT in Mali. 
Leden van deze sociale beweging komen met name op voor de rechten en valorisatie van de 
identiteit van voormalige Tuareg slaven (zie Hahonou & Pelckmans 2011 forthcoming). Tot zover 
hebben voormalige Fulɓe slaven in Mali niet zulk een eigen, officiële organisatie. Wel zijn er hier 
en daar individuen als Saajo (epiloog) die proberen tegen algemene opvattingen over het 
slavenstigma in te gaan. 
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Een focus op mobiliteit kan niet zonder in achtname van wat er gebeurd bij 
terugkeer van migranten. Uit hoofdstuk 9 blijkt het dorp zowel tijdens als na migratie 
een belangrijk referentiepunt voor de diaspora. Ondanks het feit dat migranten van 
slavenafkomst veel verdienen tijdens hun ‘avonturen’ in steden of het buitenland, 
blijken ze weinig bewegingsruimte te hebben om hun sociale statuspositie te 
herdefiniëren bij terugkomst. Bovendien is het in het specifieke netwerk van de Dicko 
Kau familie ook nog eens zo dat de Dicko’ s als intellectuelen vaak beter betaalde 
banen hebben dan de Kau’s. Vermits de Dicko’s dankzij hun migratie sociaal nog 
mobieler zijn dan de Kau’s, valt de relatieve sociale mobiliteit van de Kau familie 
bijna in het niets.  
 
Tot slot vertelt de epiloog de niet succesvolle poging van Saajo, een intellectueel 
van slavenafkomst, om zijn familie te overtuigen dat ze het familiefortuin niet mogen 
spenderen aan het vrijkopen van een van zijn nichten. De case van Saajo illustreert 
hoe ondanks het feit dat sommige individuen (Saajo bijvoorbeeld) erin slagen zich aan 
het stigma en de ideologie van slavernij te onttrekken (en dus symbolisch gezien het 
Koord ontbinden en hun Hoofd veranderen), dit niet tot een collectieve verandering in 
sociale relaties leidt. In tegenstelling tot Saajo, blijven Saajo’s familieleden zich wel 
gebonden voelen aan het Koord en kiezen zij ervoor door te gaan met handelen 
binnen de normen van het culturele veld van hiërarchie. Zij zijn nooit uit hun dorp 
weggetrokken en hebben niet gestudeerd in Libië. Zij bleven dus veel meer dan Saajo 
opereren in een cultureel referentiekader, gebaseerd op bestaande tradities en normen. 
In de conclusies worden de verbindingen tussen relaties, mobiliteit en macht als 
hegemonie en ideologie geanalyseerd en in relatie tot het Koord, de Weg en het Hoofd 
besproken. 
Conclusies  
Het uitgangspunt van deze studie is dat sociale verandering in machtsverhoudingen 
samenhangt met mobiliteit en met relaties. Het vernieuwende daaraan is dat de 
dilemma’s en strategieën van mensen met slavenstatus in hun mobiele en relationele 
context wordt meegenomen in de analyse. Uit meerdere studies naar strategieën en 
posities van voormalige slaven in Fulɓe samenlevingen in West Afrika blijkt impliciet 
dat er een link is tussen mobiliteit en sociale mobiliteit. Maar er zijn nauwelijks 
studies die mobiliteit an sich als een actieve strategie de aandacht gaven die het mijns 
inziens wel verdient. De belangrijkste bijdrage van deze studie aan post-
slavernijstudies is daarom een methodologische: mobiliteit als ‘meetlat’ waarlangs 
veranderingen en continuïteiten in het culturele veld van hiërarchie gemeten worden.  
 Uit deze mobiele benadering blijkt dat geografische afstand niet noodzakelijk de 
sociale afstand ten opzichte van het slavenstigma vergroot. Mobiliteit leidt niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs tot sociale promotie van slavenafstammelingen volgens een 
unilineair proces van A naar B(-eter). In tegenstelling: in het netwerk dat bestudeerd 
word, blijkt het stigma van slavenstatus en het culturele veld van hiërarchie ‘mee te 
reizen’ met de migranten. Ondanks het feit dat geografische afstand de mogelijkheid 
biedt aan voormalige slaven om zich van hun slavenstatus te distantiëren, blijven de 
mogelijkheden om te migreren, trouwen, leidinggevende te worden van de meeste 
Kau slavenafstammelingen verbonden aan die van hun voormalige Dicko meesters 
(stereopartners). Vandaar ook de titel van dit proefschrift: hiërarchieën zijn niet lokaal 
gebonden en reizen mee in sociale relaties (‘travelling hierarchies’) van actoren die er 
soms wel en dan weer niet bewust iets mee doen (“moving in or out of slave status’). 
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Het feit dat deze relaties samen met de actoren mobiel zijn is de erfenis van het 
slavernijverleden. Het zijn ‘reizende hiërarchieën’.  
 Het argument is dat omwille van ‘moderne’ assumpties die mobiliteit gelijk 
stellen aan unilineaire verandering in termen van vooruitgang dat tijdelijke, niet 
evidente en subtielere vormen van verandering in het culturele veld van hiërarchie 
over het hoofd gezien worden in mobiele contexten. De relaties in het bestudeerde 
netwerk tonen aan dat de dominantie van een groep over de ander juist sterker kan 
worden in de migratiecontext. Ook wordt immers macht uitgeoefend op een impliciete 
manier. Deze impliciete vormen van macht komen overeen met wat Comaroff & 
Comaroff (1991) hegemonie genoemd hebben. Moderne assumpties over de één op 
één- relatie tussen status, emancipatie en mobiliteit maken ons blind voor de kracht 
van hegemonie in het culturele veld van hiërarchie, dat in zichzelf mobiel kan zijn.  
Naast deze reizende, geografische mobiliteit, blijkt ook sociale mobiliteit van beide 
families inter-afhankelijk. Het korte antwoord op de vraag wat veranderd is in de 
relaties tussen voormalige slaven en meester-families sinds de formele afschaffing 
van de slavernij in 1905 is: vanalles. Sociale verandering waaierde uit in verschillende 
richtingen, maar voor het beschreven familienetwerk blijkt echter het meereizen en 
meebewegen van hiërarchieën het meest voorkomend. Er veranderde dus vanalles, 
maar niet noodzakelijk ‘veel’. 
 
Een tweede vernieuwend aspect van deze studie is de ‘relationele benadering’ van 
slavenstatus en sociale mobiliteit in postslavernij samenlevingen in de Sahel. De 
meeste studies naar slavernij in de koloniale periode werden beïnvloed door visies en 
interviews met invloedrijke, vrije machthebbers van de samenleving: het 
vogelperspectief van de machthebbers. In (neo-)Marxistische studies van de jaren ‘70 
en ‘80 was er een focus op de visie van slaven en hun afstammelingen: het 
kikkerperspectief van de gemarginaliseerden. Deze studie was een poging om de 
gulden middenweg te bewandelen. Het argument is dat veranderingen in sociale status 
enkel genuanceerd geanalyseerd kunnen worden als beide groepen (zowel 
vrijgeborenen als slavenafstammelingen) in beeld gebracht worden en de trajecten van 
die groepen, die intensieve contacten met elkaar onderhouden, parallel aan elkaar 
gemonteerd en geanalyseerd worden. Het beschrijven van de sociale mobiliteit van 
een bepaalde voormalige slavengroep lijkt immers zinloos, indien deze niet in relatie 
tot de groep waaraan ze zich meten wordt geanalyseerd. Voor de Kau familie is de 
enige geslaagde vorm van emancipatie de plaats van hun voormalige Dicko meesters 
in te kunnen nemen en dus toegang te krijgen tot de politiek.  
Een aantal studies wijzen uit dat afstammelingen van slaven eerder ervaring 
opdeden met arbeidsmigratie. In het beschreven familienetwerk migreerden zowel de 
Dicko familie als de Kau slavenafstammelingen. Deze simultane migratie verklaart 
waarom de Kau familie minder opties had voor sociale promotie. Met name bij 
terugkeer (hoofdstuk 9) blijkt de politieke promotie van de Kau familie overschaduwd 
te worden door die van de Dicko familie. Bovendien geeft deze relationele benadering 
een genuanceerder beeld van het ‘waarom’ van de reproductie van sociale hiërarchie 
tussen beide groepen. Ieder heeft een eigen stijl geïnternaliseerd en velen doen op hun 
manier voordeel met de bestaande verhoudingen. Dienstmeiden van slavenafkomst 
ervaren het feit dat nobele families hen rekruteren absoluut niet als een vorm van 
moderne slavernij maar eerder als een buitenkans om in de stad te kunnen verblijven. 
De methodologische focus op een enkel netwerk is uitzonderlijk en werkt 
bovendien verhelderend. In andere post-slavernijstudies worden de strategieën van 
verschillende groepen voormalige slaven met elkaar worden vergeleken, terwijl al 
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deze groepen reeds in het verleden een totaal andere positie ten opzichte van elkaar 
innamen. De focus op een enkel netwerk maakt het dus mogelijk om kwalitatieve 
diepgang te bereiken in de studie naar strategieën van een specifieke groep slaven, nl. 
de Kau familie, voormalige slaven van de politieke elite. Zowel de relationele als 
mobiele benadering zijn goede invalshoeken om teleologische visies op sociale 
verandering tegen te gaan. Emancipatie is dus geen proces dat plaatsvindt op een 
stijgende lijn: het is eerder een tijdelijke, relationele, bewegende staccato van de 
verschillende trajecten in het culturele veld van hiërarchie. Uit de analyse in 
hoofdstuk 8 kwamen een vijftal ‘bewegingen’ of ‘wegen’ in het culturele veld van 
hiërarchie naar voren: zich aan de hand van bestaande sociale status voortbewegen (to 
move on), terug in sociale status bewegen (to move back in), zich tegen sociale status 
verzetten (to move against), zich van zijn sociale status weg bewegen (to move out), 
of een combinatie van het zich weg bewegen door zich stil in een andere statusgroep 
te integreren (shortcuts). 
In de conclusie wijd ik verder uit over deze ‘shortcuts’ die ik zie als een stille 
sociale verandering in het culturele veld van hiërarchie. In de introductie werd 
voorgesteld om sociale verandering te beschrijven aan de hand van het machtsmodel 
van de Comaroff’s (1991). Een cultureel veld, in dit geval het cultureel veld van 
hiërarchie, is onderhevig aan verandering als van hegemonie naar ideologie bewogen 
kan worden. Dit triadische machtsmodel legt ook uit waarom zo weinig 
slavenafstammelingen ‘tegen’ het stigma van slavenstatus in bewegen. De case van 
Saajo (die dat wel deed) toont immers hoe wie tegen bestaande normen en velden van 
culturele hiërarchie in beweegt, nogal wat tegenstand en onbegrip kan verwachten van 
wie niet dezelfde wereldvisie deelt.  
Het gebrek aan protest lijkt logischer als men bedenkt dat het overheersende 
culturele veld van hiërarchie hegemonisch blijft. Het is moeilijk om tegen de stroom 
in te roeien. Het feit dat we aan de oppervlakte geen mensen tegen de stroom in zien 
of horen roeien, betekent echter niet dat ze er niet zijn. Er zijn sterke 
onderwaterzwemmers die wel verandering in hun positie aanbrengen. Maar zij doen 
dat onder water: stil en onzichtbaar. Het is dus niet noodzakelijk zo dat het proces 
waarbij hegemonie bewust aanvaard en herkend wordt, niet aanvechtbaar is. 
Integendeel, de strijd die geleverd wordt om van hegemonie naar ideologie te 
bewegen, vindt wel plaats maar zo stil mogelijk. Sociale verandering kan zich aan het 
oog onttrekken. Het gevecht is niet zichtbaar in luide vormen van (georganiseerd) 
politiek protest.  
De specifieke tak van de Dicko familie die centraal stond in deze studie, is een 
goed voorbeeld van hoe de beweging van hegemonie naar ideologie zich in bijna 
volledige stilte voltrokken heeft. Deze Dicko’s hebben gedeelde roots met zowel 
slaven- als nobele families. Het is dankzij speciale Islamitische 
huwelijksarrangementen dat zij hun slavenstatus hebben kunnen overwinnen. Dit 
deden zij echter niet door het bestaande stigma en stereostijlen te bekritiseren, maar 
eerder door zich langzaam maar zeker te bekwamen in de patriarchale stijl. Zij konden 
dit doen omwille van het specifieke tijdsgewricht waarin de besproken generaties zich 
bevonden. Enerzijds profiteerden zij van het wettelijke statuut als kinderen van 
concubine huwelijken in Islamitische ideologie. Anderzijds genoten zij het privilege 
van scholing dankzij de koloniale interventie waarbij kinderen met slavenafkomst 
naar school gestuurd werden. Tot slot leverde de postkoloniale context ideologieën 
waarin gelijkwaardigheid officieel en wettelijk gepromoot wordt. Deze familie wist 
zich van hun slaafstatus te ontdoen op een niet-confronterende manier: zij hebben de 
bestaande sociale grenzen overschreden in plaats van ze aan te vechten. Zij hebben 
331 
 
het culturele veld van hiërarchie voortgezet en zelf gereproduceerd omdat ze de 
mogelijkheden hadden om van hegemonie naar ideologie te bewegen en weer terug. 
Zij hebben hun eigen beweging van hegemonie naar ideologie omgedraaid en de 
verandering in hun sociale status aangegrepen om de bestaande hegemonie te 
bevestigen. Er zijn dus actieve bewegingen van ideologie naar hegemonie die niet aan 
bod komen in het machtsmodel van de Comaroffs (1991). Naast de aandacht voor 
‘stille manieren’ waarop mensen van hegemonie naar ideologie bewegen, heb ik 
‘omkeringen’ in sociale verandering gesignaleerd: ideologie kan actief monddood 
gehouden worden door actoren die meer baat hebben bij het behouden van het 
hegemonische aspect van de culturele velden van hiërarchie.  Met andere woorden: 
ondanks het feit dat er inderdaad mensen zijn die onder water en tegen de stroom in 
vechten, blijken de meeste zwemmers die stroomopwaarts gaan, uiteindelijk toch 
weer mee te buigen met de rivierstroom. Zij die hun sociale status weten te 
veranderen, kiezen ervoor om de status quo van de sociale verdeling in verschillende 
statusgroepen te behouden. Deze ‘omkeringen’ zijn dus een vorm van sociale 
verandering die baat heeft bij zijn eigen onzichtbaarheid en bij reproductie van 
bestaande verhoudingen op een hegemonische manier.  
Het is dus belangrijk om het machtsmodel gebaseerd op de triadische relatie tussen 
het culturele veld van hiërarchie, ideologie en hegemonie te verfijnen. Er zijn stille en 
omkeerbare processen van sociale verandering (van hegemonie tot ideologie en weer 
terug). Om deze omkering analytisch hanteerbaar en zichtbaar te maken, 
introduceerde ik het concept van ‘shortcut’ of sluipweg. ‘Shortcuts’ zijn niet alleen de 
stille reconfiguraties van hegemonie in ideologie, maar ook het omgekeerde proces; 
stille reconfiguraties van ideologie terug in hegemonie. ‘Shortcuts’ kunnen 
gekarakteriseerd worden door een bewust, actief belang in vergetelheid, eerder dan in 
luidruchtige claims voor sociale verandering. De ‘shortcut’ is dus een impliciete vorm 
van sociale verandering die in stilte plaatsvindt door weigeringen, passiefheid en 
omkeringen, eerder dan actief uitgesproken protest, legale claims of politieke 
proclamatie. Het concept van de shortcut verwijst naar het stille, subtiele en op het 
eerste zicht passieve protest tegen het stigma van slavenstatus.  
Een van de centrale vragen in deze studie was hoe mobiliteit een rol speelt in dit 
soort sociale veranderingen. Het antwoord is dat de meeste ‘shortcuts’ in post-
slavernij samenlevingen beschikbaar werden voor mensen dankzij hun mobiliteit. Het 
is dankzij mobiliteit dat de Dicko tak van het beschreven netwerk toegang kreeg tot 
educatie en een shortcut kon creëren in het culturele veld van hiërarchie op een 
hegemonische manier. Het zich toe-eigenen van heroïsche verleden van de Dicko 
familie (hoofdstuk 1), het reproduceren van geografische en sociale plaatsen 
(hoofdstuk 2 & 7) en de specialisatie van de Dicko’s in de patriarchale stijl, maakt 
hun eigen geschiedenis en habitus met de loyale stijl monddood. (hoofdstuk 4 & 8). 
Uit hoofdstuk 5 blijkt dat de manipulatie van legale procedures door de Dicko’s 
sociale grenzen hercreëert. Hoofdstuk 6 toont aan hoe mobiliteit een centrale bron is 
die ze controleren. Tot slot analyseerden Hoofdstuk 1 & 9 hoe decentralisatiepolitiek 
een belangrijke rol speelde in het creëren van potentiële ruimte voor sociale 
onderhandeling en nieuwe shortcuts.  
 
 Tot slot analyseer ik in de conclusies of Wegen (mobiliteit als sociale 
verandering) de Koorden (veranderingen in relaties en representaties) en Hoofden 
(identiteit en stijlveranderingen) hebben veranderd. Ik concludeer dat Wegen zowel 
heen als terug bereisd worden, of vermeden worden via ‘shortcuts’ die niet voor 
iedereen beschikbaar zijn. Het begrip ‘Koord’ staat voor de relationele benadering, die 
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aantoonde dat hiërarchieën reizen en dat de aanwezigheid van het Koord op 
verplaatsing vaak onderschat wordt. Tot slot symboliseert het begrip het ‘Hoofd’ hoe 
identiteit gelinkt is aan een verleden van slavernij. Mensen (afhankelijk van tijd, 
plaats en omstandigheden) kunnen bewegen van loyale naar patriarchale stijlen, maar 
ook weer terug. De referentie naar mobiliteit van status in de titel van dit proefschrift 
(‘moving in and out of’) onderstreept de plaatsgebonden en tijdelijkheid van deze 
stijlen en identiteiten: mensen adopteren een bepaalde stijl op bepaalde momenten en 
in bepaalde ruimtes. De adoptie van een stijl verbindt mensen met elkaar in sociale 
relaties, die op hun beurt de toegang tot instituties als politiek, nationale administratie, 
school, rechtbank, monetaire economie en migratie bepalen.  
Het idee dat mensen ‘Wegen’ hebben, in de zin van opties om culturele velden 
wezenlijk te veranderen, blijkt vaak een illusie. De toegang tot en de richting van 
Wegen blijkt maar al te vaak ingebed in reeds bestaande instituties (zoals scholen, 
politiek, wetten) en ruimtelijke netwerken van mensen (zoals gastheren en 
stereopartners) die je niet zomaar kan veranderen. Het slavernijverleden blijft zich dus 
manifesteren in bestaande machtsverhoudingen, ook als deze mobiel worden. Het 
culturele veld van hiërarchie reist mee met de mobiele actoren die verbonden blijven 
met het onzichtbare Koord. Weinigen knippen het Koord volledig door. Niet terug 
kunnen vallen op bestaande relaties is immers een riskante onderneming in dit soort 
samenlevingen waarin ‘onzekerheid’ wat betreft overlevingskansen groot is.634 
Sociale veranderingen manifesteren zich meestal in het ‘stille omzeilen’ (exit 
mobility) van status en een enkele keer in het ‘omkeren’ van de oorspronkelijke status 
(shortcuts). Hiërarchieën reizen dus op verschillende manieren mee met de mobiele 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
634  Deze onzekerheid in de droge Sahel is het centrale thema in de studie ‘Arid ways’ van Mirjam de 
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